Defense of Greece 1941

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MarkN
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Re: Defense of Greece 1941

#16

Post by MarkN » 30 Sep 2017, 13:25

jwsleser wrote: A question that has floated around in other discussions is whether the Allies (Greece and the UK) could craft a defense that could successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941. My intent for starting this thread is to explore that question.
But all that is then presented is a critique of one possible defensive line. How does that "explore that question" how the "the Allies ... successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941"?
jwsleser wrote: Due to the lack of primary sources...
I have a 50+ page file that are the (British) notes of a series of staff talks (about 20 meetings in total) held during second half of January and the first half of February between the appropriate staff officer from the Greek General staff and their opposite number in the British Military Mission. The file also includes the 'terms of reference' for the discussions as drawn up by General Papagos. The staff talks were to be a "tactical study" and an analysis of the "steps to be taken at once" for an Anglo-Greek defence of Greece against a German (and Bulgarian) attack.

In brief, the discussions considered the defence of Western Thrace east of the Nestos; three defensive lines east of the Vardar (Struma, intermediate and Metaxas); the Vardar valley approach from Yugoslavia; and, four lines west of the Vardar. The Olympus-Vermion (and onwards) being the most easterly of the four.

Towards the end of these talks, on 8 February, the Greeks decided that their defensive posture/line was to be determined by the position of the Yugoslavs. From all of the lines under consideration, three were selected as the 'best' lines - where each became 'the best' line which would be adopted according to the Yugoslav position.

Thus, according to the Greek General Staff study, 'the best' line on 8 February was the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line given that Yugoslavia stance at that time was to remain neutral. Despite this, General Papagos kept his troops east of the Vardar on the Metaxes Line.

The understanding of a 'best line' is a moving target not necessarily predicated on purely military capabilities, force levels etc. etc.

For the Anglo-Greek meeting held on 22 February the Yugoslav stance had not changed and thus the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line still remained the 'best line' according to the Greek General Staff study and Greek military advice. No doubt this is why General Papagos proposed at the meeting that it be the line they stand upon. Whether the British considered it to be the 'best line' is not discernable. Nevertheless, they agreed to General Papagos' proposal and continued their discussions upon that basis. Despite this, General Papagos kept his troops east of the Vardar on the Metaxes Line.

The Yugoslav position had still not changed come the 2-4 March round of Anglo-Greek discussions. The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line still remained the 'best line' according to the Greek General Staff study and Greek military advice. [Who made the greatest error in understanding what was previously agreed etc has been discussed elsewhere and needs no further regurgitation here]. However, General Papagos now held the position that it was now impossible to extract his forces from the Metaxes Line.

In other words, any discussion about what was the 'best line' was now redundant: General Papagos had contrived to 'fix' his troops to the Metaxes Line regardless of all context and threat. What stance Yugoslavia took was now irrelevant. The number of Allied battalions available was now irrelevant. The topography and any defensive preparation already completed was now irrelevant. What approach route(s) the Germans planned to take into Greece were now irrelevant.

The 'best line' for the defence of Greece was not chosen based upon an analysis of the military capabilities of the Allies. According to General Papagos and the Greek General Staff at the time, the 'best line' was determined primarily by the stance of Yugoslavia.

Post war narratives propose that even Yugoslavia's actual stance was not the determiner either. In otherwords, the Greek General Staff study and advice of 8 February was not adopted because it had been decided that the 'best line' was determined by the one which would best encourage the Yugoslavs to adopt the stance that they, the Greeks, desired. In otherwords, the Greeks decided the 'best line' was one that would 'pull' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause. A line east of the Vardar. The 'diplomatic message' being sent being that we, the Greeks, are taking a major risk to our own security standing east of the Vardar but we are doing it for you, the Yugoslavs, because we know that Salonika is so important to you - please come and join us and help out. The 'best line' was a entirely construct of attempting diplomatic leverage.

The alternative 'best line' according to this diplomatic leverage was a line west of the Vardar. A line chosen to 'push' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause. The alternate 'diplomatic message' being along the lines of we, the Greeks, are looking after our own national interest and have decided that we do not have the forces to defend Salonika and points further east - if you, the Yugoslavs, want us to reconsider this and help you retain access to Salonika you need to join us and help out.

Post war narratives argue that the decision by the Greeks as to what was 'the best line' flowed from diplomatic manouvering not military capability. That may or may not be true. Some have argued 'the best line' flowed from Greek (military) pride. Nevertheless,I would suggest that is why lines based upon military capability have not been at the forefront of historical study - they are essentially irrelevant to the historical events and decision-making. The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line is taken de facto as the 'best line' based upon the Greek Military Staff study - again for more political than military reasons since it seems to have been based around what political stance the Yugoslavs took rather than a credible understanding of what the Yugoslavs offered militarily.

