Biggest battles in Africa

Discussions on other historical eras.
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Musashi
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#16

Post by Musashi » 02 Jul 2004, 00:19

Welcome the first member from Angola :) I suppose you will provide us interesting informations :)

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The rivals in Angola

#17

Post by Soldier » 02 Jul 2004, 00:25

On the amounts of belligerents in the bell of 1975-76, some data.

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Of the enemy side men, approximate combatian: 
FLEC -5,000 
FNLA -20,000 
UNITA -22,000 (this segun Savimbi, because in the West they calculated 6.000 to him) 
Zaire -11,000 (a regiment, several battalions and companias in Cabinda and north-this of Angola) 
Sudafrica -10,000 (with namibios, the South Africans say that troops of the SADF were single of 3.300) 

Across: FAPLA -25,000 MMCA (Cuba) - 1.000 at the beginning of November of 1975, 10.000 at the beginning of January of 1976, 36.000 in April-May of 1976. 

This he is maximo, soon the number is reduced. Sovieticos advisers - they begin to arrive in January of 1976, reach several hundreds this anus. 

The amount of Portuguese, veterans of anuses and without work from the exit of Portugal of Angola in 1975, was of several thousands, mixed in almost all the contingents. For example, one of the enemy columns that advance on Caxito the 6 of November of 1975, tapeworm 800 men FNLA, reinforced by one compania of 130 Portuguese targets to the control of Colonel Gilberto Holy and I castrate and the greater Cardoso (ex- member of the politica policia REQUESTS of Salazar), and 3 zairienses battalions to the control of a colonel of Zaire. Or the force "Zulu" South African who the 4 of November advances on Benguela, counted on 150 South African targets with her AML, ademas of namibios, and a battalion FNLA (with 450 angolanos and 80 Portuguese). There are sources that say, that even in 32° Battalion "Buffalo" 1.800 Portuguese in this bell habian. 


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sorry

#18

Post by Soldier » 02 Jul 2004, 00:28

I am not from Angola but I have a lot of information about this country and its history.

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#19

Post by Andy H » 02 Jul 2004, 03:28

Anyone know the numbers involved in the Algerian war of Independence?

Andy H

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#20

Post by Karwats » 02 Jul 2004, 09:21

Hello Soldier and welcome
But the sudafricans say:They never were defeated in battle and they lost the war,because the americans left them alone against the cubans,and they were only 3.000 and the cubans more than 36.000.
The South Africans withdrew their 2 Combat groups Foxbat & Zulu because American "political" support had been withdrawn for the operation.Not because of military reasons.

In any case the main objective of the operation was not to conquer Angola. If that was the case I think we would have commited more troops than 1 Inf Bn and a reinforced Armoured car contingent. The Objectives were to keep the MPLA from occupying the entire country aand enable UNITA to continue as a viable ressitance in the south-east of the country.

"I never lost a battle,but I've never won a F***N war"- This is quote from Colonel Jan Breytenbach ,Commander (commandante) of 32 Bn "Os Terivos".
I have a doubt: In the sudafrican contingent from 1975 to 1976.Were there namibians troops friens of the sudafricans?
The South West African Troops were fighting with us for the whole war, but in this case Operation Savanna there were not SWA troops with our forces.
36 armored Panhard AML-90, 40 armored Panhard AML-60, 100 light tanks M-41 Walker Bulldog and AMX-13, more than 100 transports Panhard M-3, Unimog trucks and jeeps with antitank tubes S/R of 106 mm and systems Entac, systems artillerymen of 57 mm and 140 mm, as well as helicopters Alouette III.
Hmmmmm, well lets just clear up some things.
The AML 90's sounds about right -we call them Eland. 2 Squadrons of 16 so 32. AML 60- is too much only 8.
100 M 41/AMX 13 8O No, we never had M 41 or AMX 13 in SADF.
in any case the only time we ever had tanks on the Battlefield was in 1987/88 at Cuito Cuanavale and it was only 1 Squadron. In this fight our tanks destroyed 68 T55,T62 so if we had 100 tanks I think we would have done something else than withdraw :D
100 Panhard M3 - No we never had this, trucks would have been British Bedford type but not 100-maybe 40.
Unimogs and Jeeps (Landrovers) with 106 yes correct but no Entac.
We never had Entac,much later we had Milan but it is not very effective in thick bush.
57mm ?? and 140mm Artillery. 140mm is Right this was British 5.5 or we say G2. 57mm is not one of our calibers, maybe mistake for 25 Pounder which is 88mm.
first four South African soldiers captured themselves, his names, in case there are doubts are: the end Hannes Gernardus Terblanche, soldiers Robert Wilson, Graham Danney and Robert Wiehahn.
This is wrong. In the whole war 2 soldiers from South Africa were captured. Sapper van der Mescht and Maj Du Toit. It is possible these 4 men were KIA - I will look it up but for sure not POW.
demolished two South African helicopters with 7 crew on board and eliminated other 7 South African soldiers with fire of snipers with the loss of a single soldier.
What kind of evidence exists that the Cubans have shot down two South African helicopters on this day (and, what should have been the actual date of these kills)?
There is no evidence for this.
I know of two times when helicopters were shot down with all crew.
1 Puma in 1983 with RPG and 1 in Mozambique (sorry i forget the year) but I think 1978-79. There is a wesite that shows all SAAF losses, just have to find it again.

You must know if all the Cuban aircraft victories are counted, they have shot down the entire South African airforce twice. :D

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Some acig.org articles...

