Biggest battles in Africa

Discussions on other historical eras.
Soldier
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Africa

#46

Post by Soldier » 12 Jul 2004, 21:17

You said:

Code: Select all

We didn't lose the political battle my friend we lost the political war. 
C'est la Guerre. Today we don't have Apartheid but we have a Communist goverment and our Army is a joke.
Sorry but I am not agree,Mandela was elected in a free election and Sudafrica is not Communist,check its constitution in Sudafrica now there is liberty,when the apartheid there was not freedoom for all,now everybody are equal before the law.

And Mbeki was elected in a free election,he is not communist.There is a free press a free market and a democracy and all the world has a good opinion about Sudafrica a country with a lot of problems but now it is a country with freedoom.

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Re: Africa

#47

Post by CoffeeCake » 14 Jul 2004, 02:03

Soldier wrote:
Sorry but I am not agree,Mandela was elected in a free election and Sudafrica is not Communist,check its constitution in Sudafrica now there is liberty,when the apartheid there was not freedoom for all,now everybody are equal before the law.

And Mbeki was elected in a free election,he is not communist.There is a free press a free market and a democracy and all the world has a good opinion about Sudafrica a country with a lot of problems but now it is a country with freedoom.
I agree with you wholeheartedly. Its just troubling to see Johannesburg as one of the most crime ridden, if not the most crime ridden city in the world, and the government can't do anything about it. It brings up the question, is freedom worth the price of having to worry about your personal safety from fellow citizens everyday?

Back to the subject at hand, all Cold War proxy wars were brutal and dirty tactics were used by each side. Angola is one example of what I mean. For 27 years, this cold war proxy was on, only to end 2 years ago. Other nations involvement made this a small world war (South Africa vs Cuba, therefore US vs USSR).


Tomas
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#48

Post by Tomas » 30 Sep 2005, 19:55

Hello Everyone,.
I'm new in this forum,really interested in South Africans modern Wars (Angola,Mozanbique).I'm Spanish military modeller from Madrid.
I'm trying to seach the next information,participate the russian BTR-70 in any Angolan War?.Also too any photos or units signals.
Please somebody have any information?.
Regards,

Tomas

Zygmunt
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#49

Post by Zygmunt » 01 Oct 2005, 12:27

Welcome to the forum Tomas!

Are you familiar with the http://www.brushfirewars.org website? There may not be any specific information on exactly what you asked for, but it might be a good place to start; the site is about small wars (such as the ones that interest you), and is presented with the modeller in mind. Even if you don't find what you're looking for now, there may be an article coming soon, or links to other sources that you may find useful.

Hope this helps,

Zygmunt

Tomas
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Thanks

#50

Post by Tomas » 01 Oct 2005, 12:50

Hi Zygmunt,
Thanks a lot for your kind words and link.
All the best,

Boeta
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re: Biggest Battles in Africa

#51

Post by Boeta » 22 Nov 2005, 01:04

Lasting 137 days, the biggest battle fought in Africa was arguably the battle between the South African supported security forces and the joint Angolan/Cuban forces at Cuito Cuanavale during 1988/89. Following this battle, South Africa finally withdrew her forces following the start of peace negotiations.

Unfortunately for South Africa, the Angolans/Cubans were much better at propaganda resulting in the South Africans being depicted as having suffered a major defeat. Proof exists, though, that the opposite actually happened. The South Africans used both G5's and - the then prototype - G6's to hole up the Angolans in and around Cuito Cuanavale. Occupying Cuito Cuanavale would have proven a major political risk for the South Africans, and as a result no effort was made to occupy the town. A decision they might now regret.

A number of misconceptions about the Angolan War still exist:

1. South Africa was never at war with Angola. Neither were the South Africans interested in occupying the country. South Africa was interested only in preventing Swapo from infiltrating and operating in the northern parts of South West Africa (now Namibia), protecting its own interests in the process.

2. Following the coup d'etat in Lisbon (1974), South African troops were first deployed in southern Angola during August 1975 to protect construction teams working on the Calueque and Ruacana hydro-electric and irrigation scheme which had become a target for Swapo.

