How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

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ljadw
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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#166

Post by ljadw » 26 Sep 2018, 19:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
26 Sep 2018, 16:31
ljadw wrote:
26 Sep 2018, 06:59
Calunmy ??[/quote
P 139 Hitler responsible for the Stalingrad fiasco because he refused the retreat of 6th Army .
The actual passage is,

"The Luftwaffe's problems in 1942 directly reflected the catastrophic failure of German grand strategy in Russia. In a larger sense, however, the root of those problems lay in the unjustified overconfidence that had marked German strategic and industrial planning after the stunning victory over France. Because the Germans had done so little to expand production despite control over most of Europe, the Reich's ground and air forces faced enemies who possessed a growing material superiority. Hitler's gamble in the summer of 1942 in the east further exacerbated German numerical inferiority. For the Luftwaffe, the imbalance was becoming unmanageable. Disregarding the difficulties in Russia, the Luftwaffe confronted in the west an Anglo-American industrial capacity that in the last quarter of 1942 outproduced Germany by 250 percent in single-engine fighters, by 196 percent in twin-engine aircraft, and by 20,077.7 percent in four-engine bombers. While some of the West's production went to the Pacific and to Russia, the rising wave of Allied production was becoming clear.135 It would soon swamp Germany's aerial defenders. "

Where is Stalingrad even mentioned?
P 148 : the decision to hold in Africa was a dreadful mistake .
Um, page 148 is Table XXX. German Losses by Theater, Jan-Nov 1943. Can you even be bothered to make sense anymore?
You have an other copy : in my copy it is mentioned on P 139 :"'Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day ( = November 24 )when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad . "
And on my copy ,Table XXX is on P 138 .
On my copy ,Chaper V (Attrition on the periphery: November 1942-August 1943 ) starts on P 137 and finishes on P 185 .

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#167

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Sep 2018, 05:31

ljadw wrote:
26 Sep 2018, 19:38
You have an other copy : in my copy it is mentioned on P 139 :"'Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day ( = November 24 )when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad . "
You must have a very odd edition, since that line is on page 150 of the Airpower Research Institute edition, which is the first edition. In any case, how is that statement wrong? Certainly it is no guarantee that an immediate order for a breakout would have resulted in a better outcome, I rather doubt it would have, but that still does not invalidate Murray's simple statement, nor make it the commentary of a Cold warrior denigrating the British and Soviets and exulting the Germans. 8-) :lol:
And on my copy ,Table XXX is on P 138 .
And that is page 148 of the original edition.
On my copy ,Chaper V (Attrition on the periphery: November 1942-August 1943 ) starts on P 137 and finishes on P 185 .
Begins on page 147 in the original edition and ends on page 261. I wonder if part of your problem may be that you are using a crank edition with ten or eleven pages missing? :lol: Either that or your edition moved the chapter end notes to the end of the work? Makes it kind of a PITA to discuss such things when publishers play such games.
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ljadw
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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#168

Post by ljadw » 27 Sep 2018, 08:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 05:31
ljadw wrote:
26 Sep 2018, 19:38
You have an other copy : in my copy it is mentioned on P 139 :"'Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day ( = November 24 )when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad . "
You must have a very odd edition, since that line is on page 150 of the Airpower Research Institute edition, which is the first edition. In any case, how is that statement wrong? Certainly it is no guarantee that an immediate order for a breakout would have resulted in a better outcome, I rather doubt it would have, but that still does not invalidate Murray's simple statement, nor make it the commentary of a Cold warrior denigrating the British and Soviets and exulting the Germans. 8-) :lol:
And on my copy ,Table XXX is on P 138 .
And that is page 148 of the original edition.
On my copy ,Chaper V (Attrition on the periphery: November 1942-August 1943 ) starts on P 137 and finishes on P 185 .
Begins on page 147 in the original edition and ends on page 261. I wonder if part of your problem may be that you are using a crank edition with ten or eleven pages missing? :lol: Either that or your edition moved the chapter end notes to the end of the work? Makes it kind of a PITA to discuss such things when publishers play such games.
About Murray blaming Hitler for Stalingrad ,parotting the German generals, this was very popular in the US during the Cold War,for obvious reasons,and it is still popular .What Murray is saying is that without Hitler 6th Army would not be encircled , or if encircled, it could escape from Stalingrad .The truth is that Stalingrad was caused by the failure of Blau, which was caused by the Soviet refusal to collaps .The Soviets were responsible for the defeat of Stalingrad,as were the Germans for the successes of Fall Gelb/Fall Blau .When the Germans won, the German generals said that they were responsible, when they lost, they blamed Hitler and Murray does the same .In his conclusion,Murray talks about the German arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigators . This is irrelevant as this attitude had no influence on the German military decisions during the war : in the Barbarossa Weisung Hitler said that one must prevent the escape of parts of the Soviet army to the region east of the Dnjepr-Dwina . About the Americans, there was no underestimation :before Barbarossa the LW warned that the US were outproducing Germany in aircraft,Hitler's reaction ,BEFORE Barbarossa, was to order that the LW and KM should have priority in the armament question .

