Rommel vs. Montgomery

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Alter Mann
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Rommel vs. Montgomery

#46

Post by Alter Mann » 18 Jun 2004, 17:21

Rommel left North Africa on the 23rd of September after turning over command to General Stumme. His doctor had advised him to take a prolonged rest in Germany in order to recover from jaundice and high blood pressure.

Interestingly enough, at about the same time Gause was declared unfit for further North African service due to un-specified health issues, Westphal was having problems with jaundice and von Mellenthin had just been evacuated due to dysentery. The lack of effective supply led to poor rations and the number of men sick from jaundice was becoming a problem.

I highly recommend the book 'The Rommel Papers' edited by B.H. Liddell-Hart for insights into Rommel's thinking during the El Alamein campaign. As I said, it indicates to me that he was not nearly as naive about logistics as some other works suggest.

I think that Sun Tsu came up with the 3 to 1 rule just as a general guideline to be used when deciding whether to attack/defend or not. He did not believe in losing soldiers unnecessarily, especially since this could boost the morale of his enemies. He did not believe in fighting any battle that he was not absolutely positive he could win. At this time also there was usually very little difference in the weapons used by each side and usually not a great deal of difference in training. Since then, troops have become much more expendable, leading to instances where the 3 to 1 rule was disregarded, sometimes successfully, sometimes not.

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#47

Post by Wm. Harris » 20 Jun 2004, 22:31

I find it kind of odd that in this debate over the merits of Axis and Allied equipment/tactics in North Africa, the Italians have been completely neglected. Most of the Axis forces Montgomery had to face were Italian (ie: Rommel's advance on Alexandria in mid-1942 consisted of 15 divisions -- 2 German armoured, 2 German infantry, 9 Italian infantry and 2 Italian armoured), and they were of generally lower calibre than their less numerous Afrika Korps counterparts.

Their equipment was for the most part obsolscent; their tanks especially couldn't stack up to those in use by the British at any point in the war (except perhaps for the small numbers of M/13s used after 1941).

The Regia Aeronautica employed some good aircraft, but these were consistently outperformed by superior British machines and better-trained British airmen. There was no way they could provide adequate protection for the convoys struggling to keep Rommel supplied.

Aside from elite formations like the Bersagliere regiments and airborne divisions, the average Italian infantryman suffered from poor morale, poor pay and contempt for the government that had sent them to fight in the desert wastes. There was only so much Rommel could do with men such as these making up the bulk of his forces.


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Rommel vs. Montgomery

#48

Post by Alter Mann » 20 Jun 2004, 23:24

Good points, Mr. Harris. Who can you blame? The Italian Army's vehicles were designed for use in Italy, not North Africa. Italian industry was not capable of making large castings, so the hulls were made from plate and riveted. Il Duce started the whole North Africa thing, trying to increase the size of his empire.

The Italian troops were poorly equipped, poorly supplied even though the Commando Supremo gave them precedence in supply shipments over the Germans most of the time, poorly fed and poorly led, especially by company level officers. The officers and men did not even eat the same food. The situation was made even worse by the fact that German equipment losses were often made up from Italian equipment, which was obscelescent even at the beginning of the war.

On the other hand, the Italian troops gave a good account of themselves on many occasions. Rommel said many times that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the Italian soldiers that hadn't been caused by their military system.

On the third hand, especially during the retreat from El Alamein, the Italian troops, almost entirely non-motorized by that time, caused Rommel enormous difficulties. He lost an entire Italian division in the retreat from the El Alamein line and was amazed later when Ramcke's regiment(?) was able to get back to the Axis lines, after a few adventures and after being left in very much the same situation.

Rommel was rumored to be an Italian-hater after North Africa, and was not allowed to cross even the 1938 border between Germany and Italy, for political reasons. He had originally been slated to command all troops in Italy's defense against the Allied invasion, but it never happened.

As I've said before, I think that, if I had been Hitler, I would have left North Africa to the Italians, no matter what happened there. That book just wasn't worth the candle.

