Fubbik
The Matildas were heavily armoured but slow and under-gunned. They did good work against the Italians, but were no match for the German 88´s.
True but neither was any German tank including the Tiger I.
Come to think of it none of them were a match for the British 17lb gun.
The British were inadept at using armour and infantry together, but the German were not. The British had met them often enough to be able to learn from them.
...and they did eventually.
The British converted tanks like the Canadian Ram and the M7 "Priest" SPG to carry infantry. AFAIK, the Red Army never progressed beyond carrying its infantry on the tanks themselves.
Going on with a plan although one has learned that the circumstances have deteriorated seems like sloppy planning to me.
Like Germany progressing with Citadel?
Like the allies progressing with Overlord even though they knew the weather was closing in and storms were forecast - which eventually cost one of the Mulberry harbours?
Deciding to continue is a function of command - it's called risk assesment. It's not sloppy planning - it's what commanders are paid to do.
Rommel vs. Montgomery
German tanks weren't really meant to fight other tanks under early German doctrine. That was the province of the AT arm - so their 37 mm guns' inability to deal with Matildas (and later with T34s) was much more critical than their tanks' impotence when facing a Matilda - that was expected to be a rare occurrence.Polynikes wrote:The Matildas were heavily armoured but slow and under-gunned. They did good work against the Italians, but were no match for the German 88´s.
True but neither was any German tank including the Tiger I.
Later on when battlefield tactics changed, the Germans were fully capable of fielding tanks that outmatched anything the opposition could field.
Ok, but this gun entered service many years later than the 88.Come to think of it none of them were a match for the British 17lb gun.
Well, the learning process wasn't so straightforward. O'Connor's 1940-1941 desert offensive was a textbook exercise in combined arms, but apparently this was all forgotten when the Germans came to North Africa. It was apparently also a great shock that the Germans were unsporting enough to use the 88 against tanks, even though this had been experienced at Arras in 1940.The British were inadept at using armour and infantry together, but the German were not. The British had met them often enough to be able to learn from them.
...and they did eventually.
The Soviets got many Lend-Lease White halftracks, which made the Red Army a more mobile force as the war progressed.The British converted tanks like the Canadian Ram and the M7 "Priest" SPG to carry infantry. AFAIK, the Red Army never progressed beyond carrying its infantry on the tanks themselves.
That operation was called off before things had deteriorated very much. One reason was the Allied invasion of Sicily.Going on with a plan although one has learned that the circumstances have deteriorated seems like sloppy planning to me.
Like Germany progressing with Citadel?
A window of clear weather was also forecast between storms, and this turned out to hold true. It was a simple exercise in weighing risks.Like the allies progressing with Overlord even though they knew the weather was closing in and storms were forecast - which eventually cost one of the Mulberry harbours?
Well, the assessment part implies that you don't necessarily carry on, though deviating from the strategy that you have already laid down is generally a bad idea.Deciding to continue is a function of command - it's called risk assesment. It's not sloppy planning - it's what commanders are paid to do.
[quote...Deciding to continue is a function of command - it's called risk assesment. [/quote]
Carrying on with a plan after the odds have turned against you is not called risk assesment. It´s called lunacy. Change the plan or scrap it, but don´t go on with it if the conditions have changed for the worse.
Carrying on with a plan after the odds have turned against you is not called risk assesment. It´s called lunacy. Change the plan or scrap it, but don´t go on with it if the conditions have changed for the worse.
So with the failure of Barborrosa in the Winter of 41/22, Germany should have got the hell out of Russia, but they didn't-that's lunacy.Carrying on with a plan after the odds have turned against you is not called risk assesment. It´s called lunacy. Change the plan or scrap it, but don´t go on with it if the conditions have changed for the worse
Andy H
Shrek
German tanks weren't really meant to fight other tanks under early German doctrine. That was the province of the AT arm - so their 37 mm guns' inability to deal with Matildas (and later with T34s) was much more critical than their tanks' impotence when facing a Matilda - that was expected to be a rare occurrence.
You miss the point, it was countered that although the Matilda II was superior to any German tank in 1939-40, it couldn't stand up to the German 88mm gun in an AT role and that is true...
However it is the nature of AT guns to be able to knock out tanks & I was just making the point that the ability of the 88 to knock out the Matilda II is hardly a criticsism of the tank.
Later on when battlefield tactics changed, the Germans were fully capable of fielding tanks that outmatched anything the opposition could field.
Generally true yes but Germany also fielded many assault guns in place of tanks and also many Pz IV tanks that were inferior to the tanks that opposed them.
Indeed when the T-34/76 was enocuntered in 1941, there was hardly a German tank to match it.
Ok, but this gun entered service many years later than the 88.
It was formally introduced in May 1942, granted sometime after the 88 but only 2 years into the real war.
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paters ... illery.htm
The Soviets got many Lend-Lease White halftracks, which made the Red Army a more mobile force as the war progressed.
The British also received US scout cars and half tracks - the Brits also devised their own solutions and the Red Army was still carrying soldiers on the tops of tanks at the war's end.
That operation was called off before things had deteriorated very much. One reason was the Allied invasion of Sicily.
Yes Citadel was going badly and the landings in Sicily was the final nail.
The German plans were known to STAVKA and they prepared thoroughly for it.
A window of clear weather was also forecast between storms, and this turned out to hold true. It was a simple exercise in weighing risks.
Absolutely it was. Risk management - just like proceding with Market-Garden. Some gambles work, others fail...those storms might have destroyed BOTH Mulberry harbours and that "window" might never have happened, indeed I don't know if you're aware but the Scottish chief meteorologist employed by SHAEF was not fully supported by his colleages and admitted later that it was a "hunch".
Well, the assessment part implies that you don't necessarily carry on, though deviating from the strategy that you have already laid down is generally a bad idea.
