Malta Garrison 1942

[Davide Pastore]

1/ was Malta worth deploying forces to that could be lost?

No.

I well know this goes contrary to the feelings of most readers, however the Axis capture of Malta would not have changed the historical timeline of the war. Axis supplies to Africa were already working at the maximum rate allowed by the receiving capabilities of the Lybian ports. Taking Malta would not have increased such rate.

Of course Britain is forced to do something in case of invasion, just out of political / moral / propaganda reasons, but without taking too many risks.

I believe RN is going to try a night raid against the landing beaches, bombarding the beachheads. However the historical experience (Leros 1943) proves RN is likely to bombard their own troops as well. Yes, I know, Anglo-Saxon historians are quite shy with such details

Did ULTRA provide enough useful data on Axis Mediterranean ops

Yes.

So what? Anyone knew an invasion was being prepared since spring 1942.

Did air and submarine assets from Malta do enough damage to Axis naval tranpsort?

No.

It is just propaganda. Force K at some times sunk a number of ships, however if you look at the long-term picture the supply line is the same through the war years. Anyway, Malta forces can sink something only when the island is not under attack. The moment C3 convoys sail, Malta RAF has one-digit strength, with RN strength at zero (submarines can operate from Haifa, but the horde of small shallow-draught landing crafts has nothing to fear from them).

COULD reinforcements be sent

They can be sent from home, however they are not going to arrive to Malta.

Are you familiar with Pedestal? Consider that the Axis forces collected to stop the operation were inferior to the ones intended for C3.

3/ What was available - and where - that could be sent?

Oh, you can take the entire 8th Army if you like

As said above, the problem is carrying the payload to the island under STRONG (and I mean STRONG) enemy contrast.

4/ What further mechanised assets could be sent?

No use. Malta terrain is not tank ground. Moreover, tanks burn a lot of fuel.

And HOW could they be sent?

By ship. To be sunk en route.

5/ Could enough damage be caused to the attacking airborne forces to force their capitualation?

To put things in perspective:

A) the Axis airborne force to land during the first six hours is LARGER than the entire Malta garrison. And this only if you include in the garrison count such terrific troops as KOMR

B) such airborne force has nothing to do but dig in in place and await counter-attacks. For an example of a likely outcome, see how Folgore easily threw back an overwhelming mechanised assault at El Alamein. Yes, I know, Anglo-Saxon historians are quite shy with such details

C) the following amphibious first wave, on land 24h after the first airdrop, is going to move the balance to FOUR TO ONE.

D) in case of need, the second wave (day 3 to day 5) can move the balance to SEVEN TO ONE.

E) in any case, the Axis invasion includes something Allied troops very rarely (if ever) met: Italian troops throughfully trained for their role, employed in their planned role, provided with superior armoured assets, operating under total air superiority. When the already-quoted Anglo-Saxon historians thinks about Italian soldiers, generally they have Compass in mind.

stone walls enclosing smaller fields! More broken ankles, legs and backs AND defensive-wise - think Bocage minus the hedges; dry stone walls, banked ditches and sunken lanes in a landscape that looks like the squares on a chessboard

What a strange universe. Those legendary stone walls are a huge help to the Allied garrison, but (of course) the Germans and the Italians are too dumb to use them as a mean of defence.

P.S. I have yet to met a single Britishman mentally prepared to accept that there is the vague possibility that, perhaps, maybe, possibly, in some cases, who knows, Malta could fall

[phylo_roadking]

LOL starting in no particular order -

I have yet to met a single Britishman mentally prepared to accept that there is the vague possibility that, perhaps, maybe, possibly, in some cases, who knows, Malta could fall

Oh, am very prepared to accept it as an almost-certainty but the cost to the Axis is going to far outweigh the usefulness Malta actually had to the Allies during the war, making it as MacDonald called crete "a lost victory".