#21

Post by Zygmunt » 02 Jul 2004, 11:58

Regarding the SAAF helicopters in Angola,

http://www.acig.org has an article that may be of interest:

"Angola: Claims & Reality about SAAF Losses".

Right in the middle of that article (just above the paragraph entitled "How many SAAF Mirages were actually lost?") there is some infomation about SAAF Puma losses.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, for those of you who remember that (on page one of this thread) I suggested the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict as perhaps involving some of the biggest battles in Africa, http://www.acig.org has this article:

"II Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998 - 2000"

Also you can check out the "kill" claims from 1999-2000 on their table of "Different African Air-to-Air Victories".

Ethiopian Su-27s in combat with Eritrean MiG-29s? Sounds pretty heavy to me...

Zygmunt

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Angola

#22

Post by Soldier » 02 Jul 2004, 22:17

Karwats said:

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In any case the main objective of the operation was not to conquer Angola. If that was the case I think we would have commited more troops than 1 Inf Bn and a reinforced Armoured car contingent. The Objectives were to keep the MPLA from occupying the entire country aand enable UNITA to continue as a viable ressitance in the south-east of the country
I dont think so,when southafrica invaded Angola in 1975,they wanted destroyed the MPLA,but the cubans stopped them in Ebo and destroyed the bridges along the Queve river and then the sudafrican troops were stopped.You said that the sudafrican left Angola only for external pression.
But this is not true.The sudafrican left Angola.

1.They dont have external support(EE.UU)
2.They were only 3.300 and 3.300 can not defeat 36.000 cubans

I dont understand that you said:The sudafricans left Angola no for military reasons,This is wrong.The principal factor was the american help,they did not have american help,but the sudafricans lost severals battles in Angola.
They were defeated by the cubans and the Mpla.They didnt lose many men:29 in comabt,but they were defeated.
BECAUSE they can not destroyed the Mpla.
For me there are militar reasons for the sudafrican defeat in Angola.

You said:

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The South West African Troops were fighting with us for the whole war, but in this case Operation Savanna there were not SWA troops with our forces. 
Check this article of Tom Cooper

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Specific troops from Daniel Chipenda's FNLA South Group were trained by Col. Jan Breytenbach, the founding commander of the 1 Reconnaissance Regiment SADF, and his team of Recce Commandos at the start of the Operation "Savannah", in August 1975 at Mpupa, Angola, 70 kilometres north of the South-West Africa border. These troops were taught a style of guerilla warfare and tactics modelled on those used by the US special forces to teach indigenous troops during the Vietnam War. Cast-of South African equipment and battlefield pick-ups of Communist block-weaponry, uniforms, and field gear were pressed into use by the group. The use of Communist equipment was not only expedient, but also enabled the unit to live off and blend in with the nemey as an effective guerilla force. The group was organized into two rifle companies, a machine gun platoon, a mortar platoon and an anti-tank section. 

The FNLA force was given the title Bravo Group, and was teamed with South West African Territorial Force 201 Battalion (recruited from Bushmen), or Alpha Group, to form Zulu Force. Zulu Force was put on the attack at the start of the Operation "Savannah". 

Ok, that's the first trace: obviously, there was a SWA Territorial Force 201 Battalion consisting of SWA Bushmen who fought with the SADF in Angola, in 1975. This unit was not, however, a part of the SADF. Namely, in the book "Modern African Wars 3: South-West Africa", (Osprey "Men-at-Arms" Series, No. 242), one can find the description and short history of the 201 Battalion on the p.18: 

Formed in 1974 with an infantry company of Portuguese and Bushman refugees from Angola; reformed with more Caprivi Bushmen in 1975. They took part in Operation Savannah as Combat Group Alpha. 
There were namibians troops with the sudafricans in 1975.

3.You said that Cuba never captured 4 sudafricans prisioners.
Chek this picture

Image
The soudafrican soldiers

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ANGOLA

#23

Post by Soldier » 02 Jul 2004, 22:19

A post about a southafrican soldier in Angola.Read this post ,he says that after the Ebo battle,they lost the initiative.

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This page is devoted to letters dealing with claims that have come out though the years. There are those who were heros, and wannabe heros, some of whom on questioning could only have been in Operation savannah in spirit. In addition uncertainty still exists in many areas with those concerned wanting maximum glory for their part in the action. 

Lt van Vuuren  pulled into our exact positions after the battle
when the snoopy air op reported tanks moving forward in order to allow us to
re-log with heats to go forward and meet them. When we returned bombed up,
we heard all these hero stories, but we saw no new bodies. I doubt very much if any chap will manage to shoot 11 Cubans nogal through a 10cm empty shell porthole at distances of 10m plus with a Star 9mm  with only two mags? He had
never proved himself as a shot when we did range work at
School of Armour.

You have to bear in mind that that specific war pre and after independence
in November 75, was a very fluid one.  We were "seconded" to Angola as
"foreigner" soldiers dressed in all sort of gear with all supposed RSA
signatures removed.  No one bought the phony guttural English accents
though. Three smallish combat groups lightly armed started the fracas, and
later as the show picked up speed and the fighting escalated by everyone
upping the art, both sides upped the weaponry.  So our 60mm mortars became
81mm, later added 25 pounders, and eventually 5,5 howitzers against much
heavier opposition.  No air support by both sides.  Pity that one though.
The early part of the war up to the middle high lands were pretty romantic
days as military excursions go.

My own recollections were that yes, initially the infantry did some good
work, but when we got bogged down in a more conventional battle, it was
predominantly an artillery/armour war with the better individuals acting in
support of the command structures i.e. OP's etc. 

