From Wehrmacht to Bundeswehr

[Urmel]

Thanks for that. I notice von Senger und Etterlin didn't serve on the eastern front either. Obviously they wanted generals with relatively clean hands.

You'll find that he did.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Per ... engerF.htm

So was Crüwell:

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Per ... ewellL.htm

[Adam Carr]

Thanks for that. A very useful reference. Misled by Wikipedia again

Does anyone have a link to video of Mein Guter Kamarad being sung in a non-Nazi context, unlike all the versions at YouTube?

So defending Holstein in the First Schleswig War or defending Germany in 1870/71 were not good causes?

The First Schleswig War was a petty dynastic squabble in which no-one was particularly "right." Schleswig-Holstein clearly belonged to Denmark under international law as it was then understood. The three Prussian wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 were acts of calculated aggression organised by Bismarck to bring about German unity under Prussian junker rule. "Defend Germany" against poor old Louis Napoleon? Quelle de drôle.

[Larso]

Yes my source kind of contradicts itself, saying on the very next page that the army was right as far as cadres went but very short on privates - the attitude amongst the young being 'ohne mich' (without me). So yes conscription was introduced in 1956, the first being inducted on 1 April 1957, with considerable political cost - riots were even feared. It seems the compromise was that only those who 'volunteered' to accept consription were eligible. By the end of 1957 the Bundeswehr strength had climbed to 134,000.

Army strength was 3 divisions by the end of 57, 4 in 58 and another in 59, when the army numbered 235,000, of whom 144,000 were in the Bundesheer - whatever sub part of the Bundeswehr that was? There were 10 divisions by 1960, 11 in 63 and the 12th in 1965, so a few years later than planned. Evidently this number was seen as the maximum that the country could maintain.

Originally all 12 were to be Panzer divisions. In 1965 though they were in the configerations of 3 Pz, 7 Pz Gr and 1 each mountain and Luftlande. The Germans dropped the US Combat Command structure, going with three brigades, of four battalions, one being artillery. Pz bdes had 2 tank and 1 mech inf battalions and the Pz Gr had the reverse. The US army undertook to provide most of the combat service support.

As for weapons - none had been produced in Germany since 1945 and as Britain and France did not have sufficient economic capacity the US seems to have gone it alone. The first delivery was 15th May 1956. By 1963, delivered major weapons types were the M24 Chaffee and M41 Walker Bulldog light tanks for Recon. Medium tank inventory numbered 1,500 M47s and 1,000 M48s. There were also M44 155mm self-propelled howitzer. German industry was now producing the HS-30 (20mm cannon) armoured personnel carrier.

These deliveries did still not fully equip the German formations but it seems a more pressing problem at this stage was a shortage of 25,000 junior officers and NCOs - it seems the Wehrmacht veterans provided the top level of manning and the conscripts the bottom but there was a big gap in the middle still.

Not all of these figures seem to add up I have to say but this book does seem to give a flavour of how things developed.

[nondescript handle]

Adam,

This gets quite OT, and the main purpose of my half-serious remark was really to express surprise that you classified the support for a puppet regime on the other side of the globe as a "good cause".

But: The Danish-German war of 1849 was not a "dynastic squabble": The Danish government tried to incorporate Holstein, a sovereign German country in personal-union with the Danish king, into the Danish Kingdom and to forcefully Danefy the German population. Which resulted in an revolt and, because of massive popular support, the intervention of the German states.

Yes, Bismarck put a lot of pressure on Napoleon III, but Napoleon was nevertheless the aggressor. He declared war over a minor political issue, crossed the border and captured Saarbrücken. Without these actions there would've been no Franco-German War.

And while neither of these wars have been squeaky clean (and IMHO no war is), the right of an ethnic group to self determination and self defence (even when the attack was partly provoked) are "better" causes than securing pipelines...

Regards
Mark

[Larso]

Tsouras' next chapter deals with the issue of tradition in the new army.

The dilemma was identifying valid traditions from the military past - one Defence Minister stated "the military's fondness for tradition and its pageantry was 'a burden in the age in which technological progress by armies and modern weapons placed ever greater demands on a soldiers abilities' ". To further assist with the break from this, the uniform according to Tsouras was deliberately chosen as 'baggy and shapeless' in order to break from established martial tradition. There was also a change to position of attention, adopting a more Americanised stance.

As for unit lineage, permission was sought to reintroduce the von Seekt system of lineages and honours adopted in 1921 in which company level units of the Reichswehr had preserved continuity with the regiments of the old imperial army. Some units moved on their own accod, Pz Bn 2 in Hemer, Westphalia, formally assumed the lineages of the three imperial hussar regts (inc Blucher Hussars & Deaths Head Hussars of Danzig) and the Reichswehr and Wehrmacht 5th Cav itself had borne the Deaths Head lineage. The army developed a plan to take effect in 1961 that would assign lineages up to 1939. However in 1965 the government strictly forbade the assumption of lineages according to the Reichswehr.

I've still got a few more decades to go but there was a class of ships that managed to get themselves named after WW2 generals - The Rommell for instance but I also seem to recall reading on this Forum recently that there were recent calls for the Mölders airforce squadron to be renamed.