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Re: Rommel vs. Montgomery

#49

Post by DrG » 20 Jun 2004, 23:49

I agree with most of what is told by Alte Mann and Wm. Harris, except for the following points:
- morale: it was not that horrible as often told; censorship of letters and Carabinieri (military police) reports don't show any problem with the troops fighting in North Africa.
- vehicles: while Italian tanks were simply horrible, the self propelled guns (like the Semovente da 75/18) were of average quality, the armored cars (Autoblinda AB.41) were very modern and the trucks were the best avaible in North Africa thanks to their engine (they hadn't carburettors, that are full of problems with sand).
- supplies arrived rather safely to North Africa, the troubles came then: small capacity of Libyan ports (a maximum of 100,000 t per month versus the 500,000 of Egypt and the pipeline from Mid-East) and long distance from ports to the front (a distance that had to be covered using trucks and not trains as for the Britons).

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Rommel vs. Montgomery

#50

Post by Alter Mann » 21 Jun 2004, 18:14

DrG, I just finished re-reading the section of 'Rommel's Diaries' that covers Second El Alamein to the Kasserine Pass. He mentions time and time again that convoys from Italy to North Africa were losing 50% or more ships during the trip to Allied submarines, aircraft and even surface ships. Often, the only fuel supply was provided by Luftwaffe transport planes.

I agree that transport from the ports to the front lines was a severe problem. The roads were bad and the trucks didn't last long between major repairs. Most of the fuel carried was used up just getting the trucks to the front lines. Hmmm . . . Why didn't the Commando Supremo route the ships to Axis controlled ports closer to the front lines? Rommel asked them this question many times and they never came up with a reasonable explanation. There was certainly a problem with doing this if the port was within range of Allied bombers. I think I remember that two critical tanker loads were lost in a forward port just after First El Alamein.

Based on what I have read, the loss rates for shipping to North Africa don't seem to indicate that they arrived safely.

There was a huge shortage of trucks due in large part to the lack of even a paved road to to the Libyan/Egyptian border. Rommel said himself that transporting supplies that far, even over paved roads, made no sense, and should have been done by trains. Unfortunately, only Commando Supremo could make railroads or paved roads appear, and, although they made a lot of promises, they never sent the men, equipment and materials to make it happen.

I have no idea how good the Italian trucks were, but there can't have been very many of them. Otherwise, why were the Italian forces with the Afrika Korps non-motorized?
and the trucks were the best avaible in North Africa thanks to their engine (they hadn't carburettors, that are full of problems with sand).
I suspect you mean that the engines were fuel injected. Unfortunately, fuel injection systems are more susceptible to sand damage than carburetted engines as well as being much more complicated.
Carburetted engines without effective air cleaners allow sand into the cumbustion chambers where it scores the walls and sooner or later ends up in the oil.

Fuel injected engines still need to get air from somewhere, so you still need an effective air cleaner. Sand can also damage the fuel injection system much quicker than it can damage a carburettor, so you have two problems instead of one.

From what I have read, everyone in North Africa preferred the British trucks at that time even though the British had made little effort to standardize them.

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Re: Rommel vs. Montgomery

#51

Post by Jon G. » 21 Jun 2004, 19:07

Just piping in on your debate...
Alte Mann wrote:DrG, I just finished re-reading the section of 'Rommel's Diaries' that covers Second El Alamein to the Kasserine Pass. He mentions time and time again that convoys from Italy to North Africa were losing 50% or more ships during the trip to Allied submarines, aircraft and even surface ships. Often, the only fuel supply was provided by Luftwaffe transport planes...
To quibble with Rommel rather than with you, but does he mention that he very strongly favoured going on the offensive into Egypt in the spring of 1942, rather than allow limited Axis resources to be used for taking Malta? He persuaded first Kesselring and then Hitler, and finally Hitler persuaded Mussolini to give Rommel the go-ahead, rather than taking Malta - an island whose importance to the safety of Italian convoys he otherwise emphasized time and again.
Hmmm . . . Why didn't the Commando Supremo route the ships to Axis controlled ports closer to the front lines? Rommel asked them this question many times and they never came up with a reasonable explanation. There was certainly a problem with doing this if the port was within range of Allied bombers. I think I remember that two critical tanker loads were lost in a forward port just after First El Alamein.
Allied air superiority was one problem - the very limited capacity of Tobruk and Benghazi another.
Based on what I have read, the loss rates for shipping to North Africa don't seem to indicate that they arrived safely.
By and large, they generally did - as long as they were bound for Tripolis, far away from the front for most of the campaign. Some convoys also made it farther east, but they had to be very heavily escorted by the Italian navy, whose fuel expenditure was strictly rationed.
and should have been done by trains. Unfortunately, only Commando Supremo could make railroads or paved roads appear, and, although they made a lot of promises, they never sent the men, equipment and materials to make it happen.
In fairness, Rommel could have taken the absence of railroads in North Africa into account before plunging well into Egypt? Also, building 1000+ miles of railroad in blasting heat, in an extended combat zone would have been an enormous task - and of course, all the equipment and supplies needed for that construction work would have taken away still more from Tripolis' already too small capacity.
From what I have read, everyone in North Africa preferred the British trucks at that time even though the British had made little effort to standardize them.
I think this was simply an issue of availability - there must have been far more British trucks in North Africa than Italian and German trucks combined. I don't think the British trucks had any advantages over Axis ones for mechanical reliability -

