Why did Che Guevara lose at Bolivia?
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MrFurious
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Why did Che Guevara lose at Bolivia?
How come Che Guevara failed to gather the support he needed from the Bolivians? Why did he keep on fighting when it was clear that the people was not interested??
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Oskar
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- Location: Bolivia
Che Guevara in Bolivia
Mr. Furious:
Well, being Bolivian, I guess I'm suited to answer this one.
The main reason Che could gather no support in Bolivia was because he offered the people nothing they did not already have, though there were other reasons too. Let's see why this is so... Now, brace yourself because this will be a long one.
Che came to Bolivian (La Paz) as a tourist in April of 1952, right at the very time Bolivia was in the midst of a revolution (which lasted three days). His memories of the social upheaval that took place during this time would greatly influence his choice of country in 1966, but by this time, the whole country had dramatically changed and this is something he did not realize.
You see, before 1952, Bolivia was ruled by an oligarchic society. Three men, Patino, Hoschild and Aramayo controlled the vast majority of the wealth in the country due to their ownership of the mines (in fact, Patino was considered one of the richest men in the world). Their wealth, power and leverage in national politics, was such that these men were able to pressure the government to pass laws that would favor them greatly. They were so powerful they were known as the "Barons of Tin." For years after the Chaco War (1932-35), the various military and civilian regimes that ruled the country after the war had tried to curtail that power but to no avail.
The way Bolivian society worked back then (and you could also say it is true even today), is that in order to get a job anywhere, you had to know someone who knew someone, be registered in a political party and have done work for them, be connected someway or another, etc.
Another important aspect of Bolivian society back then was that political participation was limited by what is known as the "Qualified vote," whereby only adult men who could read and write and owned land were allowed to vote (not to mention run for political office). What these people wanted to do was to maintain political power and control restricted to the few who had access to it. These same people were the ones who owned all means of production in the country as well as most of the land. And in terms of land, even though slavery had been abolished in 1850, the peasants who worked in these vast estates were as close to slaves as the definition allows. They were treated poorly, they were paid meagerly for their work (if at all), and they were tied to the land, for it was the same landowner who offered him and his family food on the table. The peasants could leave if they wanted, but if they did so they would not find another "job."
The MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - National Revolutionary Movement) was founded in 1941 and by 1951 it proposed a series of changes that appealed to many people who were tired of the old regime. The MNR won the elections, however, those in office, fearing that the structure they had fought to maintain was going to disappear with the MNR, supported a coup that did not recognize the elections results. Not to worry, for the situation was in such disarray that a year later the MNR would come to power by force of arms. The reason many had favored the changes the MNR offered in 1951 was because for years, the political elite had been so busy trying to keep the system, as it was that it disregarded other important aspects, such as the economy. The government ran constant deficits, inflation was on the rise and so too were taxes (not to mention the internal dissatisfaction within sectors of the military due in large part to the outcome of the Chaco War).
And now to the reforms implemented by the MNR...
After taking over in April of 1952, there were four key reforms that the party instituted throughout the next four years; these were the Agrarian reform, the nationalization of the mines, Universal suffrage and Education reform.
Agrarian Reform:
This reform literally took land away from the landed elite and gave it to the peasant. The Law textually says, "The land belongs to he who labors it" (please forgive my ill translation for I am translating from Spanish. This reform allowed many peasants; who9 had previously been "slaves," to become owners themselves (imagine the boost in morale for them).
The main problems with this reform were that the owners were not given just compensation (if at all) for the expropriat6ed land (but they had so much money so who really cares). Another problem was that the peasants were given the land but that was it. They were never given the proper instruction on how to better farm and harvest their plot. And furthermore, this reform meant that almost all of the land in the highlands and valleys went to the peasants, but this area was in some cases overpopulated and not very adequate for farming, that the elite moved to the lowlands in the eastern part of the country, were land was plentiful, virgin and MUCH better than that which they had given up. In short, the reform that was meant to kill the landed elite, only served to make them more powerful in the long run.
The Nationalization of the Mines:
For years, after the Chaco War, the military had tried to curtail the power of the Barons of Tin and were met with an Iron wall. Well, the MNR managed by decree to expropriate the mines of the three most powerful men in the country (although heavy compensation in this case was inevitable since the men in question were really powerful). The miners then became state employees and were unionized.
The biggest problem with this reform was that the government hoped to be able to increase production and efficiency through nationalization, but this was not possible. In fact, the government ownership of the mines meant a constant economic loss to it. Another hope was that the country could be diversified, though that would not come until the 1980s.