[nondescript handle]

[...] but there was a class of ships that managed to get themselves named after WW2 generals [...]

The three Lütjens-class (= Charles-F.-Adams-class) destroyers: Günther Lütjens, Erwin Rommel and Werner Mölders.

[...] but I also seem to recall reading on this Forum recently that there were recent calls for the Mölders airforce squadron to be renamed [...]

The Jagdgeschwader 74 carried the tradition name Mölders 1973-2005. In 1998 on the 60th anniversary of the bombing of Guernica the parliament passed a resolution to remove all tradition names of members of the Legion Condor.

Regards
Mark

[Adam Carr]

I don't think this is the place for a debate about Afghanistan. I do think it's a good cause, and I don't think it's got anything to do with pipelines, but we can agree to disagree about that.

On Schleswig-Holstein: as Palmerston said "The Schleswig-Holstein question is so complicated, only three men in Europe have ever understood it. One was Prince Albert, who is dead. The second was a German professor who has gone mad. I am the third and I have forgotten all about it." My (admittedly limited) understanding is that the traditional rights of the King of Denmark were generally recognised. The problem was that by the mid 19th century notions of national self determination were increasingly in conflict with dynastic rights. The fact that the population of Holstein was German was irrelevant from the point of view of traditional dynastic right, but increasingly important to German nationalists. So from the point of view of the King of Denmark (and international law as it was understood at that time), the German states were commiting aggression against him by trying to take Holstein from him. Obviously Germans saw it differently, although they were quite happy to argue dynastic right against national self-determination when it suited them, as in Poland.

On the Prussian wars. It's true that Frence declared war on Prussia in 1870, but that's because Louis Napoleon was stupid enough to walk into the trap that Bismarck set for him, as the Danes and the Austrians had previously been. All three wars were planned and premeditated by Prussia to bring about German unity under Prussian hegemony and to exclude the Habsburgs from German affairs.

[nondescript handle]

Adam,

Queen Elizabeth II is the Queen of both the UK and Australia. Does that give her the right to make Australia a part of the UK, dissolve the government in Canberra and (because Australia is administrated from Cardiff) make Welsh the official language of Australia?

The Kingdom of Denmark on one hand and the Duchies of Schleswig and of Holstein on the other hand were three different and sovereign entities, despite the fact that the same man was monarch of all three.

The incorporation of Holstein into the Kingdom of Denmark was an annexion of a sovereign (if dynastically connected) state.

Oh, a trap? Resisting an invasion is not a "good cause" if the attacker is too weak to succeed? So the Russians were not fighting the "good cause" resisting "poor Napoleon" and "poor Adolf"?
How many yardsticks do you have?

Regards
Mark

[Larso]

Sadly, Peter Tsouras has nothing in his book about Denmark or Napoleon III, so I'll just bang on with a few things about the emerging Feldheer. Thanks though for that info on those ships and Mölders - I hadn't realised the action was linked to the Condor Legion.

In 1967, as per NATO 'Flexible Response' doctrine, the German army began to emphasize 'far forward defense' to defeat/deter a conventional attack (seems pretty obvious really). By 1974 the army was organised as follows -

I Corps
1st PzGr Div
3rd Panzer Div
6th PzGr Div
7th PzGr Div
11th PzGr Div
Pz Regt 100

II Corps
4th Jager Div
10th Panzer Div
1st Gebirgs Div
Pz Regt 200

III Corps
2nd Jager Div
5th Panzer Div
12th Panzer Div
1st Luftlande Div

Given the thread subject, I find it interesting that only a very few of the above have a numerical link to a WW2 formation and even 3rd, 5th and 10th Pz were fairly well regarded and behaved units.

A bit more from Tsouras - By 1975 the Bundesheer reached its maximum strength of 345,000. Reserves at this time numbered 1,056,000. The field units had a mix of unit strengths - some intentionally at only cadre strength, with relacement battalions set to make good wartime losses. I think relacement units might be a bit of a German thing, almost harking back to the WW2 policy of replacement divisions. Evidently reserves are different too - they were to be asigned individually, where needed, rather than as complete units as in most armies.

Interestingly, despite considerable ongoing public animosity to the military, the German army was very well equipped compared to the French for instance. They having only a quarter of the tanks for a similar sizes army and only an eighth of the APCs. In both cases of generally inferior capability.

Tsouras does note though that this growth outpaced the recruitment and training of junior officers and NCOs, with ongoing shortages in the mid 20,000s. There were also discipline issues resulting from the Innere Fuhrung (inner leadership policy that emphasized the moral responsibilities of soldiers in a democratic society) approach - it seems not all soldiers were prepared to be as adult in terms of accepting discipline as had been invisioned. This was exacerbated by the more rebellious conscripts of the late 60s and 70s. Evidently 30 company commanders of 7th PzGr wrote directly to Defense Minister Schmidt complaining they didn't have the 'moral, legal or material means to discipline or train their troops and would no longer answer for such conditions'. They were supported by many hundreds of other officers. In response Schmidt introduced various practical measures that eased the burden on junior officers and brought peace to the ranks. It seems this swung the pendulum back a little more to a common sense centre after the reaction to the nazi era brought some unintended consequences.