OP"s played a strong role on both sides as the world was pretty broken terrain around there.  Their artillery were good and you had to watch out for any tell tale signs. If
you were sloppy or got within eye sight, boom boom boom!! and you had to
scoot in a hurry to set up base elsewhere. This happened very frequently and
in fact increased.  If we deployed our patrols, we noticed smoke fires
lighting up as far as we drove, they  would manage to track us and bring
artillery down on us.  We ended up disciplining these malpractices with our browning 7,62's, and it was only later in Rhodesia that I saw the other side of the coin and how povos are the true losers from both sides.

The Cubans never or hardly countered our armoured car troop movements with equal force.  Except once towards Amboive when Lt"bevel box bones" Beneke and his fresh unblooded troops (June 75 intake and half trained) had to patrol towards Amboive,  enroute crossed a rickety bridge and got mortared with 120's and one shell landed on top of the commander hatch of the Trp Sgt and effectively neutralized him.  They broke
and tried to "withdraw" too fast when Lt bevel box bones' car received a
direct hit from a heat type projectile just beneath the turret blowing a
wheel off, (we surmise it to have been a 110/106 recoilless type as we
couldn't find any surface marks indicating heavier guns?) , they then
abandoned all caution and simply rushed in total chaos with the result that
they damaged what had to pass as a bridge and only managed to get 2 cars
across.

They actually left the other 3 cars intact with all operational
radio settings and call signs in place, and all decamped at speed on top of
the last remaining two. We  (Papa troop) were at that stage miles way on
the right flank of the road on a similar probe, when we were recalled at
speed to try and recover the cars.  No such luck, as when we eventually
arrived 6 hours later, the Cubans have driven them off.  Along with the cars
captured earlier at Ebo they are today on display in Luanda.  Want to go and
have a look-see one day...  Obviously we all had to do some serious net
changing onto new frequencies as well as apply new shackle codes.

To my mind it was Foxbat that took the main battles.  (of course I would say that), though Papa troop worked in all three groups over time and were in Angola the longest of all individual units, 2 months in the south and then from Oct till Feb  nearly 5 months, close onto 7 months running; and we loved it.  I in fact was sad when we
eventually drove over the Rocades bridge and ended a wonderful adventure (all
expenses paid.)

I certainly never trusted the Unitas an inch. His irregulars were certainly better dressed, equipped and led than the rest, probably because of Col Jan's direct involvement and command.  Our recollection of any of these local irregulars were that they decamped at the sound of the first shots and could hardly be called military fighting forces, rather militia at best.  It was amazing how "our" ranks swelled on
ration days, hordes, but the moment you had to do some fighting work, you
had to make do with a rather shrunken force who preferred the "mole" approach, deep down under fire.  They became very boisterous after a battle, and liked to prance around with new found booty.

There were the  odd good ones, but their efforts went to the wind amongst the rabble.  The only leadership that got anything out of them were absolute ruthless dictators.  The comandantes and tenentes wore full uniforms and fancy boots, the sargentos lesser clothed.  I even saw some 13 year old sargentos.  The troops had bare feet and rags, with initially a motley array of weapons.  Anything from M1's, stens, G3's, mausers, and I even saw a MP 43!!!  Later they were re-equipped with G3's, but tended to
discard it for AKs under fire with little regard for ammo. 

The Unitas also varies between geographic areas, with the middle lot somehow more barbarous. I saw them slice meat from a live cow tied to a tree, apparently part of
their belief system.. it lived for a couple of days till they got to the
more vital parts and blood loss made it keel over. We could not stand the sound of that poor beast in agony, yet were told to leave them at it.

I still remember the more tranquil part of that time, with the smoke trailing lazily up into the sky early in the morning, with ourselves brewing tea and drying ourselves.  Breakfast? that was  only invented when we got back to the States.  Food was always in a bit of short supply.  We often had to trade food from mulattos and the odd surviving Portuguese in town, and the only currency was petrol.  We came across warehouses filed with valuable stock, but worthless in war or for use by povos. 

We had to rescue caged animals and sometimes shoot them to relieve them of
their misery. 

At Ela Ela we found an abandoned cheese factory and did it reek!!  From a fully equipped hospital we re-equipped ourselves with theatre tools as we never were issued knife and fork sets when we traveled forth into the Angolan yonder from Grootfontein.  In fact we had no personal gear and were only issued one pair of green fatigues per man.  With my no: 11's all they had were sail takkies and I had to do with a cut up pair of old unrecognizable army boots of which the seams came apart, right through the
campaign. I also had four front false teeth, and soon the front bit broke
off.  That I carried around in my pocket, and every time I had to "dress
formally", back went the teeth to be held in place with my tongue and I
spoke with a lisp.  No one pitied the fragile ego of a 18 year old
mind.

We got one up one old Kruis one day with a local capitano who dearly wanted to get in Kruis' good books but wasn't allowed near enough to prove his worth.  He lamented his fate with us, and asked us if we couldn't teach him some Afrikaans as the good Cmdt would certainly then favour him more.

We obliged, but it took two days for him to master the sentence
phonetically which we assured him were a highly approved manner of greeting
you seniors with much aplomb and respect.


"...jou manaivirbaksteneom'nhoerhuistebou".  When he felt confident enough he
strutted off to the combi one day and came to an unbelievable smart
attention, snapping his hand to his black beret, whilst uttering the said
mastered greeting aloud enough for all and sundry to hear.  For a moment he
stood there with a huge grin, and then a big burly major stepped forward and
klapped him so hard he cart wheeled away to find his feet and disappeared
complaining bitterly.  We told him that the major had a bad day and maybe he
should go back the next day.  Poor bugger got shot before he got another
opportunity.

