Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
I'm currently locked in an argument about what Rommel's supply lines were like and I'm stuck on the issue of his long distance supply units, as the usual source, van Creveld, is pretty sparse on the details of the Großtransportraum supply elements that support the DAK. How many vehicles sustained Rommel (and potentially the Italians?) in 1941 and 1942, how did it change over time, what was the composition of that truck supply and how much of it was Italian or French? Thanks for any help on this.
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
How does one become "locked in an argument" before researching, studying and understanding a subject?stg 44 wrote:I'm currently locked in an argument about what Rommel's supply lines were like and I'm stuck on the issue of his long distance supply units, as the usual source, van Creveld, is pretty sparse on the details of the Großtransportraum supply elements that support the DAK. How many vehicles sustained Rommel (and potentially the Italians?) in 1941 and 1942, how did it change over time, what was the composition of that truck supply and how much of it was Italian or French? Thanks for any help on this.
Are you interested in how only the DAK was supplied or the whole Panzer-Armee Afrika or the entire Axis forces in Libya and Egypt?
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
Debating van Creveld. As we got into GTR units in the East was realized just how little substance there was in the van Creveld chapter on Rommel's logistics. I'm interested in both DAK and the wider Panzerarmee supply and Italians too if you know anything about all of that.MarkN wrote:How does one become "locked in an argument" before researching, studying and understanding a subject?stg 44 wrote:I'm currently locked in an argument about what Rommel's supply lines were like and I'm stuck on the issue of his long distance supply units, as the usual source, van Creveld, is pretty sparse on the details of the Großtransportraum supply elements that support the DAK. How many vehicles sustained Rommel (and potentially the Italians?) in 1941 and 1942, how did it change over time, what was the composition of that truck supply and how much of it was Italian or French? Thanks for any help on this.
Are you interested in how only the DAK was supplied or the whole Panzer-Armee Afrika or the entire Axis forces in Libya and Egypt?
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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
Mate,
You pose an interesting idea?
How did the Axis supply system work?
Clearly running trucks from Tripoli to Tobruk or Alamein was too long for any Transport system, so there must have been supply lines via Bengasi and or other towns to stock pile stores in depots as they went along the road.
So would a Truck company run stores to say Bengasi, then an other company to Tobruk, then an other to Alamein?
So stores depots would be along this line, and Truck companies moved from depot to depot?
This would save ware and tare on the Trucks reducing break downs and engine ware.
S.B
You pose an interesting idea?
How did the Axis supply system work?
Clearly running trucks from Tripoli to Tobruk or Alamein was too long for any Transport system, so there must have been supply lines via Bengasi and or other towns to stock pile stores in depots as they went along the road.
So would a Truck company run stores to say Bengasi, then an other company to Tobruk, then an other to Alamein?
So stores depots would be along this line, and Truck companies moved from depot to depot?
This would save ware and tare on the Trucks reducing break downs and engine ware.
S.B
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
Here is a paper by a US Army logistician.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
and a book here:
British and German Logistics Support during the WWII North African Campaign Paperback – April 15, 2015
by U.S. Army War College (Author)https://www.amazon.com/British-Logistic ... 1511733829
North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment Major Mark D. Kitchen 6 November 2015 Pickle Partners Publishing £0.92 ebook from Google
I suspect the answer is that Rommel didn't manage logistics....
stg you aren't getting locked into a discussion similar to this closed thread are you?
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 3&start=15
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
and a book here:
British and German Logistics Support during the WWII North African Campaign Paperback – April 15, 2015
by U.S. Army War College (Author)https://www.amazon.com/British-Logistic ... 1511733829
North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment Major Mark D. Kitchen 6 November 2015 Pickle Partners Publishing £0.92 ebook from Google
I suspect the answer is that Rommel didn't manage logistics....
stg you aren't getting locked into a discussion similar to this closed thread are you?
