some questions on italian campaign

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teg
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some questions on italian campaign

#1

Post by teg » 15 Sep 2018, 17:24

Italian Campaign certainly has strategic importance. But after 1943 Allied Mediterranean communications were effectively protected by capturing naval bases in Sicily and Southern Italy. Was it a mistake to sent huge number of soldiers and technics to Italy in 1944-1945 ( there were near 1,5 mln. allied soldiers in Italy up to 1945? May be it was better for allies to conduct static war in Italy in 1944 and concentrate the overwhelming majority of resources on liberating France and NW Europe?

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Urmel
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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#2

Post by Urmel » 22 Sep 2018, 14:37

From memory, someone here has run the numbers in the past (Qvist?), and showed that overall the Germans committed more to the campaign than the allies, so it was worth it.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#3

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 22 Sep 2018, 14:52

And of course, there wasn't a vast quantity of spare shipping available to move all of the troops, vehicles, guns, equipment, etc from Italy around to ports in NW Europe (and the (few and often badly damaged) ports in NW Europe were rather busy unloading all the troops already assigned to that campaign and all the logistic support they needed.

Wasn't the "overwhelming majority of resources" concentrated on liberating France and NW Europe?

And finally, it would have been possible for the Germans to move their resources in the same direction and more rapidly (by rail).

Regards

Tom

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Andy H
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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#4

Post by Andy H » 02 Oct 2018, 13:07

teg wrote:
15 Sep 2018, 17:24
Italian Campaign certainly has strategic importance. But after 1943 Allied Mediterranean communications were effectively protected by capturing naval bases in Sicily and Southern Italy. Was it a mistake to sent huge number of soldiers and technics to Italy in 1944-1945 ( there were near 1,5 mln. allied soldiers in Italy up to 1945? May be it was better for allies to conduct static war in Italy in 1944 and concentrate the overwhelming majority of resources on liberating France and NW Europe?
Hi Teg

It'll be a detailed cause and effect as to whether what your suggesting would have the outcome your suggesting.

Its very easy to say if the 1.5 million had been only deployed here, then X would have happened. However, could all of the 1.5 have been accomodated (literally in some cases) in theatre or even if deployed would they have been effective?

Logistics is the key aspect and though the western Allies had overwhleming dominance they couldn't always bring that to bear and as already pointed out, the Axis had shorter and quicker means at thier disposal.

Also at what stage do you say enough is enough in the Med? After NA! After Sicily! After Rome!

Regards

Andy H

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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#5

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 22 Nov 2018, 19:38

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
22 Sep 2018, 14:52
And of course, there wasn't a vast quantity of spare shipping available to move all of the troops, vehicles, guns, equipment, etc from Italy around to ports in NW Europe (and the (few and often badly damaged) ports in NW Europe were rather busy unloading all the troops already assigned to that campaign and all the logistic support they needed.

Wasn't the "overwhelming majority of resources" concentrated on liberating France and NW Europe?
This was why Eisenhower and the French leaders were so adamant about reviving Op ANVIL as Op DRAGOON. Control of the south France port group and the relatively intact railways running north allowed a relatively quick avenue to move US/French corps from the Med to what they saw as the main effort
... And finally, it would have been possible for the Germans to move their resources in the same direction and more rapidly (by rail)...
Thats worth a close look. I've lately been reading on the Allied bombing effort vs the Italian/Austrian railways in 1944. Trying to get a take on exactly how badly it damaged German mobility and supply movement.

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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#6

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 22 Nov 2018, 23:42

Carl,
This was why Eisenhower and the French leaders were so adamant about reviving Op ANVIL as Op DRAGOON. Control of the south France port group and the relatively intact railways running north allowed a relatively quick avenue to move US/French corps from the Med to what they saw as the main effort
Wasn't that only realised in hindsight? After all, any sensible withdrawal by the Germans would have seen the ports and railways more thoroughly demolished? I'd always thought that the French wanted to get their troops back into France for obvious (and totally understandable) patriotic reasons (think of D-day with a couple of French divisions leading the assault! :) ).
I've lately been reading on the Allied bombing effort vs the Italian/Austrian railways in 1944. Trying to get a take on exactly how badly it damaged German mobility and supply movement.
That sounds interesting. I guess they did move a couple of Pz Gren divs (3 ad 15?) pretty quickly in August 1944. I might have something about the level of interdiction suffered by German forces in Italy. I'll see if I can dig it out.

Regards

Tom

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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#7

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Nov 2018, 04:49

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 23:42
That sounds interesting. I guess they did move a couple of Pz Gren divs (3 ad 15?) pretty quickly in August 1944. I might have something about the level of interdiction suffered by German forces in Italy. I'll see if I can dig it out.
Tom,

First encounter by Third Army with 3. Panzergrenadier Division was 28 August, 15. Panzergreandier Division a few days later. The 15. Panzergrenadier movement began after 10 August and on 29 August both divisions were still shown on the German maps as in transit by rail. Also about 28-29 August, the two divisions were ordered to set up east of Reims, prepared to attack Third Army. However, by 1 September, they had abandoned that plan and instead established a defensive front between Verdun and Commercy.

