Logistics Support of the "Common" Soldier

[perrys7342]

It's been over a decade since I last posted to this forum. But in my " Bucket List" years, I'm still trying to learn and consolidate some of the "Dicotomies of Life"..and NO, I don't have the remaining life period to try to understand the Two Candidates we are now being "presented with" and "given" the unenviable task of "accepting" either as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief. The closest I can come in feeling is the US Commanding General "squirming in a chair" on Bataan and discussing surrender of US Forces in the Philippines.

It's been 22 years since I retired after a career that started as a Nuclear Weapons(Primary) and Infantry (Secondary Officer) in Germany in 1960. In an era just prior to President Kennedy's visit to Germany in 1963 (and subsequent activation of Special Forces and Black Ops Operations), we also conducted "White and Grey" Ops operations in the open against Soviet Forces East Germany. After return and Graduate School I became a "Junior Rocket Scientist" at White Sands Missile Range evaluating Warhead Lethality (and was somewhat "shocked" that the only "semiofficial" source of Wound Ballistics was...from German "Medical Experiments" on Concentration Camp Inmates in WWII) of various of various Air Defense and Ground Combat Weapons Systems. I got to work with the "2nd String" Group of WWII German Scientists after Von Braun went to NASA. Afterwards, I moved on to Wright Patterson and started a string of assignments involving logical support of the F-4, F-111 (including the "unwanted" B model for the Navy), the A-10, F-15, B-1, and longest the Light Weight Fighter and F-16. After assignment at Air Force Systems Command at Andrews, I returned to my "Heartland" Army at Ft. Lee and eventually ending up being responsible for preparation of the logistics aspects of AirLand Battle 2000, the Defeat of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact 2nd Echelon) a few years before the fall of the Berlin Wall. The still "unsolved" doctrinal issue, which I confronted directly when my Unit issued War Reserve Nuclear Weapons to Infantry, Armored Cavalry, Armored, and Artillery units (see the Movie "Catch 22" for what it was like) during the Cuban Missile Crisis is the transition from Conventional, to Tactical Nuclear, to Strategic Nuclear...Under what Combat Condition, Who (Authority), What (Yield) and When(Timing on the Ground)... (and NO I won't ask the "Trumpster" for advice). I finally ended up at Rock Island with responsibility for all Ammunition (Conventional for all Services), Nuclear, Chemical Biological (for Army and Marine Corps), Weapons Armament (from Pistols, M16A2's,etc to Self Propelled Arty, Helios and Tanks)...Air and Ground), and Transportation.

But it was as I was watching some OLD VHS Tapes of some of the key battles of WWII (Philippines, Singapore, North Africa, Anzio, Barbarossa, Stalingrad, Tarawa, etc) that I concluded what the logistical support "index" requirements were of Combat Units during WWII. Note these are my "opinionated" estimates.

The finest Light Infantry soldier of WWII were the Japanese as evidenced by their operations in the Pacific, Far East, and administration of the huge Muslim populations in Indonesia and surrounding areas with minimal force structure. (And I worked on the logistics doctrine to convert the US Army from what was called "Division 86" Armor Heavy after the fall of the Soviet Union to a balanced Force structure including Light Infantry Divisions).

In the US Military we go to "extreme" lengths to plan the sustainment of forces in various theatres to determine the "Basis of Issue" by Unit Type. In the Ammunition Arena, we used the slogan "A Soldier can survive 2 Days without Water, 7 Days without food ration, but only Hours without Ammunition".

My Opinion Conclusion on the Japanese, is that the ordinary US Combat Soldier required 20-30 times the logistical sustainment base of the Japanese Infantryman. While the US Military in operational planning prepares to never have a Soldier without access to water, food, ammunition, and weapons (and yes, units can get "cut off" or surrounded and have critical shortages), the Japanese military logistics doctrine was entirely different (and brutality to local populations was the "normal" operational result). The primary source of food supply was "foraging of the local population and taking food, livestock, poultry and anything of combat value). Forget "bullet executions" of civilians, ammunition is too precious, "let them starve as naturally occurs". If you run low on ammunition and weapons "take them from the enemy by any means, bayonet, concrete blocks, rocks, pipes). Satisfy Soldiers "Creature Needs" by Comfort Women, where available, or "Use as you please available female population". In a similar index, I believe a US Soldier needed and received 5 times the logical support of a Soviet Soldier in WWII, and the probably 2 times the German Wehrmacht (the last due to incompetent "infighting" and vastly inferior production capabilities and resupply avenues).