Education reform:
This reform allowed all Bolivians to get an education, regardless of wealth, sex, race, ect. The government made education accessible to all and implemented a system of free public education for the vast numbers of people whom would not be able to pay for it.
The problem here was that, though the number of schools and teachers increased, teachers were paid poorly and were unmotivated. This led to poor education standards for the average student.
And finally, the Universal Suffrage:
As I* have said before, voting was very limited before the passage of this reform. The new law allowed all Bolivian adults, regardless of sex, or education level to vote in a national election. To give you an idea of how dramatic this was, during the 1951 election only 200,000 men voted out of a population of about 3,000,000. During the 1956 election, almost 1,000,000 people voted.
The problem here was that, the MNR went a little further than just allowing everyone to vote, they changed the political system. Before the reform, people voted for President, Senators, Representatives Governors and Mayors. After the reform, people only voted for the President and the percentage a party got was automatically passed onto Congress by mean of a party list. Also, the President now appointed all Governors and Mayors. The idea was to make Bolivian political structure identical to that of Mexico.
So you can see that the people already had everything Che offered them, the problem was that Che was unaware of the changes that had taken place since his last visit. He thought Bolivia would be a good place to spread a revolution because it was at the center of the continent and because he believed the country to be ripe for another revolution. This was not the case.
To give you an idea of how profound these reforms were, when many elderly people in the countryside are asked why they continue to vote for the MNR, they say it is because the only party that has done something for them has been the MNR.
And now to other aspects of why Che failed...
In 1967, the country was run By Rene Barrientos, whom had been an Air Force General and had overthrown the MNR in 1964. He was elected President in 1966.
The poor loved Barrientos. He spoke the Quechua dialect to them and often went to many of their communities, drank Chicha with them and treated them as equals. It was his charisma that got him elected (that and the fact he had no one running against him in the 1966 election). He was so loved by the people (read indigenous poor), that he's known as the General of the People. Even today, many indigenous people visit his tomb and leave flowers at it.
Another aspect that helped Bolivia counter Che was that as soon as the US found out he was in Bolivia, they sent in a plethora of advisors, dumped a lot of money into the country and practically re-armed, trained, equipped and massively improved the Bolivian military. To the US it was payback time. They could not get Castro so they would go after Che. To give you an idea of how important this became to the US, at the very same time, there was a rebel insurrection in Peru (which the US was also aiding the Peruvian regime fight to destroy it) which was much larger in terms of size than Che's expedition and probably more dangerous, but it was Che that took precedence over Peru (even though under other circumstances, the US would have been alarmed at the Peru scenario).
Well, I could continue writing about what were some of the things Che did to try to persuade the people to follow him, but this post is long enough as it is. If you are interested in knowing about it let me know and I will post an addendum to this message.
I hope this helps,
Oskar
Well, being Bolivian, I guess I'm suited to answer this one.
The main reason Che could gather no support in Bolivia was because he offered the people nothing they did not already have, though there were other reasons too. Let's see why this is so... Now, brace yourself because this will be a long one.
Che came to Bolivian (La Paz) as a tourist in April of 1952, right at the very time Bolivia was in the midst of a revolution (which lasted three days). His memories of the social upheaval that took place during this time would greatly influence his choice of country in 1966, but by this time, the whole country had dramatically changed and this is something he did not realize.
You see, before 1952, Bolivia was ruled by an oligarchic society. Three men, Patino, Hoschild and Aramayo controlled the vast majority of the wealth in the country due to their ownership of the mines (in fact, Patino was considered one of the richest men in the world). Their wealth, power and leverage in national politics, was such that these men were able to pressure the government to pass laws that would favor them greatly. They were so powerful they were known as the "Barons of Tin." For years after the Chaco War (1932-35), the various military and civilian regimes that ruled the country after the war had tried to curtail that power but to no avail.
The way Bolivian society worked back then (and you could also say it is true even today), is that in order to get a job anywhere, you had to know someone who knew someone, be registered in a political party and have done work for them, be connected someway or another, etc.
Another important aspect of Bolivian society back then was that political participation was limited by what is known as the "Qualified vote," whereby only adult men who could read and write and owned land were allowed to vote (not to mention run for political office). What these people wanted to do was to maintain political power and control restricted to the few who had access to it. These same people were the ones who owned all means of production in the country as well as most of the land. And in terms of land, even though slavery had been abolished in 1850, the peasants who worked in these vast estates were as close to slaves as the definition allows. They were treated poorly, they were paid meagerly for their work (if at all), and they were tied to the land, for it was the same landowner who offered him and his family food on the table. The peasants could leave if they wanted, but if they did so they would not find another "job."
The MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario - National Revolutionary Movement) was founded in 1941 and by 1951 it proposed a series of changes that appealed to many people who were tired of the old regime. The MNR won the elections, however, those in office, fearing that the structure they had fought to maintain was going to disappear with the MNR, supported a coup that did not recognize the elections results. Not to worry, for the situation was in such disarray that a year later the MNR would come to power by force of arms. The reason many had favored the changes the MNR offered in 1951 was because for years, the political elite had been so busy trying to keep the system, as it was that it disregarded other important aspects, such as the economy. The government ran constant deficits, inflation was on the rise and so too were taxes (not to mention the internal dissatisfaction within sectors of the military due in large part to the outcome of the Chaco War).
And now to the reforms implemented by the MNR...
After taking over in April of 1952, there were four key reforms that the party instituted throughout the next four years; these were the Agrarian reform, the nationalization of the mines, Universal suffrage and Education reform.
Agrarian Reform:
This reform literally took land away from the landed elite and gave it to the peasant. The Law textually says, "The land belongs to he who labors it" (please forgive my ill translation for I am translating from Spanish. This reform allowed many peasants; who9 had previously been "slaves," to become owners themselves (imagine the boost in morale for them).
The main problems with this reform were that the owners were not given just compensation (if at all) for the expropriat6ed land (but they had so much money so who really cares). Another problem was that the peasants were given the land but that was it. They were never given the proper instruction on how to better farm and harvest their plot. And furthermore, this reform meant that almost all of the land in the highlands and valleys went to the peasants, but this area was in some cases overpopulated and not very adequate for farming, that the elite moved to the lowlands in the eastern part of the country, were land was plentiful, virgin and MUCH better than that which they had given up. In short, the reform that was meant to kill the landed elite, only served to make them more powerful in the long run.
The Nationalization of the Mines:
For years, after the Chaco War, the military had tried to curtail the power of the Barons of Tin and were met with an Iron wall. Well, the MNR managed by decree to expropriate the mines of the three most powerful men in the country (although heavy compensation in this case was inevitable since the men in question were really powerful). The miners then became state employees and were unionized.
The biggest problem with this reform was that the government hoped to be able to increase production and efficiency through nationalization, but this was not possible. In fact, the government ownership of the mines meant a constant economic loss to it. Another hope was that the country could be diversified, though that would not come until the 1980s.
Education reform:
This reform allowed all Bolivians to get an education, regardless of wealth, sex, race, ect. The government made education accessible to all and implemented a system of free public education for the vast numbers of people whom would not be able to pay for it.
The problem here was that, though the number of schools and teachers increased, teachers were paid poorly and were unmotivated. This led to poor education standards for the average student.
And finally, the Universal Suffrage:
As I* have said before, voting was very limited before the passage of this reform. The new law allowed all Bolivian adults, regardless of sex, or education level to vote in a national election. To give you an idea of how dramatic this was, during the 1951 election only 200,000 men voted out of a population of about 3,000,000. During the 1956 election, almost 1,000,000 people voted.
The problem here was that, the MNR went a little further than just allowing everyone to vote, they changed the political system. Before the reform, people voted for President, Senators, Representatives Governors and Mayors. After the reform, people only voted for the President and the percentage a party got was automatically passed onto Congress by mean of a party list. Also, the President now appointed all Governors and Mayors. The idea was to make Bolivian political structure identical to that of Mexico.
So you can see that the people already had everything Che offered them, the problem was that Che was unaware of the changes that had taken place since his last visit. He thought Bolivia would be a good place to spread a revolution because it was at the center of the continent and because he believed the country to be ripe for another revolution. This was not the case.
To give you an idea of how profound these reforms were, when many elderly people in the countryside are asked why they continue to vote for the MNR, they say it is because the only party that has done something for them has been the MNR.
And now to other aspects of why Che failed...
In 1967, the country was run By Rene Barrientos, whom had been an Air Force General and had overthrown the MNR in 1964. He was elected President in 1966.
The poor loved Barrientos. He spoke the Quechua dialect to them and often went to many of their communities, drank Chicha with them and treated them as equals. It was his charisma that got him elected (that and the fact he had no one running against him in the 1966 election). He was so loved by the people (read indigenous poor), that he's known as the General of the People. Even today, many indigenous people visit his tomb and leave flowers at it.