Those legendary stone walls are a huge help to the Allied garrison, but (of course) the Germans and the Italians are too dumb to use them as a mean of defence.

My point is they'll help and hinder both sides. The one thing they're guarateed to do is make clearing the island FAR slower than Crete. But I'll return to that.

My question "1/ was Malta worth deploying forces to that could be lost?" was bound up with "Did ULTRA provide enough useful data on Axis Mediterranean ops" I'm very much aware that at that point in the war, summer 1942, with the Allies in full retreat in the Desert again Churchill COULD have made a pragmatic decision on Malta - but it would never be portrayed as such to the British public

I say "could have" because according to Colville Churchill was at a very low ebb over the summer over the apparanet non-performance of specifically British serviceman - France, the various retreats in the Desert, Greece (but not Crete), Singapore and of course Tobruk II in the end, so he could on a knife-edge decision decide the garrison was incapable of holding Malta ANYWAY, ....or do a typical Churchill and let it get his back up and through everything into the island if he could. In THAT particular instance

"COULD reinforcements be sent"

No

...wouldn't let the real practicalities of it stop him LMAO Severe losses incrued or not.

However, my point over "1/ was Malta worth deploying forces to that could be lost?" and "Did ULTRA provide enough useful data on Axis Mediterranean ops" is - was Malta important enough as a cover for Ultra? If Churchill and those in the Ultra loop decided yes, the island would be reinfoirced and defended. If no, the garrison would stand as it was.

Malta was definitely not tank terrain - NOR was Crete - generally. But as in Crete, they'd be positioned near probably landing grounds and valuable assets like airfields. Open aras where tanks WOULD assist greatly. In Crete those at Maleme were literally thrown away attacking without infantry support, I don't see that mistake being repeated. BUT look at the counter-attack at Galatas with Roy Farran's single MarkIV supporting. Tanks DID have a role on Malta's terrain IF used properly and pre-positioned.

As for fuel - those tanks listed for Malta weren't the thirstiest. I wonder exactly how much petrol was bunkered on the island during the summer of 1942? At a pinch they would run on aviation spirit for a time at the cost of rapid wearing-out of already old engines.

the Axis airborne force to land during the first six hours is LARGER than the entire Malta garrison

Davide, you know better than to go by sheer numbers. The FJ forces in the first wave on Crete lost 20% of their forces in landing or in the first couple of hours, on terrain that was slightly more advantageous than Malta. A further 5-10% were rendered ineffective for a time by being scattered, and the high percentage of officers that were killed or injured in landing. Hence my caveat on the mistakes the Axis would have to NOT duplicate, and the chance factors they'd need to reduce.

such airborne force has nothing to do but dig in in place and await counter-attacks

Don't assume - like Student did before Mercury - that all the attacking forces would drop in the right place, and that they would be in good enough shape to handle counter-attacks. In the locations the counter attacks DID happen through the week the FJ were usually thrown back - hungry, thirsty and short of ammunition. In Crete the RIGHT counter attacks were NOT made at the right time - but a good Axis commander cannot and SHOULD not rely on that happening again

Folgore easily threw back an overwhelming mechanised assault at El Alamein

Folgore hadn't lost a sizeable percentage of its stores, and supplies, officers, and men in a combat drop on unsuitable terrain. How much work have you done on Crete?

the following amphibious first wave, on land 24h after the first airdrop, is going to move the balance to FOUR TO ONE

Study the actions off Crete. IF London thought Malta was worth defending, the Navy would go in. Doesn't matter what losses if the RM managed to fight them off, the landing timetabling would be shot to hell and there would be casualties.

Italian troops throughfully trained for their role, employed in their planned role, provided with superior armoured assets, operating under total air superiority.

