Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

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ljadw
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#46

Post by ljadw » 23 Nov 2016, 23:11

MarkN wrote:
And, more specifically, you have written on at least two occasions that supplies shipped in 1942 were lower than previously and conclude that this means the Axis were shipping what they needed when they needed it. A rather outlandish conclusion in my opinion, but each to his own. Have you considered that the lesser amount shipped was due to a lack of shipping. A lack of shipping based upon former transport ships sitting on the bottom of the sea?
Lack of shipping was only a minor reason : one should begin with the beginning

A Were the supplies for NA available ?

B Could the German /Italian railways transport the available supplies to the Italian harbours ?

C Was the stockage capacity of these harbours sufficient for the arriving supplies?

D What about the loading capacities of the harbours ?

E How many MV were daily available ?

F Could the RM provide the needed escorts?

G What about the needed fuel ?

H What about the unloading capacities of the ports of NA ?

I What about their stockage capacities?

J What about the transport capacities in NA ?
If something happened in this chain, it would influence all the other parts of the chain : ONE example : if due to a shortage of coal or bad weather, the railways were transporting less supplies to the Italian harbours,this would influence the rest of the chain .But how much, that's an other point, reserved to an experienced logistician .
The problem was not only to send supplies to the Italian harbours, but also to get them out of these harbours and it was the same for the NA harbours : one ton of supplies in Tripoli did not help Rommel, a ton of supplies at the front was helping Rommel .

About the comparison 1941/1942 : in the first 3 months of 1941 220000 ton arrived in NA, in the first 3 months of 1942 171000.

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#47

Post by ljadw » 23 Nov 2016, 23:17

Richard Anderson wrote:
MarkN wrote:And, more specifically, you have written on at least two occasions that supplies shipped in 1942 were lower than previously and conclude that this means the Axis were shipping what they needed when they needed it. A rather outlandish conclusion in my opinion, but each to his own. Have you considered that the lesser amount shipped was due to a lack of shipping. A lack of shipping based upon former transport ships sitting on the bottom of the sea?
Let's see, as of June 1940, the Italian merchant fleet comprised 786 ships greater than 500 GRT, totaling 3,318,129 GRT. There were another 200-odd coaster smaller than 500GRT. Of those, 212, aggregating 1,216,637 GRT, were lost of the declaration of war. The Italians gained 204 ships aggregating 818,619 GRT to September 1943, but lost 460 aggregating 1,700,096 GRT in the same period. Giorgerini, La Battaglia, p. 32 and Greene and Massignani, Naval War, p. 50.

Of those lost, 1,372,029 can be attributed to Allied forces, 61% of that to Malta.
But, as long as we don't know how many ships were reserved for the NA convoys, it is impossible to draw any conclusion :even if on 1 january 1942 the Italian merchant fleet was down 10 % , this does not mean that less ships would be available for the NA convoys . It is possible that X % less ships would be available, but the opposite also is possible : it depends who would have priority: the NA convoys or the other convoys .


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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#48

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Nov 2016, 23:25

ljadw wrote:The 113000 GRT estimate is an estimate, van Crefeld gives other figures, and other authors also other figures ;besides, is there any proof that these estimates influenced the amount of supplies that was sent ?
Why, yes, van Creveld did give other figures, many of which have been invalidated, and drew the conclusion that it was port and motor vehicle capacity that was the primary factor affecting Axis operations in North Africa. He was also drawing those conclusions in 1977 before access to the data in ULTRA decrypts was available.

Why yes, there is quite a bit of "proof" for the effect of the prewar Italian estimates. The first effect was to cause the Italians to throw their hands up and declare it couldn't be done, thus their attempt to stockpile supplies in Libya prewar.

We also don't need the "estimates" to calculate what was required for Axis operations, since the Italians and Germans did so for us. While imprecise, since they were working off projections, we know what they required. For example, in October 1942 the German KM Staff concluded the minimum monthly requirement for PzAA was 40,000 tons and 60,000 were required for operations.
The december 1941 estimate is only the usual attempt from Rommel to cover his ass and to blame the Italians and the supply forces .
Interesting, so now Rommel is so all powerful he could make Commando Supremo, the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegssmarine to dance to his tune.
Besides Rommel was wrong (not for the first time ):in december 1941 39000 was delivered, in april 1942 150000 and in july 1942 91000 (the last figure debunks the claim that in the summer the LW was abandoning the attacks on Malta and that this caused again very big losses to the convoys .)Even if Rommel received the double (300000 instead of 150000) he still would whine that this was only the most urgently required supply . Thus one should not take into account the opinion of Rommel about supplies . His sombre assessment was : he was forced to retreat and blamed supply shortages, but the truth is that what was arriving in december had no influence on the situation on the front in december .What influended more or less (and more less that more ) the situation on the front in december, was what had arrived in NA in september/october,because it took weeks before supplies arrived at the front .
Could you try for a modicum of coherence please?

