Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

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Orwell1984
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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#31

Post by Orwell1984 » 12 May 2017, 22:17

To read the best study on the subject of German logistics in North Africa you need to be able to read German:

Reinhard Stumpf, “Probleme der logistik im Afrikafeldzug 1941–1943,” contained in

Vorträge zur Militärgeschichte 7. Die Bedeutung der Logistik für die militärische Führung von der Antike bis in die neueste Zeit

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#32

Post by MarkN » 12 May 2017, 23:21

stg 44 wrote:That isn't exactly true, ...
Really?
stg 44 wrote: they did achieve all of the objectives laid out in the Barbarossa order by Hitler except for taking Leningrad rather than besieging it and of course taking Moscow.
Rubbish.... Historical revisionism.

Hitler's Weisung 21.


Image

Translation....
I. General Intention

The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armoured spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia.

MarkNote: FAIL - Destroyed a lot, but nowhere near enough to win.

The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.
MarkNote: FAIL - didn't get close.

The last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then, if necessary be eliminated by the Air Force.
MarkNote: FAIL - didn't even get a chance to start this part.

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Fleet will quickly lose its bases and will then no longer be capable of action.
MarkNote: SUCCESS.

The effective operation of the Russian Air Force is to be prevented from the beginning of the attack by powerful blows.
MarkNote: PARTIAL SUCCESS.


To reiterate:
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga–Archangelsk. /
The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The strategic objective of Barbarossa was NOT to take Moscow and Leningrad; they were merely waypoints enroute as evidenced by later wording in the same document. The strategic objective of Barbarossa was not even to completely defeat the Soviet Union.
The strategic objective was to contain the Soviet Union east of the Urals.
The Wehrmacht didn't get close. Nowhere near to the the stated objective.

This is not what if. These are facts concerning history as it actually happened not revisionst history or gaming.


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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#33

Post by stg 44 » 13 May 2017, 00:23

MarkN wrote: Rubbish.... Historical revisionism.
Oh great, a pissing match.
MarkN wrote: Translation....
I. General Intention

The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in Western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armoured spearheads. Russian forces still capable of giving battle will be prevented from withdrawing into the depths of Russia.

MarkNote: FAIL - Destroyed a lot, but nowhere near enough to win.
The bulk of the Soviet armies stationed on the pre-war border were destroyed in the border battles. The problem for the Germans was the Soviets built a 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th echelon of forces, of which the 2nd was being formed in June and was not detected. Of course the 2nd echelon was not even formed, let alone known about when Hitler wrote his order. Largely the Soviets didn't withdraw into Russia, they steadily counterattacked and generated all sorts of forces the Wehrmacht had not even considered possible.
So technically it was a success, mooted by facts on the ground beyond June.
MarkN wrote: The enemy will then be energetically pursued and a line will be reached from which the Russian Air Force can no longer attack German territory. The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.
MarkNote: FAIL - didn't get close.
The Soviet air force WAS pushed back out of range of Germany in July. They didn't face aerial attack from the Soviets beyond August 1941 until 1945. So that was a success, but in terms of the Volga-Archangel line that was a long term objective not necessarily to be reached in 1941 but after the USSR had collapsed; clearly that was never reached, but not and immediate objective, as occupying the USSR was planning on taking some time.
MarkN wrote: The last surviving industrial area of Russia in the Urals can then, if necessary be eliminated by the Air Force.
MarkNote: FAIL - didn't even get a chance to start this part.
Sure, but that was a long term objective. That was to come after the defeat of the Red Army, the overriding objective of the operation, and the ability of the USSR to resist west of Moscow. The A-A Line and bombing of the Urals was a long term mission as part of the occupation:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A-A_line
The A-A line as the end-goal of military hostilities was chosen because an occupation of the entire Soviet Union in a single military campaign was considered impossible in view of its geographic dimensions.The remaining Soviet industrial centers further eastward were planned to be destroyed by aerial bombardment, for which an entire Luftflotte ("air fleet"; equivalent in status to an army group) was to be assigned.[5]
Rich, Norman (1973). Hitler's War Aims: Ideology, the Nazi State, and the Course of Expansion, pp. 210-212. W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ural_Moun ... r_a_border
Effectively the A-A Line and eventual Ural border were to mark the end of planned hostilities, not the 1941 campaign. It was mentioned in the context of Barbarossa as a long term strategic goal, not the operational objective for 1941 campaign.
MarkN wrote: The effective operation of the Russian Air Force is to be prevented from the beginning of the attack by powerful blows.
MarkNote: PARTIAL SUCCESS.
Agreed. They were not knocked out, but severely damaged.
MarkN wrote: To reiterate:
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga–Archangelsk. /
The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The strategic objective of Barbarossa was NOT to take Moscow and Leningrad; they were merely waypoints enroute as evidenced by later wording in the same document. The strategic objective of Barbarossa was not even to completely defeat the Soviet Union.
The strategic objective was to contain the Soviet Union east of the Urals.
The Wehrmacht didn't get close. Nowhere near to the the stated objective.