Deviating from the aim is a bad idea...best example is the German effort in the Battle of Britain.
Change the details certainly but never the aim.
Market-Garden wasn't sloppily planned. Indeed if anything it was OVER-planned with too tight a timetable and too narrow a margin for success.
But most of all it failed because of the greatest intangilble of all - luck.
German tanks weren't really meant to fight other tanks under early German doctrine. That was the province of the AT arm - so their 37 mm guns' inability to deal with Matildas (and later with T34s) was much more critical than their tanks' impotence when facing a Matilda - that was expected to be a rare occurrence.
You miss the point, it was countered that although the Matilda II was superior to any German tank in 1939-40, it couldn't stand up to the German 88mm gun in an AT role and that is true...
However it is the nature of AT guns to be able to knock out tanks & I was just making the point that the ability of the 88 to knock out the Matilda II is hardly a criticsism of the tank.
Later on when battlefield tactics changed, the Germans were fully capable of fielding tanks that outmatched anything the opposition could field.
Generally true yes but Germany also fielded many assault guns in place of tanks and also many Pz IV tanks that were inferior to the tanks that opposed them.
Indeed when the T-34/76 was enocuntered in 1941, there was hardly a German tank to match it.
Ok, but this gun entered service many years later than the 88.
It was formally introduced in May 1942, granted sometime after the 88 but only 2 years into the real war.
http://www.btinternet.com/~ian.a.paters ... illery.htm
The Soviets got many Lend-Lease White halftracks, which made the Red Army a more mobile force as the war progressed.
The British also received US scout cars and half tracks - the Brits also devised their own solutions and the Red Army was still carrying soldiers on the tops of tanks at the war's end.
That operation was called off before things had deteriorated very much. One reason was the Allied invasion of Sicily.
Yes Citadel was going badly and the landings in Sicily was the final nail.
The German plans were known to STAVKA and they prepared thoroughly for it.
A window of clear weather was also forecast between storms, and this turned out to hold true. It was a simple exercise in weighing risks.
Absolutely it was. Risk management - just like proceding with Market-Garden. Some gambles work, others fail...those storms might have destroyed BOTH Mulberry harbours and that "window" might never have happened, indeed I don't know if you're aware but the Scottish chief meteorologist employed by SHAEF was not fully supported by his colleages and admitted later that it was a "hunch".
Well, the assessment part implies that you don't necessarily carry on, though deviating from the strategy that you have already laid down is generally a bad idea.
Deviating from the aim is a bad idea...best example is the German effort in the Battle of Britain.
Change the details certainly but never the aim.
Market-Garden wasn't sloppily planned. Indeed if anything it was OVER-planned with too tight a timetable and too narrow a margin for success.
But most of all it failed because of the greatest intangilble of all - luck.
Rommel vs. Montgomery
Well, as you can see, I'm quite new to this site, interesting stuff, I must say. Reading however this discussion, I think it got a bit off-line.
Bringing it back to the question itself, we seem to forget two big facts:
In Africa Rommel had in the early years the advantage of the Feller reports.
Knowing by this every Britisch move. Does that say something about his militairy capabilities?
Montgomery had the Enigma code, kept secret for a long time and raising quite some stir in England that Monty's victory over Rommel was not that glamorous at all, as he writes in his book.
There the score is 1 all.
Also, please do not forget that Rommel was praised by the Germans as well as by the allies, at first not with a deeper thought, later to let the allies victory shine even more then they were?
Nothing wrong with that, although we heve to keep taht in mind when we want to solve the question, who was the greater general?
To compare the both is a bit silly really. They had more differences then they had things in commen.
Montgomery had a picture of Rommel in his command car. Rommel did not.
About equipment? Well what can you say, the facts state that Gemany at the beginning of the war had tanks not matching the allies. The only plus was their speed.
Bringing it back to the question itself, we seem to forget two big facts:
In Africa Rommel had in the early years the advantage of the Feller reports.
Knowing by this every Britisch move. Does that say something about his militairy capabilities?
Montgomery had the Enigma code, kept secret for a long time and raising quite some stir in England that Monty's victory over Rommel was not that glamorous at all, as he writes in his book.
There the score is 1 all.
Also, please do not forget that Rommel was praised by the Germans as well as by the allies, at first not with a deeper thought, later to let the allies victory shine even more then they were?
Nothing wrong with that, although we heve to keep taht in mind when we want to solve the question, who was the greater general?
To compare the both is a bit silly really. They had more differences then they had things in commen.
Montgomery had a picture of Rommel in his command car. Rommel did not.
About equipment? Well what can you say, the facts state that Gemany at the beginning of the war had tanks not matching the allies. The only plus was their speed.
Rommel><Monty
Fieldmarshall B.L.Montgomery was very good commander indeed - for WW1.
Most of people disagree with me on this, claiming that he was one of the best "modern" commanders, and their argument is often:"He had Rommel beaten at Alamein."
What I reply to that is this: "Alamein was, in many ways, standard WW1 battle, dominated by arty, landmines and infantry."
Battlefield was compact 38 mile long line with no flanks. On the northern end of it was the sea, and on the southern end unpassable Qattara depression. Only way to attack at Alamein was direct one, and to attack that way one must have enormous advantage in men and machines of war over the defender.
It wasn't tanks that resolved that battle, but infantry and cannons. Monty judged good that Germans will counter-attack, so his infantry had task of gapping minefields, and creating a situation that will invite german armour into counterattacks, in which it will be decimated by stout-hearted infantrymen and AT cannons.
Montys orders to his troops were to gain their objectives "at any cost". Losses of the Commonwealth infantry were horrible. As we all know, his overwhelming advantage paired with extremely bad Axis supply situation won in the end. Also, credit must be given more to the soldiers and line officers who fought skilled and bold against the enemy of same quality!