3. Under pressure from other African countries concerned with the situation in Angola - particularly the Ivory Coast, Zambia and Zaire (now the DRC) - South Africa was requested by her normally hostile neighbours to intervene. Similar requests were received from Jonas Savimbi (Unita) and Holden Roberto (FNLA). South Africa agreed to supply both Unita and the FNLA with weapons and equipment. Later, at their request, South Africa also provided the necessary instructors and training for these groups. The South Africans provided support during clashes with the MPLA, unfortunately at times being drawn into the fighting.

4. Unita and the FNLA also received support from other western countries - the USA in particular - when it became known that the Angolan government has requested Soviet assistance. A number of Eastern Bloc countries provided the Angolan government with the necessary support, chief amongst who was Cuba who provided weapons, equipment and personnel.

5. This being the era of the so-called Cold War, South Africa also found herself under pressure from the West to oppose a Marxist regime coming to power in Angola. Pressure which, ultimately, led to Operation Savannah mentioned earlier on these pages.

6. Urged on by other African countries, and the USA promising at least passive support, the South African government decided to ignore its own policy of not interfering in the internal affairs of others and decided to actively intervene. A decision which they possibly regretted when, following a fast sweep through the southern parts of Angola in support of the combined Unita/FNLA forces, the political situation in Washington changed and Pretoria found itself under continuing pressure to remove its forces from Angola, the western nations having given up on Angola as "a lost cause".
What was to be a covert operation, became a public embarrassment when several South African soldiers were captured and put on display.
The support South Africa enjoyed from the OAU (the Organisation for African Unity) were withdrawn when the OAU could not decide whether to recognise an MPLA government in Angola. Not willing to shoulder the burden of Angola alone, Pretoria decided to withdraw. This decision did not endear the South African government to the South African forces on the outskirts of Luanda, especially not when their withdrawal was claimed by the Angolans to be a major victory over the South Africans (having convenietly forgotten that Unita, the FNLA and the SWATF (to an extend) was also involved, and that the opposing forces had devastated their positions in some areas).

7. The South Africans started withdrawing on 22 January 1976. The obsessive secrecy surrounding the operation - even when it became public knowledge in the rest of the world - did not do the image of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the government any good, neither internationally or nationally. To this day, those who were there are extremely unhappy about Pretoria's ultimately political decision about an obviously military affair.

8. Unable, or maybe unwilling, to accept that the forces operating against them during the war that lasted some 23 years were not always South African, the Angolan government and its Soviet backed propaganda machine nevertheless continuously blamed South Africa for battles fought, even claiming victories over South African forces when the South Africans were not involved. Defeats sometimes suffered by the Unita forces were attributed to the South Africans. Unfortunately for South Africa, other countries shared this opinion.
Whilst South African backed, and supportive of Unita, the security forces operating against Swapo consisted of the South African Defence Force, the South African Police, the South West African Territorial Force and the South West African Police. Large numbers of Portuguese/Angolans also served with the security forces, notably in 101 Battalion and the notorious 32 Battalion .

9. Pointing out the security forces' ability to hit at (Swapo) targets in the northern parts of Angola virtually unhindered (e.g. Casinga), independent analysts have in the past pointed out that, had South Africa been interested in occupying Angola, she would have been able to do so within a very short period of time.

With regards to the statement above that South Africa has, at present, a communist government, the following:

10. Following the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa implemented a new constitution in 1996 which is, arguably, one of the best in the world. At least, nobody is joking about it.

11. Whilst it is true that both Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were democratically elected, it is a fact that the present government has communist ties and an affiliation with the South Africa Communist Party.

12. This would explain why some, if not most, civilians (white, coloured and black) serving in or with the former security forces are uncomfortable and treat their government with distrust. They were, after all, thought to be fighting against communism. A fact which most western countries now ignore - whilst they were passively involved in the Cold War, the security forces were actively fighting the Cold War, sometimes coming up against the most modern of Soviet weaponry not even known to the west to exist...