This is not what if. These are facts concerning history as it actually happened not revisionst history or gaming.
Technically speaking the goal for 1941 was to break the Soviet state and if possible push them beyond the Volga-Archangel line, the Ural line was to mark the final border eventually, not in 1941. The occupation of Leningrad/Moscow were elements of breaking the power of the Soviet state, which even with the historical reality of the operation would have been instrumental in breaking the USSR as a state and with it Stalin's political legitimacy to rule, as well as cracking the economic foundations of the Soviet war effort. Historically yes, clearly Operation Barbarossa fell short of not only it's final objective line, but also the primary mission of defeating the Soviet military and state elements of power in European Russia. Barbarossa succeeded in a number of it's objectives, but ultimately failed in the ultimate ones. It was a near run thing though and with some changes the loss of major cities like Leningrad and Moscow would have the result of starting the collapse of the Soviet state or at least Stalin's rule over it, so while the Volga-Archangel line was needed, the ultimate spirit of the operation's goal, inflicting defeats so bad on the USSR it starts to collapse, can succeed if Leningrad and Moscow are taken in 1941.

Even David Glantz said in a lecture you can find on YouTube that it was ultimately the failure to capture Moscow in 1941 that determined the operation failed and Germany wouldn't be able to win the war (though it's ultimate defeat only being assured after the defeat at Stalingrad).

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#34

Post by stevebecker » 13 May 2017, 02:46

Mate,

It was not the German Army that lost in Russia in 1941 it was Adolf who keep turning his Panzer Armies away from there objectives, like the 1st PA towards Leingrad moved south and the 2nd PA from Moscow towards Keiv.

By the time they come back to their missions it was to late as the area around Leingrad was never cleared, to seal of the city, and the 2nd PA was still some distance from Moscow before the Russian counterattack.

The 3rd PA was caught still trying to push through Russian Moscow defences when the counterattack drove them back.

Would Rommel corps made any difference in Russia, I dought it because Adolf still commanded?

S.B

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#35

Post by MarkN » 13 May 2017, 11:38

stg 44 wrote: Oh great, a pissing match.
Nope. There is no "pissing match". There is a publically available documented history of what Hitler and the German High Command intended and expected.

Weisung 21 is crystal clear. I reiterate again.
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga–Archangelsk.
The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The final objective of the operation was not Moscow, Leningrad or whatever. Nor is the timeframe stated.

Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the effects of weather and terrain.
Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the speed at which the Russians could put paper formations into the field.
Hitler and his Generals may have overestimated the damage they would inflict on the Russians before Moscow and Leningrad.

But Hitler and his Generals did NOT fail to recognise that Moscow, Leningrad and so on were NOT going to be the end game. It was assumed by them that the Russians would remain motivated, resilient and continue to fight even after their capture. Plan Barbarossa and subsequent Weisung clearly demonstrate the expectation that the Russians would continue the war from east of the Urals.

