Mainila shots II soviets
-
- Member
- Posts: 760
- Joined: 20 Nov 2006, 23:49
- Location: Finland
Finnish frontier guard staff sergeant Emil Nikkanen was an eyewitness of the Mainila shots, this is how he saw the events:
1. Soviets soldiers dug a hole in the fields of Mainila.
2. They put something in the hole.
3. Soldiers ran away.
4. First heavy and then smaller explosions were heard.
5. One Soviet soldier gets wounded in his foot.
Mainila shots were not shot by artillery, but artillery grenades were exploded in situ.
http://www.hameensanomat.fi/Article.jsp?article=41758
1. Soviets soldiers dug a hole in the fields of Mainila.
2. They put something in the hole.
3. Soldiers ran away.
4. First heavy and then smaller explosions were heard.
5. One Soviet soldier gets wounded in his foot.
Mainila shots were not shot by artillery, but artillery grenades were exploded in situ.
http://www.hameensanomat.fi/Article.jsp?article=41758
Well, that is the Soviet logic at is best/worst.Yuri wrote:For search of true originators of provocation on November, 26, 1926 near Manila it is necessary, as a minimum, to answer two questions:
I. Who did not want in the autumn of 1939 of the beginning Soviet – Finnish war («Winter war») or on another - to whom was not favourable during that moment of the beginning of this war?
II. Who wanted in the autumn of 1939 of the beginning the Soviet – Finnish war («Winter war») or on another - to whom the beginning of this war was favourable during that moment?
The analysis of documents gives such answers:
I. War did not want:
a/ the Government of the USSR and the General Secretary of Central Committee VKP/b/ I. Stalin;
b/ two members of the Government of Finland, one of which marshal Mannerheim;
c/ fuhrer III Reich Adolf Hitler
II. War wanted it:
a/ the Finnish supporters of idea about construction «Great Finland from Baltic up to Ural»;
b/ the Governments British (Chamberlen and Churchill) and French (Reino, Laval, Lebren, Peten) colonial empires;
c/ the so-called, Polish government in emigration (for example, on November, 30, 1939 this, so-called, the government has declared war of the USSR).
In view of all aforesaid the following conclusion is inevitable.
It is the most probable, that provocation on November, 26, 1939 near Manila - a handwork of officers of the Finnish Army which were supporters of idea «Great Finland from Baltic up to Ural» and/or the English agents. Thus marshal Mannerheim did not know about this provocation of the own officers
According to the Western standards, the crucical question is: was it possible that the Finnish artillery fired the shots. As there was no Finnnish artillery in the area, that is out of question.
So the alternatives are: were they shots fired by the Soviet side or are they mere Soviet propaganda. As the NKVD men have later told that they arrangered the incident and the facts correspond the story, the former alternative seems proven beyond the reasonable doubt.
As for who wanted the war in November 1939, after the negotations have failed
1. the Finnish goverment let the people who had been evacuated from the cities and frontier area to return home, open the schools etc.
2. Stalin, on the other hand, gave the Red Army the orders to prepare for the war, and so it was ready to make a massive attack only *four* days later
- Alex Yeliseenko
- Member
- Posts: 1119
- Joined: 25 Jan 2006, 16:40
- Location: RUSSIA
It does not cancel that fact, that Stalin did not want the beginning of this war.janner wrote: whilst initially keen to obtain a diplomatic solution, Stalin authorised executive action after Finnish delegates failed to provide a suitable solution to his security concerns over the course of seven (?) meetings.
janner wrote: UK wanted to initiate a war in Finland – where is the evidence for this – after all our official records are also open now after the 50 year rule expired and someone would have mentioned it to Ironside in advance so he could have done a little planning.
You, however, the big master of jokes: for example, about this day confidential correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt is not published (in full); about this day not published the documents connected to the Gess’s flight - assistant A. Hitler.
The British strategy at the end 1939 beginning 1940 was to transfer operations on periphery of the European Theatre of war – in another way, the British strategy consist in that the fires of war blazed outside territory of France, that is on the Balkans and in Scandinavia.
