Malta Garrison 1942

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Ironmachine
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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#91

Post by Ironmachine » 19 Jun 2008, 08:35

What I'm trying to say is that if we take the quote:
Briadier Beckett, stated that in April 1942 there were [...] 112 heavy guns [...] and that "Investigation proved that there was no point over Malta itself at which less than eighty Heavy AA guns could fire at one time...
the relevant data is that there were 112 heavy guns; the information about eighty heavy AA guns firing at a point at one time, though certainly interesting, also means that if that is done you are left with 32 guns to cover the rest of the island, creating a very poor defense. Unless Axis planes are coming from just one direction or the island had just one target to be attacked, there is little reason for eighty guns to fire to the same point. Of course, it is a good thing to have ample fields of fire and to be able to concentrate your firing, but at the end you still only have 112 guns to cover the island, and concentrating the fire in a point would left great areas under-defended. That without considering the fact that eighty guns firing to a point is not really a density, because a point is not a surface measure. If you have to cover an area of 1,000 x 1,000m, you will have a density of 80 guns per square kilometer, but if you have to cover an area of 2,000 x 2,000m, you will have a density of only 20 guns per square kilometer, or a gun per each 50 square meters (not too impresive, I think).
I certainly agree with you that this can give an idea about how well deployed the AA defense was (even though with Malta being an small island with no great heights I think there were no many problems with that), but the real limitating factor was the total number of guns...

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#92

Post by Ironmachine » 19 Jun 2008, 09:05

On the other hand, I can see more relevance for this kind of information in the other examples you have provided:
I've seen such maps for other places where AA density was deemed important (eg MULBERRY), and similar ones for A-Tk coverage (eg, Medinine) and field artillery coverage (eg, El Alamein).
Anti-tank fire is much more affected by ground relieve, so in that case I can find some utility for that information (regarding blind spots, for example), and we also have to consider that neither anti-tank nor field artillery coverage have the problem of the third dimension (i.e., height) that anti-aircraft fire has. Regarding anti-aircraft density in cases such as that of the Mulberry, it is obvious that the smaller the area to be covered, the more relevant that the information is, as more rightly can the area covered be reduced to a point and the density of fire information is more realistic.


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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#93

Post by Tony R » 19 Jun 2008, 09:15

This interesting thread began with a question about the strength and equipment of the Malta garrison in 1942. It soon evolved into an argument about the proposed Axis invasion of the island. This in turn led to a debate about Malta’s anti-aircraft capability. There was a reference to “grotesquely overestimated gunners’ wartime claims”. A bit unfair considering that the RAF, the Regia Aeronautica and the Luftwaffe also over-claimed. This was not intentional but an inevitable result of the confusion prevalent in battle. The fact remains that Malta resisted two and a half years of air attacks. It did so due to Malta-based pilots (including Commonwealth and American pilots), British and Maltese anti-aircraft gunners, the overworked and today sadly overlooked PBI, the guts and determination of the islanders themselves and because of the heroic relief efforts of the Royal Navy and Merchant Navy. Anti-aircraft gun positions were situated throughout Malta; many of the concrete emplacements are still there. I do not know how many guns could concentrate their fire in a particular area at any one time but how important is that considering the size of the little island and the concentration of heavy and light AA as well as MG posts? All took their toll of enemy aircraft. Targets such as airfields and the dockyard area (Grand Harbour) were well-defended and AA fire plans evidently worked. In spite of sometimes acute ammunition shortages and with the gunners and everybody else struggling on near-starvation rations, Malta held out and remains the only community to be awarded the George Cross: Britain’s highest civilian award for gallantry.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#94

Post by waterloo » 19 Jun 2008, 12:57

i agree the minutia of AA density is a bit of a red herring. - So much to say that island was clearly Heavily defended in AA.
The claims of aircraft shot down again is really uninportant, Im always amazed at the tiny casualtys aircraft take in bombing raids of that period , even battles in the battle of britain , the numbers shot down were piffilgly small compared to the numbers involved.

The point is the AA prevented accurate bombing. It certainly put great strain on the attacking aircraft , I have read many accounts from german pilots of "growing old" over malta.
You have a long way to fly, and any damage means you have a very poor chance of getting home. dry. or at all. so even light flak would make you - think.
I would imagine it put the hebbies up any thought of an airborne attack , especially after crete.

Starvation and demoralization nearly worked, but of course without an actuall invasion it could not work, who do you surrender to? - you can't surrender to aircraft.
So to take the island you have to invade or the brits have to retreat. - but you still have to physically put troops on the isalnd.