Documented history.

And set against that there is your speculation and what if counter-factual history. Sprinkling of the odd falsehood, reinterpretation of the facts and deliberate misdirection do not strengthen your speculation.

If you want to underestimate the Russians even further than Hitler and his Generals did - despite having the knowledge through hindsight that we do - crack on!

If you want to speculate that the Russians would collapse and give in completely once Moscow is taken, crack on. Everybody is entitled to an opinion and the right to formulate whatever counter-factual ahistory they wish. Some authors have made a killing writing fictional history. But please don't come onto a forum such as this with falsehoods such as "they did achieve all of the objectives laid out in the Barbarossa order by Hitler except for taking Leningrad rather than besieging it and of course taking Moscow" to mislead whilst embelishing your what if counter factual ahistory.

There is a place on this forum for counter-factual ahistory and what if scenarios. I suggest you start a thread there.

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#36

Post by ljadw » 13 May 2017, 13:23

stevebecker wrote:Mate,

It was not the German Army that lost in Russia in 1941 it was Adolf who keep turning his Panzer Armies away from there objectives, like the 1st PA towards Leingrad moved south and the 2nd PA from Moscow towards Keiv.

By the time they come back to their missions it was to late as the area around Leingrad was never cleared, to seal of the city, and the 2nd PA was still some distance from Moscow before the Russian counterattack.

The 3rd PA was caught still trying to push through Russian Moscow defences when the counterattack drove them back.

Would Rommel corps made any difference in Russia, I dought it because Adolf still commanded?

S.B
This is the old propaganda of the defeated German generals : there is no proof that an attack on Moscow was possible in the summer and everything indicates that it was impossible .

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#37

Post by ljadw » 13 May 2017, 13:26

MarkN wrote:
stg 44 wrote: Oh great, a pissing match.
Nope. There is no "pissing match". There is a publically available documented history of what Hitler and the German High Command intended and expected.

Weisung 21 is crystal clear. I reiterate again.
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga–Archangelsk.
The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The final objective of the operation was not Moscow, Leningrad or whatever. Nor is the timeframe stated.

Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the effects of weather and terrain.
Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the speed at which the Russians could put paper formations into the field.
Hitler and his Generals may have overestimated the damage they would inflict on the Russians before Moscow and Leningrad.

But Hitler and his Generals did NOT fail to recognise that Moscow, Leningrad and so on were NOT going to be the end game. It was assumed by them that the Russians would remain motivated, resilient and continue to fight even after their capture. Plan Barbarossa and subsequent Weisung clearly demonstrate the expectation that the Russians would continue the war from east of the Urals.

Documented history.

And set against that there is your speculation and what if counter-factual history. Sprinkling of the odd falsehood, reinterpretation of the facts and deliberate misdirection do not strengthen your speculation.

If you want to underestimate the Russians even further than Hitler and his Generals did - despite having the knowledge through hindsight that we do - crack on!

If you want to speculate that the Russians would collapse and give in completely once Moscow is taken, crack on. Everybody is entitled to an opinion and the right to formulate whatever counter-factual ahistory they wish. Some authors have made a killing writing fictional history. But please don't come onto a forum such as this with falsehoods such as "they did achieve all of the objectives laid out in the Barbarossa order by Hitler except for taking Leningrad rather than besieging it and of course taking Moscow" to mislead whilst embelishing your what if counter factual ahistory.

There is a place on this forum for counter-factual ahistory and what if scenarios. I suggest you start a thread there.
Yes and no : the assumption was that the SU would be defeated on the border, that the Ostheer would advance to the Urals and that the Soviets would start a guerilla war east of the Urals which would last a generation, but this would not importune the Germans .

