ClintHardware wrote:However, we also have several Incidents of the Dog not Barking in the Night because:
I have no idea what dogs have got to do with this - whether barking or not.
ClintHardware wrote: It does not exclude individual panzers being repaired more than once nor does it say they were.
It does not exclude combat damage - some of the suspension damage may also have been from combat damage or contributed to by combat damage.
It does not refer to or specifically identify internal damage repairs from spalling, partial penetrations and full penetrations.
It does not refer to or specifically identify damage from onboard fires.
It does not refer to or specifically identify damage to electrical systems.
It does not refer to armour plate patching.
It does not seem to include the "shattered" panzer on the 4th April - witnessed by Captain Constant 4th Field Squadron, R.E. - But this example would have had behind armour internal damage probably including every type of damage conceivable including at least one big plate patch. So if this panzer is not included you only have a partial report in terms of the whole situation in respect of Panzer Regiment 5.
I does not include any of those things nor an infinite number of other possibilities. And why should it? It is a document written, it seems, to explain the difficulties they were experiencing due to to desert conditions and to try to justify what appeared to be a poor showing of tanks on the front line.
Nevertheless, despite it being of limited scope, it is an interesting report because it explains where more than half of the tanks were when 5.leichte reached Tobruk with just 25 'fit' tanks. It is the document that you should be using to explain why such a small number were present on 11 April. All you have to do now is research where the remaining 72 were.
ClintHardware wrote: Also it refers to 83 panzers out of 155 but it gives no operational status in respect of any of the 155. Were only 83 able to be repaired with what they had available?
The document states 83 pantsers were taken into workshop between 2-11 April due to serious damage caused by desert conditions. The seriousness of the problems would seem to indicate they were probably still all in workshop on 11th, but it is not beyond the realms of possibility that some had been turned-round.
It does not state how many were taken into workshops prior to 2 April and were still being held therein. We know from Schorm that his company was already down on a few tanks prior to starting the desert bashing.
It does not state how many were taken into workshops during the same period but reasons other than desert bashing. I have no doubt some were.
It does not state how many were inoperational due to the desert and which had still not made it to workshop by 11 April. Given the scale of the problem, some may still not have been recovered by the 11th from their desert parking. Also, when did the reinforced lei.kp that routed via Benghazi and er Regima rejoin the main force? Was it before or after 11 April?
...and on and on...
The first paragraph makes it clear that the 83 refers soley to those falling out because of the desert between 2-11 April.
The second paragraph indicates that 44 Pz.III suffered engine failure and probably all needed 'new' engines installed - as well as 14 other tanks.
The fourth paragraph gives details of suspension problems experienced on the very same tanks. It also contains one reference to non-desert damage.
ClintHardware wrote: Its not very comprehensive in terms of ruling out or ruling in.... is it?
Why should it? It was not written to help you understand the tank state and make money from your books. It was a basic report trying to explain just how severe the desert had taken a toll on the tanks.
ClintHardware wrote: This report is a pack of Dogs in the Night.
If this has any relevance, perhaps you could explain.
To summarise.
The document tells us with some certainty that of the 155 pantsers (inc. the 7 command tanks), 83 were not present infront of Tobruk's gates on 11 April due damage inflicted by the desert.
The difference is 72. If your objective is to ascertain the number of likely battle damage casualties, then you ought to be directing your effort into placing those 72 rather than trying to inflate the number by arguing that some of the 83 desert casualties were battle damaged or double entry bookeeping.