Meanwhile, in June, due largely to a shortage of shipping space, the total arriving in Africa was 32,327, in July, when Malta was neutralized, it
rose significantly to 91,491, then dropped to 51,655 arriving in August, recovered to 77,526 in September, then dropped again to 46,698 in October. More critical was what was targeted and what was lost, particularly between 27 and 30 August, which prompted Rommel to delay the resumption of the offensive until the night of 30 August and to scale back his objectives.
In february 1942 58000 ton arrived in NA and Rommel started a successfull offensive .

In november 1942, 97000 ton arrived in NA and the AK was running for its live .
Um, in November 1942, 63,376 tons arrived in Libya, 34,339 arrived in TUNISIA.
Thus the arrival or not of supplies is only an excuse to explain away a defeat /retreat . On all sides . On all fronts .
Why yes indeed, of course possession of or lack of supplies is irrelevant to all sides and all fronts. :roll:
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 23 Nov 2016, 23:53, edited 1 time in total.
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MarkN
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#49

Post by MarkN » 23 Nov 2016, 23:32

ljadw wrote: Lack of shipping was only a minor reason : one should begin with the beginning
Define what is minor? How do you conclude it was minor?

Who defines the beginning? Does it make sense to rail freight and store freight when you know there are no ships available to carry across the sea?

Again you are drawing conclusions on what you want to believe to support what you want to believe whilst still telling Richard Anderson that conclusions cannot be drawn.

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#50

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Nov 2016, 23:53

ljadw wrote:Lack of shipping was only a minor reason : one should begin with the beginning

A Were the supplies for NA available ?
Yes, within limits, including commitments to other theaters, such as Greece. That of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
B Could the German /Italian railways transport the available supplies to the Italian harbours ?
Yes, within limits, which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
C Was the stockage capacity of these harbours sufficient for the arriving supplies?
Yes, within limits, which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
D What about the loading capacities of the harbours ?
The Italian naval staff calculated 24 ships could be handled at a time in Italian harbors and 19 in North African ones...in peacetime. It was anticipated wartime would reduce that substantially. We know the upper tonnage range for unloading in Africa was 150,000, since that is what was achieved. All of which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
E How many MV were daily available ?
Which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
F Could the RM provide the needed escorts?
No, which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
G What about the needed fuel ?
Which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
H What about the unloading capacities of the ports of NA ?
Already addressed in "D". Are you just being repetitive as part of your trolling?
I What about their stockage capacities?
What about them? They were evidently enough for the Italians to initially plan on relying on "stockage capacity" instead of regular shipments. Which of course is irrelevant to what was sent and what effect Malta had on what was sent.
J What about the transport capacities in NA ?
If something happened in this chain, it would influence all the other parts of the chain : ONE example : if due to a shortage of coal or bad weather, the railways were transporting less supplies to the Italian harbours,this would influence the rest of the chain .But how much, that's an other point, reserved to an experienced logistician .
The problem was not only to send supplies to the Italian harbours, but also to get them out of these harbours and it was the same for the NA harbours : one ton of supplies in Tripoli did not help Rommel, a ton of supplies at the front was helping Rommel .

About the comparison 1941/1942 : in the first 3 months of 1941 220000 ton arrived in NA, in the first 3 months of 1942 171000.
The only "chain" I see is your usual attempt at jerking chains.
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Rob Stuart
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#51

Post by Rob Stuart » 24 Nov 2016, 00:12

ljadw wrote:The fact that 2/3 of the losses were caused by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta does not prove that Malta was important/more important than an other base and for Britain and for the Axis, because of 2 logical points
Here is a logical point for you: If the Malta-based cruisers, destroyers, subs and aircraft used for offensive operations could have inflicted the same level of loss on Axis shipping if they had been based elsewhere, than why in hell would the British keep them in Malta? Any alternative base would have been less vulnerable than Malta and it would have been easier to get fuel, ammo and so on for these offensive forces to just about any other base, so clearly they were kept in Malta because it was from there that they could inflict the most damage on the enemy.

