But all that is then presented is a critique of one possible defensive line. How does that "explore that question" how the "the Allies ... successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941"?jwsleser wrote: A question that has floated around in other discussions is whether the Allies (Greece and the UK) could craft a defense that could successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941. My intent for starting this thread is to explore that question.
I have a 50+ page file that are the (British) notes of a series of staff talks (about 20 meetings in total) held during second half of January and the first half of February between the appropriate staff officer from the Greek General staff and their opposite number in the British Military Mission. The file also includes the 'terms of reference' for the discussions as drawn up by General Papagos. The staff talks were to be a "tactical study" and an analysis of the "steps to be taken at once" for an Anglo-Greek defence of Greece against a German (and Bulgarian) attack.jwsleser wrote: Due to the lack of primary sources...
In brief, the discussions considered the defence of Western Thrace east of the Nestos; three defensive lines east of the Vardar (Struma, intermediate and Metaxas); the Vardar valley approach from Yugoslavia; and, four lines west of the Vardar. The Olympus-Vermion (and onwards) being the most easterly of the four.
Towards the end of these talks, on 8 February, the Greeks decided that their defensive posture/line was to be determined by the position of the Yugoslavs. From all of the lines under consideration, three were selected as the 'best' lines - where each became 'the best' line which would be adopted according to the Yugoslav position.
Thus, according to the Greek General Staff study, 'the best' line on 8 February was the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line given that Yugoslavia stance at that time was to remain neutral. Despite this, General Papagos kept his troops east of the Vardar on the Metaxes Line.
The understanding of a 'best line' is a moving target not necessarily predicated on purely military capabilities, force levels etc. etc.
For the Anglo-Greek meeting held on 22 February the Yugoslav stance had not changed and thus the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line still remained the 'best line' according to the Greek General Staff study and Greek military advice. No doubt this is why General Papagos proposed at the meeting that it be the line they stand upon. Whether the British considered it to be the 'best line' is not discernable. Nevertheless, they agreed to General Papagos' proposal and continued their discussions upon that basis. Despite this, General Papagos kept his troops east of the Vardar on the Metaxes Line.
The Yugoslav position had still not changed come the 2-4 March round of Anglo-Greek discussions. The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line still remained the 'best line' according to the Greek General Staff study and Greek military advice. [Who made the greatest error in understanding what was previously agreed etc has been discussed elsewhere and needs no further regurgitation here]. However, General Papagos now held the position that it was now impossible to extract his forces from the Metaxes Line.
In other words, any discussion about what was the 'best line' was now redundant: General Papagos had contrived to 'fix' his troops to the Metaxes Line regardless of all context and threat. What stance Yugoslavia took was now irrelevant. The number of Allied battalions available was now irrelevant. The topography and any defensive preparation already completed was now irrelevant. What approach route(s) the Germans planned to take into Greece were now irrelevant.
The 'best line' for the defence of Greece was not chosen based upon an analysis of the military capabilities of the Allies. According to General Papagos and the Greek General Staff at the time, the 'best line' was determined primarily by the stance of Yugoslavia.
Post war narratives propose that even Yugoslavia's actual stance was not the determiner either. In otherwords, the Greek General Staff study and advice of 8 February was not adopted because it had been decided that the 'best line' was determined by the one which would best encourage the Yugoslavs to adopt the stance that they, the Greeks, desired. In otherwords, the Greeks decided the 'best line' was one that would 'pull' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause. A line east of the Vardar. The 'diplomatic message' being sent being that we, the Greeks, are taking a major risk to our own security standing east of the Vardar but we are doing it for you, the Yugoslavs, because we know that Salonika is so important to you - please come and join us and help out. The 'best line' was a entirely construct of attempting diplomatic leverage.
The alternative 'best line' according to this diplomatic leverage was a line west of the Vardar. A line chosen to 'push' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause. The alternate 'diplomatic message' being along the lines of we, the Greeks, are looking after our own national interest and have decided that we do not have the forces to defend Salonika and points further east - if you, the Yugoslavs, want us to reconsider this and help you retain access to Salonika you need to join us and help out.
Post war narratives argue that the decision by the Greeks as to what was 'the best line' flowed from diplomatic manouvering not military capability. That may or may not be true. Some have argued 'the best line' flowed from Greek (military) pride. Nevertheless,I would suggest that is why lines based upon military capability have not been at the forefront of historical study - they are essentially irrelevant to the historical events and decision-making. The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line is taken de facto as the 'best line' based upon the Greek Military Staff study - again for more political than military reasons since it seems to have been based around what political stance the Yugoslavs took rather than a credible understanding of what the Yugoslavs offered militarily.
As late as 3 April, General Papagos is still asking - this time directly to General Jankovic - whether the Yugoslavs are defending all their frontier and how many troops they have defending the very south east. Standing on the Metaxes Line had not 'pulled' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause in the manner required by General Papagos to have an chance of successfully defending Greece. Perhaps not 'the best line' after all!