Well I believe Rommel was a better general, the supply problems weren't entirely his fault. If Montgomery had the same strength as rommel and the same stretched and poor supply system, i'm sure he would've done worse.
I believe that a good general is one that can make most use of the resources he has and inflicting the most casualties with limited casualties suffered from his side. Rommel fits in the category.
Rommel vs. Montgomery
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rcristi2271
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Alter Mann
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Rommel vs. Montgomery
I had the opportunity to read either a biography or an autobiography of Montgomery, written after WWII, several years ago. I wish I still had it. It was very interesting. Naturally, I've read quite a bit about Rommel as well. I think that they both had flaws, but Rommel's flaws caught up with him at El Alamein.
IMHO, Montgomery was conservative, sometimes to the point of apparent timidty. Rommel, on the other hand, was quite capable of making some very rash decisions. At El Alamein, for example, Montgomery wasn't about to budge until he felt he had over-whelming superiority. Rommel was at the end of a very strained logistics chain and his supply situation was actually getting worse every day while Montgomery's was getting better. Commando Supremo had promised Rommel that he would receive a fuel re-supply in time to support his attack on El Alamein, but the tankers were sunk before they could unload the fuel.
I think many people under-estimate the effect that Allied air superiority had on this action. The Axis forces were under air attack constantly every day that weather conditions permitted before the final confrontation. I read somewhere that the Allied aircraft would drop bombs on individual soldiers because the had plenty of bombs. The effect that this would have on morale, especially for the Italian troops, who no longer had motorized transportation, must have been significant. I have also read that one reason Rommel didn't want to turn back before the decisive battle was that he feared that the Allied aircraft would decimate his troops, especially the ones on foot, during the retrograde. (There was also the famous Hitler order.)
In a situation like this, where you can't mke the opponent blink, can't retreat, and the logistic situation is getting worse every hour, I'm sure that Rommel thought he was doing the right thing, but I don't think he should have attacked toward El Alamein in the first place, due to the logistical constraints.
Rommel never seemed to grasp the true meaning of 'secondary front' but still, he certainly didn't want North Africa to become one. Almost everyone else, especially Hitler, was mainly interested in the Russian campaign, though.
I think that, if Rommel had been able to accept the fact that the only reasonable function left for him in North Africa, unless Malta could be taken, was to tie down as many Allied troops and assets as possible, he might have decided on a different strategy that might at least have prolonged the campaign, and would have at least given him an opportunity for a few more lightening strikes agaist the Allied forces, like some of the earlier battles that he fought so successfully. Air power would still have had an increasing effect, and the Wehrmacht still didn't have much experience on the defensive, but he could have shortened his supply lines, especially after he talked the Commando Supremo into landing supplies at the right ports, built up some kind of reserve and attempted to avoid decisive engagements until he had a better chance to win them. This was the strategy that Montgomery was using, and it worked for him. I think Rommel could probably have done it better, though, if he had tried.
IMHO, Rommel's book about his experiences in WWI gives a good indication of the type of commander that he would become. He had a lot of good points, but everyone has flaws. So did he.
IMHO, Montgomery was conservative, sometimes to the point of apparent timidty. Rommel, on the other hand, was quite capable of making some very rash decisions. At El Alamein, for example, Montgomery wasn't about to budge until he felt he had over-whelming superiority. Rommel was at the end of a very strained logistics chain and his supply situation was actually getting worse every day while Montgomery's was getting better. Commando Supremo had promised Rommel that he would receive a fuel re-supply in time to support his attack on El Alamein, but the tankers were sunk before they could unload the fuel.
I think many people under-estimate the effect that Allied air superiority had on this action. The Axis forces were under air attack constantly every day that weather conditions permitted before the final confrontation. I read somewhere that the Allied aircraft would drop bombs on individual soldiers because the had plenty of bombs. The effect that this would have on morale, especially for the Italian troops, who no longer had motorized transportation, must have been significant. I have also read that one reason Rommel didn't want to turn back before the decisive battle was that he feared that the Allied aircraft would decimate his troops, especially the ones on foot, during the retrograde. (There was also the famous Hitler order.)
In a situation like this, where you can't mke the opponent blink, can't retreat, and the logistic situation is getting worse every hour, I'm sure that Rommel thought he was doing the right thing, but I don't think he should have attacked toward El Alamein in the first place, due to the logistical constraints.
