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In the early hours of 6 October (on Yom Kippur, the holiest of the Jewish holidays), Elazar finally became convinced that war would indeed break out that same day, even though the Chief of Military Intelligence Major General Eli Zeira and the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan still believed that this was highly unlikely. Dayan's conviction had two major consequences
Dayan refused to approve Elazar's request for a general call-up of the reserves (Elazar nevertheless eventually decided independently on a limited call-up, beginning on 5 October).
Dayan refused to approve Elazar's recommendation that the IDF engage in a pre-emptive air strike, planned for 11:00 a.m. on Yom Kippur (the airforce was ready for the strike, but its jets never took off).
Yet never censored was Moshe Dayan who twice refused to call up the reserve or authorized a air strike nor for that matter was golda Meir....who was the commander - in -Chief.....
Yet In the early days of the fighting, Elazar was one of very few Israeli commanders who managed to keep his cool and even maintain an optimistic view of where events were heading. This was in especially sharp contrast with the political leadership, most notably Moshe Dayan, who spoke of the "destruction of the Third Jewish Commonwealth."
A similar case was https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_D._Lavelle