In the US Military, only the Marine Corps was the advocate of eliminating the full automatic capability of the M16 and M16A1 in development of the M16A2 to conserve ammunition.
The Army's primary concern focused on reliability rather than the Vietnam lack of fire discipline on designated targets where either"everyone fired a full magazine or no one fired" saved only by the tendency to jam.


Apologize for the length of this post...it's just an accumulation of thoughts over the past decade.

PCS

[South]

Good afternoon Perry S 7342,

Welcome to the AHF after absence. I missed your orig post.

No need for me to see movie "Catch 22", the DisHonest John Rocketship got me focused.

Could never learn about / get my questions answered (at least replied to) re the Davy Crockett (looked like a version of a recoilless rifle tactical nuclear weapon.

Some, if not most AHF participants won't be familiar with "Rock Island" Arsenal, .......and their excellent museum !

Re: "administration of the huge Muslim populations in Indonesia [sic] (Dutch East Indies, until final end in 1963); Gallows Humor ?!

A tangent view to a point presented; If you omit the value of human life assigned by concepts from Western Civilization and consider soldiers as just another commodity such as a glass bottle filled with kerosene, China produced premier infantrymen - especially for the WWII-era Red Army later renamed (circa 1946 [?]) PLA.

You've got much real history to offer us here.


Warm regards,

~ Bob

On Chesapeake, grid east of Ft Lee.

[perrys7342]

Bob,

When we issued the Davy Crockett to V Corps Armor Cavalry Units during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Colonels Commanding would point
to the mapboard and say" What do I want with this pissy little thing" (he didn't realize what even a "only" 50 Ton explosive nuclear warhead would do in comparison to the Toys in his Unit basket. He was particularly upset when I could not tell him if there would be any "resupply" or how and when the Strategic Nuclear Weapon release (President, to USAREUR, to Army 7 Vaihingen, to V Corps, if still existing, would happen), saying" I got 3 Russian Guards Division that I'm trying to screen while falling back and you want me to hold this Thing until a release EXECUTE notification"

He further indicated he "didn't want it" and I informed him he had no choice. The "Catch 22" in that Unit was that he wanted the S-4 to sign for it. We had already loaded them for him on the 106mm RR on his Jeeps. When I finally tracked down the S4 " Bn "Drunk" Warrant Officer, he asked when I was leaving and to come back and he would sign for it then. NOW...I told him and he started to sign. But as I was going out the door, he asked "Is the Container an accountable item??...Traditional Supply Guy thinking. I said "Who Cares?" and he said, I can't sign until I know. I told him "Forget the Dam Container" I'll tale it with us and had my Guys load it in my Jeep. When about 12-18 hours later we got the "Stand Down, Recover all Nuclear Warheads" I couldn't recall what I had done with the Container. Couple of weeks later, I found it, repainted it Black, stenciled my name on it when I returned to the US shipped my household goods in it. I still have it in my Garage in Florida today.

The Story with the 280 mm Gun "Atomic Cannon" and the Honest John Rocket/ 8" Howitzer Bns was even more"Catch 22" but I'll save that till later.

Thanks, Perry

[South]

Good morning Perry and all,

Now I "officially" know why the Davy Crockett tactical nuclear ________(what ever type of weapon it was designated) looked like a big 106 mm recoilless rifle; It was on the same tripod.

I was told ....... unofficially........that the Davy Crockett was needed because of a lack of close air support in this era of US Army history.

Believe I saw......but never studied......a / the 280 mm Atomic Cannon at Ft Sill, Oklahoma.

Again, appreciate background information.

Warm regards,

~ Bob

[Sheldrake]

Bob,

When we issued the Davy Crockett to V Corps Armor Cavalry Units during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Colonels Commanding would point
to the mapboard and say" What do I want with this pissy little thing" (he didn't realize what even a "only" 50 Ton explosive nuclear warhead would do in comparison to the Toys in his Unit basket. He was particularly upset when I could not tell him if there would be any "resupply" or how and when the Strategic Nuclear Weapon release (President, to USAREUR, to Army 7 Vaihingen, to V Corps, if still existing, would happen), saying" I got 3 Russian Guards Division that I'm trying to screen while falling back and you want me to hold this Thing until a release EXECUTE notification"

He further indicated he "didn't want it" and I informed him he had no choice. The "Catch 22" in that Unit was that he wanted the S-4 to sign for it. We had already loaded them for him on the 106mm RR on his Jeeps. When I finally tracked down the S4 " Bn "Drunk" Warrant Officer, he asked when I was leaving and to come back and he would sign for it then. NOW...I told him and he started to sign. But as I was going out the door, he asked "Is the Container an accountable item??...Traditional Supply Guy thinking. I said "Who Cares?" and he said, I can't sign until I know. I told him "Forget the Dam Container" I'll tale it with us and had my Guys load it in my Jeep. When about 12-18 hours later we got the "Stand Down, Recover all Nuclear Warheads" I couldn't recall what I had done with the Container. Couple of weeks later, I found it, repainted it Black, stenciled my name on it when I returned to the US shipped my household goods in it. I still have it in my Garage in Florida today.


