Ukraine lost the defensible Perekop Isthmus in a day, whereas the Germans and Russians held it for months in WWII. Why?

[Sid Guttridge]

Something went very wrong with Ukrainian defence in the south in 2020.

The Perekop Peninsula to the Crimea is a highly defensible bottleneck. The Red Army held it for a couple of months in 1941 while the Germans were running riot elsewhere. The Germans held the same peninsula against the Red Army, which was by then dominant elsewhere, for over six months during 1943-44.

The Ukrainians seem to have lost it on the first day of the current Russian offensive. Their troubles at Mariupol are one result of this, as was the loss of Kherson and the emergence of the threat to Odessa. There will need to be a serious Ukrainian post mortem over the almost immediate loss of the Perekop Isthmus position.

Does anybody know why the Ukrainians failed to contest the foot of the Perekop Isthmus effectively?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Yuri]

hi, Sid

1941 and 1943-43 (German Wehrmacht & Royal Romanian Army & Slovak troops against the Red Army) for 2022 do not correspond to the situation.
In 1941 and 1944, they attacked from the mainland to the peninsula.

The year 1920 is suitable for this case. An offensive from Baron Wrangel's White Army against the Red Army.
The White Army carried out a successful offensive from the Crimea, as the Red Army sent its forces to war with Poland, which insidiously took advantage of the appearance of Baron Wrangel in the Crimea and captured Kiev.
The army of Baron Wrangel attacked and captured Berdyansk, Militopol, Kherson.
It is easy to attack from the Crimean Peninsula across the isthmus if there is superiority in forces.
I have visited these places a lot.

By the way, Baron Wrangel in the Crimea was delivered to Sevastopol on the morning of March 22, 1920 by the English battleship "Emperor of India".

BaronWrangel.jpg

Baron Wrangel - "The Black Baron".

"The White Army the Black Baron is preparing the royal throne for us again.
But from the taiga to the British seas, the Red Army is the strongest".
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vA-W_MPg9ec
This famous song was performed in 1920 in connection with the delivery of Baron Wrangel's army to the Crimea by the British.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Yuri,

You post, "It is easy to attack from the Crimean Peninsula across the isthmus if there is superiority in forces." Why? Both the Germans in 1941 and the Red Army in 1943-44 failed to break through from the north for months despite dominance elsewhere.

Is there some geographical feature which favours an attack from the south but not from the north?

The Ukrainians have proved quite capable of holding superior Russian forces elsewhere, so why not at the Perekop bottleneck? Were their forces there weak? Were they surprised? Did the Russians use aerial and/or marine envelopment? Was it something else?

Cheers,

Sid.

[Yuri]

The Turkish rampart on the isthmus is a slender system of defensive structures, including walls and deep ditches, it is not one but several lines created by the Turks against the Russians.

By the way, in 1968, the Mosfilm film studio made the film "Two Comrades Served." This is the best film about the Civil War, the best Soviet actors were filmed.
The film is about the events and people (both on the part of the Reds and the Whites) of the period when the Red Army was preparing for the assault, the assault itself and the flight of the whites from Sevostopol. It is known that the white emigrants also liked the film.
Dialogues are of crucial importance in the film, so it will be difficult for a foreigner to understand.

There is a scene in the film when the main characters fly over the Crimean Rampart on a very old plane and the defensive structures are clearly visible.
https://youtu.be/e7P3QbcI91U?t=1192

The storming of the Turkish rampart by the forces of the Red Army on November 8, 1920, along with the defense of Tsaritsyn. the most famous battles of the Civil War.
In the film there is a scene of the storming of the Turkish rampart, from this scene it is clear what the complexity of the infantry offensive on this rampart is.
It is clear that this protective shaft is designed against the attackers from the mainland.

[Reigo2]

Does anybody know why the Ukrainians failed to contest the foot of the Perekop Isthmus effectively?