Unitas?  We troops didn't take to these dudes at all, and when out of eye
shot of brass took them out whenever we could.  Just before bridge 14 when
attempting a crossing, we saw some Cubans in a jeep pulling up on the other
side, I lined my sights up and saw that a large tree with a platoon size
group of Unitas clustered underneath it, blocking my sights.  I hollered at
them to clear out, but they simply stared at me with sullen eyes as they are
wont to do if told to do something they didn't agree on.  As we couldn't get
into another position, I simply let go a HE round to clear the tree, and
after that a HEAT for the jeep.  I got the jeep, but strange didn't notice
any UNITA jumping around in joy at the sight.  Till this day I wondered
where those okes went?

To the best of my memory Danny was a Angolan that caught Jan's favour and
served him well as a junior leader.  Due to Col Jan's loyalty to his troops,
he managed to withdraw them out to S.W.A. and they formed the basis for the
later 32 Bat, one of the best light fighting units in the world in
their specific role.  The rest of his history you know well.  His book
Buffalo Soldier is highly recommended for the true soldier.

As far as the infantry goes, totally unreliable!!They discarded there G3's for AK's without a thought as to ammo, attacked by laying down a tremendous noisy barrage of rifle and RPG fire ill aimed if aimed at all, something to do with he who makes the most noise wins?? In Africa context it appears to be the norm till today, hence the low kill rates on either side.  Normally one side breaks and runs like hell, and the poor sods who gets caught were summarily killed if not first tortured. 

Specifically at bridge 14 just beyond the first line of defenses we crossed, I at one stage had to get out of the armoured car, take down a co-ax aerial and walk around and thrash the infantry out of their hiding places to get them to move in something like a
military formation to give us an infantry screen as we were pulling fire.
Nothing heroic, simple necessity. They had a habit of melting away, for soon we saw no more covering Unita troops with us.  Oh! they re appeared soon after the battle only to shoot the couple of prisoners in cold blood we were able to have captured in a swamp. They all joined in that and took great glee in emptying their mags in the spastic bodies. At such times we had little control over them. It took great aggression for us to secure two captives and spirit them away in a jeep to Cela where
they were hospitalized and later ended up in the Rapport and Sunday Times as
agricultural advisors. By rescuing them we nearly fought a greater war than the one just past. I remember having to have to pistol whip quite e few AK waving Unitas who were on the verge of shooting the poor buggers as well. I never heard Col Jan's troops to have behaved the same.

To the best of my knowledge, what Danny Roxo did at bridge 14 was some
recce jobs and do OP work, for which he was not trained and had to be led
by the receiving artillery officer at the guns, he managed this very commendably.

I am familiar of his participation at Bridge 14, but in general their role
as infantry were very limited, and the leader element contributed to
artillery OP's etc.  That was limited to the period up and till the actual
crossing.  Thereafter we lost contact with them as we were in positions
consolidating our advance. 

The real fighting were done by the artillery who softened up the various strong points, and preceding bridge 14, the immediate opposing defenses till the armoured cars could cross and deploy to the flanks, and that point (the flanks) was the deciding factor as all the enemy defenses were set up facing the road as all movement at that time of the year were limited to the road ways. 

Thunder storms broke out EVERY afternoon around 3 pm, but the 4 days prior to our actual attack/crossing, we had dry days, draining the ground sufficiently for
our 5 ton cars to deploy and roll them up.  This was however not planned,
and it was our Papa troop Charlie call sign car driver by Eion Gibson, who
upon managing to cross the bridge, realized that his right wheels were holding well on the road dirt shoulders and tested it further.  We were suppose to attack along the road in a herring bone formation, but pulled effective fire soon after managing to cross the bridge. We were on the right hand side of the road with our wheel on the
bit of shoulder that it offered, when Eion came over the intercom stating
that the ground felt stable and that he was going to pull off. Soon all four cars were on either side of the tar road, drawing less fire.


The Cubans had all their guns sighted on the tar road and could not get to
us in time as we advanced too fast for them to reposition.  It was like
swatting flies and it was a good killing time...  Our crew were well
experienced and integrated and worked together fantastically.  Eion the
driver would call directions as Martin Ziegler and I worked from the
turret and watched from the sights.  It went like clock work and we
leaped frog forward in two teams each of two cars banging away with our main
armament and machine gun.  We had them on the run and didn't  have time
to wait for reinforcements to come up.  We just kept on going.  Maybe the
true hero of bridge 14 was Eion Gibson?  If not for him testing the ground we just might have been stopped on the tar road alla Ebo!

The infantry played a very limited role at Bridge 14. Col Jan
refers to an incident in which Danny was sent forward under the protection
of the armoured cars, but best of my recollection it did not happen like that.Based on some comments he made towards that end, I think that his orders might have been passed on incorrectly and /or misconstrued before they got to us. It was still in the days of the strict need to know British military tradition, so we lowly rankers had little
knowledge of what the brass had in mind.  Yet, I think that it was exactly
troop initiative that sometimes went further than the anticipated brass
intentions, and carried the day. 

Bridge 14 was a prime example of that. Deploying off the main axis of advance and carrying on well beyond the stated objective.  So, maybe a mere kavalaris driver in the armoured Corps were the reason of Cmdt Kruis' moment in the sun and further
rapid promotion. Although I think chaps like him made sure they had all the
right contacts for such an event.  Not like poor cmdts Jan en Eddie or even
the Holshauzen brothers!!!