The Story with the 280 mm Gun "Atomic Cannon" and the Honest John Rocket/ 8" Howitzer Bns was even more"Catch 22" but I'll save that till later.

Thanks, Perry

Please go on. I am trying to reconstruct how we would have fought the cold war for the benefit of the British Army which needs to be ready to fight against a first class peer enemy. http://www.staffrideservices.com/?p=232

As far as I can see, no copies of the corps general deployment plans were retained for historic purposes and much of the material was then destroyed as part of the "peace dividend" I have been interviewing members of 24 and 50 Missile Regiments and the last Commander of 1st British Artillery brigade. It has been a struggle to reconstruct the plans and the development of NATO tactical doctrine.

The thinking behind tactical nuclear weapons is alien to the current generation of servicemen, and provokes a lot of discussion and thought. They find the idea of jeep mounted nuclear weapons under the control of junior officers and NCOs as almost incredible. I'd be very grateful for any pointers. Contact me by PM or via the board.

[perrys7342]

My Area of Operations (AO) in 1960-1963 was the US Army V Corps (ending at Fulda) and the German III Corps. The British Army of the Rhine was supported by other Units in what was called NORTHAG. The US Army VII Corps has responsibility for the SOUTHAG AO . Overall USAREUR Doctrine and Order of Battle was based on assumptions that at least 60 percent of Soviet Forces East Germany (which included the primary Warsaw Pact Partners" would strike at CENTAG thru the Fulda Gap and along the line of V Corps with the line "Bending" from heavy losses under the Soviet presumed 4:1 Conventional Force advantage toward the Belgian Border and "hopefully" reaching a stalemate ON THE GROUND after employment of Army Tactical Nuclear Weapons supported by Tactical Air Forces Nuclear Delivery and backup (with Presidential Approval) from the Nuclear Submarine Strike Force. At that "stalemate" point, the planning assumption was that the Warsaw Pact Forces had been "thrown under the Bus" and were effectively out of the force mix for Western Europe but the "Main Punch" of countering the Soviet 2nd Echelon remained "undefined". This "GAP" between Conventional, Tactical Nuclear, and Strategic Nuclear Worldwide Conflict was never fully defined in my years of Service.

The US Army Doctrine at the time was called the "PentomicArmy" and focused on what were termed "semi-autonomous" Divisional Units made up of 5 Brigades plus supporting Armored Cavalry, Armor, and max 155mm Artillery. These Units were supposedly capable of "360 degree" Attack and Defensive Security Operations while receiving V Corps deep penetration fire support from Nuclear 8" inch Howitzer, Corporal, Honest John, with later Lance and Sergeant Missile Systems. The Wide Gaps between the Divisional Units and Corps Support was essentially a "Open Target" No-Mans Zone.

I plan on preparing a separate Post on the deployment of Atomic Demolition Munitions in the Fulda Gap which happened during the same period as the Operational Test and VIP "Gala" of the Davey Crockett in CONUS under the sponsorship of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) and Army.

Thanks for your comments,

PCS

[perrys7342]

Keep in mind that in this era of the Cold War, the public image of a Officer carrying a briefcase behind the President with supposed Nuclear Authority Release Codes didn't exist. Until President Kennedy came to Europe in 1963 any individual Commander, Officer, NCO, or Individual Soldier could have armed and deployed without authority the Tactical Nuclear Weapons under his control, from the 20-50 Ton Davey Crockett to the 20-60 Kiloton Corporal Missile.

In his visit to the Mediterranean, he asked a young Navy LT JG (similar to my authority level as an Army 1st Lt) on a Guided Missile Cruiser what he would do if there was a sudden presumed Soviet Attack in Force on his Carrier Battle Group. The honest reply..."I'd order the immediate final arming of Nuclear Missile Warheads and tactical engagement while concurrently informing the Battle Group Commander's Flagship of my actions."