No, they met the FJ on Crete instead. Who met ALL the criteria in spades in that except the armour - BEFORE the attack was launched...

under total air superiority

Which the LW ALSO enjoyed at Crete, but the flight time to and from shore limited them to arriving over the target at fixed and predictable times. Also, if Malta still had a handful of airworthy aircraft at the point of invasion - that would be more than Crete had IIRC there was a nice line of Buffaloes that couldn't fire their guns and either three or four Hurricanes. Air superiority doesn't actually help much when distance from land only gives sorties a few minutes over the island at fixed and known arrival times after flying off from the mailand at dawn.

As for the armour, you're assuming that the armour WOULD arrive. As discussed elsewhere - ONE glider cracking up on landing is going to create a traffic nightmare that can't be cleared easily. And you're assuming the required airfield can be taken in useable condition - or can be cleared under counterattack and longrange fire. And that the garrison didn't counterattack and retake it. Look at events at Maleme in detail. Remember - the defenders DO have the benefit of ULTRA information - they will know IN ADVANCE exactly how important that single airstrip is to the invaders...

Don't forget the major issue of Crete of the attacking force being unable to communicate with Athens for some days. The Me321s are NOT going to be sent until the airfield is available or else they may as well drop into the sea for there's nowhere else for them to land safely. Reinforcements were ONLY put on the ground at Maleme under fire and by landing on the apron THEN using the fresh forces to clear the defenders further out of range - by aircraft that under power could pick their own landing path and then when unloaded could taxi out of the way of the next aircraft in line Even if the Me321s arrive - they arrive ONCE until the airfield can be cleared again.

____________________________________________________________________________________

I can fully forese Malta being taken - eventually. But it is not in ANY way going to be the textbook result that a simple superiority in numbers would indicate. Those numbers have to arrive, be cohesive after the drop, be resupplied and not be left to go hungry and thirsty and short of ammunition. Dropping with weapons is fine, but a single man can't carry enough ammunition for himself for two or three days' steady fighting. They DEPEND on regular resupply...which SHOULD have happened at Crete, there was no RAF opposition to it arriving, but it arrived late and in the wrong places.

The eventual victory would be at a horrendous cost, with the Axis forces taking very major losses before simply overwhelming the garrison through sheer numbers when and if they finally get their delayed follow-up waves onto the island. But any delay in the resupply and follow-up timetable will be greatly magnified in events on the ground.

Of course the LW COULD threaten to do another Rotterdam...

Here's a general question - why do people positing Axis WIs have them carrying out unhistorical operations and actions....but never allow the ALLIES to deviate from historical OOBs?

[Davide Pastore]

Oh, am very prepared to accept it as an almost-certainty

My friend, I'm so happy of having met the first one who is

but the cost to the Axis is going to far outweigh the usefulness Malta actually had to the Allies during the war, making it as MacDonald called crete "a lost victory".

No doubt. I am sure Malta conquer would not have changed much except the way most people coming from a particular insular land looks at the military history of people coming from a particular peninsular land

In Crete those at Maleme were literally thrown away attacking without infantry support, I don't see that mistake being repeated.

Looking at most desert battles, it seems that most British tankers [infantry tanks apart] had some little problems (understatement here) at inter-acting with supporting arms.

And it doesn't seem that the repeated occasions when Germans show them (the hard way) the correct employment of different arms on the field made them to change their opinion

IF London thought Malta was worth defending, the Navy would go in.

No doubt. But RN cannot arrive before the first wave has landed. Cannot, really. Check the distance involved.

Possibly you may think the clever RN will learn about the landing hour, and start before it. Very clever, aren't they? But the Italians (who may be dumber than most, but are not that dumb) as soon as being noticed of RN leaving Gibraltar and/or Alexandria, will simply postpone (one , or two, or three days) the airdrop.

RN cannot sail forever up and down the sea, and sooner or later has to return to base. As sure as death and taxes, the day they are back in port the first parachute will open over Malta. Since I suppose RN is not that dumb either, the net result is that they will wait until having positive knowledge the landing is under way (and cannot be called back).