Bear in mind that a armoured car troop was sent forward every day for more or less
10 days to cover the engineers building the bridge. The infantry who
were supposed to do so ran away at the first sight of the enemy approaching.
We would park in a staggered formation on the road leading up to the bridge.
The right side was bordered by a lane of trees beyond which the river
wound off to our right rear 45o.  The left side had shrubs facing the
hillocks, sloping upwards.  The river bankd were thickly grown.  The 1st
bridge collapsed, and the 2nd had logs thrown over the causeway and tied
together.

The last day or two we were supposed to effect a crossing, but we were frightened away every time by close artillery fire and rocket fire. The actual crossing was simply another attempt which worked.  We had strict orders not to proceed beyond 3 km's, but when we saw that we could deploy on the soft ground, we took own initiative and carried on till 13km's.  

Cmdt Kruis kept on calling us back over the radio, but we "had trouble in understanding" as we seemed to "receive" him only 1/5 to 2/5 intermittently. He sent  Lt Heinze in an armoured car, who upon a tactical appreciation realized the value and radioed back, strangely finding good reception...  and we advanced in 
a five car formation. We could have carried on till the next town 20 klicks away, and hence Luanda, as we had wiped out the last major fighting formations
before Luanda. Snoopy reported that they were frantic digging up the tar
road with graders to stop us. Between the artillery and armoured cars we
killed upwards of 2000 Cubans that day and Papa troop as the only
complete and experienced regular troop led the way, thus
facing all major opposition. The position around the main infantry and
artillery positions looked like something out of Delville Wood, thick tree
stumps shot of 3 feet above the ground, and collapsed bunkers. Every where
was pieces of body, and the ground looked well ploughed over. It would have
yielded a remarkable harvest upon a year if agriculture could have been properly used!

We used to drive up to the bridge every afternoon, accompanied by Unita infantry, it was nothing new the specific day that Col Jan refers to when Danny and his troop went with us as we again went forward. The infantry trudged along and well before the
bridge went to ground. The moment we stopped, we pulled heavier than
usual fire. We noticed a movement to our right and the next moment received incoming RPG rocket fire all over. We started returning fire, but it appeared that we were going to be cut off, and we could see none of our covering infantry even close to our position, so we beat a hasty retreat for 2 klicks down the road to get behind the cover of the hill on our left.


He states that he revved the crew, which I cannot recall, but we were asked
where our infantry were, and told them that they left us before the shooting
had started. Later it appeared that Danny was their platoon leader and found himself cut of over the river without any support. 

Col Jan blames us, but what about Danny's own troops? They were supposed to give that cover, and how did Danny get himself separated from his troops to the point that he had no tactical control over them? In addition, we were not briefed that we had any special function other than the usual prodding, nor that we had "special soldiers" with us. Danny certainly didn't make or keep contact with us, and was not on the same
radio net as us. For all practical purposes we had no tactical deployment cohesion or control.

The only other notable action resembling such an intensity was Ebo where we
were totally defeated and lost something like 5 cars and seven crew as well
as lots of infantry and the full mortar complement under Staff Sgt "Stasie"
from School of Infantry. He came driving back with all his mortar men piled
dead on the back of a "groentelorrie" (commandeered vegetable truck). It
appeared that the Cubans had them zeroed to a T and doesn't matter where
they deployed, after a second or third shot, the Cubans smacked them
with counter artillery. We speculated that they had radar, but with
hindsight it might just have been good OP work or excellent positions.

The time around the 1st November the three combat groups were the only organized fighting formations and had a free run of the south, hence the rapid advance. The MPLA and Cubans (whom we started seeing around from Oct on) simply didn't have time to organize sufficient defenses in depth and were over awed by our rapid advance
and aggressive actions. Real cowboy stuff till Ebo where we certainly lost
our initial bravado, and after our recovery became true veterans who could
stand the ground.

At the time of Bridge 14 the Foxbat Combat Team were deployed and later
reinforced with small detachments from the other two groups which all ended up on the central road to Luanda due to practical circumstances.


To the east at Sanga the roads were impassable to CG Orange and equally so
to the west where marshy areas prevented CG Bravo. They left strong holding
forces and joined Foxbat with small detachments. They reached us
after Bridge 14.  Col Jan had some troops there arriving in the nick of time
at the battle of Ebo, and they appeared to have saved the day by deploying
at the Y-junction to Ebo when we came helter skelter down the track only to
stop at the pass/tar road. I maintain that if only a BRDM or a couple of
trucks with infantry full of Cubans pursued us, we might have been defeated that day as we were totally demoralized after seeing for the first time our own white troops being shot to pieces and close comrades running through the bushes bleeding and hysterical with wide eyes. It shook us as we didn't know what had happened and what terrible force they had run into for nothing came over the net. 

Kruis took over from Eddy Webb days before and I think he made a mistake to order a general withdrawal, it could easily have turned into a route. I think he should have dug in as he still had cohesion at that point with a couple of armoured cars on the back ridges. Kruis was the staff officer sort, not of Webb or
Breytenbach's mettle (both controversial but highly effective tactical
commanders)  Kruis hardly left his command combi or came close to the front.  We only saw him when we went back for more supplies.


REMF?  Ebo was the first time we faced trained troops, and to boot regular Cubans.  No MPLA. We got our own back at Bridge 14. After that it was simply holding stations while we were losing the initiative, prodding around behind lines, and eventually we withdrew in Feb with the Cubans hot on our tail. Papa troop did tail end Charlie duty again and we had many skirmishes on our way down. We had to change a bevel box on a car under fire!! Another spot we had to blow one of our cars up when another
bevel box packed up with no spares avalible.  Damned bevel boxes!!!  We learnt
how to change engines without tiffie(mechanic) help under trees.  Our drivers were a
marvelous cool headed imaginative lot (though smelly and with awful stomach
odours especially when we were hatched down!)  So ended our Angola
excursion of 75/76 called Ops Savanah and I earnt my Cunene clasp to go with
my Pro Nutro service medal.