It seems from open sources that there was no strong Ukrainian defenses there. There is information that the commander of the Ukrainian 59th Brigade said in an interview that some days before the start of the war the brigade started training in Nikolaev oblast instead of going to defend the Perekop. After the start of the war the Brigade retreated towards Kherson under attack from Russian aviation.
https://fat-yankey.livejournal.com/1679 ... s#comments

So either the Ukrainian high command miscalculated (possibly were fooled by Russian deception) or feared that at Perekop their forces will face heavy attack and will be destroyed there.

[Yuri]

All this is the speculation of a pseudo-expert.
Truth on Earth

Taurida_Steeps.jpg

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Reigo2,

Thanks for the explanation and the link, which contains some apparently hard facts, such as this Ukrainian OB:

1st Panzer - Chernihiv (PPD) are fighting at home;
- 10th Mountain Assault - Kolomia, Iv-Frankivsk Region (PPD);
- 17th Panzer - Kr. Horn (PPD), possibly a mehbat in the JFO;
- 24th OMBr - Luhansk e.g.;
- 28th OMBr - Odessa (PPD);
- 30th OMBr - Donetsk e.g.;
- 53rd OMBr - Severodonetsk/Lisichansk (PPD), in combat;
- 54th OMBr - Artemovsk (Bakhmut) (PPD), in combat;
- 56th OMPBr - Mariupol (PPD), in combat;
- 57th OMPBr - Luhanske e.g.;
- 58th OMPBr - Sumy, Glukhov, Konotop;
- 59th OMPBr - Mykolaiv;
- 72nd OMBr - Kyiv Oblast, Brovary;
- 92nd OMBr - Kharkiv;
- 93rd OMBr - Sumy, Okhtyrka;
- 128th UGPBr - Donbass (it is not known exactly where);
Airborne Forces:
- 25th OPDBr - Avdiivka/Balakleya;
- 79th ODShBr - Severodonetsk;
- 80th OAMBr - Lviv (PPD);
- 81st ODShBr - Raisins;
- 95th ODShBr - Gorlovka;

Plus

Marines:
- 35th OBrMP,
- 36th OBrMP;
Artillery:
- 406th Artillery Group (Mor.peh);
- 32nd Reap (Marine Peh)
- 40th Art. brigade;
Reconnaissance:
- 73rd Marine MTR Center

14th OMBr - near Kiev, seen in the battles for Makarov.
30th OMBr - fighting near Horlivka (Svitlodar)
53rd OMBr - fighting in Donetsk region.54th
OMBr - fighting in Donetsk region.56th
OMPBr - Mariupol Zaporozhye (PPD), "Mariupol" - this name;
61st OPBr (Jaeger) - Chernihiv (PPD) is fighting at home.
The 95th ODShBr - it has a PPD in Zhytomyr, there seem to be some parts of the brigade left, or new ones were formed from reservists, but the brigade also participated in the battles near Makarov, Kiev region along with the 14th OMBr. I mean, it's kind of in two places.
35th OBrMP - in the battles, near
Mykolaiv36th OBrMP - in the battles in Mariupol (units)

Cheers,

Sid

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Yuri,

Thanks. The typed explanation with the map might help us understand what went wrong for the Ukrainians at the foot of the Perekop Isthmus. Its immediate loss seems to have been the cause of most of their problems in the south. However, advancing from there in at least four directions may have stretched available Russian forces and they certainly seem to be having problems at Mikolaiev and possibly soon at Kherson.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Reigo2]

All this is the speculation of a pseudo-expert.
Truth on Earth

Don't be so harsh on yourself, Yuri! The writing on the map (which you so modestly have captioned as Truth on Earth) seems sound and not a speculation of a pseudo-expert. However the question is why Perekop was lost in a day by the Ukrainians? Was it because the Ukrainians tried to defend it with significant forces but were still crushed by the heroic, almost Biblically acting* participants of the special military operation? Or simply the Ukrainians had no serious forces there which may have been the case if we take into account the alleged claims by the commander of the Ukrainian 59th brigade. At least I haven't noticed any videos from Perekop where we can see destroyed Ukrainian positions, dead or captured soldiers. This also seems to point that there were no significant Ukrainian forces.