Normandy was also WW1 battle copy. It was the battle of attrition, which Germans were bound to loose in face of Allied quantity. Monty's casulties were enormous. First days of July he was advised to cut down those losses somehow, bcs UK had reserves for only 15 more days of supporting that high death-rate. Infantry casulties were equal to some of offensives in WW1.
Finally, when he made up a really modern operation (Market-Garden) he managed to make plan so complicated and with so little margin for errors that made it collapse on itself...
So this is why I call Monty "a great trench general".
Let's widen the "area of confict". Let us compare Monty and Fox.
They were completely different. Unlike Monty, Rommel was a 1st class opportunist. When he saw his chance, he siezed it and he often played hazardous game. Rommel was expert that knew all rules of war, but he often broke them in manner of greatest field-commanders in history.
On the other hand, Monty was a bit over-cautious. He handled even the smallest problem with great care and by the numbers. Hew was perfectionist! There was good sides to it, as well as bad.
For example, he organized massive training of all his troops, and he inspired all his subordinates. Royal Engineer Corps invented brilliant way to gap "Devil's Gardens" (several, 1000m wide, belts of mixed, high density minefields). Infantry finally developed coordination with armour(after 15 months of fighting against DAK and various Commanders!!!). Troops of Eight army were finally organized into divisions. They weren't heterogene battlegroups any longer. Monty banned "Jock columns"and "battlegroups". He ordered that divisions must be used as one body, and that only special tactical demands can approve extraction of a brigade from it's division. Naturally, those changes finally made an army out of 8.Army, and they were much needed, but it took time...
Time that Rommel used to create strong and firm defence that will cost an enemy a high price, and hopefully bring his attack to a stalmate or maybe even defeat. Despite all Monty's advantages battle lasted 12 long days, doubtfull of outcome.
In that "schoolar" approach of Monty there was one other important thing. He studied his Opponent and his methods. Rommel was "big news" nothing less for Allied press than for German. More than that, Monty had military intel on Fox, and he had a bunch of German-won battles to study Rommel's tactics. He concluded that if his infantry can traverse (sometimes even 5kms with 3 mine-belts!) minefields, and take a bridghead on "the Jerry side", and if his sappers can make way for AT cannons and tanks, then he will make Rommel counterattack.
German counterattack will be broken by overwhelming numbers on Allied side. He prooved to be right. Rommel did counterattack, and lost the battle because of that. If Rommel held his tanks concealed, "hull-down", by the sides of those 88s and if he refused to attack, he would probably see Monty off, and maybe even conquer Suez in the end!
But Rommel was a different type of man. Like Monty he fought in WW1, but he saw more action than Monty and he had no participation in trench-warfare, unlike Monty. He even got "Pour le Merite" for his extraordinary courage, skills and results (and he was the 1st junior CO in the Army decorated that high). While fighting Italians on Mt.Matajur (Gebirgsjaeger captain, already once wounded, at the time) he managed to take 6000 of them as POWs, and he only had a little under 2000 soldiers, while his dead and wounded count was well under 100!
In May of 1940. he led 7th "The Ghost Division" Pz.div. and played very important role in brekout from Ardennes and race to the Channel. His victories in Africa I won't even speak about! Rommel was aggressive commander, and his thoughts were always on the attack, because of his good exeperiences from WW1 and Blitz.
After he was repulsed in "1st Alamein" his Army's strength was drained, so he had to dig in and prepare the defence in order to rest, save and even somewhat strenghten his troops. He was forced into defence and he had to let the initiative go...
One more thing, he underestimated Montgomery! What can be said in Rommel's favour on that unforgiveable error is that Monty, unlike himself, was "nobody" out of British army. Rommel's intelligence even failed to inform him (because they never found that out of course) that just like Rommel, Montgomery wrote manuals for infantry training. He was his fellow infantryman, and I am sure that if Rommel knew that, he would've had paid very much attention to Monty.
Above all that, Rommel was very tired and sick, and that somewhat obscured his usually sharp mind. He let himself believe that the new General would be as incompetente as stream of others who have been beaten (Wavell,Ritchie,Auchinleck). Panzer Armee's HQ was arrogant and over-selfconfident, just like their Boss. None of them thought that their Panzers can be defeated. Counterattacks on firm AT cannon defence prooved costly and foolish. They knew how they crippled Tommies in the same game quite a lots times! I can't explain to myself why they tried that...
Maybe they tried it because almost every time before panzer+infantry attack preceeded by the heavy barrage and serial bombing had succeded?
I can't say that defeat at Alamein can prove Rommel's inferiority to Montgomery. I think that there were bunch of Allied generals that could've achieved that victory. Monty was competent enough, but he was a general from the other era. His luck was that he came into the Command AFTER Germans had passed their peak (in my opinion in Africa they reached it during Gazala battle, and passed it after Siddi Rezegh), and were forced into defence on all fronts. My guess is that if Monty was lured into the mobile armoured battle like his predcessors in Africa, he would've lost it, just like them.
Most of people disagree with me on this, claiming that he was one of the best "modern" commanders, and their argument is often:"He had Rommel beaten at Alamein."
What I reply to that is this: "Alamein was, in many ways, standard WW1 battle, dominated by arty, landmines and infantry."
Battlefield was compact 38 mile long line with no flanks. On the northern end of it was the sea, and on the southern end unpassable Qattara depression. Only way to attack at Alamein was direct one, and to attack that way one must have enormous advantage in men and machines of war over the defender.
It wasn't tanks that resolved that battle, but infantry and cannons. Monty judged good that Germans will counter-attack, so his infantry had task of gapping minefields, and creating a situation that will invite german armour into counterattacks, in which it will be decimated by stout-hearted infantrymen and AT cannons.
