1.Introduction
On October 28th 1940, at 5:30 a.m., an ultimatum was delivered to Greece by the Italian Embassy in Athens. They were required to cede various coastal positions and strategically important islands to the Italians within three hours. General Metaxas , head of the Greek Council of State, refused these demands and later on the 28th October an Italian invasion of Greece (from the previously conquered Albania) began.
Over the next few weeks, the Italians were repulsed by the Greeks and pushed back into Albania. Britain and the Commonwealth sent troops and equipment to help the Greeks, and Churchill's ideas of a "Balkan Confederation" seemed a little less far-fetched...
But then Hitler and the OKW, disturbed by this turn of events, sent German forces into Greece to prop up the faltering Italians. The Greeks and British/Commonwealth forces were pushed back, and Greece fell to the Axis.
But what were the forces of the Hellenic Kingdom, that trounced such a local power as Italy? Greece 1940 (apart from Crete) is largely a forgotten conflict in the English-speaking world, and perhaps I can redress this balance a bit with the following.
The Italian invasion of Greece in October 1940 was one of Mussolini's major wartime disasters. A totally inadequate Italian army blundered into the mountains of north-west Greece, where it was defeated, thrown back into Albania, only to be rescued by the German invasion of Greece the following year.
2.The Road to War
War with Greece in 1940 was far from inevitable. Whilst King George and sections of the Greek political elite had anglophile tendencies, Greece was led by General Metaxas, a dictator who had far more in common with the Axis leaders than the western democracies. It was the policy of Mussolini and his pro-Albanian clique including Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, Jacomoni, governor-general of Albania and the commanding general, Visconti Prasca which drove Italy to war with Greece.
Hitler's strategic plans required that the Balkans remain quiet. In the summer of 1940 German troops had secured the Rumanian oilfields, Bulgaria was pro-German and the Yugoslavian Prince Regent supported the axis. Even Turkish neutrality was being undermined. Yet it had been agreed that the Balkans would be in Mussolini's sphere of interest and the Italian dictator was jealous of Hitler's success. The complex diplomatic moves and political machinations of the Italian leadership are beyond the scope of this article. However, in the final analysis it was Mussolini who sanctioned the invasion, without advising his ally Hitler until after the invasion had begun.
3.The War plans
The original Italian plan (known as Contingency G) was a limited territorial expansion into the Epirus region for which the nine Italian divisions in Albania were deemed sufficient. However, this was expanded in a second phase to the total occupation of Greece at a meeting only two weeks before the invasion at which the naval and air force chiefs were not even present. The Chief of the General Staff, Marshall Badoglio, who had previously indicated muted objections to the war, argued that 20 divisions would be required. Visconti Prasca asked for only three extra mountain divisions and some support units. Even these were to be fed in when the initial objectives had been achieved. His motives for refusing reinforcements can only be a matter for speculation. However, the fact that a more senior general might command a larger army, probably influenced his thinking.
For such a modest army to be successful required several favourable factors including; strategic and tactical surprise; a supporting invasion by Bulgarian forces; diversionary attacks on the poorly defended mainland; massive air support; and treachery in the Greek armed forces.
Unfortunately for the Italians the Greeks knew the approximate date of the invasion and King Boris of Bulgaria declined Mussolini's invitation to participate. This meant the Greek army was well established in the invasion area with the possibility of shifting reinforcements when Bulgarian neutrality became clear. No diversionary attacks were planned (even the island invasions were called off at the last moment) and a winter offensive coupled with negligible air planning minimised the value of Italian air superiority. Despite optimistic views expressed by commanders in Albania and substantial investment in bribes, there was no evidence that Greek forces would collapse due to internal dissent.
The Greek operational plan was very simple. It consisted of two lines using the natural defensive features of the rivers and mountain ranges. In Epirus the army was to follow the principle of elastic defence avoiding major losses. In Macedonia the first line was to be used as a platform for an offensive onto the Koritsa plateau.
4.The Forces.
Italian Army (CinC General Visconti Prasca)
Julia Alpini Division (Pindus Front): 10,800 men & 20 guns
Littoral Group (coast, two cavalry regs. and one reg. of Grenadiers): 4,823 men & 32 guns
Arezzo Infantry Division (Yugoslav Front): 12000 men & 32 guns
Venezia Infantry Division (Marching from Yugoslav front to XXVI Corps): 10000 men & 40 guns
Tsamouria Corps (General Carlo Rossi, Epirus Front)
Ferrara Infantry Division: 12,785 men & 60 guns +3,500 Albanians
Sienna Infantry Division: 9,200 men & 50 guns
Centauro Armoured Division: 4,037 men & 24 guns + 163 light tanks (90 serviceable)
XXVI Corps (General Gabriele Nasci, Macedonian Front)
Parma Infantry Division: 12,000 men & 60 guns
Piemonte Infantry Division: 9,300 men & 32 guns
The Italian Corps were only established four days before the invasion
Greek Army (CinC General Alexandros Papagos)
Epirus Front -VIII (8th) Division +Colonel Davakis' detachment - 15 battalions & 66 guns
Pindus Front - 3 reinforced battalions & 6 guns
Macedonian Front - IX (9th) Division + 4th Inf. Brig. - 22 battalions & 90 guns
The Greek second line had a further seven battalions in position.