The British strategists would act silly if did not exploit Soviet–Finnish frontier dispute.
In 1930 English investigation had strong positions in Finland.
To exclude negative influences of Britain on Soviet-Finnish relations in 1939 – means to bury eyes on the mainest factor.
Participation of Poles it is not enough probable, however, to reject completely the Polish trace in this business I did not hurry up.janner wrote: There is absolutely no evidence to support this point. In addition, the Polish Government in exile was in disarray at this time and hardly in a position to coordinate such a strike.
In 1939 the Polish Army bad, however, it was impossible to tell about the Polish investigation. Who – who, and Englishmen should know about it well.
Again. It does not deny that fact, that Stalin preferred a peace way of the decision of dispute.janner wrote: All the evidence that I have seen published in reputable, internationally available works using Soviet and Finnish documents, points towards it being a Soviet action to allow Stalin to break off the non-aggression pact and initiate the invasion.
This comrade is known in Russia for the deep knowledge in the field of wine-vodka products. As the source on a history of the Soviet-Finnish relations this comrade is absolutely unusable.janner wrote: Whilst the present Russian leadership may not support this position it has already been acknowledged by a previous President.
I am glad, that reading of mine posts delivers to you so much pleasant impressions.janner wrote: ...
Besides it would have been one hell of a shot from our artillery ranges in Larkhill.
...
Thanks for brightening my morning with such a delightfully eccentric post
However, should notice to you - the some of those members of this forum, - who in the beginning cheerfully laughed on my posts, - in a result had a full discomfiture.
I pay attention Your that in calculations the data from the Finnish official sources were used. Calculations show - the Finnish data a full nonsense.Juha Tompuri wrote:Agreejanner wrote: Thanks for brightening my morning with such a delightfully eccentric post
Spasibo – ThankJuha Tompuri wrote: P.S. It's Mainila (as janner has correctly posted ), not the capital of the Philippines nor (hemp)rope
After the NKVD men presented their statement, these kind of arguments are ridiculous.Alex Yeliseenko wrote: At border the Finnish forces could have mortars. About mortars shots witnesses from the Finnish party speak.
If one thinks the situation in November 1939, the Finnish government was willing to have the common investigation made, as was agreed in the Non/aggression pact, but the Soviet government was not.
In November 1939, after the negations had failed, Stalin not only wanted war but gave orders to prepare it. His closest men have testified it, besides the archives.Yuri wrote:It does not cancel that fact, that Stalin did not want the beginning of this war.janner wrote: whilst initially keen to obtain a diplomatic solution, Stalin authorised executive action after Finnish delegates failed to provide a suitable solution to his security concerns over the course of seven (?) meetings.
The British and French plans to help Finland in 1940 were made impromptu. There were no such in the fall 1939.Yuri wrote:The British strategy at the end 1939 beginning 1940 was to transfer operations on periphery of the European Theatre of war – in another way, the British strategy consist in that the fires of war blazed outside territory of France, that is on the Balkans and in Scandinavia.janner wrote: UK wanted to initiate a war in Finland – where is the evidence for this – after all our official records are also open now after the 50 year rule expired and someone would have mentioned it to Ironside in advance so he could have done a little planning.
The British strategists would act silly if did not exploit Soviet–Finnish frontier dispute.
Participation of Poles it is not enough probable, however, to reject completely the Polish trace in this business I did not hurry up.janner wrote: There is absolutely no evidence to support this point. In addition, the Polish Government in exile was in disarray at this time and hardly in a position to coordinate such a strike.
In 1939 the Polish Army bad, however, it was impossible to tell about the Polish investigation. Who – who, and Englishmen should know about it well.[/quote]
With that kind of logic, one could prove the moon is made of cheese.
Again. It does not deny that fact, that Stalin preferred a peace way of the decision of dispute.[/quote]janner wrote: All the evidence that I have seen published in reputable, internationally available works using Soviet and Finnish documents, points towards it being a Soviet action to allow Stalin to break off the non-aggression pact and initiate the invasion.
On the condition that he got what he wanted.
