How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

[Henri Winkelman]

Instead of evacuating his troops in Northern Africa, Hitler instead ordered to reinforce Tunisia. The Tunisian Campagin ended in May 1943, the allies took around 250.000 prisoners. This defeat was, in fact, much bigger than Stalingrad since only 91.000 Germans were captured in that city and they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. (which was not the case in Tunisia.)

Couple of questions:

1. How big was the Afrika Korps before reinforcements arrived? (So lets say, around October 1942) I am only talking about manpower now since much of the equipment was actually destroyed in the months before.
2. How many German reinforcements were send to Tunis in November 1942?
3. Is it possible for the Germans to evacuate most troops from Tripoli at the end of 1942 (Like Rommel wanted) or is this a very unrealistic scenario?
4. If the allies win the Run for Tunis and lock down the Tunisian ports, will the war in Africa be over before January 1943?
5. Since the Italian troops were pretty useless, how many of the captured Axis troops were German?

[Andy H]

Instead of evacuating his troops in Northern Africa, Hitler instead ordered to reinforce Tunisia. The Tunisian Campagin ended in May 1943, the allies took around 250.000 prisoners. This defeat was, in fact, much bigger than Stalingrad since only 91.000 Germans were captured in that city and they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. (which was not the case in Tunisia.)

Couple of questions:

1. How big was the Afrika Korps before reinforcements arrived? (So lets say, around October 1942) I am only talking about manpower now since much of the equipment was actually destroyed in the months before.
2. How many German reinforcements were send to Tunis in November 1942?
3. Is it possible for the Germans to evacuate most troops from Tripoli at the end of 1942 (Like Rommel wanted) or is this a very unrealistic scenario?
4. If the allies win the Run for Tunis and lock down the Tunisian ports, will the war in Africa be over before January 1943?
5. Since the Italian troops were pretty useless, how many of the captured Axis troops were German?

Hi Henri

In relation to Q5
The official US History gives a figure of around 275,00 in total, whilst 18th AG gives a figure (20/3-13/5) of 157,000 Germans, 86,700 Italian, equalling 244,500. Rommel estimated some 130,000 Germans had been captured, whilst von Arnims estimate was 100,000 Germans and 200,000 Italians.
The UK offical history cites an official record listing those unwounded POW's as 101,784 Germans, 89,442 Italians and some 47,017 of unspecified nationality A grand total of 238,243.

Regards

Andy H

[Henri Winkelman]

Instead of evacuating his troops in Northern Africa, Hitler instead ordered to reinforce Tunisia. The Tunisian Campagin ended in May 1943, the allies took around 250.000 prisoners. This defeat was, in fact, much bigger than Stalingrad since only 91.000 Germans were captured in that city and they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. (which was not the case in Tunisia.)

Couple of questions:

1. How big was the Afrika Korps before reinforcements arrived? (So lets say, around October 1942) I am only talking about manpower now since much of the equipment was actually destroyed in the months before.
2. How many German reinforcements were send to Tunis in November 1942?
3. Is it possible for the Germans to evacuate most troops from Tripoli at the end of 1942 (Like Rommel wanted) or is this a very unrealistic scenario?
4. If the allies win the Run for Tunis and lock down the Tunisian ports, will the war in Africa be over before January 1943?
5. Since the Italian troops were pretty useless, how many of the captured Axis troops were German?

Hi Henri

In relation to Q5
The official US History gives a figure of around 275,00 in total, whilst 18th AG gives a figure (20/3-13/5) of 157,000 Germans, 86,700 Italian, equalling 244,500. Rommel estimated some 130,000 Germans had been captured, whilst von Arnims estimate was 100,000 Germans and 200,000 Italians.
The UK offical history cites an official record listing those unwounded POW's as 101,784 Germans, 89,442 Italians and some 47,017 of unspecified nationality A grand total of 238,243.