Italian 'standard' divisional organisation in 1940 was 2 (3 btn.) regiments usually with 2 Blackshirt battalions attached. Greek divisions had 3 (3 btn.) regiments. Artillery support was similar with 9 batteries. The Italians were better provided with light mortars and the Greeks had more MGs. Both the Italian and Greek divisions had limited AA and ATG provision. Supply services were poor on both sides although this was more vital to the Italians who had only 107 lorries in Albania out of an estimated requirement of 1,750.
In the air, the Italian Air force in Albania had 55 bombers and 107 fighters (more than half CR42 & 32's). They could also count on support from Brindisi in the form of 119 bombers, 20 JU87's and 54 fighters. The tiny Greek air force had only 27 bombers and 38 fighters serviceable. However, Italian air-ground co-operation was negligible with the Albania air commander, General Ranza being based in Tirana, many miles from army HQ. The supporting squadrons in Italy were not even in telephone contact.
5.The Campaign
The Italian offensive was launched on 28 October in driving rain that deprived the army of air cover. The Littoral group moved slowly down the coast while the Tsamouria Corps advanced through the mountains towards Kalpaki where the only resistance it met with, was the Colonel Davakis' dettachment (2,500 men).
Colonel Davakis:
On their left the Julia Alpini Division split into two regimental battle groups either side of Mount Smolikas with the objective of seizing the Metsovon pass. In Macedonia the XXVI Corps (primarily the Parma Division) was thinly spread in defensive positions.
Rapidly rising rivers and mud tracks resulted in slow progress with Greek screening forces falling back onto prepared positions. Despite the difficulties the Aosta Lancers in the Littoral Group gained a bridgehead over the Kalamas River. The Tsamouria Corps made slow progress on what were little more than mountain tracks with the Centauro's tanks simply sticking in the mud where they had to be abandoned. The Julia Division in the centre began to create a wedge in the Greek position despite the conditions and Papagos responded with infiltration attacks that almost surrounded the Italians.
A sea of snow:
Bersaglieri reinforcements helped extricate the Division only after heavy losses.
On 6 November the Italian command was reorganised into two armies:
9th Army
Piemonte, Arezzo, Parma & Venezia Divisions in Western Macedonia.
Julia and Bari (diverted from cancelled Corfu invasion) Divisions on the Pindus.
Tridentia Alpini Division in reserve.
11th Army
Ferrara, Centauro and Sienna Divisions
To be reinforced by four divisions in preparation for an offensive after 5 December.
General Soddu subsequently replaced Visconte Prasca.
With the Italian offensive grinding to a halt, Papagos shifted the X (10th) and XV (15th) Divisions to the Macedonian front to join the IX (9th) Division (C Corps).
Greeks on attack:
The Italians had dug in on the Devoli River with their backs to the Morava massif. XV (15th) Division in the north made spectacular advances in freezing conditions around Mount Ivan whilst IX (9th) & X (10th) Divisions pushed the Italians back off the mountains exposing the key valley town of Korce which was abandoned on the 21 November.
Greeks on the outskirts of Korce:
Italian reinforcements where thrown into the line piecemeal often without supporting arms and into a chaotic command structure. The loss of Koritsa and Erseke exposed the left flank of the 11th Army on the coast which was forced to retreat deep into Albania whilst being vigorously counterattacked by fresh Greek divisions. By 10 January the Klisura junction had been captured and Italian units only managed to stabilise the line south of the port of Vlore. Even this was due more to the lengthening Greek supply lines than effective Italian resistance. Marshall Cavallero replaced General Soddu.
The Greek strategy was now to capture Vlore then stabilise the line so that divisions could be redeployed to the Bulgarian front. It was becoming increasingly obvious that a German invasion was likely. The assault supported by RAF squadrons made some progress but ground to a halt in bad weather.
The Italians again reinforced up to a total of 28 divisions(4 Alpine, 1 Armoured and 23 Infantry) totalling 526,000 men. On 9 March their spring offensive used seven divisions in a limited attack between the Vijose River and Mount Tommorit. The 14 Greek divisions holding the Albanian front gave some ground until the attack was called off on 25 March after heavy casualties on both sides. This remained the position until April when the German invasion of the Balkans moved through the Pindus capturing Ioannina, sealing the Greek army in Albania.
Losses
The Italian casualties amounted to approximately 13,755 killed 25,067 missing (presumably KIA) and 63,242 wounded. The Greek losses totaled 14,562 men, including the 1,237 missing (presumably KIA) and 67,485 wounded. The Greeks suffered most of their casualties in the course of the Italian spring offensive (Operation "Primavera"-1,263 dead, 4,036 wounded. The Greek I (1st) Infantry Division accounted 559 dead, 2,067 wounded). In addition, the Greeks took some 23,000 Italians as POWs. The Italians captured 2,392 Greeks
Reference: Hellenic Society of Keele University
http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks26
http://members.fortunecity.com/fstav1/t ... _12_16.jpg
http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks26/28October/355.gif
http://members.fortunecity.com/fstav1/t ... epirus.jpg
http://members.fortunecity.com/fstav1/t ... era40b.jpg
http://www.keele.ac.uk/socs/ks26/28October/478.gif
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ETO/Eas ... gns-11.jpg
http://members.fortunecity.com/fstav1/t ... el1941.jpg
http://members.fortunecity.com/fstav1/t ... ermans.jpg
: the Greek counter-attack started in Nov. 1940, there were offensive operations untill Jan. 1941, but by the time of the German attack, Italy had already re-gained numeric superiority and made a limited offensive in March. The Germans would have rescued the Italian position if they had attacked in Dec. 1940, in April the situation was stable or favourable to Italy.