- Alex Yeliseenko
- Member
- Posts: 1119
- Joined: 25 Jan 2006, 16:40
- Location: RUSSIA
You too hurry up to do conclusions. You read results of investigation lieutenant colonel Inkala? One of the Finnish witnesses approved, that heard explosion mortar shell.Anne G, wrote:After the NKVD men presented their statement, these kind of arguments are ridiculous.Alex Yeliseenko wrote: At border the Finnish forces could have mortars. About mortars shots witnesses from the Finnish party speak.
If one thinks the situation in November 1939, the Finnish government was willing to have the common investigation made, as was agreed in the Non/aggression pact, but the Soviet government was not.
The data from the Finnish witnesses could take place only at performance of all below-mentioned conditions:Alex Yeliseenko wrote:At border the Finnish forces could have mortars. About mortars shots witnesses from the Finnish party speak.
- shooting was conducted with the Finn of territory;
- shooting was conducted from a mortar;
- the mortar settled down near to the Finnish frontier guard # 2;
- speed of flight of a mine was minimal of possible; - that is shooting was conducted with use minimal numbers charge bunches.
Well, I translated some info about the accident:Juha Tompuri wrote: I've allways thought that there were casualties.
Rather interesting information is contained in the article of Pavel Aptekar about Mainila accident. The article in russian is available here:
http://www.rkka.ru/analys/mainila/mainila.htm
According to Aptekar the only Red Army unit stationed in the vicinity of Mainila was 68th Rifle Regiment of 70th Rifle Division. The author has found the journal of operations of the regiment. This document contains a record that on 26th November in the result of fire from the Finnish side 3 were men killed and 6 wounded. However, as Aptekar asserts, the journal was compiled not synchronously with the events since it is signed by regiment commander captain Salnin, while at the first days of the war the commander of the regiment according to documents was colonel Rusetzky. So the record could be a falsification. Moreover Aptekar didn’t manage to found any records about the accidents in the synchronous documents: reconnaissance and operational reports of 70th Division and 19th Rifle Corps and reports about extraordinary events. And the most interesting thing, that the author has found, is the documents on numerical strength of 68th regiment for the last dates of November. It looks as follows (regular personnel/reservists):
25th November 932/2109
26th November 932/2109
27th November 932/2109
28th November 932/2109
29th November 932/2109
It’s evident that the strength of the regiment remained constant and so no confirmation of the losses suffered on 26th November can be found in these daily strength reports.
It is interesting to note that soviet commanders on the spot were simply unaware of the accident till evening 26th November. According to V. Baryshnikov (“From the cold peace to the Winter War”) the staff of 19th Rifle corps had known about the accident from Moscow radio. The operational report sent by the Staff of Leningrad Military District to Moscow at 10 pm 26th November didn’t contain any certain information about the number of the victims (and it seems from the record of cable conversation Baryshikov quotes that the District’s received the information about the accident from the General Staff itself). It said: “There are killed and wounded, their precise number is to be ascertained”. At the same time this number was already declared in Molotov’s communiqué to the Finnish Ambassador and in the report of Soviet radio.
Then the absence of the casualties is confirmed by the ovservations of the Finnish soldiers. That is an evidence of a Finnish soldier Oni Emil Savalainen:
“I was on the observation post on 26th November between 15.00 and 18.00. When I arrived at the post I heard a shot and after roughly 20 seconds I saw an explosion in the direction 15-00. The distance from the point of observation was roughly 1100 meters. About tree minutes later a man appeared at the place of explosion and then 5 or 6 others arrived. They examined the crater left by the explosion for about 3 minutes. Then nobody appeared on that place. As far as I can guess, the shots were made from Russian side from direction 18-00 or 19-00. Also the rifle shots were heard from that direction after the explosions.”
Taken from:
http://www.around.spb.ru/finnish/docs/dir0note.php
With reference to “Talvisodan historia. Porvoo-Helsinki-Juva. WS. 1977. Osa 1.”