Regards.

Tomas
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Biggest Battles in Africa

#52

Post by Tomas » 22 Nov 2005, 14:27

Many thanks Boeta,
For your aclarations and comments,they are very instructive.
But my problem,about the fusiliers vehicule BTR-70,continue.Its very hard to find,any comments or picture of this AFV in Angola?.
All the best.

Tomas

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Boeta

#53

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 00:26

You are really funny,have you read my last posts about "Savanaah Operation".I used southafrican sources,but the southafricans only repeat the same story.

You also repeat the same opinion than many southafricans but let me show you,you are wrong about it.


Gral Malan:

and the SA government did not wna to continue. Genl Magnus Malan later had this to say:" We could take on Luanda and the whole of Angola militarily, but would we be able to take it politically? That we did not continue was the best desicion made. It would have led to a never ending war, where SA would be seen as the aggressor in the eyes of the world, and no one would have helped us. We would have had our own Vietnam."

They could have their own Vietnam,if Malan believed this idea is because the enemy was not weak.Why did the southafricans forget the military problem?.

Vorster:We decided to pull out of Angola after careful deliberation, we came to the conclusion that we would be left on our own holding the baby, once the US and France decided to cut and run, it stopped being a military adventure ,we were left with no choice, we would have been sucked into a full-scale war, and that is why we left Angola"

Full scale war I ask you again;If the enemy was weak:Why did he has this idea? :x

Tom Cooper wrote it:

Observing the situation in September 1975, they've seen that the available FNLA and UNITA forces were insufficient to defeat the MPLA: in fact, the FNLA was short of getting routed by the MPLA. Consequently, they attempted to deploy a minimal force that they though could help the UNITA defeat the MPLA (they did not really consider the FNLA as their ally: this organization was usefull, however, as it was binding MPLA forces). Now, in the middle of the advance on Luanda the news came about massive Cuban reinforcements arriving in Luanda and Pointe Noire, in Congo-Brazzaville.

That was a different kind of war they were now about to fight: from that moment on this was a race against time. They had to advance swiftly or their light armour and firepower couldn't take it on the heavily armed Cubans, especially not in a static battle of attrition. Their advantage was in manoeuvre. What they have lost was this race: the Cubans stopped them, prevented the further advance towards north and engaged them in a static battle of attrition.

From that moment onwards it was a political decision: commit more troops or pull out. There was no support for a larger invastion, so they pulled out. That's it. There was no "lost battle", the exchange ratios were heavily in SADF's favour: with more troops - and the SADF did not consist of only 2.000 troops in 1975 - they could've breached the Cuban lines. But, the politicians said, "no, we're not doing this: return to SWA". And that's it: I don't know if you make a difference between military and political decisions: don't get me wrong (I don't even know where are you from and do not want to imply anything), but I know this is frequently not the case in specific countries ruled by communist regimes. But, I do.

So, if you like it that way, their - the South African - cause was lost, but not the battle. A "pyric" victory would've been one where they'd attack further to the north and suffer - just for example - 50% losses while doing so. Pyric victory is usually one where one is successful but suffers such losses that he can't exploit the success. The South Africans did not suffer such losses: they were careful to avoid this happening. They knew they WOULD suffer such losses if holding out at the front along the Cuvo. That's what they definitely avoided.

If you insist on such things then only the Cubans can be described as achieving a "pyric" victory, because they have stopped the South African advance at a price of heavy losses (certainly between five and ten times higher than SADF's), and then were not capable of pursuing and routing the SADF, but have left it retreat into SWA undefeated



Cobus Venter:Another reason.

think we could have taken Luanda if we were prepared to take moderate casualties,say 50 to 100 men, You have bear in mind that the South African public only became aware of our involvement in Dec '75 after we had 3 men taken prisoner, not in combat , but as a result of them getting lost and blundering into enemy territory. The government of the day felt that the political price of double or triple digit casualties would be unsustainable.