Montys orders to his troops were to gain their objectives "at any cost". Losses of the Commonwealth infantry were horrible. As we all know, his overwhelming advantage paired with extremely bad Axis supply situation won in the end. Also, credit must be given more to the soldiers and line officers who fought skilled and bold against the enemy of same quality!
Normandy was also WW1 battle copy. It was the battle of attrition, which Germans were bound to loose in face of Allied quantity. Monty's casulties were enormous. First days of July he was advised to cut down those losses somehow, bcs UK had reserves for only 15 more days of supporting that high death-rate. Infantry casulties were equal to some of offensives in WW1.
Finally, when he made up a really modern operation (Market-Garden) he managed to make plan so complicated and with so little margin for errors that made it collapse on itself...
So this is why I call Monty "a great trench general".
Let's widen the "area of confict". Let us compare Monty and Fox.
They were completely different. Unlike Monty, Rommel was a 1st class opportunist. When he saw his chance, he siezed it and he often played hazardous game. Rommel was expert that knew all rules of war, but he often broke them in manner of greatest field-commanders in history.
On the other hand, Monty was a bit over-cautious. He handled even the smallest problem with great care and by the numbers. Hew was perfectionist! There was good sides to it, as well as bad.
For example, he organized massive training of all his troops, and he inspired all his subordinates. Royal Engineer Corps invented brilliant way to gap "Devil's Gardens" (several, 1000m wide, belts of mixed, high density minefields). Infantry finally developed coordination with armour(after 15 months of fighting against DAK and various Commanders!!!). Troops of Eight army were finally organized into divisions. They weren't heterogene battlegroups any longer. Monty banned "Jock columns"and "battlegroups". He ordered that divisions must be used as one body, and that only special tactical demands can approve extraction of a brigade from it's division. Naturally, those changes finally made an army out of 8.Army, and they were much needed, but it took time...
Time that Rommel used to create strong and firm defence that will cost an enemy a high price, and hopefully bring his attack to a stalmate or maybe even defeat. Despite all Monty's advantages battle lasted 12 long days, doubtfull of outcome.
In that "schoolar" approach of Monty there was one other important thing. He studied his Opponent and his methods. Rommel was "big news" nothing less for Allied press than for German. More than that, Monty had military intel on Fox, and he had a bunch of German-won battles to study Rommel's tactics. He concluded that if his infantry can traverse (sometimes even 5kms with 3 mine-belts!) minefields, and take a bridghead on "the Jerry side", and if his sappers can make way for AT cannons and tanks, then he will make Rommel counterattack.
German counterattack will be broken by overwhelming numbers on Allied side. He prooved to be right. Rommel did counterattack, and lost the battle because of that. If Rommel held his tanks concealed, "hull-down", by the sides of those 88s and if he refused to attack, he would probably see Monty off, and maybe even conquer Suez in the end!
But Rommel was a different type of man. Like Monty he fought in WW1, but he saw more action than Monty and he had no participation in trench-warfare, unlike Monty. He even got "Pour le Merite" for his extraordinary courage, skills and results (and he was the 1st junior CO in the Army decorated that high). While fighting Italians on Mt.Matajur (Gebirgsjaeger captain, already once wounded, at the time) he managed to take 6000 of them as POWs, and he only had a little under 2000 soldiers, while his dead and wounded count was well under 100!
In May of 1940. he led 7th "The Ghost Division" Pz.div. and played very important role in brekout from Ardennes and race to the Channel. His victories in Africa I won't even speak about! Rommel was aggressive commander, and his thoughts were always on the attack, because of his good exeperiences from WW1 and Blitz.
After he was repulsed in "1st Alamein" his Army's strength was drained, so he had to dig in and prepare the defence in order to rest, save and even somewhat strenghten his troops. He was forced into defence and he had to let the initiative go...
One more thing, he underestimated Montgomery! What can be said in Rommel's favour on that unforgiveable error is that Monty, unlike himself, was "nobody" out of British army. Rommel's intelligence even failed to inform him (because they never found that out of course) that just like Rommel, Montgomery wrote manuals for infantry training. He was his fellow infantryman, and I am sure that if Rommel knew that, he would've had paid very much attention to Monty.
Above all that, Rommel was very tired and sick, and that somewhat obscured his usually sharp mind. He let himself believe that the new General would be as incompetente as stream of others who have been beaten (Wavell,Ritchie,Auchinleck). Panzer Armee's HQ was arrogant and over-selfconfident, just like their Boss. None of them thought that their Panzers can be defeated. Counterattacks on firm AT cannon defence prooved costly and foolish. They knew how they crippled Tommies in the same game quite a lots times! I can't explain to myself why they tried that...
Maybe they tried it because almost every time before panzer+infantry attack preceeded by the heavy barrage and serial bombing had succeded?
I can't say that defeat at Alamein can prove Rommel's inferiority to Montgomery. I think that there were bunch of Allied generals that could've achieved that victory. Monty was competent enough, but he was a general from the other era. His luck was that he came into the Command AFTER Germans had passed their peak (in my opinion in Africa they reached it during Gazala battle, and passed it after Siddi Rezegh), and were forced into defence on all fronts. My guess is that if Monty was lured into the mobile armoured battle like his predcessors in Africa, he would've lost it, just like them.
After 9 pages this is going to cover some ground and skip a bit, but here goes.
Tanks
Crusader and previous types of Cruiser tank (A9 etc) were powered by Nuffield Liberty engines no Meteor's (derated RR Merlins). The Meteor was a much superior engine that powered the Cromwell, Comet, Centurian and Conquer.
The Valentine might have been underpowered, and a bit light in certain specification, armour, firepower etc. But it was dead reliable. Ok it was about the only British tank that was, but even the Russians admired its reliability.