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Rommel vs. Montgomery

#52

Post by Alter Mann » 21 Jun 2004, 19:46

Hello, Shrek. In general I can't disagree with you. I do think that Rommel finally realized the value of Malta, though. After El Alamein he says he tried to convince the Commando Supremo that it must be neutralized because of the supply problems it caused.

One thing that mystifys me about this particular diary entry is that he says he offered to take on the task with his own forces. What was he thinking?

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#53

Post by DrG » 21 Jun 2004, 21:36

Some points of my reply are like those of Shrek, I wrote it when I was offline before reading Shrek's text.
Alte Mann wrote:DrG, I just finished re-reading the section of 'Rommel's Diaries' that covers Second El Alamein to the Kasserine Pass. He mentions time and time again that convoys from Italy to North Africa were losing 50% or more ships during the trip to Allied submarines, aircraft and even surface ships. Often, the only fuel supply was provided by Luftwaffe transport planes.
Actually the true data are different from Rommel's claims:
Image
Alte Mann wrote:Why didn't the Commando Supremo route the ships to Axis controlled ports closer to the front lines? Rommel asked them this question many times and they never came up with a reasonable explanation. There was certainly a problem with doing this if the port was within range of Allied bombers. I think I remember that two critical tanker loads were lost in a forward port just after First El Alamein.
Tripoli was the largest port avaible, if supplyes had been sent only to the ports nearest to the front, the capacity would have been even lower than the maximum 100,000 t. In Dr. Enrico Cernuschi's words:
Enrico Cernuschi wrote:The Lybian harbour capacity was, before the war, at best, no more than 100,000 tons. in a month. At war this total dropped to an half for simply logistic reasons, not considering the effect of bombers ect. The Suez, Port Said and Alexandria system was able to receive about 500,000 tons, not considering oil which was coming by pipeline. Quite heavier cargos (tanks, for example) could be managed in an easier and faster way in Egypt than in Lybia yet in 1940. It was a problem of docks, cranes, sea bottom, workers and so on which could not be changed, at war, in a brief time but would have need years of work during peace time.
Alte Mann wrote:There was a huge shortage of trucks due in large part to the lack of even a paved road to to the Libyan/Egyptian border. Rommel said himself that transporting supplies that far, even over paved roads, made no sense, and should have been done by trains. Unfortunately, only Commando Supremo could make railroads or paved roads appear, and, although they made a lot of promises, they never sent the men, equipment and materials to make it happen.
I don't know why a railroad (that, by the way, is much more vulnerable to air attacks than a road) was not built during the war, if it was only a matter of time (I don't think, since the Britons extended the Egyptian railroad from Marsa Matruh to almost Tobruk in six months in 1941/42; while the kilometers of railroad that had to be build by Italy would have been many times more, Italy had also more than six months avaible), or for technical reasons, or because instead the economic and widely used way to transport supplies were ferry boats sailing along the coast (though still vulnerable to enemy airplanes). But not even a railroad would have solved the problem of the capacity of Libyan ports, far lower than the Egyptian and, per se, the most important cause, on the long run, of the defeat of Axis in Libya.
About the much debated matter of fuel, there is a critic to Rommel that is often forgotten: if he was so short of fuel as he claimed, how were his troops able to retreat from el-Alamein to Tripoli? Gen. Bayerlein wrote that the battles of el Alamein were not influenced by any lack of oil.
Alte Mann wrote:I have no idea how good the Italian trucks were, but there can't have been very many of them. Otherwise, why were the Italian forces with the Afrika Korps non-motorized?
All the trucks transporting supplies were Italian, and not a few were used by the Germans too. But there weren't enough (well, to be more precise, it would have been impossible to keep them supplied of fuel and spare parts) also for Italian infantry. By the way, at El-Alamein Italy had 2 armoured and 2 motorized divisions, not only infantry.
Alte Mann wrote:I suspect you mean that the engines were fuel injected. Unfortunately, fuel injection systems are more susceptible to sand damage than carburetted engines as well as being much more complicated.
I shall check where I got that info, but, as far as I know, Italian trucks were considered a good prize also by Britons, whose trucks were thought to be less reliable.