Rommel never seemed to grasp the true meaning of 'secondary front' but still, he certainly didn't want North Africa to become one. Almost everyone else, especially Hitler, was mainly interested in the Russian campaign, though.
I think that, if Rommel had been able to accept the fact that the only reasonable function left for him in North Africa, unless Malta could be taken, was to tie down as many Allied troops and assets as possible, he might have decided on a different strategy that might at least have prolonged the campaign, and would have at least given him an opportunity for a few more lightening strikes agaist the Allied forces, like some of the earlier battles that he fought so successfully. Air power would still have had an increasing effect, and the Wehrmacht still didn't have much experience on the defensive, but he could have shortened his supply lines, especially after he talked the Commando Supremo into landing supplies at the right ports, built up some kind of reserve and attempted to avoid decisive engagements until he had a better chance to win them. This was the strategy that Montgomery was using, and it worked for him. I think Rommel could probably have done it better, though, if he had tried.
IMHO, Rommel's book about his experiences in WWI gives a good indication of the type of commander that he would become. He had a lot of good points, but everyone has flaws. So did he.
The consistent sense I get from all of Montgomery's battles and campaigns is that he was a good general, but not a great one.
I think the prolonged buildup to Alamein is neither something that detracts from his standing nor a sign of any particular greatness or wisdom. British reinforcements were flowing in 8th Army, German reinforcements were not, in any comparable degree. He also grasped that 8th Army required time to regain it's rather shattered morale after the debacles of the preceding battles. In this situation, the course chosen stands out as the obvious one.
The battle itself was fought as a well-conceived and well-implemented set-piece action, and reflects well on him, though as has been pointed out, given the disparity of forces his generalship can hardly be seen as the main reason for its outcome. However, he has been rightly criticised for his inability to prevent DAKs withdrawal, which had important consequences in the longer term and certainly delayed the conquest of Africa.
In Sicily, his actions seem competent if not outright impressive. His conduct of the advance through South Italy on the other hand has been justifiably ridiculed - the first allied personnel who linked up with 5th Army were two war correspondents who had grown so annoyed with eternal caution that they had simply driven on ahead on their own, arriving without having so much as seen a German.
Monty's conduct of the Normandy battle has IMO earned much undeserved criticism (though he contributed to that himself by ruffling feathers with his arrogance and through unconvincing attempts at obscuring his initial intentions. On the whole, I think he made the right major decisions, and saw the battle in realistic and sensible terms. That being said, its outcome was hardly to any great extent the direct product of his leadership or planning.
Market garden was a strategic overreach for which he must bear responsibility, and that resposibility must also extendto the sluggish performance of XXX Corps, without which the operation might conceivably have been a great success rather than a shocking setback.
I would describe him as tactically competent, thoroughly professional and alert to the many imponderables that affect performance. It is interesting to speculate how much of his overcarefulness was a question of temperament and how much was a result of realistic assessment of the relative strengths and weaknessess of his own forces and those of his opponents. In Normandy, his basic approach seems to have been centred around an acute awareness of the ability of the Germans to severely punish any exposed or unbalanced posture if provided with the opportunity to do so.
cheers
I think the prolonged buildup to Alamein is neither something that detracts from his standing nor a sign of any particular greatness or wisdom. British reinforcements were flowing in 8th Army, German reinforcements were not, in any comparable degree. He also grasped that 8th Army required time to regain it's rather shattered morale after the debacles of the preceding battles. In this situation, the course chosen stands out as the obvious one.
The battle itself was fought as a well-conceived and well-implemented set-piece action, and reflects well on him, though as has been pointed out, given the disparity of forces his generalship can hardly be seen as the main reason for its outcome. However, he has been rightly criticised for his inability to prevent DAKs withdrawal, which had important consequences in the longer term and certainly delayed the conquest of Africa.
In Sicily, his actions seem competent if not outright impressive. His conduct of the advance through South Italy on the other hand has been justifiably ridiculed - the first allied personnel who linked up with 5th Army were two war correspondents who had grown so annoyed with eternal caution that they had simply driven on ahead on their own, arriving without having so much as seen a German.