Another aspect that helped Bolivia counter Che was that as soon as the US found out he was in Bolivia, they sent in a plethora of advisors, dumped a lot of money into the country and practically re-armed, trained, equipped and massively improved the Bolivian military. To the US it was payback time. They could not get Castro so they would go after Che. To give you an idea of how important this became to the US, at the very same time, there was a rebel insurrection in Peru (which the US was also aiding the Peruvian regime fight to destroy it) which was much larger in terms of size than Che's expedition and probably more dangerous, but it was Che that took precedence over Peru (even though under other circumstances, the US would have been alarmed at the Peru scenario).
Well, I could continue writing about what were some of the things Che did to try to persuade the people to follow him, but this post is long enough as it is. If you are interested in knowing about it let me know and I will post an addendum to this message.
I hope this helps,
Oskar
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MrFurious
- Member
- Posts: 62
- Joined: 14 Mar 2002 02:15
Dear Oskar, I'm very impressed by this wonderfully detailed post! Yes, please, if you are willing, do continue as I am thoroughly fascinated by the "Che in Bolivia" scenario. Che arrived in Cuba from Mexico with Castro and about 15 other guerilleros and soon there were 300 revolutionaries, in about a year.
Of course, at that time Cuba was little more than a ghetto used by the United States, and the dictator Battista was a bloodthirsty psychopath. The people were very unhappy and so support for Che was widespread.
But I'm very interested in the Bolivia scenario. In fact, one thing I find bizarre about Bolivia is the lack of access to the ocean! It's a country completely surrounded by land! Didn't the government debate over buying access to the ocean from Chile?
Thank you for this great description!
Of course, at that time Cuba was little more than a ghetto used by the United States, and the dictator Battista was a bloodthirsty psychopath. The people were very unhappy and so support for Che was widespread.
But I'm very interested in the Bolivia scenario. In fact, one thing I find bizarre about Bolivia is the lack of access to the ocean! It's a country completely surrounded by land! Didn't the government debate over buying access to the ocean from Chile?
Thank you for this great description!
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Oskar
- Member
- Posts: 89
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002 22:40
- Location: Bolivia
Che
Hi Mr. Furious:
Well, all the things I’m telling you are off the top of my head because all my books are back in Bolivia.
You mentioned two issues in your last post, Che and Bolivia’s exit to the Ocean. I will address both and will start with Che first.
Before I go into Che proper, I could recommend a few books to read, namely Che’s diary and a book by Gary Prado, who was in charge of the pursuit of Che entitled “Yo Capture al Che” (I captured Che). I would advise you stay away from Castaneda’s “Companero” because, though it does give a good description of the Bolivian campaign, a nfriend pointed out to me he often lies, distorts the truth or outright does not bother to check all possible sources. Another book you might try is “Che” by Jon Lee Anderson.
The Che expedition to Bolivia had people of several nationalities including a few Bolivians like the Peredo Brothers.
Some of the anecdotes I know of Che are the following:
When Che with part of his group arrived at a town, they needed to stock their medical supplies and so went to the nearest “Farmacia” if you can call it that. The owner, as soon as he saw this armed group, became frightened, but Che assured him they were there only to get supplies and would not harm him. While Che read out his list, the man would pull out the product (if he had it), every time he did so Che said “Apunte,” which means to write down but also point your gun. By the time the man was done with the medical supplies Che asked him how much it was, puzzled by the question the man said he did not know, at which point Che said “Have I not told you to write it down (Apunte)?” Realizing that troops were on his trails and that it would take time for the owner to calculate the total cost, Che picked up the supplies, left a chunk of Bolivian currency and left. After he left, the owner started counting the money, and what Che had left him was much more than the original cost of the supplies.
The other one takes place, if memory serves me right, in the town of Samaipata. There were several Bolivian troops at this town and most were in a restaurant ordering something to eat, before, either camping for the day or continuing their march. Somehow Che managed to surround them without them realizing it and pretty much, had the soldiers as prisoners within the restaurant. At this point Che told the officer in charge they were there only to get supplies and gave his word not to harm/kill any of the troops if the officer in return, gave his word they would not chase Che after they were done. After a while, when Che had all the supplies he needed, told the officer he had kept his part of the deal, and left. At this point a subordinate told the commanding officer to pursuit and call for re-enforcements, but he replied, “No, He has kept his word and I shall keep mine.”