Regards

Andy H

Thanks Andy, very useful information. So lets say it was 110.000. Do you know anything about my other questions? How many of these men could have een saved? How many were actually evacuated? If any?

[Berto]

Since the Italian troops were pretty useless

Sorry to burst your bubble, but I just want to quote a despatch by Alexander after the battle of Enfidaville: "It was noticed that the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them".

Or to remind you that by 9 May your valuable German troops had utterly collapsed, driving themselves to captivity in their own vehicles, while General Messe’s "useless" Italian divisions, haggard and battered as they were, kept fighting till 13 May, when Mussolini himself ordered Messe to surrender because fighting on would only mean a useless bloodshed for a few more days of resistance...

[OHara]

I agree with Berto that the Italian troops in Tunisia were hardly useless but that’s just an aside. There isn't, it seems, a simple answer to how many Axis troops fell into Allied hands in May 1943. The range is 200,000-275,000. Other than that, there is the matter of how many Axis prisoners would have been taken had the Axis not defended Tunis at all (as many as 230,000 in Libya), and what other bad consequences would have befallen the Axis cause had the Allies occupied Tunis in November 1942 as they originally planned, Rather than in May 1943.

Here is an quote from my book Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory (Naval Institute 2015)

“Thus, when Axis resistance collapsed, it was rapid and confused and no one definitively tallied the troops captured. The claim that the campaign netted “a human deluge of 130,000 German and 120,000 Italian soldiers--more prisoners than the Russians had taken at Stalingrad. . .” (Breuer, Operation Torch, 257.) has been advanced as an offset for Torch’s failure to achieve its original goal. (Also see Rolf, Bloody Road to Tunis, 282 and Howe, Northwest Africa, 666. He says 275,000) However, even if true this seems a specious argument. In March Allied intelligence estimated that 150,000 men would become prisoners when Tunisia finally fell. But this count failed to include “the number of extra administrative troops and civil and military officials in Tripolitania who had nothing to do with the final battle but headed east into the last bridgehead.” The official British history states that “The closest Allied record is that of the unwounded prisoners actually held on 25th May.” This numbered 101,784 Germans, 89,442 Italians, and 47,017 men nationality unspecified (Arab auxiliaries and volunteers and some French). Regardless of the actual number of combatants captured in May 1943, the number of Axis troops in Africa in December 1942 was probably greater. In addition to 40,000 Italians and Germans in Tunisia there were 133,000 Italians, 70,000 Germans and 26,000 native troops in Tripolitania. (Cernuschi, correspondence based on Canevari, La Guerra Italiana, vol.2) Had Tunisia fallen in December, the vast majority would have certainly been captured anyway. Moreover, an early victory would have avoided more than 75,000 Allied (including French) casualties, saved much shipping, opened the Mediterranean far earlier, and subsequent campaigns, be they in Sicily or France, would have started earlier. There is little question that the Axis bridgehead in Tunisia was a bad deal for the Allies and represented Torch’s worse failure.

Vince

[Henri Winkelman]

Since the Italian troops were pretty useless

Sorry to burst your bubble, but I just want to quote a despatch by Alexander after the battle of Enfidaville: "It was noticed that the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them".

Or to remind you that by 9 May your valuable German troops had utterly collapsed, driving themselves to captivity in their own vehicles, while General Messe’s "useless" Italian divisions, haggard and battered as they were, kept fighting till 13 May, when Mussolini himself ordered Messe to surrender because fighting on would only mean a useless bloodshed for a few more days of resistance...

I wouldn't be too proud of your Italian comrades Berto. Although I am aware of this story, It is not confirmed by other sources. And you probably know that 115.000 Italians were captured on Sicily a couple of months later, while all the German troops were able to escape and fought a lot better. Not to speak about the disaster in early 1941 when a small English force took 120.000 POW's during Operation Compass.

The only thing I know is that the Italians fought quite well when they were under German command. (Like Rommel) I have to admit that the Germans surrendered surprisingly early in Tunisia, but that doesn't say anything about the Italians.

