The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

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Wilhelm_Klave
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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#31

Post by Wilhelm_Klave » 13 Nov 2010, 16:06

I know that the Finnish army was ready to fight against the USSR if needed, I had no doubts about that.

My question is this: If a war broke out in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would the USSR be able to claim an "attack by Germany and its allies" (IE: NATO, especially Norway) and thus request passage through Finnish soil to "repel the attack", and if yes, would the Finnish goverment be willing to initiate war with the USSR in order to stop the Soviet forces moving through Finnish Lapland into Norway.

Like I said: Global Warsaw Pact plans have not been revealed.
However, I have a pretty intimate knowledge of Warsaw Pact doctrine and Division-level strategy, as well as certain important info about planned Polish and Soviet operations in surrounding areas, like the Baltic.

With this info, I have some sound premises about the Soviet plan against Norway to assume the following:

1) The USSR would see the capture of airfields and naval bases in Norway as critical for the naval war in the north Atlantic.
2) The USSR would launch a large airborne operation against northern Norway, possibly aimed at Narvik, combined with some sort of brigade-sized amphibious operation of the Northern Fleet, possibly aimed at Tromso. These forces would be supported by various types of special and unconventional forces.
3) Supporting the attacking airmobile and amphibious forces with armored and motorized formations would have been seen as crititally important in the face of expected NATO reinforcements of Norway. The single road leading from Pechenga into Norway would have been deemed as insufficient and to easy to block with airstrikes to be the sole route into Norway.
4) Thus after a few days, (enough to mobilize most of the first-echelon Leningrad MD motorized units), the USSR would request passage through Finnish Lapland. The designated unit would most likely the 63rd Motorized Rifle Division, which would probably be given an order to advance along the line Kandalaksha-Sodankyia-Muonio-Skibotn, with the ultimate goal of linking up with the airborne desant at Narvik. A second Motorized Rifle Division would probably move along the Murmansk-Inari-Karasjok-Alta line. Possibly a third Motorized Rifle Division would follow in the next few days.

This is of course all speculative, but given the objectives, the forces available and the the potential NATO forces in the area, I believe that every warsaw Pact commander would come up with something similar.

All in all: The USSR would probably do its best to avoid war with Finland and espcially Sweden. However, for the USSR's attack on Norway a free passage through Finnish Lappland was key.

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Hanski
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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#32

Post by Hanski » 13 Nov 2010, 18:05

Wilhelm_Klave wrote:My question is this: If a war broke out in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would the USSR be able to claim an "attack by Germany and its allies" (IE: NATO, especially Norway) and thus request passage through Finnish soil to "repel the attack", and if yes, would the Finnish goverment be willing to initiate war with the USSR in order to stop the Soviet forces moving through Finnish Lapland into Norway.
Like we both agree, this is all highly speculative.

In applying the FCMA Treaty, there was a mechanism in it for mutual consultations for the event of an "attack by Germany and its allies" or a perceived threat of such an attack (which indeed was used in the "note crisis" of 1961; please Google for "The Diplomatic Note Crisis between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1961: A Reflection of the Cold War or a Soviet Attempt to Meddle in a Sovereign Nation’s Affairs?").

To justify "repelling the attack", if we look it at from a purely legalistic point of view, it would then have required mutual agreement between the negotiators of Finland and the USSR that such an attack against Finland or against the USSR via Finnish territory had really happened, or that it was about to happen. Evidence would have been first called for on the existence of the threat.

My best guess is that the Finnish side would have refused to believe in such a threat unless real, and delayed any Soviet deployment in Finland as long as possible. Certainly the details of the Soviet units involved would have been discussed, and when it became clear that they are offensive troops intended to occupy Norway or Sweden, Finns would have denied their access, as it would have otherwise constituted a violation of Finnish neutrality.

But it becomes an entirely different matter if international law is abandoned, and there is instead outright pressure or even blackmail, i.e., raw power and the law of the jungle.

That would have meant throwing overboard the whole FCMA Treaty, as the Treaty in itself had no intent of using Finland as a springboard for a Soviet offensive against Western powers. So in that case, if Soviet troops had not been invited to Finland as mutually agreed, but intruded our territory against the standpoint of the Finnish government, it would then have constituted a Soviet attack against Finland. And yes, the neutral and sovereign Finland would then have had no choice but to initiate war with the USSR in order to stop those Soviet forces moving through Finnish Lapland into Norway -- just like what should be done today if troops of the Russian Federation attempted the same.