This next one is not an anecdote, but something an uncle told me, which I found very interesting. He said that Che’s group would often try to communicate with the troops to try to convert them to their cause. He mentioned if a plain soldier was at the radio, Che’s men would say to him something like “Brother, we are fighting for you, we are here to give you the treatment you deserve and which this oppressive government has denied you. We are here fighting for your freedom and your rights.” But as soon as a more senior NCO, not to mention an officer, came along and tried to talk to the “guerrilleros,” Che’s men would chase him off with insult after insult. Now, I do not think they were trying to convert the soldiers by telling them lies, I believe they truly believed every word they were saying, but as I have said before, Bolivia’s reality had changed by the time Che arrived.
About this uncle I was telling you, he’s a very interesting person to talk to. He served in the military as a conscript during the late 60s’/early 70s, just after Che’s expedition had been crushed. Though he did not serve during that time, he was living in the Cordillera Province, where part of the fighting took place. Furthermore, during at least a year, he was Regis Debrai’s cell guard. They became very good friends with time and has told me many anecdotes of that time. Let me know if you’re interested in hearing about them.
As for Che’s tactics, I don’t know much about how he was able to keep the Bolivian military at bay for the time he did, but I can only say he was better trained in the art of fight and flight, which the Bolivians were not. I know they would often try to evade the military by making them think they were somewhere they were not. In one case, they lit a flashlight from a tree and shake it a bit. The soldiers at a distance tried to shoot at it to hit anyone who held it. In the meantime, the guerrilleros would flee. By the time the military decided to see what they had hit, they found they had wasted ammo and that the guerrilleros were long gone. Another tactic they would use is to hit (kill) the lead man in a military column (whom was more often than not, the guide in the area), or kill the officer in charge. By doing this, many civilian guides refused to help the military and many officers shaved their mustache and hid their hand guns, since that was he easiest way to recognize them.
In 1968, there was a meeting of many South American military leaders (I don’t recall where), to discuss how each country had dealt, or would deal with leftist insurrection. Many countries were really hard liners in terms of how they would imprison, torture and beat the living daylights out of the people in order to prevent an insurrection. Such was the case of Peru, or the Brazilians… And Argentina, dear God, they were so far to the right that had Reinhard Heydrich been present, he would have been taking notes. They all saved the Bolivian representative, General Ovando, for last. Since he had recently dealt with Che, it was hoped he would give some good tips that others could follow and implement. Well, to everyone’s astonishment, he said something along the lines of “A leftist insurrection in our countries takes place because the government forgets, excludes, or oppresses the poor. And as such, an armed rebellion is the only way they can hope to be heard. In order to prevent something like this from happening, the government should listen to their problems, provide better education, and give them access to the country’s political and economic channels, so that they feel included and part of the community as a whole.” I’m probably making most of this up, but that was, in essence, the message he delivered. Needless to say it felt like a kick in the rear to all others. After all, they wanted practical military solutions they could implement.
Now I will get into a very personal issue, and that is the burial place of Che. About 4-5 years ago a huge delegation of Cubans Argentines, and other nationalities came to Bolivia to find out where Che and many of his group were buried (and also try to identify them). I believe they found Che and a few others, but my concern is that the government went out of its ay to aid in this endeavor, and forgot about the 54 Bolivians who laid down their lives protecting their country. This is something I cannot swallow and I blame the Bolivian government for it.
And now to the issue of a Bolivian exit to the ocean. Before I proceed, I will try to be as unbiased as I can, but I must warn you that I am Bolivian, therefore take this fact into consideration with anything I tell you from now on.
In 1879 Bolivia and Peru went to war against Chile. Chile was the aggressor, but I cannot deny Bolivia has part of the blame for Chile’s reaction. In any case, the Bolivian military was ill equipped and ill prepared for war, they were out of it by 1880. The state of Bolivian readiness was nothing like that of the 1830s when it was a recognized South American power. I believe either Bolivian was too confident in its military power, or were aware of their weakness and expected their weakness to be compensated by Peru’s strength. In any case, Peru was pretty much left to fend for itself during the next three years, when Chilean troops occupied Lima and forced a peace treaty. This treaty was signed in 1904, giving Chile the only Bolivian seacoast, and the southern portion of Peru. Since then, Bolivia has tried consistently to seek a sovereign exit to the sea, but to no avail.