The HERO/DMSi study on Italian interdiction did not get into the movement of the two divisions, but gave an overall picture of the effects in August and September, which were severe, but not crippling to German logistical and troop movements.
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Tom from Cornwall
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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#8

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 23 Nov 2018, 11:22

Rich, thanks.

I seem to recall that some details of both movements were revealed by Ultra decrypts. I’ll have a look to see what they say.

Regards

Tom

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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#9

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 30 Nov 2018, 18:55

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
22 Nov 2018, 23:42
Carl,
This was why Eisenhower and the French leaders were so adamant about reviving Op ANVIL as Op DRAGOON. Control of the south France port group and the relatively intact railways running north allowed a relatively quick avenue to move US/French corps from the Med to what they saw as the main effort
Wasn't that only realised in hindsight?
Only in the sense of the campaign progressing three or four times as fast as anticipated. When Eisenhower was insisting in Jan/Feb the ANVIL operation proceed it was understood by everyone the advance across France would be slower than the rebuilding of the railways and automotive roads. Through July it was starting to look like the January estimates were optimistic. The ongoing problem of Allied cargo shipping was on their minds as well. Every extra day a ton was aboard a ship represented a net loss of that most precious of Allied resources. Transporting US & French corps to Marsailles from other Med ports was more than twice as fast as getting them to Bourdeux, St Nazairre, Brest, ect... Finally there was the matter of not opening the Atlantic ports on time. By late June its was clear the Bereton port group was not going to be opened on schedule, & neither were the Channel ports. that lent some additional urgency to getting the battle front in France expanded from another direction.
I've lately been reading on the Allied bombing effort vs the Italian/Austrian railways in 1944. Trying to get a take on exactly how badly it damaged German mobility and supply movement.
That sounds interesting. I guess they did move a couple of Pz Gren divs (3 ad 15?) pretty quickly in August 1944. I might have something about the level of interdiction suffered by German forces in Italy. I'll see if I can dig it out.

Regards

Tom
Don't know if they moved just the men, and picked up new equipment in Germany, or if they took trucks and tanks with them. Both were the practice, depending on circumstances. Most of the reading I have at hand is short on hard data and long on stories about Allied bomber groups repeatedly dropping bridges in Italian valleys and German soldiers detraining at every bridge to wade across the river to the next locomotive and cars. In the spring of 1944 a large part of Kesselrings decision to retreat from the winter positions, back to nearer Rome, was the inability to maintain ammunition and equipment reserves at the forward army depots south of Rome.

Some hard numbers on all this would be useful.

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Re: some questions on italian campaign

#10

Post by Sheldrake » 01 Dec 2018, 10:53

teg wrote:
15 Sep 2018, 17:24
Italian Campaign certainly has strategic importance. But after 1943 Allied Mediterranean communications were effectively protected by capturing naval bases in Sicily and Southern Italy. Was it a mistake to sent huge number of soldiers and technics to Italy in 1944-1945 ( there were near 1,5 mln. allied soldiers in Italy up to 1945? May be it was better for allies to conduct static war in Italy in 1944 and concentrate the overwhelming majority of resources on liberating France and NW Europe?
Until D Day for Op Overlord there was a clear logic to an allied offensive in Italy. On 6th June there were 20+ German divisions in Italy which were not available for the Germans to defeat the cross channel assault at its most vulnerable stage. The 20+ Allied divisions deployed to Italy are irrelevant as the rate of the allied build up in Normandy was a function of assault shipping. The extra 20 divisions not deployed wopuld merely have joined the queue of Normandy reinforcements.

The success of the allied offensive in MayJune 1944 was an added bonus. The Germans had to reinforce Italy at the every moment the allies attacked in France. After the successful liberation of France in June-August 1944 there is less justification for an allied offensive, though the argument that "anyone not skinning should grab a leg and pull" meant that there should be sustained pressure on the Germans in Italy otherwise they would have a free rein to withdraw troops that could have been available at the critical points on the Western Front. That is all counter factual and un -provable.

The arguments are complicated by the fact that the war was not waged by a single rational Allied commander but by an alliance whose institutions and commanders had their own priorities and political interaction.
- The US Army's leadership retained support for launching the invasion of France in 1943 that they lost at the Casablanca Conference.
- Individual commanders championed the cause of their own sphere of interest and theatre of operations. Unsuprisingly Ike lost interest In Italy after his appointment as Supreme Commander for NWEurope. Nor that the commanders in Italy championed operations there.

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