So it seems that adjusting to the post-nazi era took a few decades, even in terms of bedding down the right attitude within the army itself. Another point of interest on comparisons with the earlier army - a survey in 1967 showed that 49.7% of all Bundeswehr officers were of Prussian origin, including 61.2 of lieutenants! Although there were differences in the tradtional military aristocracy, in the imperial army 70% of generals had aristocratic origins, in 1967 it was less than 10% and only 2.7% of the entire officer corps.

[nondescript handle]

[...] Given the thread subject, I find it interesting that only a very few of the above have a numerical link to a WW2 formation and even 3rd, 5th and 10th Pz were fairly well regarded and behaved units. [...]

But that was blind chance. The Bundeswehr started by simply numbering divisions in the sequence they were founded from 1 to n, with Panzer, Jäger, and Panzergrenadier divisions using the same numberspace, and not re-using the "founding numbers" for "special numbered divisions".

So the divisions of "Heeresstruktur 3" 1973:
1. PzGrDiv
2. Jägerdivision (founded as 2. PzGrDiv)
3. PzDiv
4. Jägerdivision (founded as 4. PzGrDiv)
5. PzDiv
6. PzDiv
7. PzGrDiv
1. Gebirgsdivision (founded as the 8th division)
1. Luftlandedivision (founded as the 9th division)
10. PzGrDiv
11. PzDiv
12. Pz Div

Regards
Mark

[Larso]

Thanks Mark. I thought that there might have been a particular method to it, given the concerns. It seems to have worked out well enough. I think you might have been the one to explain the battalion numbering system to me a few years ago. I think it went by Brigade number to start with, ie the 15th, with battalions being numbered the 151st, 152nd etc Am I right? This also seems to have done the job in terms of distancing battalion numbers from WW2 formations too.

Given the British armies move away from its regimental system, partly because of the difficulty in transferring individuals and because of some of the negative impacts of tradition, I wonder whether the Germans also recognised the value in having less commitment to specific designations. That sounds a bit awkward - actually I think the approach taken with WW2 formations, whereby the focus was on the division, was probably an influence.

[nondescript handle]

I think it went by Brigade number to start with, ie the 15th, with battalions being numbered the 151st, 152nd etc Am I right? This also seems to have done the job in terms of distancing battalion numbers from WW2 formations too.

Yes. My guess is that this is a practise inherited from the Federal Border Guards (which as I mentioned earlier were the de-facto precursor to the BW), because it's quite similar to the usual numbering schemes for civilian governmental institutions. Civilian institutions often mix letters, roman and arabic numbers in their schemes tough.

The "distancing" might have been considered an additional bonus.

I wonder whether the Germans also recognised the value in having less commitment to specific designations.

The BW will create, abolish, split, merge, and/or rename units at the drop of the hat. They're quite unsentimental in that regard.

Regards
Mark

[bakof]

Hi Mark.

But: The Danish-German war of 1849 was not a "dynastic squabble": The Danish government tried to incorporate Holstein, a sovereign German country in personal-union with the Danish king, into the Danish Kingdom and to forcefully Danefy the German population. Which resulted in an revolt and, because of massive popular support, the intervention of the German states.

I don't know which history you have read or trying to write, but Holsten was from 1460 old Danish land which was occupied by Germany - period!

The Kingdom of Denmark on one hand and the Duchies of Schleswig and of Holstein on the other hand were three different and sovereign entities, despite the fact that the same man was monarch of all three.

And you then think this was "a good cause" for Germany! Hmmmm.

b.r.
bakof

[Urmel]

To further assist with the break from this, the uniform according to Tsouras was deliberately chosen as 'baggy and shapeless' in order to break from established martial tradition.

I have very serious doubts about this. The German uniform in WW2 could also appear baggy and shapeless (if worn without the Koppel - there is a picture of Crüwell looking very baggy in 'The Desert Generals'), and that is not a bad thing in a uniform, since it gives its wearer flexibility when moving. The full dress uniform is still a proper uniform.

There was also a change to position of attention, adopting a more Americanised stance.

No more 'Hacken zusammenknallen'. Instead when the unit received the order 'Rührt Euch' there had/has to be a single bang by 150 boots, and Lord help you if it did not work. One night we had to return to our rooms five times before the UvD gave up. When he did, a joker in the third row let go a monstrous barf just the moment after the 'Rührt Euch'. The UvD almost lost it completely, and we did not get a lot of sleep that night.

[Adam Carr]

Urfel, no doubt you are right about the uniforms, but I think it is obvious that there has been a deliberate policy of deprussianisation of German uniforms, and the demeanour of those who wear them, since the war. The Berlin police couldn't look less Prussian if they tried. They wear baggy green jackets and pants, they slouch around with their hands in their pockets and they smoke on duty. (On the other hand the riot police I saw in Nuremberg on May 1 this year looked extremely efficient and scary in their black body-armour and goggles, and they were obviously just itching to give the neo-Nazis a good whacking with their three-foot truncheons.)