she must have equal access to markets--what the capitalist powers claim are free for the competition. No mercantilism here; if you wanted to sell goods in Germany you had to buy German goods. I wish I could find the 1919 propaganda poster showing the wartime Hun who "will want to sell you his German goods after the war."
Let's not confuse propaganda with policy shall we? Germany was hardly the only country affected by tariff walls during the period.
He saw that the Achilles heel of the Versailles treaty was its self-determination of peoples (except Germans). The real reason for promoting all these petit-nationalisms was to encircle Germany and dissolve other empires, of course. By insisting that self-determination apply to GERMAN ethnicities he was able to dismantle that encirclement at Munich--and it would have worked in the Danzig corridor as well if he had not overstepped in asserting German hegemony against the rump Czech state afterward--which still doesn't mean that the self-determination of Danzigers and other oppressed German minorities was not a legitimate grievance. But Hitler had cashed in moral capital, and in diplomacy you must have a long standing relationship of trust or you will always need shocktroops standing by. Against smooth and snake-oily Anglo-Saxon diplomats Hitler preferred real soldiers. But that's not my problem
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This unfortunately requires a detour into more general issues, so please bear with me. there is something in your description here, but it is a bit more complicated than that. I agree that Germany was not treated according to the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. In saying that the real object of this principle was the encirclement of Germany you are however confusing different aspects of the treaty and the concerns behind it. Wilson, as you know, wanted to found the peace on a new world order that represented a radical break with the power politics of the past - national boundaries set according to the principle of self-determination, outlawing war, regulating international disputes through the League of Nations. This was entirely alien to the European states, who, sensibly, lacked faith in the power of high-minded idealism to curb national ambitions. France in particular had a completely opposite approach - she wanted a punitive peace, to weaken Germany so much as to remove any future threat, preferably through breaking up the German state. Failing that, she wanted solid military commitments frtom the US and Britain to defend France in any future war with Germany. This was not forthcoming. Britains position was more ambivalent. She had played up to Wilsons ideas to secure american participation, but lacked any real faith in them. Her need for a punitive peace was less than that of France, her fear of TOO much French influence in Europe actually real and her disinterest in central and eastern Europe profound. Wilson held te strongest sway at the conference. Perhaps inevitably, the result was a compromise between irreconcilable approaches that satisifed no-one, Germany included, and secured nothing. Wilson got the League of Nations and his principles in principle, and frustrated French ambitions to break up Germany. He did regard the settlement as having weaknesses, among them the issues of large German minorities outside Germany and the Autrian issue, but hoped that the League, once in function, would rectify these. The British got the demise of the German fleet. The French got a punitive peace temporarily weakening Germany enough to remove any threat. The League, of course, without the three strongest states in the world, did not prove able to either fulfil its function or rectify the weaknesses of Versailles, and the treaty was at the same time not punitive enough for France to hold the German threat down, while certainly punitive enough to enrage Germany. Thus, the principle of self-determination as expounded by Wilson was no PR ploy, the real object of which was to encircle Germany. Wilson seems to have been a real and genuine idealist, which I do not intend as words of praise. However, the other three major allies lacked any faith in it, which brought about a compromise result with very much such a result.
This left France in the uncomfortable and ultimately untenable position of trying to uphold this European order, which she indeed did by trying to encircle Germany. Britain was anything but a wholehearted partner in this venture - British policy came to be marked by increasing doubts about the tenability and legitimacy of the Versailles order, as well as considerable misgivings about the strength of the French position in Europe, which was also reflected in her policy vis-a-vis Germany. Within 5 years, with the Munich agreement, Hitler had shattered that order and reestablished Germany as the strongest state in Europe.
What made this possible was a considerable degree of sympathy for the German position. And it is easy to see why. Had I been, say, a top civil servant in the German MFA in the interwar years, I would have wholeheartedly supported the reinclusion of the Saarland, demilitarisation of the Rhineland, reintroduction of conscription, the discontinuance of reparations and a general ambition to re-establish Germany as a military power of a strength commensurate with her potential. The absorption of Austria, Danzig and the Sudetenland into the Reich, and the elimination of the Polish corridor, I would have considered just and worthwhile goals. All of these were rational political goals of any German state leadership, party politics aside. And if Hitler had aimed at nothing more than that, WWII could reasonably have been interpreted as a tragic mistake, much along the same lines as WWI. However, he did. Which brings me to:
As I've tried to explain on another thread, it is not merely the *reversal* of Versailles, or 1914 borders or whatnot, but the reversal of what Versailles entails. And that is a means to encircle Germany diplomatically and contain Germany economically and to prevent her from reclaiming superpower status.
Firstly, there was no superpower status to reclaim - prewar Germany had not had that position. Hitler, however, wanted to create a superpower - but this was something new. You have described it yourself - territorial expansion and hegemony in Europe, control of Eastern Europe up to the Ural mountains. This was a radical departure from even the wildest ambitions of Imperial Germany. These were political goals which constituted a real threat to every other nation in Europe. This is not a policy that can be reasonably described as wanting to reverse what anything entails, because it aimed far beyond what Germany had ever possessed, or even sought. A Europe at Germanys mercy (of which there wouldn't be much). And this is what you need to acknowledge - there is nothing modest in such aims, and it can neither be explained nor justified with reference to the Versailles order even in the widest sense. While Bismarcks Germany tacitly acknowledged, like all other European states since Napoleon, that a European order could only be based on a continually maintained equilibrium, Hitler sought to replace any European order with German hegemony. A more far-reaching, radical, risky or aggressive policy than that is hard to conceive of. Or one less likely to provide a workable solution to Germany's security issues in a wide sense. And certainly not one into which he was forced.
cheers
. You really should try Sombarts "Händler und Helden" as well, it is a most fascinating treatise, although of course primarily as a testament to the thinking in Germany at the time (which was during WW I). Sombart, BTW, was an economist. 