Thereafter RN tries to reach the beachheads after the landing is done, and hopes enough ships will get in. Then it has a night to fire against the coast, hoping to hit something important, before having to retire.

Air superiority doesn't actually help much when distance from land only gives sorties a few minutes over the island at fixed and known arrival times after flying off from the mailand at dawn.

Distance from Bf 109F bases and Malta is 130-140km (C.202 have to march a little further, having had to leave the best places to Luftwaffe). ISTM they are quite near.

The Me321s are NOT going to be sent until the airfield is available

Of course. I already told so. I believe they will land at Qrendi on day 3, more or less.
So what?

Armor is coming not by air, but by sea. I have no doubt only a (more or less small) part will safely reach the island, but the starting numbers seems high enough to me:
12x Pz IVF2
5x VK1601
5x VK1801
10x KV-1/-2
8x T-34/76
8x Semovente M40 da 75
57x Semovente L40 da 47

Assuming just 14% (a ridicously low number) of the vehicles is put ashore, the attackers will have reached the parity. And if it is true half of the force is made of not exactly an oustanding vehicle (L40), it is true as well that the same applies to the RTR unit.

Here's a general question - why do people positing Axis WIs have them carrying out unhistorical operations and actions....but never allow the ALLIES to deviate from historical OOBs?

I'm not using 'unhistorical' figures.
I'm using the historical ones, and the historical plans.
Do you?

[phylo_roadking]

But RN cannot arrive before the first wave has landed. Cannot, really. Check the distance involved

Um - why? Yes, you're forgetting ULTRA - The RN will have months' of warning and lead time...and given your caveats further down - what the RN CAN do is maintain a permanent presence on patrol by rota...OR go as far as to put a flotilla of destoyers or light cruisers into the fleet base at Malta. RN small ships and AA cruisers CAN survive in a Axis total air superiority environment IF they have enough AA ammuniton - this was the lesson of the losses off northern Crete. The lost ships were too busy ferrying troops to be given adequate time to rearm, and on two fatal occasions were tasked back into the cauldron with dangerously depleted AA stocks. Adequately armed they could and did survive for protracted periods of time in a hotile air environment...and every hour spent there was less time those aircraft spent over Malta But remember - in THIS case you had Malta with what seems to be FAR bettter AA protection onshore than Crete right on your doorstep for re-arming and re-oiling Suda Bay couldn't support the RN, it was just an unloading point. Malta was a fleet base.

I CERTAINLY don't see the RN firing on a Maltese shore, unless the ONE identifable target of the vital airfield. They're there only to intercept the seaborne landing waves and be AA pickets.

Looking at most desert battles, it seems that most British tankers [infantry tanks apart] had some little problems (understatement here) at inter-acting with supporting arms.

Desert battle experience isn't the relevant comparison here. In the Desert tanks were operating in conjunction with infantry by squadron and regiment-sized units. Therefore operating by the manual and more importantly by the doctrine. Which wasn't the best LOL But in those locations where both elements came under the same local commanders - like in Crete - cooperation down at the company/squadron level was usually better and more immediate. There they operated according to demand/need on the orders of the local zone commander, not the nearest general headquarters.

Distance from Bf 109F bases and Malta is 130-140km (C.202 have to march a little further, having had to leave the best places to Luftwaffe). ISTM they are quite near

Near - by still predictable. Which is what happened in Crete, both in the raids on Suda Bay prior to the invasion and the three days' fighter sweeps Richtofen's fighters kept up afer that, before being diverted off to preparations for Barabarossa. Dawn plus flying time gave the defenders a set time for the "morning hate", the LW had a fixed time over the target, then retired to the mainland to rearm and to refuel. Another predictable-length break. The only difference would be - on Malta the intervals would be much shorter. Yes, the SAME "rota" caveat as I'm applying to the RN above DOES apply...but Crete proved that the LW didn't think that way. THAT would not only have given them total air superiority but also permanent air cover, but they didn't do it!