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#38

Post by MarkN » 13 May 2017, 13:34

ljadw wrote: Yes and no : the assumption was that the SU would be defeated on the border, that the Ostheer would advance to the Urals and that the Soviets would start a guerilla war east of the Urals which would last a generation, but this would not importune the Germans .
There is no contradiction in this with what I posted. It may well have been an or the assumption.

The Wehrmacht did not defeat the SU on the border, they did not advance to Urals, the rest (by default) is irrelevant. The Wehrmacht fell a long way short of the stated objective.

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#39

Post by stg 44 » 13 May 2017, 16:15

MarkN wrote:
stg 44 wrote: Oh great, a pissing match.
Nope. There is no "pissing match". There is a publically available documented history of what Hitler and the German High Command intended and expected.

Weisung 21 is crystal clear. I reiterate again.
Das Endziel der Operation ist die Abschirmung gegen das asiatische Rußland aus der allgemeinen Linie Wolga–Archangelsk.
The final objective of the operation is to erect a barrier against Asiatic Russia on the general line Volga-Archangel.

The final objective of the operation was not Moscow, Leningrad or whatever. Nor is the timeframe stated.

Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the effects of weather and terrain.
Hitler and his Generals may have underestimated the speed at which the Russians could put paper formations into the field.
Hitler and his Generals may have overestimated the damage they would inflict on the Russians before Moscow and Leningrad.

But Hitler and his Generals did NOT fail to recognise that Moscow, Leningrad and so on were NOT going to be the end game. It was assumed by them that the Russians would remain motivated, resilient and continue to fight even after their capture. Plan Barbarossa and subsequent Weisung clearly demonstrate the expectation that the Russians would continue the war from east of the Urals.

Documented history.

And set against that there is your speculation and what if counter-factual history. Sprinkling of the odd falsehood, reinterpretation of the facts and deliberate misdirection do not strengthen your speculation.

If you want to underestimate the Russians even further than Hitler and his Generals did - despite having the knowledge through hindsight that we do - crack on!

If you want to speculate that the Russians would collapse and give in completely once Moscow is taken, crack on. Everybody is entitled to an opinion and the right to formulate whatever counter-factual ahistory they wish. Some authors have made a killing writing fictional history. But please don't come onto a forum such as this with falsehoods such as "they did achieve all of the objectives laid out in the Barbarossa order by Hitler except for taking Leningrad rather than besieging it and of course taking Moscow" to mislead whilst embelishing your what if counter factual ahistory.

There is a place on this forum for counter-factual ahistory and what if scenarios. I suggest you start a thread there.
Again I'm already discussing the what if elsewhere you're the one that keeps discussing that despite claiming you don't want to. The Weisung 21 proclamation was written in December of 1940 and laid out ideas for operations based on assumptions that were not that applicable to the situation as of June 1941, so many of the goals and assumptions that led to their being issued were based on faulty ideas about the USSR, like that defeating their standing army at the border would be all it took to win the campaign, leaving the rest of the fighting to be clean up; that was echoed in what Halder wrote when he thought the entire campaign had been won in the first two weeks when writing after the Minsk pocket.
The thing is that we know from history how much the Soviets depended on both the symbol and very real economic lynchpin that was Moscow, David Glantz, the Eastern Front historian relates an anecdote about how Stalin thought about evacuating Moscow during the panic of October, but decided to stay, apparently realizing that if Moscow fell his regime would unravel. It is not settled history that the Soviets could have survived the loss of Moscow, nor is Weisung 21 that applicable to the discussion of what the USSR would have in reality handled and continued on as it was based on flaws assumptions. Certainly there would have been residual resistance, but Moscow was pretty critical to the Soviet war economy and a major cornerstone of the Soviet regime itself. Discussing that isn't really discussing a What If, rather it is discussing the reality of the importance of the capital to the USSR and their war effort.
viewtopic.php?f=66&t=219561

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#40

Post by ljadw » 13 May 2017, 17:13

No : the fall of Moscow would not result in the fall of the SU,but the defeat of the red army would result in the fall of Moscow .