Another evidence (corporal T. Haninnen):”when I and jager Sundvallwere on the hill Somerikko caring out observation, on 14.40-15.00 we heard and also saw in the village of Mainila south of the post situated there five explosions of the shells shot as I guessed from the small gun or mortar. The place where shells were falling was clearly visible. Before the start of fire there were ten soldiers and a horse there. They proceeded to the bridge in Yapinnen, and then the horsemen turned to the post, while the others continued to move to the bridge. Roughly after 5-10 minutes after the soldiers left their initial location, the fire began, nobody being on the place where shells fell. On 15.00 the patrol took turn and I left the observation point”
Jager U.Sundvall: ”After corporal Haninnen left other two shells fell on the same place as the previous ones. 10 minutes after the fire ended a soldier appeared on the place, but left it at once. But soon 5 or 6 men appeared, who were standing and examining the craters for about 2-3 minutes and then left. There were no signs that anybody was killed or wounded on that place."
http://www.winterwar.ru/history.htm
With refference to "Mainilan laukaukset. Toimittaja Raimo Seppala. 2 painos. Tampere, 1969, S. 113-119"
As the conclusion: there is no confirmation of any losses suffered on 26th November in synchronous Soviet documents, and no men killed or wounded in the result of shots were seen by Finnish observers.
Last edited by Art on 25 Jun 2007, 11:50, edited 1 time in total.
This looks more and more astonihing. So we have an alternative version of the accident. But if this version is true the question appears how the calcualtion of gun location by the difference between the times when the sound of shot arrived and when the exposion was registered was made by finnish officials. So I prefer not take it with some scepsisSeppo Koivisto wrote: Mainila shots were not shot by artillery, but artillery grenades were exploded in situ.
Last edited by Art on 25 Jun 2007, 11:49, edited 1 time in total.
Don't be hurry. Who are this NKVD men, what kind of evidence did they presented, to whom and when? If this information originated from I. Bunich then at should be thrown away without any reservations.Anne G, wrote: After the NKVD men presented their statement, these kind of arguments are ridiculous.
Sound technical evidence does not exist about the Mainila shots having been fired by the Finns -- no wonder the USSR opposed an impartial investigation, because they needed a formal excuse to start a war.
Would anyone please explain: as there is plenty of evidence how Finland took multiple measures not to escalate the crisis any further, why on earth would someone have come up with the idea: "hey, let's fire at the Soviets!"?
Even a trench mortar cannot be operated by an individual, there must be a mortar team. Who would wish to become responsible of starting a war? How could he persuade others to join him in doing it? The Finns made no mistake about the asymmetry of forces, the last thing they needed was war -- but Stalin did need one.
So one of the parties had no motive whatsoever, the other had strong motives to arrange this incident (and refused to let it be investigated).
Evidently the starting point of Soviet propaganda was that if you stage an absurd enough incident, over time anything beyond belief will gradually become the truth in people's minds.
It is also a ridiculous idea that a watertight cover-up could have been possible afterwards, if this incident had truly originated on the Finnish side. We are not corrupt today, we were not corrupt in 1939.
Would anyone please explain: as there is plenty of evidence how Finland took multiple measures not to escalate the crisis any further, why on earth would someone have come up with the idea: "hey, let's fire at the Soviets!"?
Even a trench mortar cannot be operated by an individual, there must be a mortar team. Who would wish to become responsible of starting a war? How could he persuade others to join him in doing it? The Finns made no mistake about the asymmetry of forces, the last thing they needed was war -- but Stalin did need one.
So one of the parties had no motive whatsoever, the other had strong motives to arrange this incident (and refused to let it be investigated).
Evidently the starting point of Soviet propaganda was that if you stage an absurd enough incident, over time anything beyond belief will gradually become the truth in people's minds.
It is also a ridiculous idea that a watertight cover-up could have been possible afterwards, if this incident had truly originated on the Finnish side. We are not corrupt today, we were not corrupt in 1939.