So when Kennedy thereafter left the Mediterranean and came to Germany to visit Units in the Field, the USAREUR Chain was "abuzz" with "what are you going to say if he visits your Unit" during the current Exercise. When I received an "Ops Immediate" order from my Comm Van, I thought perhaps I too would get to meet the President. However, the "Stern" Message in two parts began "Make no U-Turns on the Autobahn" followed by "Report immediately any suspicious civilian or uniformed military movements in your AO" to which I had my COMM Reply "The only suspicious activity of unknown purpose in my AO is a reportedly CONUS Based Reserve Unit the XXX Quartermaster Company from Ft. Lee who doesn't KNOW WHAT THE HELL THEY ARE DOING". Almost immediately, I got a military telephone line call from my Compatriot Jack (who would later join and retire from the CIA) saying "You can't say that on the Command Net...are you at some Gasthaus drinking on Break".

Shortly thereafter, the Army imposed what was called "The Two Man Rule"...every action in handling nuclear material had to be verified by a Second Participant. Both Jack and I laughed over that one...if their was ONE mentally unstable Soldier with Access would he not likely have a "Companion" with the same mindset?

The era of Permissive Action Links and other devices were still in the future.

Respectfully,

PCS

[Sheldrake]

Keep in mind that in this era of the Cold War, the public image of a Officer carrying a briefcase behind the President with supposed Nuclear Authority Release Codes didn't exist. Until President Kennedy came to Europe in 1963 any individual Commander, Officer, NCO, or Individual Soldier could have armed and deployed without authority the Tactical Nuclear Weapons under his control, from the 20-50 Ton Davey Crockett to the 20-60 Kiloton Corporal Missile.

In his visit to the Mediterranean, he asked a young Navy LT JG (similar to my authority level as an Army 1st Lt) on a Guided Missile Cruiser what he would do if there was a sudden presumed Soviet Attack in Force on his Carrier Battle Group. The honest reply..."I'd order the immediate final arming of Nuclear Missile Warheads and tactical engagement while concurrently informing the Battle Group Commander's Flagship of my actions."

So when Kennedy thereafter left the Mediterranean and came to Germany to visit Units in the Field, the USAREUR Chain was "abuzz" with "what are you going to say if he visits your Unit" during the current Exercise. When I received an "Ops Immediate" order from my Comm Van, I thought perhaps I too would get to meet the President. However, the "Stern" Message in two parts began "Make no U-Turns on the Autobahn" followed by "Report immediately any suspicious civilian or uniformed military movements in your AO" to which I had my COMM Reply "The only suspicious activity of unknown purpose in my AO is a reportedly CONUS Based Reserve Unit the XXX Quartermaster Company from Ft. Lee who doesn't KNOW WHAT THE HELL THEY ARE DOING". Almost immediately, I got a military telephone line call from my Compatriot Jack (who would later join and retire from the CIA) saying "You can't say that on the Command Net...are you at some Gasthaus drinking on Break".

Shortly thereafter, the Army imposed what was called "The Two Man Rule"...every action in handling nuclear material had to be verified by a Second Participant. Both Jack and I laughed over that one...if their was ONE mentally unstable Soldier with Access would he not likely have a "Companion" with the same mindset?

The era of Permissive Action Links and other devices were still in the future.

Respectfully,

PCS

Whoa,

Sir, Can I quote you on that?

Here are some maps from the 1`BR Corps NorthAG battlefield.
http://www.staffrideservices.com/?p=461

[perrys7342]

Just for clarification of the "grim" reality of encounter with Soviet Forces in East Germany, my Unit (TOE 9-47D Guided Missile and Special Weapons Company Direct Support) was an "Expendable" Unit in the Order of Battle. Since we carried all the Nuclear Basic Load (and Chemical Weapons) for V Corps Combat Arms Unit, once Nuclear Release was initiated and we issued to each Unit, our Mission was "Over". In the Post-Exercise Briefings this was never mentioned directly but the results were always obvious. In some of the first Field Exercises I was in, after we "issued" Exercise "Training Items" to Units (and we always had the full Nuclear War Reserve Components with us), I would wait for redeployment orders...perhaps to reload at 7th Army Rear Depot Support Areas and return to the what remained of the "Front" for reissue. That never happened in any Exercise. I would see the Armored Cavalry Screen withdraw around our position with No Withdrawal Order and shortly thereafter the Exercise would be "terminated". When I asked my Compatriot Jack who was at the V Corps Command Center during the Exercise, why no redeployment order was ever issued, he would laugh and say "Dummy, you were Dead!". My NCO's were well aware of the truth but when my ordinary GI's asked how things ended, I just answered "Just as Planned".

When the ultimate reality of the Cold War came through during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the order came at around 0330 in the morning for release and issue of Theatre Tactical Nuclear Weapons, I faced my then pregnant 22 year Old Wife who had tears in her eyes. As I put on my web gear, I told her that My Guys were picking me up at 0400, someone would be there to take her to the Officer's Club at 0600 for further movement elsewhere but unknown, and she could take the one "GAO Bag" in the Closet. Strangely there was no "Tearful Goodbye" since we had trained repeatedly for that day we hoped would never come. Same was true throughout the next 24 hours at for each Unit Issue, very little verbal talk, no "What Ifs" , no "Gallows Humor" no customary "See You Again". Just Move On...