[Henri Winkelman]

I agree with Berto that the Italian troops in Tunisia were hardly useless but that’s just an aside. There isn't, it seems, a simple answer to how many Axis troops fell into Allied hands in May 1943. The range is 200,000-275,000. Other than that, there is the matter of how many Axis prisoners would have been taken had the Axis not defended Tunis at all (as many as 230,000 in Libya), and what other bad consequences would have befallen the Axis cause had the Allies occupied Tunis in November 1942 as they originally planned, Rather than in May 1943.

That is exactly the matter I addressed in my original questions.

Here is an quote from my book Torch: North Africa and the Allied Path to Victory (Naval Institute 2015)

“Thus, when Axis resistance collapsed, it was rapid and confused and no one definitively tallied the troops captured. The claim that the campaign netted “a human deluge of 130,000 German and 120,000 Italian soldiers--more prisoners than the Russians had taken at Stalingrad. . .” (Breuer, Operation Torch, 257.) has been advanced as an offset for Torch’s failure to achieve its original goal. (Also see Rolf, Bloody Road to Tunis, 282 and Howe, Northwest Africa, 666. He says 275,000) However, even if true this seems a specious argument. In March Allied intelligence estimated that 150,000 men would become prisoners when Tunisia finally fell. But this count failed to include “the number of extra administrative troops and civil and military officials in Tripolitania who had nothing to do with the final battle but headed east into the last bridgehead.” The official British history states that “The closest Allied record is that of the unwounded prisoners actually held on 25th May.” This numbered 101,784 Germans, 89,442 Italians, and 47,017 men nationality unspecified (Arab auxiliaries and volunteers and some French).

Impressive, I didn't know that professional historians were writing on this forum. I have read your bibliography, so many interesting subjects! (Excuse me for my English btw, I am not a native speaker.)

But on-topic: More than 100.000 valuable German troops sounds like a big offer to me.

Regardless of the actual number of combatants captured in May 1943, the number of Axis troops in Africa in December 1942 was probably greater. In addition to 40,000 Italians and Germans in Tunisia there were 133,000 Italians, 70,000 Germans and 26,000 native troops in Tripolitania. (Cernuschi, correspondence based on Canevari, La Guerra Italiana, vol.2) Had Tunisia fallen in December, the vast majority would have certainly been captured anyway. Moreover, an early victory would have avoided more than 75,000 Allied (including French) casualties, saved much shipping, opened the Mediterranean far earlier, and subsequent campaigns, be they in Sicily or France, would have started earlier. There is little question that the Axis bridgehead in Tunisia was a bad deal for the Allies and represented Torch’s worse failure.

Vince

If I understand this correctly, there were no more troops in May 1943 than there were in December 1942. Thank you for adding the source. It sounds like Hitler didn't really reinforce Tunisia, but instead simply replaced his exhausted troops for new ones. Am I correct about that?

That shines a new light on this matter, I always thought the reinforcement of Tunisia was a total waste of manpower and increased the (possible) POW's with at least 200.000 men. Now I read your response, that doesn't seem to be the case. Thank you very much!

[Berto]

Although I am aware of this story, It is not confirmed by other sources.

"Not confirmed by other sources?"

Like, https://books.google.it/books?id=2nc7CQ ... 22&f=false or https://books.google.it/books?id=8zYVvf ... 22&f=false

And you probably know that 115.000 Italians were captured on Sicily a couple of months later, while all the German troops were able to escape and fought a lot better.

Yes, I know. Demoralized Sicilian reservists with no combat experience who were fighting in their own home, with their own people no longer supporting them, terrible equipment even by the not high standards of the Royal Italian Army, compared to some of the best units that the Wehrmacht had in the Mediterranean theatre? I'd rather compare them to the hundreds of thousands of German soldiers who, once the Western Allies entered Germany, were far more concerned with surrendering than with defending the fatherland...