Machine Guns
Bren/Vickers Vs MG38/42.... horses for courses.
As General Purpose MG's, the German weapons were much better at doing many things with one gun than either of the Commonwealth weapons. But they were/are still one size fits all solutions. These four MG's were intended to cover 3 roles:
1) LMG as a section/squad weapon.
2) MMG for sustained fire
3) Light AA MG.
Role 1.
As a LMG, the only advantage of the German GPMG's is rate of fire. A high rate of fire is useful for fleeting engagements, and for effecting enemy moral. On the other hand it has to be fed ammo, lots and lots of ammo; or it can't fire for as long on a given quantity of ammo. The Bren by both reputation and longevity was obviously an adaquate LMG, yes the MG42 as the MG3 is still in use, but then so is the Bren, in front line service with a major power as recently as 1990 and god knows where else since with smaller countries. As a lighter, throughly servicable LMG, with a more frugal diet I don't see the Bren as a disadvantage in this role.
Role 2.
Here the VMG kicks the hell out of the GPMG's, sorry, but watercooling = more rounds per hour for ore hours and the slower rate of fire eases the logistical burdon too. The whole point of a MMG is weight of fire in support, to use a well known example if Tom Hanks had been faceing an MG08 at that radar station in SPR, they'd have had to wait a long time to burn out the barrel. Now in desert conditions watercooling can be a issue, on the other hand stuffing the waterjacket with grease did the job quite nicely if not quite as effectively. Actually with the 200rd drum mag, the Bren can give the GPMG's a run for it's money too...
Role 3.
Here the German guns take the prize, as AAA RoF is everything and they have it. On the otherhand, who cares? This is at best a secondry role. The Vickers and Bren were designed to fill certain roles, the GPMG's to fill every role, that the specialist inits place isn't inferior to the generalist shouldn't be too surpriseing.
Role 4.
Yep I only mentioned 3, but this 4th is (IMHO) the main reason that the GPMG concept florished after WWII. One gun doing three jobs is cheaper than two guns in the same roles.
Small Arms
K98 Vs Lee Enfield... come on people. There is nothing wrong with either weapon, if the K98 has an advantage in ballistics, the SMLE has a 10rnd magazine and is easier to clean. Inshort the SMLE has the firepower advantage, for what it is worth.
Sten Vs MP40 = Mp40. Tomey guns were good weapons, but all the foregrip and drum mag shots were pure publicity. The Sten started to come in in late 41 and rapidly took over, well just as fast as they could pry them from their users fingers.
Grenades
Horses for courses again. The German stick grenades were 'Offensive Grenades' deliberatly light on fragmentation. The Mills Bomb No.36m was the exact opposite being a defensive grenade and maximising effect. Either is bad news to be on the wrong end of, but in a one on one, well if the massive 'Bomb fights' of WWI are any indication, the Mills wins on sheer grunt. Its a bigger grenade with a bigger bang.
Artillery
Take a look at the 3.7" AA gun before asking why it wasn't used like an 88. Its twice the size and was normally deployed to cover stretgic targets, not in the fornt lines where it would have been even harder to work with than the 88's were. You need a bloody big gunpit for a 3.7" On the other hand if more of Rommels 88's had been defending his ports from the Desert Airforce, he might have had fewer logistic bottle necks.
Liquid Containers
The British 'flimsey' can was perfectly adaquate untill it was removed from its crate. They were just the standard comercial shipping cans, and came two to a plywood box and supposed to be disposable. It was only when taken from their box and then banged around that they leaked. There is no question Jerry Cans are better, but context is important, the British cans were being missused (by nessesity).
Italian Trucks
Mainly Lancia's IIRC, they were diesel!
British Armoured Cars.
In the early days they were running around in 1920 Pat Rolls Royces and Morrises, then they got the South African Marmon Herringtons which were Ford truck chassis with M-H FWD kits. But by the end of Crusader the 11th and RDG ere useing Daimler's and given the choice between one of them and any of the Axis A/C's well 2pr Vs 20mm?
Railways.
As has been indicated with the will a railway could have been built across to Tobruk, for example in the same period two companies of Australian RR engineers built a standard gauge line from where the WI track ended to the Turkish border. Incidentally in doing this they compleated the line from Europe to Cairo, but with the creation of Israel the line has been abandoned for 50 years even if most of the earthworks are still there. The problem of course was finding the will and the Axis just didn't have it.
I don't buy the argument that rail transport is more vulnrable than road traffic, with the ecconomies of scale its easier to keep a bombed railway working than support the raod traffic it replaces even without bombing. Look at Russia on bothsides. If need be you can even run rail 'convoys' under air escort, one train making the trip is worth ten truck convoys.
Fuel
Someone asked that if fuel was such a problem where did they find enough to retreat? The axis were moving back up their supply line, moving through their own depots.
Monty Vs Romme[;/b]
As far as individual styles go, I reccon this is about the best example of national charcteristics going.
Rommel was the great improviser, he was a jugglers that so long as everything was up in the air he could keep it together. But once he stopped, and lost momentum.... As Alte Mann suggests he had a hazy concept of his own limits, if only because he so rarely found them.
Monty on the other hand was Mr. Pedestrian. One step at a time, each foot landing before the next left the ground. Just IMHO they were both great Army commanders but not Army Group/Theater commanders. Both were overpromoted and really needed a storong hand to channel their tallents properly.
In terms of personallity, Monty comes across as the least pleasent of the pair, given his decent into arrogance and self promotion. But them Rommel was no shirking violet either, and I rather suspect his publicity machine has done him a few favours over the years, after all his efforts were professionally mannaged by Gobbels and polished by romantic ledgend/myth.