Monty's conduct of the Normandy battle has IMO earned much undeserved criticism (though he contributed to that himself by ruffling feathers with his arrogance and through unconvincing attempts at obscuring his initial intentions. On the whole, I think he made the right major decisions, and saw the battle in realistic and sensible terms. That being said, its outcome was hardly to any great extent the direct product of his leadership or planning.
Market garden was a strategic overreach for which he must bear responsibility, and that resposibility must also extendto the sluggish performance of XXX Corps, without which the operation might conceivably have been a great success rather than a shocking setback.
I would describe him as tactically competent, thoroughly professional and alert to the many imponderables that affect performance. It is interesting to speculate how much of his overcarefulness was a question of temperament and how much was a result of realistic assessment of the relative strengths and weaknessess of his own forces and those of his opponents. In Normandy, his basic approach seems to have been centred around an acute awareness of the ability of the Germans to severely punish any exposed or unbalanced posture if provided with the opportunity to do so.
cheers
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Alter Mann
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Monty in Normandy
I'm glad that Qvist brought up the question of XXX Corps performance during Market Garden. It reminds me that there were several units that had performed very well in North Africa that performed very poorly in Normandy.
I've heard several explanations for this, including the totally different combat conditions, but the fact is that some units that Monty initially had great faith in did not perform as expected. Naturally, since they were Monty's opertions, he got a lot of the blame. I can't name any specific instances, but I am thinking of several abortive or disasterous armored attacks.
I've heard several explanations for this, including the totally different combat conditions, but the fact is that some units that Monty initially had great faith in did not perform as expected. Naturally, since they were Monty's opertions, he got a lot of the blame. I can't name any specific instances, but I am thinking of several abortive or disasterous armored attacks.
In particular 7th Armoured, and IIRC 50th Northumbrian were singled out for non-performance in Normandy. I only know a bit about what happened with 7th Armoured, so I restrict myself to that.
There were two things at work here - commanders who were just not mentally adapted to the style of warfare they had to fight, and soldiers who did not have the blissful ignorance of the newbie to the carnage of the battlefield. Many of them had seen what high-velocity hot metal can do to a man's body, and often the person that it was demonstrated on was one of their mates. It is a huge credit to these men that they did pull themselves together, and performed well once Normandy lay behind them.
The commanders, here I think credit needs to be given to Montgomery who did not let that ultra-British vice, chummyness, don't rock the boat, and the 'we're all part of the club' attitude, get into the way of quite rigorously rooting out non-performers, even where these men had previously given good service.
There were two things at work here - commanders who were just not mentally adapted to the style of warfare they had to fight, and soldiers who did not have the blissful ignorance of the newbie to the carnage of the battlefield. Many of them had seen what high-velocity hot metal can do to a man's body, and often the person that it was demonstrated on was one of their mates. It is a huge credit to these men that they did pull themselves together, and performed well once Normandy lay behind them.
The commanders, here I think credit needs to be given to Montgomery who did not let that ultra-British vice, chummyness, don't rock the boat, and the 'we're all part of the club' attitude, get into the way of quite rigorously rooting out non-performers, even where these men had previously given good service.
Put it this way:
If you gave Rommel and Montgomery and comparatively EQUAL force of armor and inf supported by the usual compliments in the desert...who would have won a meeting engagement between the two?
Montgomery? I think not....Rommel would have my pot o' money.
Rommel was the master of "on the fly" maneuvers. He would see something and react. Montgomery would have to think about it and make sure his arse wan't hanging out before he would decide what to do. Now this method of decision making by Rommel would be considered unwise and dangerous (in which certain occassions it was) but that is what commanders hated about Rommel...he was unpredictable! He favored the flanking maneuver but just as you bit on that he would punch right through your middle with an apparent feint.
Just my two cents worth.
If you gave Rommel and Montgomery and comparatively EQUAL force of armor and inf supported by the usual compliments in the desert...who would have won a meeting engagement between the two?
Montgomery? I think not....Rommel would have my pot o' money.
Rommel was the master of "on the fly" maneuvers. He would see something and react. Montgomery would have to think about it and make sure his arse wan't hanging out before he would decide what to do. Now this method of decision making by Rommel would be considered unwise and dangerous (in which certain occassions it was) but that is what commanders hated about Rommel...he was unpredictable! He favored the flanking maneuver but just as you bit on that he would punch right through your middle with an apparent feint.