As late as 3 April, General Papagos is still asking - this time directly to General Jankovic - whether the Yugoslavs are defending all their frontier and how many troops they have defending the very south east. Standing on the Metaxes Line had not 'pulled' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause in the manner required by General Papagos to have an chance of successfully defending Greece. Perhaps not 'the best line' after all!

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Re: Defense of Greece 1941

#17

Post by jwsleser » 30 Sep 2017, 21:47

Thank you for one of your better posts.
I have a 50+ page file that are the (British) notes of a series of staff talks (about 20 meetings in total) held during second half of January and the first half of February between the appropriate staff officer from the Greek General staff and their opposite number in the British Military Mission. The file also includes the 'terms of reference' for the discussions as drawn up by General Papagos. The staff talks were to be a "tactical study" and an analysis of the "steps to be taken at once" for an Anglo-Greek defence of Greece against a German (and Bulgarian) attack.
Are you willing to share this file? I can PM my e-mail address.
Towards the end of these talks, on 8 February, the Greeks decided that their defensive posture/line was to be determined by the position of the Yugoslavs. From all of the lines under consideration, three were selected as the 'best' lines - where each became 'the best' line which would be adopted according to the Yugoslav position.
Spot-on. The operational decision was to be based on the strategic situation. Depending upon which strategy (allied, strict neutrality, or neutrality that favored Germany) the Yugoslavs adopted would determine which line should be used. Note that this decision doesn't inform us of the best operational plan to successfully defend Greece; it merely deals with the reality on the ground (the Yugoslav position and the available allied forces).

Also note that until the Yugoslavs firmly committed to a strategy, the country was 'still in play' in terms of strategic options. Everything the Greeks attempted to do was to change the strategic situation to their favor (Yugoslavia as an ally).
Thus, according to the Greek General Staff study, 'the best' line on 8 February was the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line given that Yugoslavia stance at that time was to remain neutral. Despite this, General Papagos kept his troops east of the Vardar on the Metaxes Line.
Because the strategic situation was still unresolved. The 'given' in your statement above wasn't final. Such a defense, while likely the best under the Yugoslav's strict neutrality posture, wasn't a war winner for Greece. That is why Papagos pressed for approaching Yugoslavia after 23 February. Yugoslavia was undecided until the middle of March, and even then the government wasn't happy about signing the Axis treaty. So much unhappy that the government was overthrown two days later.
The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line is taken de facto as the 'best line' based upon the Greek Military Staff study - again for more political than military reasons since it seems to have been based around what political stance the Yugoslavs took rather than a credible understanding of what the Yugoslavs offered militarily.
Actually not true. This line also depended on the Yugoslav's military capability to defend its strict neutrality. The only differences at the operational level was the lack of any requirement to defend Thessaloniki due to Yugoslav neutrality. It still required effective Yugoslav defense of their territory. Given your argument about the actual Yugoslav military capability, this is not the best line to defend. Or are you incorrect in your assessment of Yugoslav military capability and that everyone knew how poor it was?
The alternative 'best line' according to this diplomatic leverage was a line west of the Vardar. A line chosen to 'push' the Yugoslavs into the Allied cause. The alternate 'diplomatic message' being along the lines of we, the Greeks, are looking after our own national interest and have decided that we do not have the forces to defend Salonika and points further east - if you, the Yugoslavs, want us to reconsider this and help you retain access to Salonika you need to join us and help out.
So what? The Greeks decided their choice of diplomacy. I don't agree with you, but nothing to discuss here. The Yugoslavs entered the war with the Greek decision to defend the Metaxas Line. We will never know if they would have done so if the Greeks had pulled back.
Post war narratives argue that the decision by the Greeks as to what was 'the best line' flowed from diplomatic manouvering not military capability. That may or may not be true. Some have argued 'the best line' flowed from Greek (military) pride. Nevertheless,I would suggest that is why lines based upon military capability have not been at the forefront of historical study - they are essentially irrelevant to the historical events and decision-making. The Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line is taken de facto as the 'best line' based upon the Greek Military Staff study - again for more political than military reasons since it seems to have been based around what political stance the Yugoslavs took rather than a credible understanding of what the Yugoslavs offered militarily.
How does one go from demonstrating that the decision was purely political to saying the Greeks had "de facto" determined that the Kaimaktsalan-Vermion-Olympus Line was the best? It was seen as the best at that point time with the assumption that the Yugoslav position was accurate and unchanging.

And how is best defined? Given given the current reality (Greece will be defeated) is best merely lasting longer? If the strategic situation can be changed, then it might not be 'the best'.

It is clear to me that you are having difficulty in examining Papagos's actions in terms of his dual role as the military leader of his country -a strategist that must consider all aspects of national power, as separate from his role as an operational commander. He wore both hats.

