Was Crete a success or a failure?

[BDV]

To the original question, brilliant local tactical success, by its larger implications, an awful failure.

My question - could british employ Sir Geoffrey's droptank-fitted plywood contraption, rather than the heavies for an attack from Crete? Also, can the Tavronitis problem be mitigated by a small extension (first wooden, later iron) of the airstrip across the valley, no?

[phylo_roadking]

Also, can the Tavronitis problem be mitigated by a small extension (first wooden, later iron) of the airstrip across the valley, no?

As in - a glorified bridge? Well, I'm not sure; most "rivers" in Crete are like mainland Greece - dry stone beds, or the merest trickle through them...APART from the Spring when they are rushing torrents due to Spring meltwater...often overflowing their banks! (IIRC the Ancient Greek campaigning season was short...between when the rivers dried again and the men had to go home for the harvest!)

If you remember - the RAF was already experiencing issues with airfields and Spring meltwater inundation elsewhere - http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4&t=164228 It's possible that due to the issue AND the bumpy undulating surface of Maleme, that it could simply have been relegated to being a diversionary field...

My question - could british employ Sir Geoffrey's droptank-fitted plywood contraption, rather than the heavies for an attack from Crete?

How good were Mossies on bumpy, uneven flightlines??? Could the laminated wood airframe handle the stresses....

[BDV]

The DH.98 was described as fast and maneuvrable. So the frame must have been able to take those stresses. As it was a light build, handling the landing stresses would not be too bad. The takeoff might have been the worst part.

BTW, could it have flown in defense of itself (i.e. "cookie" droppers mixed with "zerstorer" versions) confusing the heck out of the defenders? It had 100 km/h advantage over the likely defender, the IAR80!!!

As to the proposed bridge extension, a wipeout of the extension in the Spring 1942 rains might have put the airfield out of bomber launching business for a few weeks, but if still in british hands by '43, a sturdy steel structure would have likely been in place, after all we're talking about the people who built THIS! in the heart of Africa...

[phylo_roadking]

but if still in british hands by '43, a sturdy steel structure would have likely been in place, after all we're talking about the people who built THIS! in the heart of Africa...

Yes, but the builders of THAT! didn't have to worry TOO much about a Luftwaffe air blockade of the island, Italian submarines and torpedo boats roaming around...

I can see the British prolonged possession of Crete turning rapidly into a mini-BoB, with the Germans keeping significant air resources (at the expense of Fliegerkorps X in Sicily, perhaps?) in the Peloponese and nearby islands, the Italians beefing up their air assets on Rhodes...

Also - the British had a general lack of eathmoving and other heavy equipment on the island...AND on Malta IIRC, where they used the island's few tanks as aircraft tows on frequent occasions! That's one of the main reasons for Maleme etc. being so rough - no graders/'dozers/rollers etc. I won't say "hand built"....but damn' close!

Anyway - the use of heavy earthmoving equipment was prohibitive because of the SAME issue that prevented easy movement of TANKS round the island - no roads! Bulldozers etc. would have had to be moved from place to place by "lighter"; by the time of the invasion there was one(1) metalled road on the island...built by the British since they arrived in November!

The takeoff might have been the worst part.

With full fuel load, bomb load....

As a complication - largescale bomber ops can't start until there are enough diversionary fields; with the quality of the existing fields questionable, a single crackup could block a flightline far too easily. Malta was vulernable for a time this way; but by the end of the war there were some SEVEN fields on Malta (including one on Gozo) - Hal Far, Luqa and Ti'Kali of course...and four rough diversionary fields for emergencies. IIRC Luqa's flightline was SO narrow that a single crashed aircraft could block it totally...

[Graeme Sydney]

Why hold Crete?

The main value of Crete was as a naval forward base (Suda Bay). Churchill gave that reason at the time but seems to have realised a bit too late. Strategically they should have held Crete and foregone Greece.

I think in time it could have also become effective in projecting Air Power forward including attacking the Ploesti oilfields (but I don't think this possibility had been appreciated in 41).

What advantage did the Germans have in holding Crete?

I can't say I've seen the German mission statement but denying the naval base and the projection of British naval and air power forward would be enough reason. Did they make that appreciation?