Just my two cents worth.
The point about good generalship, as has been pointed out above, is that you avoid a 'fair' fight, and play to your strengths.Oxtane wrote:Put it this way:
If you gave Rommel and Montgomery and comparatively EQUAL force of armor and inf supported by the usual compliments in the desert...who would have won a meeting engagement between the two?
Rommel simply had no conception of logistics that was adequate to his command level. He was way out of his depth as commander of the Afrika Korps, as a result of his rapid overpromotion. There is no doubting that he was bold, but also no doubt that he was a gambler. Der Krug geht solange zum Brunnen bis er bricht. is the old German proverb that comes to mind when he is mentioned. His gambling after Tobruk destroyed the Afrika Korps.
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Alter Mann
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Rommel in WWI
If you look at Rommel's performance in WWI, I think it explains a lot. He was very successful with mountain infantry troops fighting at the end of their logistic chain, against the Italians. These episodes started to raise my first suspicions about him. On a number of occasions, when he was in a poor strategic position, he would ask for 'one more push', and an amazing number of them were successful. At this point I began to wonder if there was any limit to what he would ask from his men, and excpect to get it. He was awarded the Pour Le Merite for one of these actions, and that is some pretty effective positive reinforcement for his tactics.
I don't think he was as naive about logistics as a lot of people say. It seems to me that he was greatly handicapped by his forced dependence on the Command Supremo. Maybe its just because the CS realized that North Africa was a secondary front, where Rommel saw it as an opportunity to capture oil fields and eventually link up with German forces in the Crimea.
As to a meeting engagement between Rommel and Montgomery? IMHO, Rommel would prevail. This is a little unfair, though, because this is the type of fighting that the Germans were best at, at that time.
I don't think he was as naive about logistics as a lot of people say. It seems to me that he was greatly handicapped by his forced dependence on the Command Supremo. Maybe its just because the CS realized that North Africa was a secondary front, where Rommel saw it as an opportunity to capture oil fields and eventually link up with German forces in the Crimea.
As to a meeting engagement between Rommel and Montgomery? IMHO, Rommel would prevail. This is a little unfair, though, because this is the type of fighting that the Germans were best at, at that time.
Logistics is the kingmaker in war and Montgomery knew this, whereas Rommel choose to ignore it and chanced his arm.
Rommel may have had more elan about his approach which makes his style more alluring, but as with the tortoise and the hare, the tortoise though slow and plodding reaches his goal, the hare burns out before it reaches his.
Did Montgomery beat and defeat Rommel-Yes. Did Rommel beat and defeat Montgomery-No So Rommel (the great one) was beaten by a mere average mortal British General-oh the shame-where's the irony emoticon.
Andy H
Rommel may have had more elan about his approach which makes his style more alluring, but as with the tortoise and the hare, the tortoise though slow and plodding reaches his goal, the hare burns out before it reaches his.
Did Montgomery beat and defeat Rommel-Yes. Did Rommel beat and defeat Montgomery-No So Rommel (the great one) was beaten by a mere average mortal British General-oh the shame-where's the irony emoticon.
Andy H
Shermans, Churchills, Brens, 6-pdrs, 25-pdrs (not to mention 17 pdrs in Tunisia)? What exactly was crap about them in mid-late 1942? Two of these weapons are often held to be top of their class in WW2 (17-pdr the best ATG, 25-pdr the best field gun), the Bren was much loved by those who used it, and the 6-pdr was a very fine gun indeed. Low-slung, and good enough to hole anything the Afrikakorps could field, at a considerable distance.
Yes I know, there were still Crusaders, and Grants, and Honeys, and 2-pdrs. But then again, the Germans still had primarily Panzer III.
Two of these weapons are often held to be top of their class in WW2 (17-pdr the best ATG, 25-pdr the best field gun), the Bren was much loved by those who used it, and the 6-pdr was a very fine gun indeed. Low-slung, and good enough to hole anything the Afrikakorps could field, at a considerable distance.Yes I know, there were still Crusaders, and Grants, and Honeys, and 2-pdrs. But then again, the Germans still had primarily Panzer III.
The question about El Alamein really is why was it fought in the first place, after Rommel failed to breach the defences in July, he should have pulled back to at least Tobruk to resupply. Yet he waited almost passively on a stretched supply line subjected to incessant air attacks and when the blow fell, the inevitable happened, he lost.