It is perfectly normal to first discuss the current operational situation using a set of assumptions to frame the challenges, followed by discussions of operational and strategic options/actions that can change those assumptions. That is exactly what you see at Tatoi in Feb-Mar. You see conflict where I see a clear military process. The Anglo-Greek talks had to address both levels of war as the operational-level problem was unsolvable unless the strategic situation was changed. Papagos could make strategic decisions, Wavell could not but Eden could.
Some have argued 'the best line' flowed from Greek (military) pride.
All the recent scholarship has argued that Papagos was right. Are you referring to all those biased English accounts you complained about in the other thread?
rather than a credible understanding of what the Yugoslavs offered militarily.
It didn't matter what anyone thought of the Yugoslav military; it was the only option that could change the outcome. Greece was going to be invaded. The UK couldn't/didn't offer the level of military assistance needed for success. Until the Yugoslav military was tried in combat, it was an unknown. Certain defeat was the other option. You have made the case in the other threads that the UK knew Greece couldn't be saved. All the scholarship has made it clear that the top operational priority for the UK forces was not to be trapped. It is also pretty clear the Greeks knew the latter was the UK top priority. Papagos trying to address the strategic problem makes far more sense that just agreeing to defend a line that can't be defended. As you stated above:
Whether the British considered it to be the 'best line' is not discernable.
Because it didn't matter to the UK. The UK was aiding Greece for political reasons. Winning wasn't the purpose for the UK. Winning was the purpose for the Greeks. All the writers (Greek and English) agree that the two countries had very different endstates during the campaign which was the source for th eissues that cropped up. Yet in your eyes Papagos is wrong for trying to effectively defend his country by winning.

You have yet to demonstrate there was a better option. All your posts in all the threads argue that there wasn't a better option.

Papagos made a strategic decision that created risk at the operational level. That is decision-making in war. Nothing was to be gained for Greece by opting to make the decision solely based on the current operational level situation.
Jeff Leser

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Re: Defense of Greece 1941

#18

Post by jwsleser » 30 Sep 2017, 22:54

As this thread is active again, I guess I should come back to one of Mark's comment from an earlier post.
I suggest jwleser completely misunderstood what is written, or cherrypicked thinking nobody would notice.
I suggest that Mark learn to read.

From my post...
In all the discussions of how to defend Greece in 1941, one COA is usually overlooked - Defending the Beles-Metaxas Line. The post war English language accounts all provide reasons why the line shouldn’t be held, but never offer a serious examination of any advantages to defending the line. Some authors have noted that the most effective defensive fights during the campaign were executed by the under strength Greek units manning the line. Could holding the Beles-Metaxas Line be a viable option?

At least some experts believe so. In their postwar history for the US Army, The German Campaigns In the Balkans (Spring 1941), the authors (two German generals and a civilian historian) stated:

“The British fully realized the vulnerability of the Greek border defense system; it was bound to collapse in the event of a German thrust between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers. However, they let the Greeks have their way without taking the logical step of moving their forces up to the frontier into the sector west of the Metaxas Line.” (page 77, my italics).

Note the logical step mentioned here (west of the Metaxas Line) was occupying the vulnerable area between the Strimon and Vardar Rivers with the UK/CW forces.
Note that the Germans don't state that any of the lines could have been held, they are merely doing what Germans did well: looking at the operational and ignoring the strategic (the same limitation Mark has). There is absolutely no discussion of the impact of Yugoslavia in the Greek planning (the political dimension). The German statement also ignores the issue of Salonika outlined in that very same paragraph (main supply port, supports Albania forces, inability to voluntarily withdraw). The point to be understood in my post was that once the Greek had decided to defend the Metaxas Line, the logic action was to move the UK forces forward to precisely the place where the line was most vulnerable.

Of course, we know that given the UK endstate, moving forward wasn't in the cards.

So the German comments were based on the same unchanging operational situation while ignoring the strategic implications. How so German.

Please reread my final statement in that post.
Does this prevent the Germans from penetrating the Allied defense? No, because the strategic situation has remained unchanged. What it does is places the bulk of the Greek forces into a defense they are best suited for, places the UK/CW forces on the armored LOAs, and allows the Allies to exploit the mobility of the CW units. In all, it likely provides a better defense.
I didn't state successful. Once any of the Allied lines were penetrated, the Allied defense of Greece collapses. The Greek units lack mobility to successfully withdraw under pressure and the UK forces are too small to defend Greece without the Greeks.

I will also note that unlike Mark, I fully cite my sources so others can check my work to see if I had cherrypicked my sources.

Which leads me to...
But all that is then presented is a critique of one possible defensive line. How does that "explore that question" how the "the Allies ... successfully defend Greece from the Axis in April 1941"?
Three different lines discussed and Mark only reads one. Blinders? Preconceived beliefs that can't be moved by facts?
Jeff Leser

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