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 3&start=15
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
I see that no one is mentioning the Italian merchant navy and the railways .Sheldrake wrote:Here is a paper by a US Army logistician.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
and a book here:
British and German Logistics Support during the WWII North African Campaign Paperback – April 15, 2015
by U.S. Army War College (Author)https://www.amazon.com/British-Logistic ... 1511733829
North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment Major Mark D. Kitchen 6 November 2015 Pickle Partners Publishing £0.92 ebook from Google
I suspect the answer is that Rommel didn't manage logistics....
stg you aren't getting locked into a discussion similar to this closed thread are you?
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 3&start=15
There is also the fact that most supplies had as destination the Italian armed forces and the Italian civilians ,numerically the Germans were always inferior to the Italians .
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
A valid point which also should extend to Italian motor transport in North Africa. In the first of the papers I linked to Rommel is quoted as saying that logistics wasn't his problem. It was for Commando Supremo and OKH/OKW to keep him supplied.ljadw wrote:I see that no one is mentioning the Italian merchant navy and the railways .Sheldrake wrote:Here is a paper by a US Army logistician.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
and a book here:
British and German Logistics Support during the WWII North African Campaign Paperback – April 15, 2015
by U.S. Army War College (Author)https://www.amazon.com/British-Logistic ... 1511733829
North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment Major Mark D. Kitchen 6 November 2015 Pickle Partners Publishing £0.92 ebook from Google
I suspect the answer is that Rommel didn't manage logistics....
stg you aren't getting locked into a discussion similar to this closed thread are you?
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 3&start=15
There is also the fact that most supplies had as destination the Italian armed forces and the Italian civilians ,numerically the Germans were always inferior to the Italians .
This paper on the Italian Army in Egypt gives some hints.
http://www.egyptstudycircle.org.uk/Arti ... 0Qc223.pdf
It makes the point that Italian motorisation was far from complete and their vehicle serviceablity was low - around 40% unserviceable.
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
The problem is that the needed information is not available, except some generalities which are often questionable .
There is some information in The Crusader Project and Chrystos has also given some figures : that most of the supplies were for the Italians.
But most figures are about the convoys and the capacity of the harbours .
What is missing is :
how many supplies were monthly arriving at the front
how many were transported by ship (coastal shipping ),railway,truck
what was the capacity of these three (shipping,railway, truck )
There is some information in The Crusader Project and Chrystos has also given some figures : that most of the supplies were for the Italians.
But most figures are about the convoys and the capacity of the harbours .
What is missing is :
how many supplies were monthly arriving at the front
how many were transported by ship (coastal shipping ),railway,truck
what was the capacity of these three (shipping,railway, truck )
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
No, not a member of that forum and the subject was about the impact of Rommel's corps being added to Barbarossa would have made, specifically the logistics elements. Thanks for the link, I'll check it out later.Sheldrake wrote:Here is a paper by a US Army logistician.
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a220715.pdf
and a book here:
British and German Logistics Support during the WWII North African Campaign Paperback – April 15, 2015
by U.S. Army War College (Author)https://www.amazon.com/British-Logistic ... 1511733829
North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment Major Mark D. Kitchen 6 November 2015 Pickle Partners Publishing £0.92 ebook from Google
I suspect the answer is that Rommel didn't manage logistics....
stg you aren't getting locked into a discussion similar to this closed thread are you?
http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 3&start=15
Pretty much.ljadw wrote: What is missing is :
how many supplies were monthly arriving at the front
how many were transported by ship (coastal shipping ),railway,truck
what was the capacity of these three (shipping,railway, truck )
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
I'm pretty sure I don't "know" whatever it is you're looking for. It is not a subject I have ever made any attempt to read up on or understand to the depth that you seem to be looking for.stg 44 wrote: Debating van Creveld. As we got into GTR units in the East was realized just how little substance there was in the van Creveld chapter on Rommel's logistics. I'm interested in both DAK and the wider Panzerarmee supply and Italians too if you know anything about all of that.
However, I have most of the Pz.Armee Afrika and DAK KTBs etc and with a 5 minute rifle through my harddrive I came up with the following docs which may offer some interest.
I have no idea what other docs I have along these lines...