But it was probably Victory Disease and 'because we can'

[Carl Schwamberger]

The accounts remember had German objectives as using Crete as a outpost, as part of a series of OPs to shield the Balkans from further British incursions. Obviously if the Axis held Crete the Brits could not use it as a air or naval base to raid the Balkan region. Rhoades represented the eastern most outpost with its existing Italian garrison. Student proposed another operation to capture Cyprus, which was not approved. I dont know if he actually proposed other ops to capture ports in the Levant from a Cyprus base, but there are claims that he had his staff preparing such a plan.

The Axis did use the Crete airfields as a forward base for launching air attacks and air reconnisance missions vs Egypt.

[phylo_roadking]

The main value of Crete was as a naval forward base (Suda Bay). Churchill gave that reason at the time but seems to have realised a bit too late. Strategically they should have held Crete and foregone Greece.

Ernie Cunningham certainly appreciated the advantages of Suda Bay early - "the finest fleet anchorage in the Eastern Med"...but as a forward fleet base - once the Germans have taken the Peloponese - it would have required a HUGE investment in AA and air defence.

The Axis did use the Crete airfields as a forward base for launching air attacks and air reconnisance missions vs Egypt.

Eventually - after the high-altitude spitfires sent from the UK specifically for the purpose proved to be less than useful...spitfires modified locally in the Delta for extreme altitude were able to counter these quite effectively.

[Urmel]

The Axis did use the Crete airfields as a forward base for launching air attacks and air reconnisance missions vs Egypt.

But the point is they didn't need it. Ju 88 and He 111 operating from mainland Greece could (and did) do that job.

Why hold Crete?

The main value of Crete was as a naval forward base (Suda Bay). Churchill gave that reason at the time but seems to have realised a bit too late. Strategically they should have held Crete and foregone Greece.

I think in time it could have also become effective in projecting Air Power forward including attacking the Ploesti oilfields (but I don't think this possibility had been appreciated in 41).

I don't think the possibility was a necessity as long as Greece was not occupied by the Axis. In the four weeks while Greece was, and Crete wasn't, they probably had other stuff to worry about.

[Graeme Sydney]

I don't think the possibility was a necessity as long as Greece was not occupied by the Axis. In the four weeks while Greece was, and Crete wasn't, they probably had other stuff to worry about.

I'm not 100% sure what you mean but what I mean is that when Britain rushed troops and equipment into Greece they shouldn't have (and there was plenty of advice not to). But it is at this stage they should have made the decision to hold Crete at all cost.

[Hamburg44]

Gents,

crete 1941 was of course a extraordinary bloody battle for the axis,
about 3.000 paras killed, 2.000 wounded and a further 1.000 gebirgsjäger killed, missing or wounded.

But a half year later this units were rebuilt and fought in russia as fire brigades.

If crete was lost to the allied in 1941 substantly axis forces (heer, navy, air force) would have bounded for checking the allied forces on crete. Even the possible danger of air attacks from crete on the romanian oilfileds would have paralyzed axis further decisions in this region.

On the other hand allied losses (including greek losses) for the battle of crete were not insignificant:

about 20.000 men killed or pow, 2.000 men wounded,


4 cruisers, 6 destroyers were sunk and dozens of other ships sunk or damaged, some 50.000 tons war material lost.

14.000 italien pow were freed of allied captivity.

To built one cruiser afford two years...

In sum, both sides have trouble to claim victory...

[phylo_roadking]

It was a British "success" in TWO senses...

1/ the FJ may have been decimated AND rebuilt by the end of the year....but with the British not fully relying on the Germans REALLY going East in June until they actually began BARBAROSSA, it took one potential major element off the German OOB for a late Spring or Summer 1941 "Sealion II"

2/It put Hitler off any major "campaign"-sized use of the FJ again; they did train (twice?) in 1942 and 43 for Malta, but utit was never given the green light as we know. There were a few largish drops by the FJ before the end of the war...thinking of von der Heydte's battlaion-sized drop during the Bulge...but all FJ use after Crete was purely "tactical".

[merdiolu]

Also huge casaulties suffered by 7th Fallschmjager and other units shaped Hitler's outlook in a negative way about airborne warfare. After Crete he said "Airborne Divisions are a thing of past" Germans constantly shelved and at the end dissolved Operation Hercules with airborne attack because of Crete losses. It was one the reasons why Malta survived. And towards the end of war German garrisons in Crete and Dordonecelles contributed German war effort nothing while Wehrmacht desperately needed every soldier to check Red Army.

Crete was a tactical victory for Germans but once strategic hindsight comes into play it was a strategic disaster for German war effort.