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#169

Post by ljadw » 27 Sep 2018, 09:29

About the bias of Murray :
I have already given an example of his anti-Russian bias and his anti-British bias .
An other example of his anti-British bias :in Chapter IV (On the Brink ) Murray said that"' the British were saddled with a series of incompetent commanders on the ground ",for which of course he wisely preferred not to give proofs . Why ? Because such proofs did not exist .
In December 1940 ,the WDF attacked, destroyed the Italians in Cyrenaica and conquered the half of Libya . Were O'Çonnor and Wavell incompetent ? I don't think so .
The British advance was stopped, and the Italians counterattacked with the help of 1 ( later 2) German division .
The Italians were stopped in the summer,and the British counterattacked in the winter,conquering again the half of Libya . Was Auchinleck incompetent ?
Finally,the Axis attacked again, was again stopped ( by Auchinleck ) and was pushed back and this time the whole of Libya was conquered . Was Montgomery incompetent ?

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#170

Post by ljadw » 27 Sep 2018, 09:56

Where Murray is also wrong,is his claim that Ultra made convoy operations relatively easy to pinpoint and attack : he 'forgets '' to mention that in 1941 77% of the fuel that was sent to NA arrived,89 % of vehicled and spares,and 87 % of weapons and ammunition. and that for 1942 it was almost the same : 78 %, 84 % and 95 % .
Source : Christos military and intelligence corner : Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys .
The results of Ultra were not very brilliant .
Only in 3 of 24 months did less than half of the fuel arrive that was sent,for vehicles and spares 2 months,for weapons and ammunition one month .

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#171

Post by Urmel » 27 Sep 2018, 10:52

The reality is more complex than what Christos or indeed Dati Statistici portrays.

To jump from that partial, and indeed deliberately selective presentation in the Italian navy's official history to the conclusion that ULTRA results 'were not very brilliant' is just laziness and misinformation due to reliance on Google instead of research.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#172

Post by MarkN » 27 Sep 2018, 11:21

The more ljadw posts, the more his/her incompetence and abysmal understanding of the subject is highlighted. :lol:

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#173

Post by ljadw » 27 Sep 2018, 12:31

Urmel wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 10:52
The reality is more complex than what Christos or indeed Dati Statistici portrays.

To jump from that partial, and indeed deliberately selective presentation in the Italian navy's official history to the conclusion that ULTRA results 'were not very brilliant' is just laziness and misinformation due to reliance on Google instead of research.
Why is the presentation partial and deliberatedly selective ?
It was about 2 years and contained fuel, vehicles, weapons and ammunition .
In november 1942 almost 54000 tons of supplies were sent to NA ( some 15 ships ) and some 20000 tons were lost( 6 ships ? ), and that is without the coastal shipping ,that means that the Ultra results were not very brilliant .
The reasons are that Ultra did not say where ship X would be at hour Z, that informations do not mean that ships/ aircraft were available and that the merchant ships were well protected by the RM,and also that most Ultra informations were very quickly obsolete .

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#174

Post by Urmel » 27 Sep 2018, 13:20

I'm not going to do your homework for you. I also don't need you to mansplain ULTRA and the role and shortcomings of Malta to me. You are making yourself ridiculous when you do so. Christos is grinding an axe, and the presentation of the data in the Dati Statistici is partial and deliberately selective, and it is presented without any context. That's all there is to it.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#175

Post by Urmel » 27 Sep 2018, 13:21

MarkN wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 11:21
The more ljadw posts, the more his/her incompetence and abysmal understanding of the subject is highlighted. :lol:
This thread is so AHF, it don't even know it.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#176

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Sep 2018, 17:58

ljadw wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 08:49
About Murray blaming Hitler for Stalingrad ,parotting the German generals, this was very popular in the US during the Cold War,for obvious reasons,and it is still popular .What Murray is saying is that without Hitler 6th Army would not be encircled , or if encircled, it could escape from Stalingrad .
That may be, but it is your interpretation of American historiography...and that it was unique in the historiography of the west. So how was it different from the interpretation in Britain? France? Or Germany?

Btw, what Murray actually says is quite simple and factually correct. "Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad and assured him that an airlift could meet Sixth Army's supply needs." You on the other hand or putting words into Murray's mouth, as you are wont to do whenever you refer to a source. That is your interpretation of what you think Murray meant and is not, in any way, shape, or form, what Murray said.
The truth is that Stalingrad was caused by the failure of Blau, which was caused by the Soviet refusal to collaps .The Soviets were responsible for the defeat of Stalingrad,as were the Germans for the successes of Fall Gelb/Fall Blau .
Why yes that is true (although yet again you enjoy contradicting yourself - was BLAU a German failure or a success?) However, it no way, shape, or form contradicts Murray's simple statement that you take such offense to.
When the Germans won, the German generals said that they were responsible, when they lost, they blamed Hitler and Murray does the same .
Murray is correct in this statement as are the German generals who may have said it as well. Let me say it too, "Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad and assured him that an airlift could meet Sixth Army's supply needs." There, I just did. It is factually correct and has nothing to do with me "parotting" [sic] anyone.
In his conclusion,Murray talks about the German arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigators . This is irrelevant as this attitude had no influence on the German military decisions during the war : in the Barbarossa Weisung Hitler said that one must prevent the escape of parts of the Soviet army to the region east of the Dnjepr-Dwina . About the Americans, there was no underestimation :before Barbarossa the LW warned that the US were outproducing Germany in aircraft,Hitler's reaction ,BEFORE Barbarossa, was to order that the LW and KM should have priority in the armament question .
The full passage, on page 302 (and whatever page on your odd edition), is:

"What is almost incomprehensible is the fact that the Germans paid so little attention to the attrition that had occurred in France and over Britain . Not until the Wehrmacht was deep in the Soviet Union did Goring finally authorize Milch to bring order to the aircraft industry . By that time, it was too late . British production programs had a two-year head start, while the American programs were at least a year ahead . If that handicap were not enough, Milch faced a constant, uphill battle to persuade the general staff to accept as a necessity the production increases that he proposed . That failure to gear German aircraft production to a worst case analysis of what Anglo-American industry might turn out cost the Luftwaffe the air war in 1943 and 1944 . One cannot stress enough that administrative, strategic, and productive decisions in the 1940 to 1941 time frame insured the permanent inferiority of Germany's air effort throughout the remainder of the war. The basis of those decisions lay in an overestimation of the Reich's strength and a contemptuous arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigerators . Disdainful of their enemies and proud of their victories, the Germans were sure that their technological expertise and military
competence could master any threat."

You are no doubt referring to Tooze, pp. 396-460? Yes, Tooze did identify the key strategic conundrum for Hitler and his reaction to it, but he also acknowledged the same basic arrogance of Hitler as regards the Americans and Russians. Rüstungsprogramme-B did fundamentally change from a short to a long-war strategy before BARBAROSSA, but that was based partly on what the Germans already knew about the American aircraft production program and what it was supplying Britain through Lend-Lease. There was no indication that Hitler had anything other than contempt for America's military capabilities, rather he spoke of a "battle of the continents" after the foregone conclusion of Soviet defeat with perfect aplomb.

The immediate effect of Rüstungsprogramme-B was to increase Heer weapons and vehicle production by 54%, aircraft by 40%, and a tripling of U-boat production, coupled with a reduction in ammunition production (Tooze, p. 435). That squares with a belief the American "threat" could be handled by sinking the vessels shipping aircraft to Britain, coupled with a modest increase in aircraft numbers and that the modest increase in weapons and vehicle production and decrease of ammunition production was fine for crushing the USSR. That is pretty good evidence of an "overestimation of the Reich's strength and a contemptuous arrogance" of its enemies capabilities. Yes, Hitler took action before BARBAROSSA, but based on his flawed and arrogant assumptions about the US and USSR.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#177

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Sep 2018, 18:01

Urmel wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 10:52
The reality is more complex than what Christos or indeed Dati Statistici portrays.

To jump from that partial, and indeed deliberately selective presentation in the Italian navy's official history to the conclusion that ULTRA results 'were not very brilliant' is just laziness and misinformation due to reliance on Google instead of research.
Given that replying to his tripe is proving as usual to be a massive time-waster, I think I will simply stop replying at all. As is usual on the internet, the orifice that talks longest and loudest will get heard. :roll:
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 27 Sep 2018, 18:07, edited 1 time in total.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#178

Post by Richard Anderson » 27 Sep 2018, 18:02

Urmel wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 13:21
MarkN wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 11:21
The more ljadw posts, the more his/her incompetence and abysmal understanding of the subject is highlighted. :lol:
This thread is so AHF, it don't even know it.
:welcome: :thumbsup: :lol:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#179

Post by Berto » 27 Sep 2018, 18:04

Urmel wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 13:20
the presentation of the data in the Dati Statistici is partial and deliberately selective, and it is presented without any context.
Could you elaborate on that? Genuinely curious.

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Re: How many German troops wasted in Tunisia?

#180

Post by MarkN » 27 Sep 2018, 19:07

Richard Anderson wrote:
27 Sep 2018, 18:01
Given that replying to his tripe is proving as usual to be a massive time-waster, I think I will simply stop replying at all. As is usual on the internet, the orifice that talks longest and loudest will get heard. :roll:
My posting style/approach may not be to everybody's liking, but I'm not a great sufferer of fools. Many months back it became clear that ljadw is simply trolling. Trying to wind people up and get them to waste their time responding. The more serious you take his/her posts, the greater the wall of stupidy fired back. Feeding trolls has never been on my to-do list. But, at the same time, trolls cannot be ignored anymore than the idiot who deliberately double parks over your car. They are both in the way and blocking common sense. So I respond, but in a way which highlights to passing readers the stupidty, without waste my time unnecessary and without (often) getting the wall of stupidty back blocking the discussion.

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