A free passage through Finnish Lapland would have been out of the question. But again, if national survival is at stake, legal views may need to be abandoned in favour of political and military judgment, and if Cold War turns hot, military strikes are carried out, and spearheads are on the move, it may require a different appraisal of the situation as a whole. A small nation like Finland with limited resources cannot dictate the rules if great powers end up in conflict, but a strategy of survival must take the highest priority. A counter-argument to what I wrote above would be "let's just evacuate all of Lapland and let the fighting Big Boys settle it all out there between themselves".

The strategic importance of Lapland was paid attention to during the 1960's and 70's, resulting in significant increase of the military presence in Northern Finland. A garrison was set up in Sodankylä, and an Air Command with its fighter aircraft plus AA-artillery were transferred to Rovaniemi from Central Finland.


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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#33

Post by Wilhelm_Klave » 13 Nov 2010, 19:39

A free passage through Finnish Lapland would have been out of the question. But again, if national survival is at stake, legal views may need to be abandoned in favour of political and military judgment, and if Cold War turns hot, military strikes are carried out, and spearheads are on the move, it may require a different appraisal of the situation as a whole. A small nation like Finland with limited resources cannot dictate the rules if great powers end up in conflict, but a strategy of survival must take the highest priority. A counter-argument to what I wrote above would be "let's just evacuate all of Lapland and let the fighting Big Boys settle it all out there between themselves".
That was pretty much my original estimate of Finnish options. Seems they weren't all that unrealistic in the sense that at least other more Finland-savyy people come to similar conclusion.

On a more military-spectrum, I think an important aspect of the "To fight the soviets or not?" question would be wether the global NATO-Soviet war was purely conventional up to that point, or if the tactical nuclear weapons were used. If tactical nuclear weapons were being used, then it meant that Finland would be given the short end of the stick.

Warsaw pact tactical nuclear doctrine, especially its 60s-70s version, allowed a wide use of tactical nuclear weapons against ennemy supply and equipment depots, mobilization centers and communication centers, especially ones outside the main axis of the soviet land foces advance. Unfortunately given Finnish mobilization doctrine, said targets were pretty much identical with Finland's major population centers.

Its again speculation, but given the intel USSR had on the Finnish army acilities, locations etc, this would have meant a quick nuclear atack against Finnish cities in order to disrupt the mobilization and communication of the Finnish army.
If I were a 1970s Soviet front commander, I'd probably order at least 11 strikes - at Turku, Oulu, Vaasa, Lahti, Kouvola, Tampere, Jyväskylä the Kuoppio AFB, Rovaniemi AFB and at least 2 strikes in the Helsinki metropolitan area. Keep in mind that this includes my post-cold war knowledge of the Finnish army locations, a real life Soviet commander might have ordered more strikes at other urban centers due to fog of war. I'm not certain about the loss of life in such a scenario, but a rough estimate is around some 2.5 milion casualities. I am pretty certain the soviet ultimatum would at least hint at the nuclear option, which would put great pressure on the finnish goverment.

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Hanski
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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#34

Post by Hanski » 13 Nov 2010, 21:53

I agree, the use of nuclear weapons would have made a big difference, and turned everything into a nightmare scenario for Finland. Despite of Finland having a fairly large amount of hardened shelters for the civilian population and well-organised civil defence, the losses and destruction would have been devastating. And the asymmetry is more than obvious, in conventional defence against nuclear attacks.

I think scenarios like these would have belonged into the category of WW III Harmageddon, with little hope for anyone of surviving into a life worth living. I don't really know how far the military planning went into this in Finland during the Cold War, or was it simply regarded as impossible, unrealistic, and not worthwhile to prepare for after a certain stage.