The event you refer to occurred in the mid 1970s, when Generals Banzer of Bolivia and Pinochet of Chile met in a Bolivian border town, embraced each other and decided to put an end to the problem. The solution was that Chile would give them a small part of their northern territory (a corridor to the Pacific), if Bolivia gave them an equal amount of Bolivian land to Chile. A land swap if you will. The problem was that many in Bolivia did not agree to this and so the deal fell soon thereafter. Since 1976, Bolivia has no diplomatic relations with Chile due to the Chilean unwillingness to talk about this issue(the two countries have no diplomatic relations to this day).
In all fairness, Bolivia has as much right to demand an exit, as Chile has to deny it. After all, it is Chilean sovereign land. True, Bolivians have shed blood and lost during that conflict, but so have Chileans.
There were at least two opportunities I can think of where Bolivia had the chance to get what it wanted, and it royally screwed them both. The first was in the 1960s, during the Chilean Presidency of Eduardo Frei Sr. (I believe). He sent a delegate to Bolivia and was going to give Bolivia an access to the sea, but the Bolivian representative was quick to dismiss the delegate. End of story there. You should know that there are some in Chile who view the Bolivian issue as very unfair for Bolivia, but they make up a very small minority in the country. The second was in 1979, during the OAS meeting in Bolivia. At that time, the OAS, and in no small part the US, were really putting pressure on Chile to solve the problem (and I believe the problem would have been solved). However, the day after the meeting, while there were still some OAS delegates in La Paz, there was a coup in the country. Chile was quick to maneuver and convinced the other states there was no way of talking to Bolivia about this particular issue at this time. And end of story there too.
Best,
Oskar
Well, all the things I’m telling you are off the top of my head because all my books are back in Bolivia.
You mentioned two issues in your last post, Che and Bolivia’s exit to the Ocean. I will address both and will start with Che first.
Before I go into Che proper, I could recommend a few books to read, namely Che’s diary and a book by Gary Prado, who was in charge of the pursuit of Che entitled “Yo Capture al Che” (I captured Che). I would advise you stay away from Castaneda’s “Companero” because, though it does give a good description of the Bolivian campaign, a nfriend pointed out to me he often lies, distorts the truth or outright does not bother to check all possible sources. Another book you might try is “Che” by Jon Lee Anderson.
The Che expedition to Bolivia had people of several nationalities including a few Bolivians like the Peredo Brothers.
Some of the anecdotes I know of Che are the following:
When Che with part of his group arrived at a town, they needed to stock their medical supplies and so went to the nearest “Farmacia” if you can call it that. The owner, as soon as he saw this armed group, became frightened, but Che assured him they were there only to get supplies and would not harm him. While Che read out his list, the man would pull out the product (if he had it), every time he did so Che said “Apunte,” which means to write down but also point your gun. By the time the man was done with the medical supplies Che asked him how much it was, puzzled by the question the man said he did not know, at which point Che said “Have I not told you to write it down (Apunte)?” Realizing that troops were on his trails and that it would take time for the owner to calculate the total cost, Che picked up the supplies, left a chunk of Bolivian currency and left. After he left, the owner started counting the money, and what Che had left him was much more than the original cost of the supplies.
The other one takes place, if memory serves me right, in the town of Samaipata. There were several Bolivian troops at this town and most were in a restaurant ordering something to eat, before, either camping for the day or continuing their march. Somehow Che managed to surround them without them realizing it and pretty much, had the soldiers as prisoners within the restaurant. At this point Che told the officer in charge they were there only to get supplies and gave his word not to harm/kill any of the troops if the officer in return, gave his word they would not chase Che after they were done. After a while, when Che had all the supplies he needed, told the officer he had kept his part of the deal, and left. At this point a subordinate told the commanding officer to pursuit and call for re-enforcements, but he replied, “No, He has kept his word and I shall keep mine.”
This next one is not an anecdote, but something an uncle told me, which I found very interesting. He said that Che’s group would often try to communicate with the troops to try to convert them to their cause. He mentioned if a plain soldier was at the radio, Che’s men would say to him something like “Brother, we are fighting for you, we are here to give you the treatment you deserve and which this oppressive government has denied you. We are here fighting for your freedom and your rights.” But as soon as a more senior NCO, not to mention an officer, came along and tried to talk to the “guerrilleros,” Che’s men would chase him off with insult after insult. Now, I do not think they were trying to convert the soldiers by telling them lies, I believe they truly believed every word they were saying, but as I have said before, Bolivia’s reality had changed by the time Che arrived.
About this uncle I was telling you, he’s a very interesting person to talk to. He served in the military as a conscript during the late 60s’/early 70s, just after Che’s expedition had been crushed. Though he did not serve during that time, he was living in the Cordillera Province, where part of the fighting took place. Furthermore, during at least a year, he was Regis Debrai’s cell guard. They became very good friends with time and has told me many anecdotes of that time. Let me know if you’re interested in hearing about them.