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ANGOLA

#24

Post by Soldier » 02 Jul 2004, 22:22


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Karwats
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#25

Post by Karwats » 03 Jul 2004, 01:56

Hi Soldier

See below 2 links for objectives and involvement in Angola.Also link to Castro's views on Angola

http://www.geocities.com/Yosemite/Forest/1771/raid1.htm
http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/sadfpres.htm
http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/barber.htm



The long quote.
I know this website,it belongs to a Lance Corporal who was in the Operation as a driver.
It is clear that he was upset with his military service-these were conscripts. I would rather base my arguments on books from authors who have done very serious research and spoken to a lot of the people involved than one Lance Corporal who clearly did not like the Army.
The medal he refers to at the bottom is actually called the "Pro Patria" medal for external operations. Pro Nutro is a type of breakfast porridge.

Try these....

The War for Africa-Fred Bridgeland
South Africa's Border War-Willem Steenkamp

The 4 "prisoners" is from the this website http://www.urrib2000.narod.ru
correct.
This is the same website that shows the "captured" Olifant MBT that was in fact a modified Comet and never captured but bought correct??


I maintain there were only 2 South African POW's ever taken in the entire war, Both prisoner exchanges were very well documented/publicised and involved in both cases only 1 SADF soldier with Cubans and Russians. So when did we exchance these 4 ???

Soldier: You are correct and I was mistaken. I have just had a long conversation about the 4 POW's with my father who was in the Operation. He confirmed that the 4 soldiers were captured. They were from the Technical Services and were captured on a recovery mission,as a matter of fact their recovery vehicle was also captured and was still on display in Luanda ca 1998. I was not aware of this. These men were apparently exchanged for the Russians captured at Xangongo in 1981 along with the before mentioned Sapper v.d. Mescht.
Last edited by Karwats on 03 Jul 2004, 11:46, edited 1 time in total.

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Musashi
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#26

Post by Musashi » 03 Jul 2004, 10:11

Zygmunt, what means "PAF" in the phrase "PAF mercenary". Is it Polish Air Forces?
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_192.shtml
Pozdrowienia,
Krzysiek

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baldviking
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#27

Post by baldviking » 03 Jul 2004, 13:17

Somalia did invade Etiophia in 1977 in a military campaign involving several 10.000's of soldiers on both sides, F-5, Canberra, Mig-21, Mig-17, Mig-15, organized thrusts by Somalian mec brigades against Ogaden, Addis Abeba, Jijiga and Harar. Also heavy Cuban support for Etiophia. The batle of Harar 22. november 1977 until late january 1978 should have seen 3000 Somalian dead or missing in action alone. Those numbers should make the war over Ogaden a litle more than just a border war.

BTW

I do not understand why non-African troops should be excluded in this thread. All wars, at all times, have seen soldiers from all parts of the by the time available world participate. Mercenaries and volunters move along. Foreign support and training will allways be a part of every war. Even the mighty romans (mass...) recruited non-romans to participate in their legions.

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#28

Post by Zygmunt » 03 Jul 2004, 13:51

Musashi, good question - I hadn't thought about it until you pointed it out.
But I think the answer is in another acig.org article:

"Ogaden War, 1977-1978"

Based on what I read in that article I think it is certain that "PAF merc" is a reference to some twenty Pakistani pilots hired in late 1977 or early 1978. Sorry, no kills for Poles there!

Zygmunt

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Angola

#29

Post by Soldier » 03 Jul 2004, 19:58

Karwats:But my questions is about the principals reasons of the sudafrican defeat in Angola in 1975

You say:There are not military reasons in the sudafrican defeat.I dont think so.

They sudafricans did not take Luanda,because they were stopped in Ebo, they were defeated in many battles like:Balaia,Medunda and others.

I think that the military reasons were so importan in that conflict.If the cubans did not stop the sudafrican advance in Queve river,the sudafricans could take Luanda in 1975.

You said:

Code: Select all

The Objectives were to keep the MPLA from occupying the entire country aand enable UNITA to continue as a viable ressitance in the south-east of the country. 
The objectives were:defeat the MPLA,because it movemment was communist and a problem for Sud Africa.

You told me that your father fought in "Savannah":I would like to know his opinion about this operation.Because he was a member of the sudafrican Army and sure he knows a lot of things about it.

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The battlwe of Bridge 14

#30

Post by Soldier » 03 Jul 2004, 20:10

A cuban defeat in Angola


The Battle of Bridge 14 took place in December 1975 during Operation Savannah in Angola and is little-known outside of South Africa, although it represented a major defeat of the communist forces in Angola - the MPLA and the Cubans - by South African troops. Part of the reason is that the only detailed histories of this operation to be published to date have been written in Afrikaans and none have as yet been translated into English. During this battle many South African soldiers earned the Honoris Crux. Bridge 14 was located on the Nhia river, on the route from Cela to Quibala. In November Battle Group Foxbat had routed an MPLA force, which retreated across this bridge and then blew it up. The advance of the South African forces along the only tarred road to Quibala was brought to a halt at the Nhia river - due to heavy rainfall in the area and swampy terrain, the bridge was the only means of crossing with heavy vehicles.