Armor is coming not by air, but by sea. I have no doubt only a (more or less small) part will safely reach the island, but the starting numbers seems high enough to me:
12x Pz IVF2
5x VK1601
5x VK1801
10x KV-1/-2
8x T-34/76
8x Semovente M40 da 75
57x Semovente L40 da 47

Assuming just 14% (a ridicously low number) of the vehicles is put ashore, the attackers will have reached the parity. And if it is true half of the force is made of not exactly an oustanding vehicle (L40), it is true as well that the same applies to the RTR unit.

Wasn't one of the L40s MAIN weaknesses it's suspension??? It's going to be very vulnerable to damage on Malta.

As for the armour arriving by sea - that's the element that is most likely to either destruction or delay by the RN.

Delay is the real killer for airlanding operations. Proved in Rotterdam, Crete and Arnhem. The attacking forces are dependent on HIGHLY-limited supplies of food/water and ammo arriving with them - they're frighteningly vulnerable to delay in the resupply chain. The more hours resupply or heavy support can be prevented reaching the bridgehead "defenders" on the ground - ALL their resources are spiralling down.

[phylo_roadking]

Two further questions -

1/ through the 1930s and partiualrly in the FJ, the Germans gave much more emphasis to fluid control of troops on the ground by NCOs and lower-ranking officers than typical of more "traditional" armies. Even so, on Crete the FJ were severely hampered by loosing so many offciers and entire unti chains of command in the initial drops. Could the Folgore Division - I always believed Italian military training was of the "traditional" highly-regimented type - absorb the same loss of officers and command-and-control as the FJ on Crete just about managed to absorb, thanks to this emphasis in training?

2/ IF attrition during the first wave of drops and subsequent fighting kept the attacking airborne troops from greatly extending their bridgeheads until reinforced or resupplied - did the TYPE of transport planned as being available to the Axis for the operation allow their troops and armour arriving by sea to land on a hostile shore??? The heavy tanks for instance - I assume they were timetabled for landing at captured harbour/port facilities, as at Crete, rather than effective beach landing craft?

[Ironmachine]

An often (always?) overlooked fact is that Malta garrison was not in its prime shape. There had been rationing since April 1941 and IIRC by 1942 military rations were about 2,300 calories daily. Given the hard duties performed by the men, the troops were nearly exhausted, and infantry training was lacking as there were far more needed missions to fulfill. How the men could have reacted in these conditions against the airborne assault is debatable.

[phylo_roadking]

Probably about the same as the Commonwealth troops on Crete, who arrived at Suda bay from Greece in a terrible state,exhausted and most sleeping rough having lost the vast majority of their equipment, and were on VERY restricted rations and liquids. They had also lost the majority of their heavier infantry support weapons. I assume the troops on Malta were right up on inventory in that respect.

P.S. restricted rations on garrison duty or training etc. wasn't uncommon. Look at Stephen Ambrose' Pegasus Bridge - and John Howard's men having to supplement their rations with spending their wages in the NAAFI.

[Davide Pastore]

what the RN CAN do is maintain a permanent presence on patrol by rota...

AFAIK never done during the war anywhere (if the contrary is true, please show me).
To say nothing of the tear & wear of the ships involved.

Who was accusing the other of being unhistorical?

OR go as far as to put a flotilla of destoyers or light cruisers into the fleet base at Malta.

History shows it cannot be done in times of sustained enemy air offensive.

History shows RN evacuated Malta when such sustained air offensives occurred, and returned when the danger had passed.

Who was accusing the other of being unhistorical?

RN small ships and AA cruisers CAN survive in a Axis total air superiority environment IF they have enough AA ammuniton

I don't think so. The late war IJN fleets had plenty of ammunition for they large (much larger than 1942 RN standards) AA batteries, and yet you know how the story went at Sibuyan Sea, Samar, Okinawa, etc...