The italians were up for it. - the italian plan even without the germans was viable. Just bloody.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#95

Post by Ironmachine » 19 Jun 2008, 13:10

waterloo wrote:Starvation and demoralization nearly worked, but of course without an actuall invasion it could not work, who do you surrender to? - you can't surrender to aircraft.
So to take the island you have to invade or the brits have to retreat. - but you still have to physically put troops on the isalnd.
Never heard about Lampedusa? It seems that sometimes you can actually surrender to aircraft... or at least to the pilot. :lol:
Wright is celebrating one of the least known stories in WWII history – the capture, practically by accident, of Lampedusa, the tiny Sicilian outpost northwest of Malta, when a RAF crew composed of gunner Les Wright, navigator Sgt Peter Tait, and pilot Sgt Sid Cohen flew out on a search for a German pilot.
[...]
But Wright has a greater story to recount, and that is the surrender of Lampedusa’s 3,000 inhabitants and troops after a botched Air Sea Rescue flight over the Mediterranean.
“Searching for a German pilot, we took off from Hal-Far, we eventually spotted the fallen pilot, dropped emergency packs, reported his position and then started off again back to Malta.”
But on their return, with visibility dropping, problems cropped up. The Swordfish’s flight instruments started playing up. Over the intercom, Sid Cohen asked, “Does that look like Malta?”
In the distance, the crew noticed US Lightnings attacking what they assumed was Lampedusa – for months now, the Allies had been trying to soften up the small Italian island of Linosa, Pantelleria and Lampedusa.
Operation Corkscrew was the Allied invasion of the Italian island of Pantelleria on 10 June 1943. Following a ten-day bombardment, the Italian garrison surrendered when the British forces landed on the island. In fact, the Italian garrisons on other nearby islands quickly fell, clearing the way for the invasion of Sicily a month later, soon after followed by the coup that drove Mussolini away from Rome.
“So we knew it wasn’t Malta and we had the choice of landing on one of the three islands, but as far as we knew they were still in Italian hands despite the raid. We were completely disorientated. We tried to work out a way of how to fly from Lampedusa back to Malta, but the poor visibility and our instruments forced us to land on Lampedusa and take our chances as prisoners of war.”
On the ground however, Wright and his two co-pilots were prepared for capture. As soon as they landed they were approached by Italian officers. Wright swung the Vickers gun towards them but it proved unnecessary. “It turned out the entire island wanted to surrender, thinking that after the raid we had come to sort out things.”
The day was 12 June, 1943...
From http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2005/06/26/ww2.html

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#96

Post by LWD » 19 Jun 2008, 13:48

waterloo wrote:....The italians were up for it. - the italian plan even without the germans was viable. Just bloody.
My impression is that the Italians in general and the military in particular were never very strongly behind the war. Again my impression is that that is why their performance was not what others expected. If this is the case would they really have been up for a bloody invasion?

On another note an all Italian invasion might have had a better chance of success. The Germans apparently thought that leaks within the Italian miliatary were the source of British intelligence when it was really Ultra. An all Italian op may well not have been telegraphed by Ultra and come as a surprise. A German invasion would almost assuredly have been compromised.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#97

Post by waterloo » 19 Jun 2008, 16:36

good point about the security aspect. - But we had broken the italian codes I beleive.

I think as long as the Teath arm units, Folgore and Marines did most of the fighting and secured the beaches,airfields. the rest would have been able to occupy the island.

are troops weren't in a brilliant state, I still wonder how well trained and battleworhy the KOMR units were.

of course if they could get past the navy. the germans lost 4000 mountain trained troops to the navy at crete , and thats the nub of it, could they have stopped our navy?
They overestimated the opposition and were inferior to our navy. but did create the conditions were they could have invaded (just didn't realize it) for a short time.

Thier big weak point was thier command.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#98

Post by Gooner1 » 20 Jun 2008, 14:24

LWD wrote: Note that the posted map is for 16,000 feet. I would expect say 8,000 feet to look a lot sparser and goign up to say even 20,000 feet the coverage would get much heavier.
Surely the opposite - the horizontal range of any gun is far greater than its vertical ceiling.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#99

Post by LWD » 20 Jun 2008, 18:42

But if you put a heavy AA gun in the center of the isalnd it's hoizontal range will be approaching the edge of the map. The higher you get the less likely your are to have an obstructed field of fire.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#100