As for Che’s tactics, I don’t know much about how he was able to keep the Bolivian military at bay for the time he did, but I can only say he was better trained in the art of fight and flight, which the Bolivians were not. I know they would often try to evade the military by making them think they were somewhere they were not. In one case, they lit a flashlight from a tree and shake it a bit. The soldiers at a distance tried to shoot at it to hit anyone who held it. In the meantime, the guerrilleros would flee. By the time the military decided to see what they had hit, they found they had wasted ammo and that the guerrilleros were long gone. Another tactic they would use is to hit (kill) the lead man in a military column (whom was more often than not, the guide in the area), or kill the officer in charge. By doing this, many civilian guides refused to help the military and many officers shaved their mustache and hid their hand guns, since that was he easiest way to recognize them.
In 1968, there was a meeting of many South American military leaders (I don’t recall where), to discuss how each country had dealt, or would deal with leftist insurrection. Many countries were really hard liners in terms of how they would imprison, torture and beat the living daylights out of the people in order to prevent an insurrection. Such was the case of Peru, or the Brazilians… And Argentina, dear God, they were so far to the right that had Reinhard Heydrich been present, he would have been taking notes. They all saved the Bolivian representative, General Ovando, for last. Since he had recently dealt with Che, it was hoped he would give some good tips that others could follow and implement. Well, to everyone’s astonishment, he said something along the lines of “A leftist insurrection in our countries takes place because the government forgets, excludes, or oppresses the poor. And as such, an armed rebellion is the only way they can hope to be heard. In order to prevent something like this from happening, the government should listen to their problems, provide better education, and give them access to the country’s political and economic channels, so that they feel included and part of the community as a whole.” I’m probably making most of this up, but that was, in essence, the message he delivered. Needless to say it felt like a kick in the rear to all others. After all, they wanted practical military solutions they could implement.
Now I will get into a very personal issue, and that is the burial place of Che. About 4-5 years ago a huge delegation of Cubans Argentines, and other nationalities came to Bolivia to find out where Che and many of his group were buried (and also try to identify them). I believe they found Che and a few others, but my concern is that the government went out of its ay to aid in this endeavor, and forgot about the 54 Bolivians who laid down their lives protecting their country. This is something I cannot swallow and I blame the Bolivian government for it.
And now to the issue of a Bolivian exit to the ocean. Before I proceed, I will try to be as unbiased as I can, but I must warn you that I am Bolivian, therefore take this fact into consideration with anything I tell you from now on.
In 1879 Bolivia and Peru went to war against Chile. Chile was the aggressor, but I cannot deny Bolivia has part of the blame for Chile’s reaction. In any case, the Bolivian military was ill equipped and ill prepared for war, they were out of it by 1880. The state of Bolivian readiness was nothing like that of the 1830s when it was a recognized South American power. I believe either Bolivian was too confident in its military power, or were aware of their weakness and expected their weakness to be compensated by Peru’s strength. In any case, Peru was pretty much left to fend for itself during the next three years, when Chilean troops occupied Lima and forced a peace treaty. This treaty was signed in 1904, giving Chile the only Bolivian seacoast, and the southern portion of Peru. Since then, Bolivia has tried consistently to seek a sovereign exit to the sea, but to no avail.
The event you refer to occurred in the mid 1970s, when Generals Banzer of Bolivia and Pinochet of Chile met in a Bolivian border town, embraced each other and decided to put an end to the problem. The solution was that Chile would give them a small part of their northern territory (a corridor to the Pacific), if Bolivia gave them an equal amount of Bolivian land to Chile. A land swap if you will. The problem was that many in Bolivia did not agree to this and so the deal fell soon thereafter. Since 1976, Bolivia has no diplomatic relations with Chile due to the Chilean unwillingness to talk about this issue(the two countries have no diplomatic relations to this day).
In all fairness, Bolivia has as much right to demand an exit, as Chile has to deny it. After all, it is Chilean sovereign land. True, Bolivians have shed blood and lost during that conflict, but so have Chileans.