(Off topic, the role of the Luftwaffe in supporting the Afrika Korp is one worth argung, building up big scores shooting down obsolete fighters high up did nothing to affect the battlefield or protect supply lines and troops, a classic case of misguided effort)
Why did Rommel sit and wait for an attack when everything was against him? The gate to Cario had been firmly shut in July, he was from then on in horribly exposed situation, a GREAT general would have recognised the hoplessness of his postion and withdrew to ground of his own choosing.
Montegromery, was he the better general? He had performed brillantly also in the Battle of France with his Infantry Division under the most awkward of circumstances - retreating. He was cautious and thorough and also ruthless, good traits for a General (hugely egotistical too, )
In Euope the shock of battle for the Allies upset them initially but importantly, the timetable set by Montgromery was to be on the Seine by D-DAy plus 90 and that is exactly where they were.
Its a moot point, who was better, Rommel committed suicide because of the Regime he served forced him to , Montgermy lived to ripe old age, believing himself more important with each passing year.
(Off topic, the role of the Luftwaffe in supporting the Afrika Korp is one worth argung, building up big scores shooting down obsolete fighters high up did nothing to affect the battlefield or protect supply lines and troops, a classic case of misguided effort)
Why did Rommel sit and wait for an attack when everything was against him? The gate to Cario had been firmly shut in July, he was from then on in horribly exposed situation, a GREAT general would have recognised the hoplessness of his postion and withdrew to ground of his own choosing.
Montegromery, was he the better general? He had performed brillantly also in the Battle of France with his Infantry Division under the most awkward of circumstances - retreating. He was cautious and thorough and also ruthless, good traits for a General (hugely egotistical too, )
In Euope the shock of battle for the Allies upset them initially but importantly, the timetable set by Montgromery was to be on the Seine by D-DAy plus 90 and that is exactly where they were.
Its a moot point, who was better, Rommel committed suicide because of the Regime he served forced him to , Montgermy lived to ripe old age, believing himself more important with each passing year.
Andreas wrote:Shermans, Churchills, Brens, 6-pdrs, 25-pdrs (not to mention 17 pdrs in Tunisia)? What exactly was crap about them in mid-late 1942?
Yes I know, there were still Crusaders, and Grants, and Honeys, and 2-pdrs. But then again, the Germans still had primarily Panzer III.
I guess it's common courtesy to respond. Of course you know the battles with the DAK kick off mid 1941.
So Andreas, cherry pick for me.
Mp40 vrs Sten
Mg38 vrs Bren
Mg42 vrs .303 Vickers
88' ATG vrs 6-pdrs... (the 17- pdrs didn't see much service during the desert war)
Panzer III, IV, *V*. Vrs Crap!...The Sherman came later, which i'm not a fan of. (The tank is your principle weapon for land battles, especially open desert!)...
Jerry cans vrs Crappy British petrol cans.
*Since you mentioned Tunisia*
Quite true, i must admit.17-pdr the best ATG, 25-pdr the best field gun
Well but Monty only took over when the 6-pdr and the Sherman were quite common. I am not sure what the 1941 battles matter, since this thread is not about Wavell.
The Sten was reputedly susceptible to jamming, and I know nothing of the quality of the MP40. But few soldiers would have these SMGs anyway, so I guess it comes down to Lee-Enfields vs. K98. I guess that is a toss-up, and if in doubt I take the Lee-Enfield, thank you very much.
MG34 (lMG/HMG) vs. Bren or Vickers. I take the Bren or Vickers anyday. But don't take my word for it, check what Sydney Jary has to say on the matter, in '18 Platoon'. The MG34 is of course more scary then the Vickers, and enables different tactics, but it has its drawbacks, and I am inherently conservative.
MG42 HMG vs. Vickers. I take the Vickers. Less trouble with ammo, more reliable. Again, the Vickers is less useful on the attack, but that is what you have 25-pdrs for anyway.
88s vs. 6pdrs. 6-pdr, no two ways about it. More mobile, much smaller, sufficient penetrating power to kill anything the Axis fields. Good enough is the enemy of perfect.