Post by sallyg » 21 Jun 2008, 04:11

Ironmachine wrote:What I'm trying to say is that if we take the quote:
Briadier Beckett, stated that in April 1942 there were [...] 112 heavy guns [...] and that "Investigation proved that there was no point over Malta itself at which less than eighty Heavy AA guns could fire at one time...
the relevant data is that there were 112 heavy guns; the information about eighty heavy AA guns firing at a point at one time, though certainly interesting, also means that if that is done you are left with 32 guns to cover the rest of the island, creating a very poor defense.
Wrong. Overlapping fields of fire. It's not like 80 guns were clustered in the middle and 32 were parcelled out around the periphery- they overlapped.
Unless Axis planes are coming from just one direction or the island had just one target to be attacked, there is little reason for eighty guns to fire to the same point.
It's called "centres of gravity" a la von Clausewitz. On Malta the centres of gravity, the things more in need of defense than goat pastures, were the Grand Harbour, the cities and the airfields. So, one concentrates one's defences where they will do the most good, where they will see more action. The map appears to indicate that.
Of course, it is a good thing to have ample fields of fire and to be able to concentrate your firing, but at the end you still only have 112 guns to cover the island, and concentrating the fire in a point would left great areas under-defended. That without considering the fact that eighty guns firing to a point is not really a density, because a point is not a surface measure.
Of course it's a density, it's an area. No one mentioned points. The map is a measure of how many guns could effectively fire through the plane 16,000 feet ASL. The map of the surface coverages has been superimposed on the sea level surface so that it makes sense.
If you have to cover an area of 1,000 x 1,000m, you will have a density of 80 guns per square kilometer, but if you have to cover an area of 2,000 x 2,000m, you will have a density of only 20 guns per square kilometer, or a gun per each 50 square meters (not too impresive, I think).
One shell per 50m^2 equals one shell in a 2 dimensional box measuring 7m x 7m (+-). I'll avoid that if I can, thank you.
I certainly agree with you that this can give an idea about how well deployed the AA defense was (even though with Malta being an small island with no great heights I think there were no many problems with that), but the real limitating factor was the total number of guns...
Every soldier wants more. :D

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#101

Post by Ironmachine » 21 Jun 2008, 08:32

sallyg wrote:Wrong. Overlapping fields of fire. It's not like 80 guns were clustered in the middle and 32 were parcelled out around the periphery- they overlapped.
You are wrong, as you are mixing two different concepts. If you have 112 guns to cover an area, overlapping fields of fire is what may allow you to fire 80 of them to a point in the area. But if you fire 80 to a point, you are left with only 32 to cover the other points in the area at the same time. It's simply maths, there is no way to go around that... unless you know of a gun that can fire to two different points at the same time. :lol:
It's called "centres of gravity" a la von Clausewitz. On Malta the centres of gravity, the things more in need of defense than goat pastures, were the Grand Harbour, the cities and the airfields. So, one concentrates one's defences where they will do the most good, where they will see more action. The map appears to indicate that.
Yes. So what? You should also note that this certain "Colonel Weldon, who was on the staff of the Commander Royal Artillery Malta" stated that "Investigation proved that there was no point over Malta itself at which less than eighty Heavy AA guns could fire at one time..."; he doesn't seem to be overly concerned about your "centers of gravity"...
Of course it's a density, it's an area. No one mentioned points. The map is a measure of how many guns could effectively fire through the plane 16,000 feet ASL. The map of the surface coverages has been superimposed on the sea level surface so that it makes sense.
Well, it seems that someone mentioned points.
Colonel Weldon, who was on the staff of the Commander Royal Artillery Malta - Briadier Beckett, stated that in April 1942 there were one hundred and fourty-four Light AA guns on Malta (in addition to the 112 heavy guns), and that "Investigation proved that there was no point over Malta itself at which less than eighty Heavy AA guns could fire at one time,
On the other hand, I know perfectly well what the map is supposed to represent. I only stated that the total number of guns available was far more informative. After all, you could only put 112 heavy shells in the air at once, and there is no way to know the total number of guns from the map.
One shell per 50m^2 equals one shell in a 2 dimensional box measuring 7m x 7m (+-). I'll avoid that if I can, thank you.
But I suppose that you will try to avoid a shell in a 2 dimensional box measuring 5m x 5m even more, won't you? :)
Every soldier wants more
I want more guns. You want more overlapping fire. :lol:
Last edited by Ironmachine on 21 Jun 2008, 11:45, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#102

Post by JonS » 21 Jun 2008, 10:04

Ironmachine wrote:I only stated that the total number of guns available was far more informative. After all, you could only put 112 heavy shells in the air at once, and there is no way to know the total number of guns from the map.
Meh. Six of one, half dozen of the other. The density map tells you how many guns can engage a target (plane/raid/paradrop/whatever) at any given time and place (at 16k ft, blah blah blah. Assume other maps - or overlays - for different engagement altitudes). That - to me - is the critical measure. If you are only interested in the number of guns, then you need to add all the spares that are indicated in Tony R's post. But that would be silly, since it tell you nothing about how many can be bought to bear.

Total number of guns also can't tell you if you've inadvertently left a key point - or approach route - undefended, under-defended, or if you've 'over' defended a certain area or route.

Density maps also allow you to plan standing barrages at particular locations on certain approach routes and over certain targets, knowing that you'll be able to achieve a given shell density per m^3 at a given rate of fire from a known number of guns.