Robert Moss:

http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/moss1.htm

http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/moss2.htm

http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/moss3.htm

This was the end of the road for the South Africans. To have stayed on in Angola would have required a new injection of men and material, with no assurance of adequate backing from any major power, but with the certainty that a continued South African presence would be used by the Marxist lobby in the OAU in the bid to get a new vote that would commit the organisation to the MPLA, and in accelerated efforts to isolate South Africa within international bodies like the U.N.

Their refusal to go it alone was influenced by other factors. The most crucial was the possibility that the Communists might escalate the war by putting MiG fighters into the air. French intelligence sources (who maintained an excellent listening-post in Brazzaville throughout the war) reported that 12 MiG-21 fighters were uncrated in Pointe Noire in October, 1975, and assembled by Cuban technicians. American aerial surveillance subsequently established that these planes and a further 10 MiG-17s, were brought to airfields inside Angola in December. Big aircraft fuel dumps were established at the eastern diamond mining town of Henrique de Carvalho, which remained in MPLA hands throughout the war.

These planes were not used during the course of the South African campaign, nor (to the best of my knowledge) was there ever a direct threat from the Russians to intervene if the South Africans pushed farther north, or refused to depart. But the presence of the MiGs was a silent threat.

Their deployment would have presented the South Africans with the choice of committing their own Mirage fighters to an aerial battle over Angola - which might in turn have produced a further Communist escalation - or of watching superior hardware win the war for the Cubans. Even without planes, the Cubans (whose strength was up to 15,000 by mid-January) were exploiting their colossal superiority in armaments. No one intervened to stop the shipment of arms and men to Luanda during the campaign.


And check it:

It was a victory nonetheless. It taught us that in the great world conflict for which Angola was only one of the battlefields, victory or defeat depends on political will







[/b]

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a

#54

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 00:30

Another source:

"South Africa's Border war 1966-1989.

"By this time (mid December 1975) the South African cabinet had allready decided to with draw from Angola,and in fact in mid-November a formation known as 101 Task force had been formed at Rundu and placed under the able Lt-Genl Andre' van Deventer tp prepare for an orderly pull out.There was nothing else to be done. Luanda could still be taken,but a force of 1500 South African Infantry would be needed and casualties could run high which was totally unacceptable. In addition van Deventer had expressed serious reservations about the ability of the SADF's logistical systems-withered after 37 years of peace-to sustain any further escalation in the war,and in any case American support was fading fast."

For me is obvious,Savanaah was a political and military defeat for Pretoria of course the principal factor was political but no the only one.

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#55

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 00:45


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#56

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 00:53

Boeta:

This decision did not endear the South African government to the South African forces on the outskirts of Luanda, especially not when their withdrawal was claimed by the Angolans to be a major victory over the South Africans (having convenietly forgotten that Unita, the FNLA and the SWATF (to an extend) was also involved, and that the opposing forces had devastated their positions in some areas).


Boeta,they were 200 km of Luanda you can check my last post.This is not a short distance.


Boeta: South Africans (having convenietly forgotten that Unita, the FNLA and the SWATF (to an extend) was also involved, and that the opposing forces had devastated their positions in some areas).

Ok,that is correct,but the MPLA was still alive and in north front the FNLA was destroyed at Quifagondo.

In the South,Pretoria was stopped by cubans:

Robert Moss:

Novo Redondo was occupied on November 14. Here the Zulu column halted, although units were sent out to link up with the Foxbat column farther east, in the area of Santa Comba. "Rommel" sent out patrols to reconnoitre the roads farther north, and found that the Cubans and MPLA had blown all the bridges over the Queve river and set up formidable defences on the other side.

The road to Porto Amboin looked like another Death Road. It was impossible to get within four-and-a-half miles of the town cross-country because of the flooded swamps. For the same reason, it was impossible to get off the road. The road to Gabela looked easier, but scouts reported that the positions on the other side were "all manned by whites." The prospect of trying to rebuild a bridge under intensive fire from the Cubans’ "Stalin Organs" was not exactly appetising.