Respectfully,

PCS

[Stephan]

Re the theme of logistic support of the common soldier. The military historians have much to tell about that. So while some, justefably, are talking about brilliant generals, others talk about the importance of good logistics. The side with best logistics tends to win the wars...

There is an interesting well researched example. the war 1808-1909 between the swedish-finnish army against the invading Russian army whom was after Finland - at that time a part of Sweden.. A war unusually human btw, no war atrocities whatsoever. None. ONE reasone was the russians knew many finns wanted to change government so they russians had good hopes to keep the country conquered. And thus - no point to make atrocities to deprieve the enemy from taxpayers... And why harm coming compatriots, no??

Btw, the great bulk of the s-f army were finns, also most officers were finns although they all could talk good swedish, with some swedish officers added, and also some swedish cavallery in the beginning. The others national swedish forces were guarding against the French, Danes and Norwegians whom were threateing invasions in other places in Sweden...

OK, the logistics doctrine in the Swedish-Finnish army was central organized logistics. There was a transport chain forward, food, horse food etc etc was send from magasines deeply back forwards to the front line. Just minor extras were buyed from the locals, usually the regiment quartermaster buyed from the cities. It worked reasonably well, with some exceptions. One example was, at a couple occasions, the finnish army won a local battle, but couldnt pursuit the retiring russians with force: they got to stand still and bake new bread... As bread WAS the main food of these army and they werent supposed to march nor fight on empty stomach... And thus, a couple of potential fine big crushing victories become just minor victories...

The logistics doctrine in the russian army was in much different. The weapons, ammo etc was central delivered. Also much of the food. BUT. Every platoon had its own household money! And they had the right to buy from the locals. The villages, and even individual peasants themselves, as the occasion and need demanded. (in this they remind a little of the Japanese army, with the exception they HAD real money to pay with, and made less atrocities)
And it did work splendidly. Even when their offensive took them into the core Sweden, far away from their bases, and where stealing and burning could be feasible (reducing the enemy taxpayers no?), they still didnt do it, they still proceed to buy what they needed.
We know that, because after the peace was settled, the Swedish state made a summary of the casualties and complains. There were practically none. Not even rapes reported more than perhaps some occasionally... And during many years after it, the local peasants and dwellers in these core Swedish provinces of Umeå and thereabout, tried to pay their swedish taxes in rubels.... They did had a great excess of rubels.

[Sheldrake]

Just for clarification of the "grim" reality of encounter with Soviet Forces in East Germany, my Unit (TOE 9-47D Guided Missile and Special Weapons Company Direct Support) was an "Expendable" Unit in the Order of Battle. Since we carried all the Nuclear Basic Load (and Chemical Weapons) for V Corps Combat Arms Unit, once Nuclear Release was initiated and we issued to each Unit, our Mission was "Over". In the Post-Exercise Briefings this was never mentioned directly but the results were always obvious. In some of the first Field Exercises I was in, after we "issued" Exercise "Training Items" to Units (and we always had the full Nuclear War Reserve Components with us), I would wait for redeployment orders...perhaps to reload at 7th Army Rear Depot Support Areas and return to the what remained of the "Front" for reissue. That never happened in any Exercise. I would see the Armored Cavalry Screen withdraw around our position with No Withdrawal Order and shortly thereafter the Exercise would be "terminated". When I asked my Compatriot Jack who was at the V Corps Command Center during the Exercise, why no redeployment order was ever issued, he would laugh and say "Dummy, you were Dead!". My NCO's were well aware of the truth but when my ordinary GI's asked how things ended, I just answered "Just as Planned".

When the ultimate reality of the Cold War came through during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the order came at around 0330 in the morning for release and issue of Theatre Tactical Nuclear Weapons, I faced my then pregnant 22 year Old Wife who had tears in her eyes. As I put on my web gear, I told her that My Guys were picking me up at 0400, someone would be there to take her to the Officer's Club at 0600 for further movement elsewhere but unknown, and she could take the one "GAO Bag" in the Closet. Strangely there was no "Tearful Goodbye" since we had trained repeatedly for that day we hoped would never come. Same was true throughout the next 24 hours at for each Unit Issue, very little verbal talk, no "What Ifs" , no "Gallows Humor" no customary "See You Again". Just Move On...

Respectfully,

PCS

Thanks. I used some of your account on recent battlefield studies.