Generally, I believe AA fire was (at least, until the proximity fuse) more a nuisance than a defence.

I CERTAINLY don't see the RN firing on a Maltese shore

History shows this was exactly the only thing RN did, when confronted with an enemy amphibious landing against an island (Leros, 1943).

Who was accusing the other of being unhistorical?

BTW it is interesting to add that part of Lero garrison (that surrendered to a weaker German force after a not very spirited defence) had previously been part of Malta garrison in 1942

[Davide Pastore]

Could the Folgore Division - I always believed Italian military training was of the "traditional" highly-regimented type - absorb the same loss of officers and command-and-control as the FJ on Crete just about managed to absorb, thanks to this emphasis in training?

History shows Folgore men outfought anything thrown against them, and only had to abandon their lines after the front collapsed somewhere else.

Again: most historians / writers / observers cannot really believe the typical Italian soldier through the war was in any way different from the one met during Compass

did the TYPE of transport planned as being available to the Axis for the operation allow their troops and armour arriving by sea to land on a hostile shore???

This was exactly the plan, and this was exactly what the troops were trained to do.

About the expected losses, I have no doubt they would have been severe.

The heavy tanks for instance - I assume they were timetabled for landing at captured harbour/port facilities, as at Crete, rather than effective beach landing craft?

Negative. As above.

[phylo_roadking]

Davide, I'm NOT denigrating in any way the soldiers or the morale of the Folgore Division - what I am asking is - could they survive the sort of disintegration of command structure that the FJ on Crete suffered by circumstance? Only the Wehrmacht's new doctrine of tactical independence of thought and action right down to the lowest levels pulled them through some of the worst instances of major loss of life in the initial drops on Crete. That has nothing to do with motivation or morale - but entirely to do with HOW the Division was trained to fight. When they did fight they fought as highly-motivated BUT conventional troops intrgrated into a conventional OOB and command structure. Check out MacDonald and Beevor - could the Folgore Division have operated cohesively after this level of loss of life among its officer cadre? By operate I mean move to carry out its objective, rather than just condsolidate its initial bridgeheads and freeze in place awaiting reinforcement and resupply. And I mean an answer based on how the Division was trained to operate, not on emotion :roll: ...given that their morale and motivation is NOT in question here.

I'd be first to say that British Airborne certainly couldn't operate without its officer structure relatively intact - by role if not by "face" - unless training for individual operations ensured familiarity with every mans' role like John Howard's attack party for the Orne Bridges - and I assume U.S Airborne was the same. Airborne focres were trained to operate separately and without support of conventional forces for a limited time, but I don't believe the Allied' forces could have had officers "step up" quite so many ranks and responsibilities as the FJ accomodated on Crete. They simply didn't have quite the degree of flexibility trained in.

[Davide Pastore]

By operate I mean move to carry out its objective, rather than just condsolidate its initial bridgeheads and freeze in place awaiting reinforcement and resupply

Well, since you are already convinced they couldn't do that, I will not try to change your mind...

However, the paratroopers role is to freeze in place awaiting reinforcement. Their only role is to stay in the way of the bulk of the garrison in the event of a counter-attack toward the beachheads (so that the amphibious landing has to overcome only the few [#1] troops present in the landing area).

Even if all the paratroopers are eventually killed, provided they can stay in place at least 24 hours, the campaign is won.

[#1] And you possibly are not going to believe how few they were, according to the historical Malta defence plan.

[phylo_roadking]

Davide, I'm not looking to be "convinced" - just trying to find out if the Folgore Division had anything like the doctrine of low-level tactical flexibility the Wehrmacht was training into its troops thriugh the 1930s. If the answer is no - then they are more at the mercy of the level of losses the FJ took on Crete ON LANDING than the Germans historically were, given the same terrain difficulties etc.