Not to speak about the disaster in early 1941 when a small English force took 120.000 POW's during Operation Compass.

So what? That's not unheard of. In Malaya in '42, 140,000 Commonwealth troops were captured by 70,000 Japanese. At the fall of Tobruk in '42, according to Churchill himself, 35,000 Commonwealth troops surrendered to an Axis force half their number. Or since you are Dutch, we may talk about the Dutch East Indies falling to a Japanese invasion force that was considerably smaller that the defenders ...and are you aware that in the rest of the North African campaign the Italians made half of Rommel's troops and that after February 1941 and until the surrender in Tunisia the total Italian POW bag of all battles combined did not reach the total of Compass?

The only thing I know is that the Italians fought quite well when they were under German command. (Like Rommel)

Guess what, in Tunisia they were under the command of an Italian. Messe.

I have to admit that the Germans surrendered surprisingly early in Tunisia, but that doesn't say anything about the Italians.

Yes, if you willingly ignore every source that says that Italian troops in Tunisia fought rather effectively, I guess nothing says much about them.

[Dili]

A Sicily defended by veteran troops like those in N.Africa, would have been a completely different game for Allies. Now the question is could an evacuation be achieved? i think so.

[Sheldrake]

A Sicily defended by veteran troops like those in N.Africa, would have been a completely different game for Allies. Now the question is could an evacuation be achieved? i think so.

The issue with Tunisa is not whether an evacuation was possible, but whether the troops and material sent into the doomed Tunisa campaign would have been better used elsewhere.

The Germans had a principle about concentrating at the point of main effort. The main effort in late 1942 was in Southern Russia.. Stalingrad is regarded as a turning point. The Mediterranean theatre was a sideshow for Germany. Abandoning the remnants of the Panzerarmee Africa to their fate would have allowed the Germans to have more troops and aircraft with which to respond to the Soviet Uranus offensive that isolated Stalingrad.

Avoiding the Tunisian Campaign would have denied the US Army the opportunity to weed out duffers like Friedenthall. An unopposed Op[ Torch might have also led to an Allied Op Overlord in 1943. Possibly with Mark Clark somewhere in charge....

[jesk]

Instead of evacuating his troops in Northern Africa, Hitler instead ordered to reinforce Tunisia. The Tunisian Campagin ended in May 1943, the allies took around 250.000 prisoners. This defeat was, in fact, much bigger than Stalingrad since only 91.000 Germans were captured in that city and they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. (which was not the case in Tunisia.)

This incidentally, the feature of war in the west. With a smaller number, in comparison with the eastern front, irrecoverable losses are approximately the same.

[jesk]

A Sicily defended by veteran troops like those in N.Africa, would have been a completely different game for Allies. Now the question is could an evacuation be achieved? i think so.

The issue with Tunisa is not whether an evacuation was possible, but whether the troops and material sent into the doomed Tunisa campaign would have been better used elsewhere.

The Germans had a principle about concentrating at the point of main effort. The main effort in late 1942 was in Southern Russia.. Stalingrad is regarded as a turning point. The Mediterranean theatre was a sideshow for Germany. Abandoning the remnants of the Panzerarmee Africa to their fate would have allowed the Germans to have more troops and aircraft with which to respond to the Soviet Uranus offensive that isolated Stalingrad.

Avoiding the Tunisian Campaign would have denied the US Army the opportunity to weed out duffers like Friedenthall. An unopposed Op[ Torch might have also led to an Allied Op Overlord in 1943. Possibly with Mark Clark somewhere in charge....

The statement is roughly ripped out of context. It was enough for the Germans to leave 11 army in the Caucasus and this would be enough to win. In August, there was a wobbly parity in the forces with some preponderance of the Germans. The appearance of yet another army completely broke Soviet defense.