If the Finnish Army would have had time to mobilise, the bulk of the troops would perhaps have been dispersed in the forests rather than concentrated in cities. But of course, destruction of the infrastructure in cities would have caused a catastrophe for the functioning of the society as a whole. The Finnish military lead obviously had their own lists of possible Finnish targets of nuclear attacks. The Soviet doctrine was also familiar to the Finnish military lead, and some high-ranking Finnish officers had even received training at the Frunze Military Academy.
I am pretty certain the soviet ultimatum would at least hint at the nuclear option, which would put great pressure on the finnish goverment.
That would have put the Finnish government into the position of a victim of armed robbery: "will you hand over all your money to me, or do I need to kill you first?". But again, in a scenario like this, having or not having the FCMA Treaty would then have made no difference. Such ultimatums would have been explicitly against both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, and there would have been the law of the jungle instead.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#35

Post by Wilhelm_Klave » 13 Nov 2010, 23:11

Hanski wrote:I think scenarios like these would have belonged into the category of WW III Harmageddon, with little hope for anyone of surviving into a life worth living. I don't really know how far the military planning went into this in Finland during the Cold War, or was it simply regarded as impossible, unrealistic, and not worthwhile to prepare for after a certain stage.
My assumption of some 12 nuclear strikes at Finnland is not just pure speculation on my part, its strictly based on my knowledge of nuclear strikes planned on Dennmark and West Germany in a similar scenario created by the Polish Army cheifs of staff in the 1960s. The 1960s and 1970s Warsaw Pact doctrine was pretty heavy with mass use of tactical nukes.

From the military exercise plans of the Polish army from the 1960s that have been made public, I know that the polish forces alone planned at least two nuclear missile strikes against Dennmark (at Esbjerg and Roskilde) and "6-15 airforce nuclear strikes" to "knock Dennmark out of the war as fast as possible)". Other nuclear strikes in support of the "Polish Front" were to have been aimed at "Hamburg, Hannover, Bremenhaven, Brunswick and Kiel" because "(...)the destruction of these cities will probably cause a disintegration of political and economical life (...) and cause widespread panic in the areas of the strikes". Overall some 100 polish and soviet nuclear strikes were to have been launched at targest in West Germany alone.

This is taking into account that these were on the main axis of the warsaw pact advance. Finnland (except Lappland) was not on the axis of advance, so I guess the soviet leadership would be even more willing to use mass tactical nuclear strikes at Finnish targets than they were to launch at Danish ones. I assume that in case of unwillingness of Finland to let the soviet forces pass, just such a "quickly knock them out of the war" nightmare plan would have indeed have been adopted, at least in the 1960s.

The mass use of tactical nukes was not fully abandonned before the 1980s, but even then the tactical nuke threat remained.
Hanski wrote:That would have put the Finnish government into the position of a victim of armed robbery: "will you hand over all your money to me, or do I need to kill you first?". But again, in a scenario like this, having or not having the FCMA Treaty would then have made no difference. Such ultimatums would have been explicitly against both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, and there would have been the law of the jungle instead.
Of course I don't know the details of Soviet warplans, but I am almost sure that the move of Soviet mechanized columns through northern Lappland was a "must" in any Soviet plan that included an attack on Norway. I'm not sure if the USSR would have risked a war with Sweden beause of this, but I have a pretty strong feeling they would risk a war with Finnland and not back out from "sheer force" arguments to obtain passage through Lappland.

Finland, just like Poland, would sadly be a victim of its own geographical position here. The Finns, unlike Sweden for example, could have easily agreed to soviet demands and not lose face, as they could simply have "played the game" and indeed pretend that there is an active danger from "Germany and its allies" .I'm just wondering if the Finnish goverment would go for that, or rather risk war.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#36

Post by Hanski » 14 Nov 2010, 10:27

Wilhelm_Klave wrote:From the military exercise plans of the Polish army from the 1960s that have been made public, I know that the polish forces alone planned at least two nuclear missile strikes against Dennmark (at Esbjerg and Roskilde) and "6-15 airforce nuclear strikes" to "knock Dennmark out of the war as fast as possible)". Other nuclear strikes in support of the "Polish Front" were to have been aimed at "Hamburg, Hannover, Bremenhaven, Brunswick and Kiel" because "(...)the destruction of these cities will probably cause a disintegration of political and economical life (...) and cause widespread panic in the areas of the strikes". Overall some 100 polish and soviet nuclear strikes were to have been launched at targest in West Germany alone.
This is interesting -- I never knew about Poland having tactical nukes, but I thought all the nuclear arsenal of the Warsaw Pact was under Soviet command. How many were there, and were they all on missiles, or some to be launched from aircraft?