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#52

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Nov 2016, 01:30

Tonnage shipped

January 1941 - 50,505
February 1941 - 80,357
March 1941 - 101,800
April 1941 - 88,597
May 1941 - 73,367
June 1941 - 133,331
July 1941 - 77,012
August 1941 - 96,021
September 1941 - 94,115
October 1941 - 92,449
November 1941 - 79,208
December 1941 - 47,689
January 1942 - 66,214
February 1942 - 59,468
March 1942 - 57,541
April 1942 - 151,578
May 1942 - 91,188
June 1942 - 41,519
July 1942 - 97,794
August 1942 - 77,134
September 1942 - 96,903
October 1942 - 83,695
November 1942 - 120,309
December 1942 - 97,785
January 1943 - 88,933
February 1943 - 77,781
March 1943 - 77,193
April 1943 - 48,703

Average for the period is 84,621
Running three-month averages
1Q41 - 77,554
2Q41 - 98,432
3Q41 - 89,049
4Q41 - 73,115
1Q42 - 61,074
2Q42 - 94,762
3Q42 - 90,610
4Q42 - 100,596
1Q43 - 81,302
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ljadw
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#53

Post by ljadw » 24 Nov 2016, 10:01

MarkN wrote:
ljadw wrote: Lack of shipping was only a minor reason : one should begin with the beginning
Define what is minor? How do you conclude it was minor?

Who defines the beginning? Does it make sense to rail freight and store freight when you know there are no ships available to carry across the sea?

Again you are drawing conclusions on what you want to believe to support what you want to believe whilst still telling Richard Anderson that conclusions cannot be drawn.
Before supplies could be transported to NA, these supplies had to be transported to the Italian harbours, and before they could be transported to the Italian harbours, they had to be produced . Thus : first thing first . Lack of shipping occurred some times but not always:in april 1942 150000 tons were transported, but the next month only 86000. Saying that this was caused by lack of shipping is very questionable,because : why was there lack of shipping ?If it was because of losses by submarines and aircraft, how to explain that in march 1942 only 47000 ton were transported and a month later 150000.It is not so that in april suddenly dozens more of MV with their crew and fuel were available .

"Does it make sense to rail freight and store freight when you know that there are no ships available to carry accross the sea " : what is the proof that the Italians knew this ? And what is the proof that there was a shortage of ships ?

Here YOU are drawing conclusions (who are unproved ) on what you believe to support what you want to believe .

I am saying that there are no proofs that the decrease of supplies transported in 1942 to NA was caused by shipping losses, because, as I already said, big shipping losses do not mean that less ships would be available for the convoys to NA :only a small part of the Italian merchant fleet was committed in the transports to NA, and these big losses of the NA convoys could be compensated by committing more ships from other theatres . It is possible for ships to move from the Adriatic sea to Naples . Ships do a lot of shipping .

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#54

Post by ljadw » 24 Nov 2016, 10:12

Rob Stuart wrote:
ljadw wrote:The fact that 2/3 of the losses were caused by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta does not prove that Malta was important/more important than an other base and for Britain and for the Axis, because of 2 logical points
Here is a logical point for you: If the Malta-based cruisers, destroyers, subs and aircraft used for offensive operations could have inflicted the same level of loss on Axis shipping if they had been based elsewhere, than why in hell would the British keep them in Malta? Any alternative base would have been less vulnerable than Malta and it would have been easier to get fuel, ammo and so on for these offensive forces to just about any other base, so clearly they were kept in Malta because it was from there that they could inflict the most damage on the enemy.
Your point is not logical : if Malta was lost, the surface ships, submarines and aircraft based at Malta at the moment of the capture and the surface ships, submarines and aircraft that later were sent to Malta in the OTL,would not be lost : they could move to the eastern part of the Mediterranean and continue from there their attacks . they were not tied to Malta .

When Crete was captured and no longer available as base for the RAF/RN, the RAF/RN units based at Crete were not lost : they left Crete and continued the war from elsewhere .

If Gibraltar was lost , would the RN forces stationed at Gibraltar (force K ) be lost ?

If Hawaii had been lost, would that mean that the USN forces stationed at Hawaii would have been unable to continue the war ?

THE big British base in the Mediterranean was Alexandria and if Malta was lost ,why wold the "Malta" naval and air forces not be able to emigrate to Alexandria ?

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#55

Post by ljadw » 24 Nov 2016, 12:35

Richard Anderson wrote: He was also drawing those conclusions in 1977 before access to the data in ULTRA decrypts was available.

For example, in October 1942 the German KM Staff concluded the minimum monthly requirement for PzAA was 40,000 tons and 60,000 were required for operations.



Why yes indeed, of course possession of or lack of supplies is irrelevant to all sides and all fronts. :roll:

1) Ah : The monster of Loch Ness is arriving (Ultra ) and now not in the summer but in nvember : there are no proofs that Ultra information had a decisive influence on the war in NA : those who are boasting that X % of supplies were lost due to Ultra, are always wisely concealing the fact that what was lost because of Ultra was insignifiant compared to what arrived despite Ultra .