However, the paratroopers role is to freeze in place awaiting reinforcement. Their only role is to stay in the way of the bulk of the garrison in the event of a counter-attack toward the beachheads

Well - that's the ALLIED doctrine - that Airborne troops were "spoilers". Malta would have to be the same is Crete - the attackers would have to move to secure the second wave's drop or landing zones, and drop zones intended for aerial resupply i.e. they would have a concrete set of objectives to ACHIEVE, not just achieve by sitting where they landed. Crete and the amount of time it took to get reinforcements onto the island would have taught them not ONLY to secure their immediate landing zones/bridgeheads but ALSO to move proactively to prevent counterattack or the zones coming under bombardment.

[phylo_roadking]

Even if all the paratroopers are eventually killed, provided they can stay in place at least 24 hours, the campaign is won

ONLY if every other single element of the plan stays exactly on timetable :roll: The defenders would have one other major ally on their side - Von Clausewitz

The one thing the Axis forces would have to do is learn every single lesson from Crete - and the fact that in 1941...a YEAR after Holland...they were still dropping without more than personal protection weapons and clogging up their airlanding zones with broken Ju52s That's a disturbing propensity NOT to learn vital lessons...

[phylo_roadking]

Suddenly remember where I had posted THIS on Feldgrau last year;

When Layforce was sent from England at the start of 1941 to participate in the sort-of planned invasion of the Dodecanese including Rhodes, ALL references to "Commando" OR any reference to the Royal Navy were removed from ALL orders and rosters both at home and in the Middle East at GHQ MEF. To disguise the fact that "specialist" assault troops were being sent in large numbers to the Med, some 1600 of all ranks.

This force on departure comprised Nos. 7, 8, and 11 Commandos, A Troop of No. 3 Commando, and a Folboat Section. On arrival it was amalgamated with No. 52 Middle Eastern Commando and No. 50 ME Commando once it was brought back from Crete. It was nominally placed under the command of 6th Division, (Maj. Gen. J.F. Evetts), and re-rostered as four "Battalions" under Lt Col RE Laycock and ONE staff officer...his G2, Capt. EVELYN WAUGH!!! (Christ I hated his stuff at school!) -

A Battalion = No 7 Commando (Lt Col Colvin)
B Battalion = No 8 Commando (Lt Col Daly)
C Battalion = No 11 Commando (Lt Col Pedder)
D Battalion = Nos 50/52 ME Commandos (Lt Col Young, original commander of No 52 Commando)

After the Invasion of Greece made the invasion of Rhodes unnecessary, A Battalion carried out one recce raid on Bardia - and the normal confusion of ops planned and cancelled followed. For a time A and D Battalions were placed in General reserve while C Battalion was sent to reinforce the Cyprus garrison. B Battalion remained at Mersa Matruh to raid back into Cyrenaica.

However - A and D Battalions were sent under Laycock to Crete on 23rd May, and covered the retreat from Suda Bay to Sphakia. Both Battalions suffered VERY heavy losses, and only Laycock and 178 other ranks were evacuated, the rest of the survivors of the two battalions surrendering to the Germans after acting as rearguard. C Battalion was involved in securing the crossings over the Litani River during the invasion of Syria but lost a quarter of its strength, and was reallocated to Roger Keyes and sent back to Cyprus. Elements of B Battalion were sent to Tobruk, kicked around for three weeks but noone wanted them there, so went back to Mersa Matruh!

After this and the because of the general shortage of manpower and the RN's unwillingness to commit any ships to amphibious operations, Wavell decided that Layforce was redundant. Auchinleck agreed and Layforce was disbanded on 1st August. C Battalion remained intact on Cyprus, some members of No 7 Cdo went to Mission 204 assisting the Chinese in Burma, and others joined David Stirling ex of No 8 Cdo in the new SAS. All those whose regiments were in the Med were RTU'd, all others let out on general replacement.

[Davide Pastore]

Thank you, however the text doesn't make clear about which units (if any) were still in the Med in 1942.