[MarkN]

Instead of evacuating his troops in Northern Africa, Hitler instead ordered to reinforce Tunisia. The Tunisian Campagin ended in May 1943, the allies took around 250.000 prisoners. This defeat was, in fact, much bigger than Stalingrad since only 91.000 Germans were captured in that city and they managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Russians. (which was not the case in Tunisia.)

I am curious in what you mean with the word "wasted".

The implication seems to be that those troops could have been 'better' utilised somewhere else. Could they?

Or are you suggesting that they were deliberately 'lost without purpose'. Were they?

[Henri Winkelman]

Lots of things to say guys!

"Not confirmed by other sources?"

Like, https://books.google.it/books?id=2nc7CQ ... 22&f=false or https://books.google.it/books?id=8zYVvf ... 22&f=false

I have to admit you are right about this one. Still, the fact that they hold out for 2 days longer than the Germans (for just one time) isn't a very incredible achievement. They still surrendered quickly.

Yes, I know. Demoralized Sicilian reservists with no combat experience who were fighting in their own home, with their own people no longer supporting them, terrible equipment even by the not high standards of the Royal Italian Army, compared to some of the best units that the Wehrmacht had in the Mediterranean theatre? I'd rather compare them to the hundreds of thousands of German soldiers who, once the Western Allies entered Germany, were far more concerned with surrendering than with defending the fatherland...

You can't be serious about this one. You would expect people to fight for their homes even harder than in ememy's territory. The situation on Sicily was totally different from the situation in Germany in 1945 when all frontlines were broken and there was no line to fall back on.

So what? That's not unheard of. In Malaya in '42, 140,000 Commonwealth troops were captured by 70,000 Japanese. At the fall of Tobruk in '42, according to Churchill himself, 35,000 Commonwealth troops surrendered to an Axis force half their number.

Yes, it is unheard of. Never in modern history was an army defeated in a way like this. The Italians outnumbered their opponents 5 to 1, that is not the same as 2 to 1.

Or since you are Dutch, we may talk about the Dutch East Indies falling to a Japanese invasion force that was considerably smaller that the defenders...

Yes, and I am not proud of that. Neither am I about Dutch resistance during May 1940, I even opened a topic about it:

viewtopic.php?f=54&t=226574

I have to say that this also had to do with the fact that most Dutch people perceived the Germans as kind of the same "Germanic" people. I am not saying that all Dutch people were nazi's, but they were defenititely not anti-German before the war. The anti-German sentiment was created after the war, not before.

Historically, the Dutch have quite a good reputation when it comes to fighting. The Dutch Waffen SS troops in Russia were the best of all German allies and after the war the Dutch army fought a brilliant war in Indonesia, only to be stopped by the Americans. (But not after defeat on the battlefield.)

Guess what, in Tunisia they were under the command of an Italian. Messe.

Yes, he made a mess (haha) of it. If a German commander would have been in command they would have held out for at least one month more. Remember Paulus in Stalingrad.

[Henri Winkelman]

The issue with Tunisa is not whether an evacuation was possible, but whether the troops and material sent into the doomed Tunisa campaign would have been better used elsewhere.

Well, the question remains how many reinforcements were actually send to Tunisia. (A question I already asked in my first post.)

The Germans had a principle about concentrating at the point of main effort. The main effort in late 1942 was in Southern Russia.. Stalingrad is regarded as a turning point. The Mediterranean theatre was a sideshow for Germany. Abandoning the remnants of the Panzerarmee Africa to their fate would have allowed the Germans to have more troops and aircraft with which to respond to the Soviet Uranus offensive that isolated Stalingrad.

Uranus started in November 1942, the reinforcements to Tunisia were send much later. Mostly between December 1942-February 1943. So this scenario is not really an option.

Avoiding the Tunisian Campaign would have denied the US Army the opportunity to weed out duffers like Friedenthall. An unopposed Op[ Torch might have also led to an Allied Op Overlord in 1943. Possibly with Mark Clark somewhere in charge....

Haha Mark Clark, wasn't that the guy who allowed the German 10th army to escape in Italy?