At the time of the battle, the South African Government had already made the decision to withdraw its forces from Angola in view of the lack of support South Africa and Unita were receiving from the West. However, as the decision was being made, renewed fighting broke out in Angola. Colonel Swart, CO of Task Force Zulu, wanted to know what the enemy was doing at the bridge and so Cdt Breytenbach sent Sergeant Danny Roxo with a platoon of infantry and a couple of armoured cars to the bridge area to reconnoitre. Shortly afterwards the main force heard the sound of battle, including mortar fire. In the distance the two armoured cars were observed returning to the main force at full speed, closely followed by exploding mortar shells. Breytenbach ordered the cars to return to assist Roxo and the infantry, but the commanders refused, saying the barrage was too heavy.

Then the infantry appeared on the road and a few minutes later Roxo and his men had climbed onto the armoured cars and returned to the main force's positions. Roxo reported that the bridge was down, and mentioned offhand that a few enemy soldiers had been killed during his reconnaissance. Later Breytenbach heard the full story from two escaped prisoners who had overheard the Cubans discussing the encounter with Roxo with some awe. As Roxo had moved forward to check the bridge he had seen a Cuban on the far side and shot him. Roxo began to move back and more enemy troops then emerged from cover and began shooting at him. He returned fire from the hip, killing eleven of the enemy, four of them Cubans. He was later awarded the Honoris Crux for this encounter.

Foxbat's advance towards Quibala was now also checked at the Nhia river by a strong force of artillery, which included Stalin Organs, and a combined force of Cuban and Fapla infantry. It was necessary therefore not only to restore the bridge -their only means of crossing - but at the same time to eliminate a superior enemy force. Observers were sent to a nearby hill named Top Hat, and set up an OP from which they could see the bridge. They were also able to observe the enemy setting up mortar positions in a nearby kraal and called in South African artillery fire, which soon eliminated the position. The observers were also able to direct fire onto an armoured car and against a "Red Eye" (BM-21 Stalin Organs) rocket position, both of which were destroyed.

Later, from this vantage point, the South Africans were able to watch Fapla and Cuban troops wading in the river near the site of the bridge. Again they called in artillery fire, creating havoc amongst the surprised enemy, the continuously exploding shells killing many of them. Two Fapla helicopters were sent out to scour the hill for the OP, which the enemy by now knew must be in that area, but it was not discovered. The observer, Corporal Andre Diederichs, remained there for almost a week before returning to the South African lines. Diederichs was a member of the elite Recce commando, but had little experience as an artillery observer, and had to be coached on the spot by radio on the correct procedure.

Reinforcements arrived for the Cuban/Fapla force in the first week of December and set up an HQ and ammunition dump just north of the river. A patrol from "1 Recce Commando" tried to reach the site on foot, but was unable to cross the river, now swollen by heavy rain. Two nights later, on 7 December, they were landed on the north side by helicopter, but soon after passing a cattle kraal they were spotted by the enemy and fired on with machine-guns. Sergeant Frederick Wannenburg, their leader, was unable to return fire from his position, so moved from cover to cover, firing continuously. Caught eventually in a cross-fire he was wounded in the stomach and several other places. Sgt. Major Johannes Conradie then took over command, regrouped the men and sent out a flanking party which closed with the enemy and, although under heavy fire at close range, forced them to retreat. By the time a helicopter could be called in to evacuate the patrol Wannenburg had died. Both he and Conradie were awarded the Honoris Crux.

By 9 December the enemy had withdrawn to positions further back from the river and had abandoned attempts to hold the bridge, mainly because of the devastatingly accurate South African artillery fire. The rest of the troops of the South African combat group were brought forward to take up positions near the south side of the bridge.

On 10 December engineers started to rebuild the bridge, using Bluegum logs from the bush nearby, but the enemy soon began to concentrate their fire on the bridge area. Two of the South African engineers were killed during the heavy bombardment and all efforts to repair the bridge were temporarily abandoned. A patrol of infantrymen and sappers crossed over the bridge early the next morning to lift the mines from the road on the north side. A patrol of Cubans attacked them, killing an infantryman and wounding one of the sappers. The Cubans were driven off, but then a Fapla patrol appeared. In the fighting that ensued all were killed, but by that time it was too dark for the South Africans to find their way back to the bridge through the enemy positions in its vicinity.

They made their way to the river, and, since they had a wounded man, Lt. Heyns swam the river three times during the night to get help and medical supplies. The soldier was too badly wounded, however, and finally a doctor was taken across the fast-flowing river with the help of a rope and guided through the swamp to the patrol. Several Recces accompanied him, and when Fapla began to fire on them, they drew the enemy away from the stranded patrol. Lt. Heyns and the doctor carried the wounded man back on a stretcher, taking cover whenever they were fired on. A helicopter later evacuated the casualty to Cela, where he died later that night.

By 11 December the South African artillery bombardment of the enemy positions had made the area safe enough for the engineers to continue their efforts to repair the bridge, although "Red Eye" rockets continued to fall close to them. Observers who could see the salvos being fired in the distance would quickly warn the men who then took shelter until the explosions were over and they could continue with their work.

During the afternoon of 11 December the CO of Task Force Zulu, Col. Blackie Swart, paid a visit to the Foxbat positions and the two COs made a quick reconnaissance of the enemy positions. Swart pointed out that it was imperative that his force get moving again, and Kruys agreed to try and complete the work for a crossing that night or next day.