Regarding the geopolitical location of Finland, our territory was (and still is) significant as a buffer zone to the west from the globally strategic nuclear bases of the Kola Peninsula and the metropol and centre for military industry, Leningrad. The importance of these assets to the USSR (and Russia) has always been understood in Finland.

In the early 1980's, after Ronald Reagan became President of the U.S., I remember the mental atmosphere of uncertainty regarding possible nuclear war in Europe. A highly appreciated scientist in Finland, professor Jorma K. Miettinen, stated in public something like "it is likely that there will be a nuclear war, but we don't know just how it will turn out".

To my understanding, in the mutual division of labor among the Warsaw Pact troops, Poland had the role of specialising in amphibious landing operations on the coasts of the Baltic Sea. Have you any information of possible plans of Polish landing forces being used for taking bridgeheads in Southern Finland?
Of course I don't know the details of Soviet warplans, but I am almost sure that the move of Soviet mechanized columns through northern Lappland was a "must" in any Soviet plan that included an attack on Norway. I'm not sure if the USSR would have risked a war with Sweden beause of this, but I have a pretty strong feeling they would risk a war with Finnland and not back out from "sheer force" arguments to obtain passage through Lappland.

Finland, just like Poland, would sadly be a victim of its own geographical position here. The Finns, unlike Sweden for example, could have easily agreed to soviet demands and not lose face, as they could simply have "played the game" and indeed pretend that there is an active danger from "Germany and its allies". I'm just wondering if the Finnish goverment would go for that, or rather risk war.
Taking of Northern Norway would have made a lot of sense militarily to the Soviets. The Finnish decision makers realised the importance of Lapland, and instead of backing off and planning to evacuate Lapland to leave it as an open battleground for the great powers to settle their accounts on, Finns wanted to remain as "masters in their house", and filled the previous military vacuum with a reasonable military presence committed to defending the territory, and not just border guards. Of course, Lapland is a huge area with long distances, compared for example with Central Europe. To the north from Rovaniemi, there is very little other industry than tourism and reindeer business (plus some mining in recent years), so economically it is not vital for Finland, despite its importance in military security.

If it had boiled down to "sheer force" confrontation and ultimatums, I think the Finnish government would have called it just that, without playing games or pretending it had anything to do with those circumstances that that the FCMA Treaty of 1948 was designed to handle -- of course, depending on who ultimately made the decisions. President Urho Kekkonen (in office 1956 -1982) was quite fragile during the last years of his term, his successor Mauno Koivisto (in office 1982 –1994) was generally a cautious man avoiding risk-taking.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#37

Post by Wilhelm_Klave » 15 Nov 2010, 14:46

Hanski wrote:This is interesting -- I never knew about Poland having tactical nukes, but I thought all the nuclear arsenal of the Warsaw Pact was under Soviet command. How many were there, and were they all on missiles, or some to be launched from aircraft?
The soviets were to distribute tactical nukes to polish frontline divisions, as well as at least one polish bomber squadron. In 1967, due to changed in combat technology and tactics, it was demeed that transporting the nukes from the USSR to Poland in wartime would be too risky. Thus the defence ministers of the USSR and Pland signed a secret treaty in 1967, one of its results was that from that point on, the nuclear warheads were stored in Poland, ready to be used mere hours after the outbreak of the war.

The amount of nukes to be used probably changed with time. One document from the early 80s suggests that 100 missile launched tactical nuclear units (I suspect that these were standard R-300 Elbrus) and 31 aircraft bombs.
Hanski wrote:To my understanding, in the mutual division of labor among the Warsaw Pact troops, Poland had the role of specialising in amphibious landing operations on the coasts of the Baltic Sea. Have you any information of possible plans of Polish landing forces being used for taking bridgeheads in Southern Finland?
I wouldn't call it specialization, as most of the Polish units were standard Warsaw Pact Tank and Motorized divisions to be used on the north german plain.