As far as Auk Vs Monty on halting Rommel on the El Al line, and Monty reinforcing 'the gap,' IIRC the simple story leaves out a few details. Like the reason Auk left the gap, and why Monty pluged it. The one area the British were far from inferior was in mapping, at least inside Egypt, everybody used British maps or copies of captured ones, and one of the most important features was the 'Going,' that is what the surface was like and how difficult it was to drive on, Auk left the gap because it was bad going, Monty reinforced it because they were running a deception operation with false maps.
Could Rommel, suitably reinforced, have made it to Alex in his last push? IMHO no, We all agree that combined warfare wasn't the 8th Armys strong point after Compass, but positional warfare was. Give them firm flanks like the Depression and the Sea, and the situation was to their tactical advantage not Rommels. He would have needed more than a few thousand tons of assorted fuel, spares and assorted supplies to get through at El Al and still have any mass left to push on.
shane
Tanks
Crusader and previous types of Cruiser tank (A9 etc) were powered by Nuffield Liberty engines no Meteor's (derated RR Merlins). The Meteor was a much superior engine that powered the Cromwell, Comet, Centurian and Conquer.
The Valentine might have been underpowered, and a bit light in certain specification, armour, firepower etc. But it was dead reliable. Ok it was about the only British tank that was, but even the Russians admired its reliability.
Machine Guns
Bren/Vickers Vs MG38/42.... horses for courses.
As General Purpose MG's, the German weapons were much better at doing many things with one gun than either of the Commonwealth weapons. But they were/are still one size fits all solutions. These four MG's were intended to cover 3 roles:
1) LMG as a section/squad weapon.
2) MMG for sustained fire
3) Light AA MG.
Role 1.
As a LMG, the only advantage of the German GPMG's is rate of fire. A high rate of fire is useful for fleeting engagements, and for effecting enemy moral. On the other hand it has to be fed ammo, lots and lots of ammo; or it can't fire for as long on a given quantity of ammo. The Bren by both reputation and longevity was obviously an adaquate LMG, yes the MG42 as the MG3 is still in use, but then so is the Bren, in front line service with a major power as recently as 1990 and god knows where else since with smaller countries. As a lighter, throughly servicable LMG, with a more frugal diet I don't see the Bren as a disadvantage in this role.
Role 2.
Here the VMG kicks the hell out of the GPMG's, sorry, but watercooling = more rounds per hour for ore hours and the slower rate of fire eases the logistical burdon too. The whole point of a MMG is weight of fire in support, to use a well known example if Tom Hanks had been faceing an MG08 at that radar station in SPR, they'd have had to wait a long time to burn out the barrel. Now in desert conditions watercooling can be a issue, on the other hand stuffing the waterjacket with grease did the job quite nicely if not quite as effectively. Actually with the 200rd drum mag, the Bren can give the GPMG's a run for it's money too...
Role 3.
Here the German guns take the prize, as AAA RoF is everything and they have it. On the otherhand, who cares? This is at best a secondry role. The Vickers and Bren were designed to fill certain roles, the GPMG's to fill every role, that the specialist inits place isn't inferior to the generalist shouldn't be too surpriseing.
Role 4.
Yep I only mentioned 3, but this 4th is (IMHO) the main reason that the GPMG concept florished after WWII. One gun doing three jobs is cheaper than two guns in the same roles.
Small Arms
K98 Vs Lee Enfield... come on people. There is nothing wrong with either weapon, if the K98 has an advantage in ballistics, the SMLE has a 10rnd magazine and is easier to clean. Inshort the SMLE has the firepower advantage, for what it is worth.
Sten Vs MP40 = Mp40. Tomey guns were good weapons, but all the foregrip and drum mag shots were pure publicity. The Sten started to come in in late 41 and rapidly took over, well just as fast as they could pry them from their users fingers.
Grenades
Horses for courses again. The German stick grenades were 'Offensive Grenades' deliberatly light on fragmentation. The Mills Bomb No.36m was the exact opposite being a defensive grenade and maximising effect. Either is bad news to be on the wrong end of, but in a one on one, well if the massive 'Bomb fights' of WWI are any indication, the Mills wins on sheer grunt. Its a bigger grenade with a bigger bang.
Artillery
Take a look at the 3.7" AA gun before asking why it wasn't used like an 88. Its twice the size and was normally deployed to cover stretgic targets, not in the fornt lines where it would have been even harder to work with than the 88's were. You need a bloody big gunpit for a 3.7" On the other hand if more of Rommels 88's had been defending his ports from the Desert Airforce, he might have had fewer logistic bottle necks.
Liquid Containers
The British 'flimsey' can was perfectly adaquate untill it was removed from its crate. They were just the standard comercial shipping cans, and came two to a plywood box and supposed to be disposable. It was only when taken from their box and then banged around that they leaked. There is no question Jerry Cans are better, but context is important, the British cans were being missused (by nessesity).
Italian Trucks
Mainly Lancia's IIRC, they were diesel!
British Armoured Cars.
In the early days they were running around in 1920 Pat Rolls Royces and Morrises, then they got the South African Marmon Herringtons which were Ford truck chassis with M-H FWD kits. But by the end of Crusader the 11th and RDG ere useing Daimler's and given the choice between one of them and any of the Axis A/C's well 2pr Vs 20mm?
Railways.
As has been indicated with the will a railway could have been built across to Tobruk, for example in the same period two companies of Australian RR engineers built a standard gauge line from where the WI track ended to the Turkish border. Incidentally in doing this they compleated the line from Europe to Cairo, but with the creation of Israel the line has been abandoned for 50 years even if most of the earthworks are still there. The problem of course was finding the will and the Axis just didn't have it.