The sappers sweated to get the bridge ready in time and at first light on December 12 the South African artillery prepared for a supreme effort. The morning was misty and the artillery was delayed in starting its bombardment until the enemy targets became visible to the observers. The attack by the infantrymen and armoured cars was scheduled to take place in three phases:

A central attack by the Eland armoured cars and a company of infantry to drive the enemy back towards Bridge 15 near Cassamba.
An attack by a company of infantry to take the "Kraal".
An attack by a company of infantry on the hill positions to capture the high ground and then link up with the armoured cars of phase 1.
Ranged against them was a battalion of over 1,000 infantry, many of them Cuban troops. Further back were anti-tank weapons, including Sagger missiles, deployed to cover the road that Foxbat would have to advance along. In their second defence line Fapla had several 120mm Cuban-manned mortars, 75mm cannons, and an entire battery of 14,7mm anti-aircraft guns together with 122mm rocket launchers.

Most of the enemy positions had been carefully pinpointed during the preceding days by the observers and when the South Africans started with the heaviest artillery barrage of the battle, the enemy was taken by surprise. Some of Fapla's ammunition trucks were hit and exploded. Enemy artillery positions were hit and wiped out, the Cuban mortars receiving direct hits, killing most of the crews, and within a few hours the South African artillery commanded the battlefield.

At 07:00 phase 1 of the attack was set in motion, with phase 2 following almost immediately. The armoured cars rolled over the bridge and after advancing about 500 yards engaged the enemy, firing continuously. The cars deployed 100 metres to the sides of the road, confusing the enemy Sagger crews who were positioned to fire on the road. The enemy infantry began to retreat, and one of the armoured cars surprised a mortar position, destroying six mortars with one of its 90mm shells. When they ran out of ammunition a further three Elands were sent in to take their place. 2/Lt. van Vuuren, in command of the second unit, rolled past the first group and then received a warning that Cuban tanks were approaching from the north.

Enemy artillery fire was still exploding around the cars when a retreating Russian truck full of Cuban troops drove up behind the Elands. At first van Vuuren thought they were his own troops in a captured vehicle (many were used by the South Africans), but a quick radio message confirmed that they had to be the enemy. The truck's occupants were apparently also confused. They didn't fire, but tried to drive past the Elands, using the truck's indicator lights to signal their intention. Van Vuuren waited until it had overtaken his Eland and then slammed a 90mm shell into the rear of the truck, killing all of its 20 Cuban occupants.

The armoured cars then moved forward towards a farmhouse, where another 20 Cubans stood outside, apparently in conference. Van Vuuren had by now also run out of ammunition for the Elands, and ordered his commanders to close hatches. The Cubans swarmed over the Elands and began firing. Van Vuuren returned their fire with a pistol, shooting through a turret hatch and killing eleven of the Cubans as they tried to climb onto the armoured cars. It later transpired that the Cubans had been smoking marijuana at the farmhouse, which explained their reckless attack on the Elands.

The armoured cars had advanced so rapidly that the infantry had been unable to keep up with them. Phase 2 of the attack had been carried out according to plan, with little resistance being offered at the kraal, which had been abandoned by the enemy after the South African artillery shells began to land on it. They left their heavy weapons and ammunition behind.

Phase 3 had been delayed after the commander of the Unita infantry had been slightly wounded and his men refused to continue without armoured car support. Their attack was therefore taken over and completed by the troops of phase 2. Battle Group Foxbat did not, as originally envisaged, stop at Cassamba, but continued fighting and advancing until they reached Bridge 15. The enemy fought hard to stay in possession of the area, but their armour had retreated after one of their armoured cars had been hit by artillery fire.

By 12:00 the attack had been completed and the troops began to consolidate their positions. By 13:00 it had begun to rain heavily and troop movement was severely hindered, although the engineers continued to work on the bridge. The area between the hills and Almeida was now secured and patrols of South African troops and armoured cars began to clear the area of the remaining pockets of enemy troops.

The road to Quibala was now open and the South Africans moved forward to about 6 kilometres north of Almeida, although mined areas and bombardments by "Red Eye" rockets slowed the advance of Task Force Zulu. When news of Foxbat's successful attack was received at HQ the staff officers were surprised. In view of South Africa's decision to withdraw from Angola, a message had been sent to Cela cancelling the operation to capture Bridge 14, but it only reached Colonel Swart after the battle had already taken place!

The victory at Bridge 14 was so complete that the CO of Foxbat, Brig. George Kruys, had to restrain his armoured car commanders from chasing even further after the retreating enemy, an order which they accepted with some reluctance. Kruys knew that his force was too small to be able to transform the retreat into a full-scale rout.

During the battle the South Africans lost four men killed. The Cubans and MPLA lost over 400 men, although the exact number was difficult to ascertain since, as the BBC later reported, truckloads of corpses were constantly driving out of the area towards the north. Among the Cuban dead was the commander of the Cuban expeditionary force, Commandant Raul Diaz Arguelles.

Although the South Africans had decided to pull out of Angola by January, Lt.Gen. Magnus Malan visited the front on 15 December and told all the commanders that although they would receive no further reinforcements, they were to capture and hold as much territory as possible with the troops available.

For the South Africans the battle for Bridge 14 was a highly successful operation and proved that speed, surprise and an aggressive offence could tip the balance in favour of a numerically weaker force with fewer heavy weapons. The accuracy of the South African artillery played a key role in capturing the bridge and enabling both Zulu and Foxbat to continue to advance northwards. The enemy made the grave mistake of using permanent positions for its own artillery, switching the guns from site to site at regular intervals, rather than finding new positions as the South Africans did. The observers were able to register all their sites as targets and simply wait for the enemy's artillery to arrive at each site before calling fire down on them.

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