I'll see if I can find out what the COS thought of it.Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff
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SECRET
J.P. (41) 155
25th February, 1941.
WAR CABINET
JOINT PLANNING STAFF
ATTITUDE OF YUGOSLAVIA
Report by the Joint Planning Staff
As instructed by the Chiefs of Staff x we have examined Belgrade Telegram No. 289 + and submit our comments below.
Reliability of Report
2. We would point out that the probable attitude of Yugoslavia and the description of the plans she is likely to adopt, as outlined in this telegram, should be viewed with some scepticism as Tupanyanin’s Party is in receipt of a subsidy from H.M. Government.
On the other hand, the present scattered dispositions of the Yugoslav armies tally with movements of this type.
Yugoslav Plan
3. As regards the outline plan contained in the telegram:-
(a) Withdrawal of left flank of Yugoslav army into Bosnia where it would be supported by our Fleet from bases at Sibanik and Cattaro.
The commitments of our naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, apart from offensive operations, now include the convoying of supplies to Malta, the protection of our sea communications to Benghazi and the supply of Allied forces in Greece. The last of these is likely to increase very greatly as our forces there are increased. A further commitment of supplying Yugoslavia through Adriatic ports is out of the question with the forces available to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, even if bases on the Yugoslav/Adriatic coast were available to us. Moreover, operations to ship supplies through the Adriatic to Yugoslav ports would be extremely hazardous.
This army would probably, in the end, be cut off.
x C.O.S. (41) 69th Meeting.
+ Annex
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(b) Defence of Danube and Sava by Remainder of Northern Army and, Eventually, Withdrawal to Centre of Yugoslavia.
In general the northern part of Yugoslavia is exposed to flank attacks from Roumania and Northern Bulgaria. It is also more open and suitable for German armoured forces. It is unlikely that the Yugoslavs could consolidate on any line north of the Nish/Sarajevo area, south of which the country, being mountainous, is more suitable for delaying action.
(c) Attack by Southern Army on Italians in Albania through Scutari.
An advance via Scutari limits the Yugoslavs to routes close to the coast where they would be exposed to Italian Fleet action. An additional line of advance would be in the south-east corner of Albania towards Elbasan and Durazzo.
Any action against the Italians in Albania would be strategically sound, as it would threaten Italian base ports and communications and so reduce the pressure on the Greeks, enabling the latter to redispose their forces to meet a German attack. The moral effect on the Italians of a threat to their rear is likely to be considerable.
(d) Another Army Simultaneously to Attack Bulgaria.
This action is again strategically sound. The main German line of advance through Bulgaria into Greece, the railway line in the Struma Valley, lies within 15 – 20 miles from, and parallel to, the Yugoslav/Bulgarian frontier. There are several routes by which Yugoslav forces could attack this line. Any interruption to this German line of communication would have valuable delaying effects on a German advance into Greece.
(e) An Army of 300,000 men to be Established in Southern Serbia for the Defence of Salonika, and Eventual Withdrawal from Yugoslavia if forced.
While such action would be valuable in preventing a German attack on Greece through Yugoslavia, it could not prevent a German attack on Salonika through Bulgaria.
If the Greeks were holding the Aliakmon / Edessa line, west of Salonika, the Yugoslav army’s only route for an eventual withdrawal into Greece would be through the Monastir Gap or Albania.
If the Germans advanced into Northern Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav forces in the south of that country would be cut off from their arsenals. They are reported, however, to have established dumps of supplies in the south.
In the event of their withdrawal into Greece we should have to become responsible for the whole commitment, if not of re-equipping them, at least of supplying them with the whole of their requirements. This we could not undertake.
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Yugoslav Air Forces.
4. Yugoslavia has the best equipped and trained air force in the Balkan countries. It includes some 170 bombers and 120 fighters of modern types. A general retirement would deprive this force of most of its main bases but there are at least twelve first class aerodromes south of Sarajevo from which it could continue operating so long as its supplies and reserves lasted.
There is one serious weakness, namely lack of petrol. It is estimated that there is only sufficient aviation petrol in the country for three weeks of intensive warfare.
Conclusions.
5. In our opinion the best offensive action which the Yugoslavs could take would be to attack the Italians in Albania and the German lines of communication in the Struma Valley. These offensives would be of invaluable assistance to the Greeks if carried out in time; as the delay which they would impose on the Italians and Germans would enable the Greeks to re-dispose their forces to meet a German attack.