However, Poland indeed had one airborne division - the 6th Pomeranian "Red Berets" and one amphibious-marine division (an equivalent of two strenghtened soviet naval brigades) - 7th Lusatian "Blue Berets" landing division.
Their mian wartime objective would be to land in Dennmark and togeatehr with soviet units take Copenhagen and knock Dennmark out of the war withing the first days of the conflict. Both of these units were considered elite by NATO and Warsaw Pact alike.
I seriously doubt that these would have been used in Finland however - first because of politicla reasons (IE: Finland being considered a soviet influence zone), the other being a purely military one - "Why use special marine and airborne divisions in a job taht can be effectively done with Motor Rifle Divisions?". Also its worth to keep in mind taht the 6th Airborne division was trained exstensively in mountain warfare. The information regarding its use outside Dennmark remain top secret and have not been made public, but I have very strong notions that if Dennmark would fall, the "2nd stop" of the 6th Airborne was to be Norway or maybe even Iceland. Not Finland.

That does not mean that the polish high command had not prepared plans for just such a "Finnish" option, but even if they did oen should not treat such plans too seriously. The polish command was working very actively and preparing warplans for almost any occasion, even for very unlikely scenarios. I heard that there were "just in case" plans for a contingeny deployment of units to Africa in case of a limited conflict there (most likely South Africa-Angola). This was of course pretty much a fantasy scenario, as Cuban or even East German units would have been deployed rather than Polish ones. I'm sure that the "africa" plan was treated by the planists as more of an exercise in military plannig rather than a plan for a realistic and probable event. If plans of operations against Finland existed, than they were probably also more of an "exercisse" rather than a probable wartime plan.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#38

Post by Mark V » 16 Nov 2010, 01:17

Wilhelm_Klave wrote: 4) Thus after a few days, (enough to mobilize most of the first-echelon Leningrad MD motorized units), the USSR would request passage through Finnish Lapland. The designated unit would most likely the 63rd Motorized Rifle Division, which would probably be given an order to advance along the line Kandalaksha-Sodankyia-Muonio-Skibotn, with the ultimate goal of linking up with the airborne desant at Narvik. A second Motorized Rifle Division would probably move along the Murmansk-Inari-Karasjok-Alta line. Possibly a third Motorized Rifle Division would follow in the next few days.
Not forgetting the other side.

USN would not just had looked Soviet divisions moving towards Norwegian coast, and by that threatening Britain and breaching GIUK gap. Preventing Soviet fleets freedom of manouvre, keeping them bottled behind GIUK gap was critical to NATO strategy.

The carrier battle groups were in European waters exactly for that, to keep Soviets away from Narvik, etc. If Soviets are in Finnish soil, that soil is free target.

One scenario of conventional war turning nuclear is Soviet succeeding infiltrating south in Norwegian coast, towards Britain. If SOSUS barrier is threatened to be breached, NATO would respond, as they would never allow Soviet SSNs and SSBNs to go freely to Atlantic and beyond. There was no room for flexibility in defence in that area, either you have intact SOSUS and know who/where moves in North Atlantic, or you don't.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#39

Post by Wilhelm_Klave » 16 Nov 2010, 16:47

Mark V wrote: USN would not just had looked Soviet divisions moving towards Norwegian coast, and by that threatening Britain and breaching GIUK gap. Preventing Soviet fleets freedom of manouvre, keeping them bottled behind GIUK gap was critical to NATO strategy.

The carrier battle groups were in European waters exactly for that, to keep Soviets away from Narvik, etc. If Soviets are in Finnish soil, that soil is free target.
I am pretty aware of that, but I'm also aware that choosing just one Kirkenes-Narvik coastal road would make it a much easier task for the NATO airforce. The coastal road was relatively easy to block with a few sucessfull airstrikes. It was precisely the NATO air threat and supply reasons taht would have pushed the warsaw pact commanders to move through Finland rather than limit themselves to the Kirkenes road.