I don't buy the argument that rail transport is more vulnrable than road traffic, with the ecconomies of scale its easier to keep a bombed railway working than support the raod traffic it replaces even without bombing. Look at Russia on bothsides. If need be you can even run rail 'convoys' under air escort, one train making the trip is worth ten truck convoys.
Fuel
Someone asked that if fuel was such a problem where did they find enough to retreat? The axis were moving back up their supply line, moving through their own depots.
Monty Vs Romme[;/b]
As far as individual styles go, I reccon this is about the best example of national charcteristics going.
Rommel was the great improviser, he was a jugglers that so long as everything was up in the air he could keep it together. But once he stopped, and lost momentum.... As Alte Mann suggests he had a hazy concept of his own limits, if only because he so rarely found them.
Monty on the other hand was Mr. Pedestrian. One step at a time, each foot landing before the next left the ground. Just IMHO they were both great Army commanders but not Army Group/Theater commanders. Both were overpromoted and really needed a storong hand to channel their tallents properly.
In terms of personallity, Monty comes across as the least pleasent of the pair, given his decent into arrogance and self promotion. But them Rommel was no shirking violet either, and I rather suspect his publicity machine has done him a few favours over the years, after all his efforts were professionally mannaged by Gobbels and polished by romantic ledgend/myth.
As far as Auk Vs Monty on halting Rommel on the El Al line, and Monty reinforcing 'the gap,' IIRC the simple story leaves out a few details. Like the reason Auk left the gap, and why Monty pluged it. The one area the British were far from inferior was in mapping, at least inside Egypt, everybody used British maps or copies of captured ones, and one of the most important features was the 'Going,' that is what the surface was like and how difficult it was to drive on, Auk left the gap because it was bad going, Monty reinforced it because they were running a deception operation with false maps.
Could Rommel, suitably reinforced, have made it to Alex in his last push? IMHO no, We all agree that combined warfare wasn't the 8th Armys strong point after Compass, but positional warfare was. Give them firm flanks like the Depression and the Sea, and the situation was to their tactical advantage not Rommels. He would have needed more than a few thousand tons of assorted fuel, spares and assorted supplies to get through at El Al and still have any mass left to push on.
shane
I personnally think Both Monty and Rommel where good Leaders in men and i admire them both.
However I believe Rommel aided in his and the DAK's down fall, when he was ordered by Hitler to aid the italians and not to go onto the offensive until the arrival of 15th Panzer Division. he totally ignored his orders and went on the offensive, he failed to take Tobruk and alerted the British to his presence and the RN into hunting down his supply ships, by July 1941 those losses sometime totalled nearly 70% !
Hitler was outraged by this and as a request from Rommel, diverted U Boots to the Med, Doenitz argued that these boots where needed to complete the attacks on the Atlantic convoys and if they where diverted the offensive could be lost. He was to be proven correct.
Rommel also after the loss of N Africa wanted, on the invasion of Italy, to withdraw to the north, Kesselring argued that the Allies could be kept at bay further in the South, thus given more protection from allied bombers in Southern Germany, who was proven correct?
Monty was a plodder and Market Garden was totally out charactor for him, but overall he won his battles.
Andy
However I believe Rommel aided in his and the DAK's down fall, when he was ordered by Hitler to aid the italians and not to go onto the offensive until the arrival of 15th Panzer Division. he totally ignored his orders and went on the offensive, he failed to take Tobruk and alerted the British to his presence and the RN into hunting down his supply ships, by July 1941 those losses sometime totalled nearly 70% !
Hitler was outraged by this and as a request from Rommel, diverted U Boots to the Med, Doenitz argued that these boots where needed to complete the attacks on the Atlantic convoys and if they where diverted the offensive could be lost. He was to be proven correct.
Rommel also after the loss of N Africa wanted, on the invasion of Italy, to withdraw to the north, Kesselring argued that the Allies could be kept at bay further in the South, thus given more protection from allied bombers in Southern Germany, who was proven correct?
Monty was a plodder and Market Garden was totally out charactor for him, but overall he won his battles.
Andy
Considering that Rommel arrived in Libya right on the heels of a great Italian defeat, exploiting his enemy's stretched out supply line by immediate offensive action seems like a good course of action to me, particularly when you consider that it happened almost simultaneously with the Balkans campaign.Achtacht wrote:I personnally think Both Monty and Rommel where good Leaders in men and i admire them both.
However I believe Rommel aided in his and the DAK's down fall, when he was ordered by Hitler to aid the italians and not to go onto the offensive until the arrival of 15th Panzer Division. he totally ignored his orders and went on the offensive,
I don't think Rommel had been ordered to refrain from all offensive action, but rather to refrain from going further east than Benghazi IIRC. Of course he ignored that, but it seems that Rommel's defiance of orders caused much more consternation at OKH than it did to Hitler.
I am flogging a dead horse here, but Rommel's late 1941 breakdown of supply was not caused just by Italian shipping losses rising. The famous battleship convoys of late 1941 and 1942 delivered plenty of supplies to the DAK - the problem was that Rommel was very far away from Tripolis at that time, still trying to invest Tobruk right up until Crusader launched in November. He did not have enough trucks to cover the great distance from Tripolis to Tobruk, and Benghazi was only of limited use to him, being both small and well within range of the RAF in Egypt.he failed to take Tobruk and alerted the British to his presence and the RN into hunting down his supply ships, by July 1941 those losses sometime totalled nearly 70% !