Panzer II/III/IV against Matilda, Crusader, Valentine, Grant, Honey. Here the Germans have the edge (mostly), but your idea that tanks are the primary weapon only holds true if your opponent is incapable of using combined arms properly - which the British in the desert were pre-Montgomery. The DAK lost a huge amount of tanks against the 6-pdrs in Outpost Snipe. The British lost huge amounts of tanks against DAK ATGs. So tanks are your primary weapon in attack, and ATGs in defense. Now, after that excursion:
Matilda - very decent tank, let down by the refusal of the twits at War Office to supply the 2-pdr with HE.
Crusader - earlier marks unbelievably bad. Later marks, especially with 6-pdr, okayish.
Valentine - very decent tank, let down by the refusal of the twits at War Office to supply the 2-pdr with HE. With 6-pdr it became much better, despite the loss of the crewman.
Grant - equal to the German tanks.
Honey - while I have a soft spot for them, they are at best recce tanks.
Jerry cans - you just need to capture enough of them
If we go there, how about rations?
25-pdr vs. German lFH18. Not even a contest, particularly in a fast-moving theatre like the desert.
No Panzer V in the desert, or Tunisia, ever, and the 25-pdr was the standard field gun before the war, so not only in Tunisia, BTW.
So all in all I think the Desert Army's gear was really not as bad as it was made out to be. The Desert Army lost not because of bad gear, and did not win despite bad gear. It lost when it was incapable to use combined arms tactics against an opponent who did, and so it got spanked repeatedly, more often then it spanked the Germans anyway. It won when it introduced combined arms tactics and forced the DAK to fight without proper logistical support.
So I am sorry to have to say that I find this idea that the British had such bad kit just thoroughly unconvincing.
The Sten was reputedly susceptible to jamming, and I know nothing of the quality of the MP40. But few soldiers would have these SMGs anyway, so I guess it comes down to Lee-Enfields vs. K98. I guess that is a toss-up, and if in doubt I take the Lee-Enfield, thank you very much.
MG34 (lMG/HMG) vs. Bren or Vickers. I take the Bren or Vickers anyday. But don't take my word for it, check what Sydney Jary has to say on the matter, in '18 Platoon'. The MG34 is of course more scary then the Vickers, and enables different tactics, but it has its drawbacks, and I am inherently conservative.
MG42 HMG vs. Vickers. I take the Vickers. Less trouble with ammo, more reliable. Again, the Vickers is less useful on the attack, but that is what you have 25-pdrs for anyway.
88s vs. 6pdrs. 6-pdr, no two ways about it. More mobile, much smaller, sufficient penetrating power to kill anything the Axis fields. Good enough is the enemy of perfect.
Panzer II/III/IV against Matilda, Crusader, Valentine, Grant, Honey. Here the Germans have the edge (mostly), but your idea that tanks are the primary weapon only holds true if your opponent is incapable of using combined arms properly - which the British in the desert were pre-Montgomery. The DAK lost a huge amount of tanks against the 6-pdrs in Outpost Snipe. The British lost huge amounts of tanks against DAK ATGs. So tanks are your primary weapon in attack, and ATGs in defense. Now, after that excursion:
Matilda - very decent tank, let down by the refusal of the twits at War Office to supply the 2-pdr with HE.
Crusader - earlier marks unbelievably bad. Later marks, especially with 6-pdr, okayish.
Valentine - very decent tank, let down by the refusal of the twits at War Office to supply the 2-pdr with HE. With 6-pdr it became much better, despite the loss of the crewman.
Grant - equal to the German tanks.
Honey - while I have a soft spot for them, they are at best recce tanks.
Jerry cans - you just need to capture enough of them
If we go there, how about rations? 25-pdr vs. German lFH18. Not even a contest, particularly in a fast-moving theatre like the desert.
No Panzer V in the desert, or Tunisia, ever, and the 25-pdr was the standard field gun before the war, so not only in Tunisia, BTW.
So all in all I think the Desert Army's gear was really not as bad as it was made out to be. The Desert Army lost not because of bad gear, and did not win despite bad gear. It lost when it was incapable to use combined arms tactics against an opponent who did, and so it got spanked repeatedly, more often then it spanked the Germans anyway. It won when it introduced combined arms tactics and forced the DAK to fight without proper logistical support.
So I am sorry to have to say that I find this idea that the British had such bad kit just thoroughly unconvincing.