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
I have seen a number of 13000 trucks on German side at the end of 1941, but we can only guess about the number of these trucks that was available for the transport of supplies and on the number that was operational .Following what I remember, a truck lasted not more than a year .
other point : the following figures are from Christos military and intelligence corner (Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys )
In 1941 575000 ton was sent to NA for the Italians and 275000 for the Germans
In 1942 Italians :530000,Germans 280000
From these figures one must subtract the losses (some 15 % )
The Germans received on the average 20000 ton per month, but how did these supplies go to the front ? And how many ? Supply and rear units also needed supplies . And were everyday convoys of trucks leaving the harbours for the front ? Or did this happen irregularly = that some days there were no convoys because not enough trucks,or not enough supplies available ?
All things that we don't know and I fear we never will know .
And, were the German /Italian trucks reserved for German/Italian supplies ? Or could they transport a mixture = 50% for the Germans, 50% for the Italians ?
And, for the GRT,the distances were varying, as the Axis forces advanced and retreated .
Supplies were also transported to NA by air, but I assume that this was meaningless compared to the total .
other point : the following figures are from Christos military and intelligence corner (Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys )
In 1941 575000 ton was sent to NA for the Italians and 275000 for the Germans
In 1942 Italians :530000,Germans 280000
From these figures one must subtract the losses (some 15 % )
The Germans received on the average 20000 ton per month, but how did these supplies go to the front ? And how many ? Supply and rear units also needed supplies . And were everyday convoys of trucks leaving the harbours for the front ? Or did this happen irregularly = that some days there were no convoys because not enough trucks,or not enough supplies available ?
All things that we don't know and I fear we never will know .
And, were the German /Italian trucks reserved for German/Italian supplies ? Or could they transport a mixture = 50% for the Germans, 50% for the Italians ?
And, for the GRT,the distances were varying, as the Axis forces advanced and retreated .
Supplies were also transported to NA by air, but I assume that this was meaningless compared to the total .
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
Thank you for the docs, where did you get those? Any help with translation? My German has gotten a lot worse over the years.MarkN wrote:I'm pretty sure I don't "know" whatever it is you're looking for. It is not a subject I have ever made any attempt to read up on or understand to the depth that you seem to be looking for.stg 44 wrote: Debating van Creveld. As we got into GTR units in the East was realized just how little substance there was in the van Creveld chapter on Rommel's logistics. I'm interested in both DAK and the wider Panzerarmee supply and Italians too if you know anything about all of that.
However, I have most of the Pz.Armee Afrika and DAK KTBs etc and with a 5 minute rifle through my harddrive I came up with the following docs which may offer some interest.
I have no idea what other docs I have along these lines...
According to the Nigel Askey Barbarossa books the Germans had 21,100 motor vehicles in 1941. I'm not clear if that is in June 1941 or by the end of the year and what the breakdown for trucks vs. light transports is, though it is exclusive of half tracks, motorcycles, and weapons carriers/prime movers and AFVs. According to a TOE I could find for panzer divisions in 1941, they were supposed to have 2000 trucks intrinsic, while a 'Light' division had around 1400. Altogether, light transports and trucks, the two DAK divisions as of August 1941 couldn't have had more than 5000 motor vehicles (exclusive of AFVs, prime movers, motorcycles, etc.) which leaves some 16,000 motor vehicles exclusive of Rommel's divisions. Many I'm sure had to be with the Luftwaffe, but despite the van Creveld claim of 7000 in the GTR that still leaves a lot of motor vehicles unless there were some 9000 or so light transports, not trucks. Plus there is the issue of how many trucks were purchased from Vichy Tunisia (I've seen numbers around 3,000) and how were they used, how many were Italian, and how many were captured from the enemy, because Rommel used a lot of captured trucks too?ljadw wrote:I have seen a number of 13000 trucks on German side at the end of 1941, but we can only guess about the number of these trucks that was available for the transport of supplies and on the number that was operational .Following what I remember, a truck lasted not more than a year .
other point : the following figures are from Christos military and intelligence corner (Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys )
In 1941 575000 ton was sent to NA for the Italians and 275000 for the Germans
In 1942 Italians :530000,Germans 280000
From these figures one must subtract the losses (some 15 % )
The Germans received on the average 20000 ton per month, but how did these supplies go to the front ? And how many ? Supply and rear units also needed supplies . And were everyday convoys of trucks leaving the harbours for the front ? Or did this happen irregularly = that some days there were no convoys because not enough trucks,or not enough supplies available ?
