ljadw wrote: ↑27 Sep 2018, 08:49
About Murray blaming Hitler for Stalingrad ,parotting the German generals, this was very popular in the US during the Cold War,for obvious reasons,and it is still popular .What Murray is saying is that without Hitler 6th Army would not be encircled , or if encircled, it could escape from Stalingrad .
That may be, but it is your interpretation of American historiography...and that it was unique in the historiography of the west. So how was it different from the interpretation in Britain? France? Or Germany?
Btw, what Murray actually says is quite simple and factually correct. "Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad and assured him that an airlift could meet Sixth Army's supply needs." You on the other hand or putting words into Murray's mouth, as you are wont to do whenever you refer to a source. That is your interpretation of what you think Murray meant and is not, in any way, shape, or form, what Murray said.
The truth is that Stalingrad was caused by the failure of Blau, which was caused by the Soviet refusal to collaps .The Soviets were responsible for the defeat of Stalingrad,as were the Germans for the successes of Fall Gelb/Fall Blau .
Why yes that is true (although yet again you enjoy contradicting yourself - was BLAU a German failure or a success?) However, it no way, shape, or form contradicts Murray's simple statement that you take such offense to.
When the Germans won, the German generals said that they were responsible, when they lost, they blamed Hitler and Murray does the same .
Murray is correct in this statement as are the German generals who may have said it as well. Let me say it too, "Hitler sealed the pocket's fate on the next day when he ordered Paulus to hold Stalingrad and assured him that an airlift could meet Sixth Army's supply needs." There, I just did. It is factually correct and has nothing to do with me "parotting" [sic] anyone.
In his conclusion,Murray talks about the German arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigators . This is irrelevant as this attitude had no influence on the German military decisions during the war : in the Barbarossa Weisung Hitler said that one must prevent the escape of parts of the Soviet army to the region east of the Dnjepr-Dwina . About the Americans, there was no underestimation :before Barbarossa the LW warned that the US were outproducing Germany in aircraft,Hitler's reaction ,BEFORE Barbarossa, was to order that the LW and KM should have priority in the armament question .
The full passage, on page 302 (and whatever page on your odd edition), is:
"What is almost incomprehensible is the fact that the Germans paid so little attention to the attrition that had occurred in France and over Britain . Not until the Wehrmacht was deep in the Soviet Union did Goring finally authorize Milch to bring order to the aircraft industry . By that time, it was too late . British production programs had a two-year head start, while the American programs were at least a year ahead . If that handicap were not enough, Milch faced a constant, uphill battle to persuade the general staff to accept as a necessity the production increases that he proposed . That failure to gear German aircraft production to a worst case analysis of what Anglo-American industry might turn out cost the Luftwaffe the air war in 1943 and 1944 . One cannot stress enough that administrative, strategic, and productive decisions in the 1940 to 1941 time frame insured the permanent inferiority of Germany's air effort throughout the remainder of the war. The basis of those decisions lay in an overestimation of the Reich's strength and a contemptuous arrogance that dismissed the Russians as subhumans and the Americans as capable of building only radios and refrigerators . Disdainful of their enemies and proud of their victories, the Germans were sure that their technological expertise and military
competence could master any threat."
You are no doubt referring to Tooze, pp. 396-460? Yes, Tooze did identify the key strategic conundrum for Hitler and his reaction to it, but he also acknowledged the same basic arrogance of Hitler as regards the Americans and Russians. Rüstungsprogramme-B did fundamentally change from a short to a long-war strategy before BARBAROSSA, but that was based partly on what the Germans already knew about the American aircraft production program and what it was supplying Britain through Lend-Lease. There was no indication that Hitler had anything other than contempt for America's military capabilities, rather he spoke of a "battle of the continents" after the foregone conclusion of Soviet defeat with perfect aplomb.
The immediate effect of Rüstungsprogramme-B was to increase Heer weapons and vehicle production by 54%, aircraft by 40%, and a tripling of U-boat production, coupled with a reduction in ammunition production (Tooze, p. 435). That squares with a belief the American "threat" could be handled by sinking the vessels shipping aircraft to Britain, coupled with a modest increase in aircraft numbers and that the modest increase in weapons and vehicle production and decrease of ammunition production was fine for crushing the USSR. That is pretty good evidence of an "overestimation of the Reich's strength and a contemptuous arrogance" of its enemies capabilities. Yes, Hitler took action before BARBAROSSA, but based on his flawed and arrogant assumptions about the US and USSR.