In the first case (capture of Moscow = fall of the SU ) Moscow could only fall in october, and ,october was to late for the defeat of the SU .

It is also not a question of faulty ideas,but a question of needed ideas .

The SU could only be defeated if

a ) the red army was going to the border

b ) if it was defeated at the border

c ) if there were no additional forces the SU could mobilize


The Germans assumed that a, b, c would happen .But c did not happen and the war was lost .

That's why it is totally irrelevant to speculate what would happen if the AK would be in the east .

In the OTL ,the ostheer,without the AK,defeated the red army on the border.The same would also happen in the ATL (ostheer +AK) ,but there is a possibility that the presence of the AK would hurt the Germans,as the logistic system was already overloaded .

Whatever,with or without the AK, c would happen and the war would be lost .

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#41

Post by MarkN » 13 May 2017, 19:18

stg 44 wrote: Again I'm already discussing the what if elsewhere you're the one that keeps discussing that despite claiming you don't want to.
...
Discussing that isn't really discussing a What If, rather it is discussing the reality of the importance of the capital to the USSR and their war effort.
Elsewhere you are discussing what if the trucks sent to North Africa went to the Eastern Front instead. Crack on!

Here you are discussing what if the Germans managed to take Moscow and Leningrad and what if Hitler and the Germans thought that would mean victory on the Eastern Front.

Now, you may have convinced yourself that taking Moscow and Leningrad would mean victory and take it as a given. Fair dos to you. But 'given' it is not. It is counter-factual ahistory. And all of your attempts to mislead others with overt falsehoods and misinterpretations do nothing to turn your counter-factual speculation into historical fact.

You can speculate as much as you like as to how important Moscow and Leningrad was to the Soviet Union and whether victory would have been achieved by their capture. You can quote Glantz and you can quote yourself from other threads. But nothing changes. It is merely counter-factual ahistorical speculation. Speculation for a what if thread.

Historically, the Germans didn't manage to take either place; the Soviet Union didn't collapse. And, moreover, at the time Hitler and the Generals didn't believe they would either.

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#42

Post by MarkN » 13 May 2017, 22:18

Returning to the original question in the first post.

The first image in my post here: viewtopic.php?p=2078148#p2078148 is the orbat for the Pz.Gp.Afrika logistics dated 20 September 1941. That is, in effect, Rommel's Großtransportraum for that date. From that diagram, and with the aid of several other websites, you can estimate the number and type of trucks, tonnage uplift and all sorts of other interesting things about Rommel's Großtransportraum. You will see, it falls a LONG way short of the numbers indicated by Askey.

'148' and '149' refer to Italian transport battalions and '909' is a Wehrmacht unit using vehicles acquired from the French in Tunisia. Also from that schematic, only Nachschub-Kolonnen-Abteilungen '529', '533' and '686' had arrived in Libya by the end of June 1941.

The second image from the same post, indicates corps assets of the DAK. It shows a single Nachschub-Kolonnen-Abteilungen (527) which had arrived by the end of June 1941 and a Wassar Nachschub-Kolonnen-Abteilungen (W) which had not. Some may wish to consider these Rommel's Großtransportraum too.

Askey's figures looking ever more dubious.

The units and sub-units that had arrived in Libya up to the end of June 1941 can be found in Jentz's TCiNA.

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#43

Post by Urmel » 16 May 2017, 13:00

You can in fact arrive at the exact number of trucks sent by the Germans by going through the loading lists.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#44

Post by ljadw » 16 May 2017, 15:02

Urmel wrote:You can in fact arrive at the exact number of trucks sent by the Germans by going through the loading lists.
The number of trucks arriving in NA is not the number of trucks available for the Grosstransportraum .

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Re: Rommel's Großtransportraum in 1941 and 1942

#45

Post by Urmel » 16 May 2017, 15:04

No, but i) the number of trucks arriving is the number of trucks not going to Russia, and ii) for many trucks you actually get the unit they are going to in the loading lists.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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