In addition we should hope that the Yugoslavs would offer the maximum amount of delaying action to a German advance into Yugoslavia from the north and the northeast.
6. It is of the first strategic importance that the Yugoslavs should be persuaded that their plans should include:-
(a) The concentration in the south of Yugoslavia of their main forces, which are at present very dispersed.
(b) A covering force to be available in the north and north-east to delay a German advance on the lines of the Danube and Sava and to carry out the maximum amount of demolitions, withdrawal of rolling stock and destruction of barges on the Danube. This force to continue its delaying action in the mountainous area south of Nish.
(c) Striking forces to be concentrated in the south-east and south-west of Yugoslavia for offensives into the Struma Valley and Albania respectively.
(d) The maximum amount of supplies and material to be concentrated in the South.
(e) Strong measures to be taken for the control of 5th Columnists and defence of aerodromes and vital points against sabotage.
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7. We agree with the suggestion in paragraph 6 of the telegram that a fresh Naval demonstration in the Adriatic would be most useful at the present moment. We do not recommend that the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, should be pressed to make one, as we think his hands are quite full with his present commitments and operations against the Dodecanese. Furthermore, we are sure that the value of his last operation in the Adriatic was such that, if it is possible, the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, would himself wish to repeat it if forces become available.
(Signed)
I.S.O. PLAYFAIR
C.E.H. MEDHURST
W.G. ANDREWES.
Cabinet War Room.
25th February, 1941.
NOTE. Brigadier Playfair has not yet had the opportunity of seeing this report in its final form and reserves the right to make any minor amendments.
ANNEX.
DEPARTMENTAL (SECRET)
Decypher Mr. Campbell, Belgrade.
D. 8.00 p.m. 23rd February, 1941
R. 2.55 a.m. 24th February, 1941
No. 289
IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET
Tupanyanin discussed Yugoslav Government’s attitude and intentions with W on 24th February (sic).
W gave account of meeting with Germans which Tupanyanin found satisfactory. W said object of invitation was to discover Yugoslav’s position with regard to invasion of Bulgaria which (he is convinced) Germany will not undertake without knowing what it is. Yugoslav Ministers had left Germans guessing and would try to keep them guessing. W anticipated further German effort to find out before invading Bulgaria.
2. W said decisively that if Germany invaded Bulgaria to attack Greece, Yugoslavia would act. Plan in case of war was as follows:-
(a) Northern Army on left and Italian frontier would retire fighting on Bosnia where country would make German progress difficult. It would be based on Adriatic where British Fleet could support it and give possibilities of revictualling. British Fleet to make bases of Sibenik and Cattaro. This army would probably, in the end, be cut off.
(b) Second part of Northern Army would defend the line of the Danube and Sava and would retire if necessary towards the centre.
(c) Southern army would at once attack Italians in Albania through Scutari.
(d) Another army would simultaneously attack Bulgaria.
(e) An army of 300,000 men would be posted in South Serbia for the defence of Salonika and to provide force which if necessary could withdraw from the country (so that Yugoslav Government would have army in being if country finally overrun).
3. W realised that Yugoslavia could not wait to act until the Germans were almost at Salonika. He said that precautionary measures were being taken.
4. W said that Matchek had declared himself as completely in agreement with the plan and as ready to go through with it to the end. No Ministers except Matchek were cognisant of it. Tupanyanin says it can only be plan decided
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on by F and that nothing was said to indicate that it depended on Turkish action. Tupanyanin is satisfied in his opinion, that W spoke with full sense of responsibility, and that what he said represented a genuine decision.
5. Tupanyanin scouted the idea of any strong or effective move amongst leading members of the Government in favour of passivity.
6. Tupanyanin thought that you should be informed at once of the foregoing in strict confidence in case you were forming plans. He said that he realised that it was improbable that the Royal Navy could play the role contemplated but (? thought) a fresh naval demonstration in the Adriatic would be most useful at the moment, with which I agree.
7. W’s statements should for the present be kept for ourselves.
8. Tupanyanin’s impression after conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on 22nd February is that he will work for Yugoslav neutrality to the last moment but will not consent to anything contrary to the integrity and honour of Yugoslavia.
9. I propose to urge again the danger of leaving Germany in doubt.
Repeated to Cairo No. 72 for Secretary of State and Middle East, Athens No. 104 for Secretary of State.
Regards
Tom
