Cult Icon wrote: ↑23 Sep 2022, 17:40
Peter89 wrote: ↑23 Sep 2022, 16:45
Second, I think if the Russian army fills up its formations with reservist infantry according to the doctrine you quote, it is only a good choice if there is a reasonable chance to crush the Ukrainians in decisive battles. Russia have General Winter on its side for the next 6 months to come (although it is questionable how effective will that be), but when the winter is over and the campaigning season starts, Russia has to produce decisive results, because it can not keep a large army on the field (engaged in heavy combat) for a long time.
This is why I think the Russians can do two reasonable things; one is to swap the trained and equipped formations with the reservists and crush the Ukrainians at the onset of the cold winter, breaking the morale of both the Ukrainians and the Europeans; the other is to retrain and equip all formations by the next campaigning season, and then try to break Ukraine systematically.
The Doctrinally correct army is the only one that can pull off maneuver warfare and encirclements and create a full victory over Ukraine. But the losses that it will entail will not be popular at home, even if the Ukrainian army is destroyed. You have a point on the great political risk that this entails.
So do you believe that the Russians, in the possible Winter campaign- will send a similar type of army they did on Feb 24th (Artillery army with tanks, with infantry forces concentrated in VDV/Naval infantry)? This would constitute a second wave and once again artillery centric army with low maneuver possibilities.
I believe that the Russian leadership tries to regain the strategic latitude on multiple areas and levels of warfare.
It is clear that the Russian intelligence service is inferior, and I very seriously doubt that an all-out attack order would be given if there is any chance for a failure. It is also very doubtful whether Europe's morale will be broken in the winter. The Europeans have paid an immense amount of money to Russia for the energy imports, but secured a buffer that is enough for the winter ahead. This card is the strongest now. Next year, the dependency on Russian energy will be much lower, and it will be close to nothing in a few years. Thus, the economic battle is leading to nowhere, really. On the diplomatic scale, it is still very much questionable whether the anti-west coalition will support Putin's Russia or profit from its downfall. Also, Russia has not started to wear down Ukraine's critical civilian infrastructure, although as far as I know, they are capable of doing it. Maybe they try to wait for the worst possible moment for the Ukrainian and the European populations (around late December-early January).
On the military scale, Ukrainian defenses and the general state of their army will improve as time goes by. The Western help will reach its lowest ebb soon, but it will gradually increase as soon as the deliveries of the new equipment start. It is also clear that Russia has an immense - but not endless - stock of ammunition and other equipment, but these can not go down to zero either. And the capacity to replace these stocks with modern technology is questionable given the state of the economy.
Because of this I think the Russians have to act in the near future. Their objective would be something like taking Kharkov or penetrating into the strategic depths of the Ukrainian defense. The strike will probably encompass multiple attacks on critical infrastructure (power systems, heating systems, water services, etc.) and most likely coincede with a political turmoil in Europe, at a very cold winter period to maximize the effect. I think they will refrain from amphibious attacks like the one at Gostomel, and they will build more on sheer, brute force than on surprise and shock.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."