Also, while I am in no way a modern naval warfare specialist, I assume that in Norway (at least in the first few weeks) it would have been the NATO land-based airforce that would have been the main threat. If the majority of the USN would not be tied down with escorting POMCUS and supply convoys to Europe or fighting soviet subs in the Atlantic, they would still have to face the danger of Soviet Kola peninsula bases and Soviet long range aircraft. Again, I'm no expert but IMHO the Norway sea would be at least a heavily contested zone in the first few weeks of the campaign, rather than a "free-for-all" playing field for the USN or the Soviet Navy.
Mark V wrote:One scenario of conventional war turning nuclear is Soviet succeeding infiltrating south in Norwegian coast, towards Britain. If SOSUS barrier is threatened to be breached, NATO would respond, as they would never allow Soviet SSNs and SSBNs to go freely to Atlantic and beyond. There was no room for flexibility in defence in that area, either you have intact SOSUS and know who/where moves in North Atlantic, or you don't.
As for SOSUS - again, I'm not much of a navy expert, but given the 1980s oob for both sides, I assume that the SOSUS stations at Andenes and especially Jan Mayen would have been destroyed by soviet airborne, spetsnaz and missle forces in the very first hours of the war. NATO just never had enough to protect these bases in a "soviet-strike-first" scenario.
Unless there was some top-secret marine base on Jan Mayen that was never unclassified, then the only ones to defend it were the LORAN personnel. Even a platoon-sized detachment would have been a threat to it, not to mention a possible company, or battalion size spetsnaz unit.

While I'm pretty certain that Iceland was too far for the soviets to take (and thn hold) in the first hours of the war, Andenes and especially Jan Mayen would have been reasonable targets.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#40

Post by Mark V » 16 Nov 2010, 22:21

Wilhelm_Klave wrote:IMHO the Norway sea would be at least a heavily contested zone in the first few weeks of the campaign, rather than a "free-for-all" playing field for the USN or the Soviet Navy.
Yep,

One of the hottest places in world during global conflict for sure.

About carrier battlegroups. In early stages of conflict NATO would had had quite decent situational awareness about what Soviet assets are at sea on their turf, and plenty of assets (mainly SSNs) to dispose them of. The problem indeed was the attack wave that comes after that, maybe supported by breach in sensor coverage.

Other surface combatants would had been deeply tied to escort duties, but CVNs and their escorts would not be shepherding container ships across Atlantic. Their main job was up there North and offensive by its nature.

The reason why Soviets built strong naval Backfire bomber force was atleast as much about defence against USN carriers than offensive against Atlantic trade. Same goes with successive classes of cruise missile subs.

Both sides did choose different approach, both from their historical background and strenghts, and both sides built from that decades after decades, spending enormous sums of money, developing generations after generations of specialized weapons - for that one slugfest. USN carriers versus all the defending assets of Northern Fleet would had been quite a match. The relative merits have been discussed till nauseum but we will never know for sure, thankfully.


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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#41

Post by Mika68* » 01 Feb 2011, 21:55

Wilhelm_Klave wrote:I know that the Finnish army was ready to fight against the USSR if needed, I had no doubts about that.
That's not true, on the end of the Cold war Finnish army was side of Soviets and ready fight against Swedes.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#42

Post by Baltasar » 01 Feb 2011, 22:11

Mika68* wrote:
Wilhelm_Klave wrote:I know that the Finnish army was ready to fight against the USSR if needed, I had no doubts about that.
That's not true, on the end of the Cold war Finnish army was side of Soviets and ready fight against Swedes.
This seems odd as Finland has a long history of hostile relations with Russia. Finland was also not considered to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Any sources to back up that claim?

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#43

Post by Mika68* » 01 Feb 2011, 22:16

Baltasar wrote:
Mika68* wrote:
Wilhelm_Klave wrote:I know that the Finnish army was ready to fight against the USSR if needed, I had no doubts about that.
That's not true, on the end of the Cold war Finnish army was side of Soviets and ready fight against Swedes.
This seems odd as Finland has a long history of hostile relations with Russia. Finland was also not considered to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Any sources to back up that claim?
Finland had YYA-tract with Soviets since 1948 to 1991.

I was in Finnish army 1988. In "war game" we Finnish were blues and our enemys were yellows ( as Swedes). We exercised near of Swedish border in Kittilä Finnish Lapland. And pair of Soviet generals checked our military exercices.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#44

Post by Baltasar » 01 Feb 2011, 22:21

I did my military service in 1999 and we still had maneuvers versus Denmark. Maneuvers are just that.

I also meant sources as in writing. I did not find something helpful on google regarding YYA tract.

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Re: The Finnish-Soviet relations during the Cold War

#45

Post by Mika68* » 01 Feb 2011, 22:24

Friendship, co-operation and helpful tract

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