* https://www1.cbn.com/cbnnews/world/2022 ... ns-rage-on

[James A Pratt III]

It would appear that the Ukrainians just did not have the forces to defend the Isthmus. it should also be pointed out that the armies of 2022 are a lot smaller than the armies of WW II. I would say the RCW armies would be a more realistic comparison. It should also be noted that the terrain around north of the Isthmus is very open not a good place to be if your enemy has air supremacy.

[James A Pratt III]

I have since heard that the Ukrainians decided not to spread their forces out along their borders unlike the Poles in 1939. Also remmember he who defends everything defends nothing.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi James,

If so, the Ukrainians made a serious miscalculation at the Perekop bottleneck. If they had made the same determined defence on this narrow front as they did on extended fronts elsewhere, they would probably not be having the problems in the south that they currently are.

I think it highly unlikely that the Ukrainians were unaware of the importance of the Perekop position, so I suspect a debacle of some sort of which we are not yet aware.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Yuri]

Hi James,

If so, the Ukrainians made a serious miscalculation at the Perekop bottleneck. If they had made the same determined defence on this narrow front as they did on extended fronts elsewhere, they would probably not be having the problems in the south that they currently are.

I think it highly unlikely that the Ukrainians were unaware of the importance of the Perekop position, so I suspect a debacle of some sort of which we are not yet aware.

Cheers,

Sid.

Senior military commanders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine studied the history of military art in Soviet military schools and, consequently, these officers and generals studied the course of hostilities between the Red Army and the White Army of Baron Wrangel in the steppes of Taurida and Crimea in the period from March to November 1920.

I suspect that those who studied at military schools in Ukraine in the 1990s and early 2000s also studied these battles.

Thus, the military leaders of the Armed Forces of Ukraine took into account the unsuccessful experience of the Red Army, when in the spring of 1920 it tried to delay the offensive of the White Army troops in positions at the base of the Isthmus (at Perekop).

It ended in disaster for these Red Army troops.
The White Army landed troops in several places, on the shores of the Black and Azov Seas, in particular, and cut off the escape routes both to the east (to Melitopol) and to the west (to Kherson).
As a result, the Red Army units at Perekop were surrounded and defeated.
The White Army launched an offensive in several directions at once.
In essence, today the Army of the Russian Federation acts in the same way as the White Army of Baron Wrangel in the spring of 1920.

In 1920, the Red Army stopped the advance of the White Army at the Dneper, today the armed forces of Ukraine have done the same.

In 1920, during the offensive of the White Army, the main events took place at Kakhovka, where cavalry and horse-drawn wheelbarrows (Tachanka) made an important contribution to the success of the Red Army.

Tachanka1.jpg

---------------------------

Tachanka2().jpg

--------------------
In the steppes of Taurida, the Tachanka were very effective.
By the way, wheelbarrows were first used in these steppes. In honor of this type of weapon that arose in the Civil War, the song "Eh, Tachanka" was composed.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rmmQP8E1dXQ

[James A Pratt III]

Thanks Yuri. I was going to point out the Ukrainians if they tried to hold this position they were most likely going to be outflanked by amphibious assaults by the Black Sea fleet. Add to this they may have received an airborne or helicopter landings in their rear. Along with a attack from the front. So things would have ended badly for the Ukrainians. I would also like to point out there were no defenses north of the ditch so the Ukrainians are going to have to build them in mid winter.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi James,

I posted those possibilities earlier: "The Ukrainians have proved quite capable of holding superior Russian forces elsewhere, so why not at the Perekop bottleneck? Were their forces there weak? Were they surprised? Did the Russians use aerial and/or marine envelopment? Was it something else?"

Beyond speculation, what is the answer?

As for building defences in mid-winter, the Ukrainians have had over seven years in which to build such positions. The long front in the Donbas has layers of such positions. Why not the far shorter Perekop position?

It would appear that something went badly wrong on the Ukrainian side at Perekop on day one. What was it?

Cheers,

Sid