Knowing the total number of guns tells you how many guns you have.
Last edited by JonS on 21 Jun 2008, 10:24, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#103

Post by JonS » 21 Jun 2008, 10:09

Ironmachine wrote:I want more guns.
I suspect the commanders on Malta wanted more guns too. And if they were free for the asking, I'm fairly confident they would have gotten them. However, in 1942 to postal service to Malta was a tad fraught. Extracting max efficiency from the resources they had was a more practical and useful approach than whining to the War Office for another bty or regt of guns.

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#104

Post by Ironmachine » 21 Jun 2008, 11:58

JonS, I have never said that density maps are useless, only that their information is conditioned by the total number of guns in Malta. You put too much faith in them. Just some examples:
JonS wrote:The density map tells you how many guns can engage a target (plane/raid/paradrop/whatever) at any given time and place (at 16k ft, blah blah blah. Assume other maps - or overlays - for different engagement altitudes). That - to me - is the critical measure. If you are only interested in the number of guns, then you need to add all the spares that are indicated in Tony R's post. But that would be silly, since it tell you nothing about how many can be bought to bear.
The density map tells you exactly what you say. Still, even disregarding the fact that you would need a whole sheet of maps telling the story at different heights, there are many things they do not tell. For example, taking the map you showed: how many guns included in the zone of 60-80 density are also included of 40-60 density? (or, in other words, if you are firing 80 guns to the 60-80 zone, how many guns are left to fire to the 40-60 zone? That's a function of the total number of guns... so, at the end, the density maps do not tell you how many guns you can actually be brought to bear in two or more zones at the same time, while the total number of guns tells you how many guns can actually be brought to bear over the whole island...
JonS wrote:Total number of guns also can't tell you if you've inadvertently left a key point - or approach route - undefended, under-defended, or if you've 'over' defended a certain area or route.
I agree with the "undenfended" point, but not with the other two. First, whether a point is under-defended or over-defended is not an absolute, but depends on the total number of "defense" features that you have... For example, defending a city with 112 guns will not be over-defending by Berlin-1944 standards, but it will definitively be for Malta in 1942, as it would mean using all the guns available in the island. As the density map is a tool to optimize your deployment, it is highly dependent on the total number of resources available. In other words, you start with the total number of guns and then deploy them in the best possible disposition, not the other way round.
Density maps also allow you to plan standing barrages at particular locations on certain approach routes and over certain targets, knowing that you'll be able to achieve a given shell density per m^3 at a given rate of fire from a known number of guns. Knowing the total number of guns tells you how many guns you have.
Yes, density maps allow you to plan, always in function of what you have... So the prime data is the total number of guns, and the density map is just a tool to deploy it in a "maximum benefit" configuration.
JonS wrote:Extracting max efficiency from the resources they had was a more practical and useful approach than whining to the War Office for another bty or regt of guns.
No matter how much you try, you are not going to obtain more than 100%... No matter how hard you try, if you have 100 guns you are going to fire 100 shells at a time (or less...). So yes, extracting maximum efficiency from the resources was more practical and useful, but not better.

After all this, I think that you still have not understand what I am trying to say. My original statement was that in the following statement...
Briadier Beckett, stated that in April 1942 there were [...] 112 heavy guns [...] and that "Investigation proved that there was no point over Malta itself at which less than eighty Heavy AA guns could fire at one time...
the relevant information was the total number of guns, as the data about anti-aircraft fire density was not correctly stated, and even contradicted the information of the map you presented (within the conditions stated by LWD)
Even the map you provided is fairly limited in the information it gives, as it is only valuable at a certain height. I find the data about the total number of guns more "absolute" in its usefullness... but at the end, to know the real state of Malta anti-aircraft defense, you will need the total number of guns, the type of the guns, the density maps, the location maps, the data about ammo reserves, etc... So I think we can try to provide more data, instead of arguing about what seems to be just a matter of taste...

Best whishes,
Gonzalo

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Re: Malta Garrison 1942

#105

Post by JonS » 21 Jun 2008, 13:02

Ironmachine wrote:I agree with the "undenfended" point, but not with the other two. First, whether a point is under-defended or over-defended is not an absolute, but depends on the total number of "defense" features that you have... For example, defending a city with 112 guns will not be over-defending by Berlin-1944 standards, but it will definitively be for Malta in 1942, as it would mean using all the guns available in the island.
D'uh, obviously I mean over or under defended compared to any other part of the local defence scheme. Comparing the NW approach to Grand Harbour in 1942 with the SW approach to Berlin in 1945 is a stupid as it is pointless. Comparing the NW approach to Grand Harbour to the SE approach to HalFar at some given date in 1942 is useful - they don't have to be, and probably shouldn't be, the same but knowing how they differ is useful.

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