PS "Rommel's diaries" are interesting, but it's hard to find anything more self-absolutory and biased than them. Since pratically all the books about the war in N. Africa had been written only on British and German sources, sistematically ignoring the Italian ones, I suggest the only one that can give info also from Italian documents: "Rommel's North Africa Campaign" by Jack Greene, Alessandro Massignani.

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Re: Rommel vs. Montgomery

#54

Post by DrG » 22 Jun 2004, 14:32

Alte Mann wrote:Often, the only fuel supply was provided by Luftwaffe transport planes.
I've seen this claim more than once, finally I think I can prove it is not correct (certainly at least the adverb "often").
These are the data that I've found about air transports to North Africa:
- SAS (Servizi Aerei Speciali) of the Regia Aeronautica from 10 June 1940 to 31 Dec. 1942: passengers 504,146, materiels 34,190 t (monthly average: 1,100 t).
- SAS from 1 Jan. 1942 to 10 May 1943: passengers 75,854, materiels 5,810 t (monthly average: 1,341 t).
- Transportgruppen of Luftwaffe from 1 Dec. 1942 to 31 March 1943: passengers 40,059, materiels 14,179 t (monthly average: 3,545 t).
I haven't found the data for Luftwaffe before 1 Dec. 1942 (but the Luftwaffe was not present during the whole campaign and doubled its contribution, from 300 airplanes - 200 efficent -, to 600 - 370 efficent - after the occupation of Tunisia, also using the Messerschmitt Me 323 Gigant), while the text is rather unclear (at first it gives the number of sorties made between 1 Dec. '42 and 31 March '43, but the totals for passengers and materiels are described as "the total to Tunisia", thus maybe not only in that space of time).

Even if, ad absurdum, all the materiels transported by ariplanes were fuel, they still would have been a minority: just for example from Nov. 1942 to May 1943 the fuel transported by ships to Tunisia was 94,472 t (71% of the 132,522 that had sailed from Italy, 29% was lost), and in July-Nov. 1942 the fuel shipped to Libya had been 111,501 t (65% of the 171,153 t from Italy, 35% lost).
The air transport of 65 t of fuel by 52 Junkers Ju 52 to Tunisia on 8 April 1943 was considered a great success, but if compared to the amounts of fuel transported by a tanker ship it was really tiny.

This was the capacity of ports (Sfax, Tunis, Gabes, Sousse) in Tunisia: 225,000 t monthly (7,500 t daily) in Nov. 1942, reduced to 66,000 t (2,200 t daily) by Allied bombings by the second half of February 1943.

(source: Ferdinando Pedriali, "Operazione Flax", Storia Militare n. 125 feb. 2004)

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#55

Post by Andy H » 29 Jun 2004, 03:11

From memory, I beleive that the largest percentage of Italian motor transport was lost by the Italian forces in Russia.

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Rommel vs. Montgomery

#56

Post by Alter Mann » 29 Jun 2004, 13:27

Yes, the Italians had two motorized Divisions at El Alamein, but just because they were called 'motorized' doesn't mean they had any trucks left. They didn't. The 'armored' divisions also had hardly any vehicles of any kind left.

This is why Rommel wanted them pulled out of line and sent to the rear first. They could not move at the speed that the German units could, and he did not want to either lose them, or have them clogging up the escape route for the rest of his forces.