The source specified by you, first, is Bias, second, unreliabl.Art wrote: Another evidence (corporal T. Haninnen):”when I and jager Sundvallwere on the hill Somerikko caring out observation, on 14.40-15.00 we heard and also saw in the village of Mainila south of the post situated there five explosions of the shells shot as I guessed from the small gun or mortar. The place where shells were falling was clearly visible. Before the start of fire there were ten soldiers and a horse there. They proceeded to the bridge in Yapinnen, and then the horsemen turned to the post, while the others continued to move to the bridge. Roughly after 5-10 minutes after the soldiers left their initial location, the fire began, nobody being on the place where shells fell. On 15.00 the patrol took turn and I left the observation point”
Jager U.Sundvall: ”After corporal Haninnen left other two shells fell on the same place as the previous ones. 10 minutes after the fire ended a soldier appeared on the place, but left it at once. But soon 5 or 6 men appeared, who were standing and examining the craters for about 2-3 minutes and then left. There were no signs that anybody was killed or wounded on that place."
http://www.winterwar.ru/history.htm
Bias specifies the use of a word "execution" which, ostensibly, is present in a note of Zhdanov.
About unreliability speaks the following conclusion:
Such situation probably only provided that the observer is on a gun position or is very close from her.Thus, the interval of time between a shot from a mortar and break of the mine, to 20 seconds equal approximately could correspond(meet) to a distance of shooting in limits from 1500 up to 2000 m.
Moreover, this gun position of a mortar could be located only near to the observer who is taking place further of 1,5 km from a place of break. Such the observer was that Finnish frontier guard who has settled down to the north from Mainila.
In any case, all observers were in the Finnish territory - hence, the position of a mortar was in the Finnish territory.
However it not last nonsense.
The author of a site has assumed, that provocative shooting was conducted on limiting range without zeroing in on observable marks of break. It, excuse, clean madness.
In this case the deviation of breaks of mines is guaranteed against the purpose on hundreds and thousand meters.
-
- Member
- Posts: 760
- Joined: 20 Nov 2006, 23:49
- Location: Finland
The newspaper article says, that the observation was confirmed in 1989 by a military history lecture by A.M. Gorki at Scientists’ House. Maybe someone can dig the exact source.Art wrote:This looks more and more astonihing. So we have an alternative version of the accident. But if this version is true the question appears how the calcualtion of gun location by the difference between the times when the sound of shot arrived and when the exposion was registered was made by finnish officials. So I prefer not take it with some scepsisSeppo Koivisto wrote: Mainila shots were not shot by artillery, but artillery grenades were exploded in situ.
Some of the explosions were probably (meant to be) understood as muzzle blasts. Times and directions to muzzle blasts probably could be only rough estimations from the observer posts, at best, if they were not alerted to make such observations.
- Alex Yeliseenko
- Member
- Posts: 1119
- Joined: 25 Jan 2006, 16:40
- Location: RUSSIA
There is one more point of view on a problem. It was sounded by doctor S.Isotalo from Stockholm. According to its conclusions, no shots in Mainila at all existing. Finns have answered the Soviet provocation by the provocation.
" Thus, it is possible to approve, that false certificates of the Finnish frontier guards on the shots never made from any party, there were an occasion for the beginning wars ", - writes Isotalo.
Problem requires the further studying. But without policy.
It is necessary to study and " a party of war " in Helsinki. What were opinions in the Finnish society about opportunities of Red Army in 1939? Whether Finns Hoped for Uprising to Kareliyas, Komi? Whether then there was an idea of " Independent state Komi "? When we shall have answers to these questions, we can objectively look at a situation in the autumn of 1939.
Sorry, my bad English.
" Thus, it is possible to approve, that false certificates of the Finnish frontier guards on the shots never made from any party, there were an occasion for the beginning wars ", - writes Isotalo.
Problem requires the further studying. But without policy.
It is necessary to study and " a party of war " in Helsinki. What were opinions in the Finnish society about opportunities of Red Army in 1939? Whether Finns Hoped for Uprising to Kareliyas, Komi? Whether then there was an idea of " Independent state Komi "? When we shall have answers to these questions, we can objectively look at a situation in the autumn of 1939.
Sorry, my bad English.