There were at least two opportunities I can think of where Bolivia had the chance to get what it wanted, and it royally screwed them both. The first was in the 1960s, during the Chilean Presidency of Eduardo Frei Sr. (I believe). He sent a delegate to Bolivia and was going to give Bolivia an access to the sea, but the Bolivian representative was quick to dismiss the delegate. End of story there. You should know that there are some in Chile who view the Bolivian issue as very unfair for Bolivia, but they make up a very small minority in the country. The second was in 1979, during the OAS meeting in Bolivia. At that time, the OAS, and in no small part the US, were really putting pressure on Chile to solve the problem (and I believe the problem would have been solved). However, the day after the meeting, while there were still some OAS delegates in La Paz, there was a coup in the country. Chile was quick to maneuver and convinced the other states there was no way of talking to Bolivia about this particular issue at this time. And end of story there too.
Best,
Oskar
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Zapador
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- Joined: 15 Aug 2002 18:49
- Location: Sudamerica
Hi Oskar, I'm from Chile and I very, really very amaze with your explain about Bolivian's ocean history: the war between Peru-Bolivia against Chile, maybe a little short in this topic, but is very clear and only can agree with.
for years I talking with Bolivian People in Argentina and mainly they are so "visceral" and misinformed, only repeat the same things and they really hate Chilean, but almost of then are very gently people and belong a bottom class.
I know Bolivian people in Chile (my sister's godfather for example), and they are very culture and polite people.
Relations between both nations are very complicated, specially from Bolivia, mainly from both political inestability and the deepest hate against Chile. Chile have a very inept politicians in "frontiers themes", that's historical (except the in that war).
see...
for years I talking with Bolivian People in Argentina and mainly they are so "visceral" and misinformed, only repeat the same things and they really hate Chilean, but almost of then are very gently people and belong a bottom class.
I know Bolivian people in Chile (my sister's godfather for example), and they are very culture and polite people.
Relations between both nations are very complicated, specially from Bolivia, mainly from both political inestability and the deepest hate against Chile. Chile have a very inept politicians in "frontiers themes", that's historical (except the in that war).
see...
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MihaiC
- Member
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- Location: Bucharest, Romania
This is so true that you cannot wonder how come others didn't action in this manner. This is the reason why the communist revolution took place in the poorest of the big european country - Russia. Not to mention the americans who wondered why the poor vietnamese peasants didn't understand that they went there to keep them free from those who promise them land and prosperity.“A leftist insurrection in our countries takes place because the government forgets, excludes, or oppresses the poor. And as such, an armed rebellion is the only way they can hope to be heard. In order to prevent something like this from happening, the government should listen to their problems, provide better education, and give them access to the country’s political and economic channels, so that they feel included and part of the community as a whole.”
But your elaborate answer give birth to another question : How come Che went to start a revolution in a foreign country without proper prior information? It was he such a idealist?
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Cantankerous
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Re:
Che Guevara outlined the foco theory of guerrilla warfare in his 1961 handbook Guerrilla Warfare in which he argued that: (1) conducting guerrilla warfare in a country is possible through the popular support of its people for the guerrilla army; (2) popular forces can win a war against a regular army; (3) guerrillas can create their own favorable conditions; and (4) in underdeveloped parts of the Americas, the basic place of operation for a guerrilla army is the countryside. By the mid-1960s, partly due to his misgivings about Fidel Castro's alliance with the USSR, Guevara quit Castro's government and renounced his honorary Cuban citizenship, so he flocked to Bolivia to encourage peasants to start an uprising against the right-wing military dictatorship in Bolivia. After all, Che's travels through the countryside in South America in the early 1950s made him very inclined to denounce capitalism as evil, and his failed attempt to rally the Bolivian peasantry to start a Marxist guerrilla revolt was one way for him to blame the US and capitalism for anything wrong with Latin American society, including race-based inequality. Guevara spoke Spanish, while the Bolivian peasantry spoke an indigenous language, which made it difficult for Che to effectively communicate with the peasants about the need for a Marxist guerrilla uprising to topple the dictatorship in Bolivia.MihaiC wrote: ↑07 May 2003 11:33This is so true that you cannot wonder how come others didn't action in this manner. This is the reason why the communist revolution took place in the poorest of the big european country - Russia. Not to mention the americans who wondered why the poor vietnamese peasants didn't understand that they went there to keep them free from those who promise them land and prosperity.“A leftist insurrection in our countries takes place because the government forgets, excludes, or oppresses the poor. And as such, an armed rebellion is the only way they can hope to be heard. In order to prevent something like this from happening, the government should listen to their problems, provide better education, and give them access to the country’s political and economic channels, so that they feel included and part of the community as a whole.”
But your elaborate answer give birth to another question : How come Che went to start a revolution in a foreign country without proper prior information? It was he such a idealist?