All things that we don't know and I fear we never will know .
And, were the German /Italian trucks reserved for German/Italian supplies ? Or could they transport a mixture = 50% for the Germans, 50% for the Italians ?
And, for the GRT,the distances were varying, as the Axis forces advanced and retreated .
Supplies were also transported to NA by air, but I assume that this was meaningless compared to the total .
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
I cannot work out whether you are saying the Germans had 21,000 motor vehicles total in 1941, 21,100 assigned to Barbarossa or 21,100 in North Africa.stg 44 wrote: According to the Nigel Askey Barbarossa books the Germans had 21,100 motor vehicles in 1941. I'm not clear if that is in June 1941 ...
The last document that I posted above states:
A) Strength
a) Personnel: German Army and Airforce on 14/11/41 - 65,000
b) Motor Vehicles: (including Luftwaffe) - 11,000
The data applies to Libya (and a small part of Egypt).
The documents are from the Pz.Gruppe Afrika KTBs held at BAMA Freiburg.
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
The German forces in Libya had 21,100 motor vehicles assigned to it (all service branches) in 1941 according to the war game book by Nigel Askey about Barbarossa. I'm unclear if he means as of June 1941 or at some point later in the year. Askey also says all German forces in North Africa were 85,000, but perhaps he misread the original documents and it was actually 65,000. He also says combat elements for ALL services were 45,000 men.MarkN wrote:I cannot work out whether you are saying the Germans had 21,000 motor vehicles total in 1941, 21,100 assigned to Barbarossa or 21,100 in North Africa.stg 44 wrote: According to the Nigel Askey Barbarossa books the Germans had 21,100 motor vehicles in 1941. I'm not clear if that is in June 1941 ...
The last document that I posted above states:
A) Strength
a) Personnel: German Army and Airforce on 14/11/41 - 65,000
b) Motor Vehicles: (including Luftwaffe) - 11,000
The data applies to Libya (and a small part of Egypt).
The documents are from the Pz.Gruppe Afrika KTBs held at BAMA Freiburg.
Askey's book doesn't cite a source. Thanks for the translation. I'm assuming your document means that the 11,000 motor vehicles is for more than just divisions, instead total strength for the entire region?
Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942
My understanding is that the two figures apply to total German effort in Libya/Egypt.stg 44 wrote: The German forces in Libya had 21,100 motor vehicles assigned to it (all service branches) in 1941 according to the war game book by Nigel Askey about Barbarossa. I'm unclear if he means as of June 1941 or at some point later in the year. Askey also says all German forces in North Africa were 85,000, but perhaps he misread the original documents and it was actually 65,000. He also says combat elements for ALL services were 45,000 men.
Askey's book doesn't cite a source. Thanks for the translation. I'm assuming your document means that the 11,000 motor vehicles is for more than just divisions, instead total strength for the entire region?
In effect, 65,000 is the total ration strength - all mouths not just fighting troops. Similarly, the 11,000 motor vehicles is the total in Libya/Egypt. Note it specifically states "including Lufwaffe".
11,000 is a somewhat different figure to 21,100.
Remember, this is the total figure for a given day. I have no idea what it was on any of the other 364 days that year. Stating 21,100 in 1941 is rather loose and essentially meaningless. In January 1941, there would have been only a handful for a very small number of 'observers'. If it applies to June 1941 and is correct, then perhaps 10,100 have been lost between then and 14 November 1941!
It is unclear what vehicles are included. Motorcyles? Tanks? Buses? Military and impressed civilian or just military? I cannot determine whether the number 11,000 is there to help in understanding the requirements for diesel or the possible uplift. I suspect the former.
I also found another document that indicates they were short of road transport and were trying to maximise the use of Benghazi. This included sending coastal ships from Tripoli with supplies rather than by road. It took somewhat longer in time to reach the front - but reduced the need for trucks, the diesel to power those trucks and the manpower to drive them.
In effect, Pz.Gruppe Afrika was short on integral logistical uplift.