Are you sure that Rommel himself requested the U-Boats? I don't think that diverting a handful of subs to the Mediterranean had such a great effect on the Atlantic battles that it actually caused the Germans to lose itHitler was outraged by this and as a request from Rommel, diverted U Boots to the Med, Doenitz argued that these boots where needed to complete the attacks on the Atlantic convoys and if they where diverted the offensive could be lost. He was to be proven correct.
and in any case, the subs sent to the Mediterranean achieved spectacular results.Arguably, Kesselring had a more three-dimensional view of the strategic situation than Rommel did, since he was a Luftwaffe man - but for a while, the Germans thought that the main Allied invasion would come in Yugoslavia.Rommel also after the loss of N Africa wanted, on the invasion of Italy, to withdraw to the north, Kesselring argued that the Allies could be kept at bay further in the South, thus given more protection from allied bombers in Southern Germany, who was proven correct?
Ah. Simple solutions to complex situations. Easy, attractive, and generally wrongShrek wrote:O'Connor's 1940-1941 desert offensive was a textbook exercise in combined arms, but apparently this was all forgotten when the Germans came to North Africa.
O'Connors COMPASS offensive wasn't an example of what you might call combined arms. It was, OTOH, a very good example of very efficient use of the available resources against a numerous but technically inferior enemy. As but one example, O'Connors instructions for attacking the forts in the first phase of the operation featured sequential use of artillery, then armour, then infantry. The infantry weren't to move out until after the tanks had pretty much finished off all organised resistance.
That this scheme worked was primarily due to excellent reconnaissance, achievement of a high level of surprise, and the not inconsiderable factor of the Matildas being effectively invulnerable. After that first phase the British held a strong morale ascendancy which greatly assisted subsequent phases.
O'Connors methods weren't 'forgotten' after the Germans arrived, they became impractical. The cruisers and lights were shagged by then, while the 'tildas never made it past Tobruk, and had in any case been withdrawn to the Delta. A lot of the resources that 'should' have been available were diverted to Greece, Crete, Syria, Iraq, East Africa, Cyprus, etc. What was left was suitable for a screening defence, and just about numerous enough to employ the Jock Columns after that failed. The numbers game had been rectified by CRUSADER, but the methods used were still largely those of O'Connors first offensive - with the important exceptions being that the technical advantage had been lost, and the I tanks were no longer invulnerable. In other words, if O'Connor had still been around to command CRUSADER, it is likely that he would have done as badly as Cunningham.
What was inexcusable, and tragic, was the failure of the tankers - in particular those from previously cavalry units - to by-and-large adapt, improve, and co-operate with other arms during the period from mid-41 till late-42 (and even then only grudgingly in some cases). Guess who did a lot to rectify that?
Regards
JonS
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Michael Emrys
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Which reminds me, ISTR reading somewhere a description of the Italian rail line in Cyrenaica as what today we would call a light rail/commuter rail line. This source described its main function as carrying tourists on weekend holiday from Benghazi to Barce.The Argus wrote:I agree, not all narrow gauges are created equal, what you can do on 2' is nothing compared to the capacity of 3'6" and as Shrek mentions line weight is serious factor, its more important than gauge. But there is no problem putting overwidth loads on narrow gauges, provideing it's within the loading gauge of the railway. Look at any train, they're all wider than their tracks.
The loading gauge defines the dimentions of anything moving on the system, it also sets maximum weights and speeds, trains back then had to slow down on corners anyway, and the posted speed reflected the maximum loading gauge.
I suspect the limits on the African railways were more to do with traffic control, turnarond times and rollingstock than the track though, light rails only limit the axle weight and sometimes the potential speed. Not the total load or the frequency of traffic. A light rail might mean you can only run 40 ton cars instead of 50 toners but hardly stop you from running 3x40s inplace of 2x50's if the cars and locomotive power is available. If the axis railways in NA had bottle necks, I'd bet they were in finding trains to run on them, and then loading/unloading them.
a) The sort of engines suited to such colonial lines in peacetime (unless there was a lot of mineral traffic) would have been far smaller than the lines could have handled.
b) The peacetime rollingstock inventory would have been scaled to suit peacetime traffic, so fallen short of a maximum effort wartime situation.
c) The track would have been laid out with peacetime traffic in mind, so probably short on the extra trackwork that enables higher density operations (turnouts, passing loops, goods yards etc.).
d) a,b and c when combined with the maintainance issues they would have faced and any battle dammage would have also hurt the system baddly.
Ok, but my overall point in describing O'Connor's operation as a 'textbook exercise' in combined arms pertains less to how the Italian line of defense was broken and more in how O'Connor pursued his offensive to a successful conclusion after he had taken Tobruk.JonS wrote:O'Connors COMPASS offensive wasn't an example of what you might call combined arms. It was, OTOH, a very good example of very efficient use of the available resources against a numerous but technically inferior enemy. As but one example, O'Connors instructions for attacking the forts in the first phase of the operation featured sequential use of artillery, then armour, then infantry...
Transferring units into an impromptu brigade which subesequently took the inland short-cut from Mechili to Beda Fomm; essentially making one of the purpose-built Kampfgruppen that the Germans rotinely formed represents IMO a more flexible approach to conducting a battle than the British showed post-Compass, especially when you consider that Compass originally was intended to last only five days.
But then O'Connor was lucky to have the 7th Armoured Division at his disposal - this unit had been trained to a high standard with emphasis on close cooperation of arms under Hobart before he was sent home. As I understand it, the 7th must have consisted mostly of pre-war professionals on the eve of Compass.
Contrast that to Crusader, where Auchinleck repeatedly lamented Cunningham's failure to use the 7th as an entity, instead preferring to commit its units piecemeal and unsupported.
On a somewhat perfidious note, they certainly weren't forgotten to the Germans, who successfully played the reverse Compass scenario - minus taking Tobruk, of course. To the extent that O'Connor's plans weren't forgotten, the desert army at least could have expected that the inland short-cut could be used from the west too?O'Connors methods weren't 'forgotten' after the Germans arrived, they became impractical. The cruisers and lights were shagged by then, while the 'tildas never made it past Tobruk...