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Re: Rommel vs. Montgomery

#57

Post by DrG » 29 Jun 2004, 23:18

Alte Mann wrote:Yes, the Italians had two motorized Divisions at El Alamein, but just because they were called 'motorized' doesn't mean they had any trucks left. They didn't. The 'armored' divisions also had hardly any vehicles of any kind left.
I haven't the data about the number of trucks right now (neither you have them, I guess), but you should know that of the 548 tanks of the Axis at el Alamein, 299 (55.6%) were Italians. How can you state that the Italian armoured divisions "had hardly any vehicles of any kind left"?
This is why Rommel wanted them pulled out of line and sent to the rear first. They could not move at the speed that the German units could, and he did not want to either lose them, or have them clogging up the escape route for the rest of his forces.
Frankly I'd like to know the source of this statement. Not only the order of retreat often reached the Italian units later than the German ones, but their position on the battlefield was usually farther from the main coastal road, making their retreat pratically impossible (also given that the Britons broke the front in the north).

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#58

Post by DrG » 30 Jun 2004, 00:05

Andy H wrote:From memory, I beleive that the largest percentage of Italian motor transport was lost by the Italian forces in Russia.
Your memory serves you well. :)
Italy had 16,700 trucks and cars in Russia in 1942, while "only" 7,000 in Libya.

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Re: Rommel vs. Montgomery

#59

Post by Jon G. » 30 Jun 2004, 00:25

DrG wrote:
Alte Mann wrote:Yes, the Italians had two motorized Divisions at El Alamein, but just because they were called 'motorized' doesn't mean they had any trucks left. They didn't. The 'armored' divisions also had hardly any vehicles of any kind left.
I haven't the data about the number of trucks right now (neither you have them, I guess), but you should know that of the 548 tanks of the Axis at el Alamein, 299 (55.6%) were Italians. How can you state that the Italian armoured divisions "had hardly any vehicles of any kind left"?...
In all fairness, it would maybe make more sense to try measuring up the fuel stocks available to the Axis forces at the time of Alamein, rather than the number of tanks?

I would assume that the Axis units at Alamein had more serviceable tanks and trucks in the fall of 1942 than they did in the summer that year, when Rommel's push was stopped - but I recall seeing wildly conflicting numbers for number of operational tanks on the eve of Alamein. Quantifying the number of trucks available is probably a hopeless task. But I am pretty sure it was not enough to give mobility to more than a fraction of the Axis forces.

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#60

Post by DrG » 30 Jun 2004, 02:00

Shrek wrote:In all fairness, it would maybe make more sense to try measuring up the fuel stocks available to the Axis forces at the time of Alamein, rather than the number of tanks?
The number of tanks is important to quantify the Italian contribution to the battle, while your question is more (and rightly) about the whole strategic situation of the Axis.
You are right about the fact that most of Axis units were not motorized (not that I have denied it, just I underlined that it was not only the DAK that was motorized).

About the question of fuel stock, it's a good question, but we all know that el Alamein was not decided by the lack of fuel, but by the huge British superiority.
Yet, these are the data I was able to find, not about the avaible fuel stocks, but of the fuel sent to Libya before, during and shortly after el Alamein:
for each month there are 2 numbers (metric tons): the fuel sent and the fuel arrived. I've written also the recipient of the fuel.
August, September, October, November.
Regio Esercito: 15982/6421, 14080/8246, 13716/6943, 15928/7242.
Regia Marina: 1252/752, 1986/1986, 2507/1378, 1443/778.
Regia Aereonautica: 4933/2629, 2681/2641, 1659/1143, 3156/2905.
German forces: 16307/12698, 21453/19086, 7889/2844, 19401/10806.

These are the monthly totals: August 38384/22500 , September 40200/31061, October 25771/12308, November 39928/21731.

ULTRA played an important role in the sinkings, for example on 17 Oct. it decoded the full list of shippings for 21-29 Oct.

More generally, ULTRA (whose effect on the Mediterranean war was officially brought to the Italian public's knowledge only in 1981 by prof. Alberto Santoni with his "Il vero traditore", Mursia) played a significant role in the battle of convoys. The ZTPI Enigma messages referring to convoy departures, courses and arrivals, were broken in June 1941: if you compare the ships losses before and after that month on the graph that I've already posted, you'll see how important was this. Out of the 185 Italian and German merchant ships sunk from June 1941 to May 1943, 86 (plus 9 escorting warships) were sunk thanks to broken Enigma messages. Not to mention the only damaged ships, and the extra demoralizing effect achieved on the Italian Navy, charged of "betrayal" by the Germans.

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