2 ) They were wrong , as oone can expect of naval officers talking about supplies needed by a motorized force : the PzAA never received the 60000 needed for operations , but despite this, it advanced two times to Egypt .

3 ) This is something I did not say : the arrival of supplies at the NA ports does not mean the possession of supplies by the PzAA: it took as much time to move supplies from Germany to Tripoli ,as to move supplies from Tripoli to the front . Van Crefeld was right . What was important (but not decisive ) was the timely arrival of needed supplies to the front at a minimum time before an attack . And it was not decisive, because even with the arrival of needed supplies,there was still the presence of the enemy who also received supplies , and in NA the British forces always received more supplies than the Axis and were thus stronger,and this was the main reason for the Axis defeat :even without the losses caused by the Malta forces, the outcome would still be the same .

It is not because DURING the German retreat at the end of 1941 less supplies arrived at Tripoli that the retreat was caused by the arrival of less resources .

The British superiority in NA was that big that the outcome was a certainty at the start or even before the start .

All the rest is the usual attempt to excuse this defeat by blaming the Italians . Something the Germans were very good in .

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#56

Post by ljadw » 24 Nov 2016, 13:46

I have compiled the following figures from Christos' Ultra Intelligence and Rommel's convoys . Possible mistakes are mine .

1942 : Supplies arriving in NA

For the Italian Army : fuel 93000 ton,other supplies :259000

Italian Navy : 15000 /16000

Italian Air Force :23000/13000

Germans (Army and LW ) :113000 166000

Civilians : 300/75000

Source of Christos : La Marina Italiana nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale .



As one can see , the Germans (LW included) received monthly less than 25000 ton . Thus I have my doubts, big ones , about the figures of 40000 and 60000 .

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#57

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Nov 2016, 18:28

ljadw wrote:1) Ah : The monster of Loch Ness is arriving (Ultra ) and now not in the summer but in nvember : there are no proofs that Ultra information had a decisive influence on the war in NA : those who are boasting that X % of supplies were lost due to Ultra, are always wisely concealing the fact that what was lost because of Ultra was insignifiant compared to what arrived despite Ultra .
Just STFU and think for once. If you bothered to read you would realize I was NOT TALKING about the OPERATIONAL effect of ULTRA, but rather of the research use of ULTRA. The ULTRA files allow us access to Axis information and discussions otherwise not available to researchers before.

(snip the rest of the typical knee-jerk idiocy)
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#58

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Nov 2016, 18:35

ljadw wrote:As one can see , the Germans (LW included) received monthly less than 25000 ton . Thus I have my doubts, big ones , about the figures of 40000 and 60000 .
More idiocy. Panzerarmee Afrika as of 8 October 1942 consisted of?

Deutsches Afrika Korps
90. leichte Afrika-Division
X. italienisches Armee Korps
XXI. italienisches Armee Korps
XX. italienisches Armee Korps (mot)

Would you please stop and think before you post knee-jerk drivel.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#59

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Nov 2016, 19:07

ljadw wrote:Before supplies could be transported to NA, these supplies had to be transported to the Italian harbours, and before they could be transported to the Italian harbours, they had to be produced . Thus : first thing first . Lack of shipping occurred some times but not always:in april 1942 150000 tons were transported, but the next month only 86000. Saying that this was caused by lack of shipping is very questionable,because : why was there lack of shipping ?If it was because of losses by submarines and aircraft, how to explain that in march 1942 only 47000 ton were transported and a month later 150000.It is not so that in april suddenly dozens more of MV with their crew and fuel were available .
So the loss of 27% of the Italian merchant marine overnight did not result in a lack of shipping? How about the loss of 56% of their tanker fleet? As of 10 June 1940 the Italian merchant marine had just 36 tankers to transport fuel to North Africa in bulk and built just 7 more.

Meanwhile, if you had bothered to look at the annualized and quarterly data you would realize that just taking random months and comparing them as you do is not very revealing. Ships do not follow convenient monthly schedules, but instead depart in one month and arrive in another.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#60

Post by ljadw » 25 Nov 2016, 13:20

Richard Anderson wrote:
ljadw wrote:1) Ah : The monster of Loch Ness is arriving (Ultra ) and now not in the summer but in nvember : there are no proofs that Ultra information had a decisive influence on the war in NA : those who are boasting that X % of supplies were lost due to Ultra, are always wisely concealing the fact that what was lost because of Ultra was insignifiant compared to what arrived despite Ultra .
Just STFU and think for once. If you bothered to read you would realize I was NOT TALKING about the OPERATIONAL effect of ULTRA, but rather of the research use of ULTRA. The ULTRA files allow us access to Axis information and discussions otherwise not available to researchers before.

(snip the rest of the typical knee-jerk idiocy)
This is irrelevant for the discussion

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