"Rommel" radioed back to Rundu requesting that a paratroop company should be dropped behind the enemy positions at Gabela. His request was refused. Frustrated by his relative lack of firepower and the lack of any means to get across the Queve river, he then asked for permission to pull back to Lobito. He was told to wait. At last, he was told to move east and establish a new headquarters near Cela, in an area where the Foxbat column had run into formidable opposition.

"Rommel" was recalled on November 26. He could console himself for the disappointment at the Queve river with the thought that, during the 33 days the Zulu column was no the move, it covered 1,974 miles - an average of some 60 miles a day.



Have you read:Avontuoor and Operasie Savanaah

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hi

#57

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 01:24

Boeta.I would like to know your opinion about Savanaah.

I hope after all this information you dont tell me:Pretoria left Angola for external reasons.

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#58

Post by Boeta » 24 Nov 2005, 13:24

Any war, Sir, has both military and political implications.

As a trained soldier my interests are in matters military; as an academic, matters political. If we consider the purely political implications of "The War for Africa", the South African government of the day "lost". Continuous pressure - which included economic sanctions and an arms embargo - from countries around the world ultimately forced the government to reconsider its various political policies.

I do not rely on "sources" on the Internet to substantiate my arguments - to do so would be folly. Information available on the Internet can be embarassingly inaccurate.

As an academic, I try to be neutral and objective. As such, I am not interested in advertising the substantial abilities of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), or its present or past government. However, proof exists that Pretoria on a number of occasions during the war interfered in military operations. Such interference caused unnecessary frustration and even resentment amongst the SADF in certain instances.

Rather than asking "who won the war?", one should rather ask "who ultimately benefitted from the war?" The answer to the latter question is simple enough.

To understand why the war can ultimately be considered to be a political defeat for the government of the time, once has to know the history of the country and understand its people. Various population groups from a multitude of cultural backgrounds make up an extremely complex nation.

Having suffered a political defeat, it can therefore be said that South Africa lost the war in Angola. But, again, that would be simplying matters.

From a purely military perspective, the South African supported security forces were too strong for the combined Cuban/Angolan forces, devastating and capturing vast amounts of weapons and equipment. Propaganda aside, analysts would agree that, had South Africa been interested in "occupying" Angola, she would have been able to do so in a very short period of time.

We know that during the final stages of the war, Cuba had supplied Angola with 50 000 soldiers. How many MPLA, Unita and FAPLA soldiers there were, I have no idea. What I do know, is that South Africa never had more than 5 000 soldiers in Angola at any given time... She never activated all her forces.

If you are seriously considering studying the war (and its aftermath), I would recommend you get copies of the following books (as a start):

The War for Africa - Fred Bridgland
War in Angola: The Final South African Phase - Helmoed Römer-Heitman
In search of freedom - The Andreas Shipana Story - Sue Armstrong
Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic of Angola- Amnesty International
Southern Africa - A US Policy for the 80's - Chester Crocker
Africa Liberation Movements: Contemporary Struggles against White Minority Rule - Richard Gibson
Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict - Lawrence W Henderson
In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story - John Stockwell
Challenge: South Africa within the African Revolutionary Context - Al J. Venter

Just for interest's sake: the South African forces were a lot closer than 200 km to Luanda during Operation Savannah...
Last edited by Boeta on 20 Jan 2006, 14:02, edited 1 time in total.

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#59

Post by Soldier » 24 Nov 2005, 20:11

Check this map:

http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_181.shtml


The SADF was stronger than cubans,but the cubans had more resources and they controlled the Air.

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#60

Post by Tumismo » 02 Jan 2006, 00:52

Musashi wrote:Welcome the first member from Angola :) I suppose you will provide us interesting informations :)
Musashi, the member "Soldier" are not a Angolan. He are a young Cuban exiles. All these information from Cubans that he posted here, he taked from the spanish forum "foro militar general", were Cubans veterans talk about the Angolan War.

See here the section "Cuba"
http://www.militar.org.ua/phpBB2/

Best Regards

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