Blunders of Finnish Military

Discussions on the Winter War and Continuation War, the wars between Finland and the USSR.
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Vaeltaja
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#16

Post by Vaeltaja » 27 Aug 2010, 19:37

It appears some of the related posts are in Blenheim thread...
Vaeltaja wrote:As for the coastal defense ships... There are some claims that (personal information) not all of the Navy were thrilled of those ships. As it lead to not having much else there either. Some claims were that the ships were the sort of a boasting effort (pullistelua) towards Sweden and the new Swedish coastal defense ships - that is if Swedes had some of those then Finns (government) felt they needed 'better' and therefore allowed the financing of coastal defense ships (& subs) even when other parts of the military budged were being minimized. Not sure how credible that claim is however.
Vaeltaja wrote:
Steady wrote:Had it been a summer war, coastal defense ships would have been invaluable in defending Ahvenanmaa from a seaborne assault. Had Soviets taken Ahvenanmaa, Finland's lifelines to the Europe would have been largely cut.
Had Soviets been seriously bent on landing on Ahvenanmaa then two slow and thinly armored coastal defense ships with ten inch guns would not have prevented them. There are quite good comparisons in "Meidän Panssarilaivamme" ("Our Armoured Ships") by Tauno Niklander where it is nicely represented that assuming rough parity in accuracy and without amazing flukes like with Bismark when firing at Hood both coastal defense ships would have been sunk in an encounter with heavy element (they did have two battleships) of the Soviet Baltic Fleet which would have suffered only minor to moderate damage - though it wouldn't certainly have been a free ride without risks.
Could add to the last the Niklander thought that coastal defense ships were a real threat to Soviet landing supported only by a cruiser sized ship (Kirov) but would have been outclassed by more than 1 cruiser or if enemy would have had even 1 battleship present in the engagement. And all of this assuming that torpedo equipped escorts of the cruiser(s) (and/or battleships) would have stood idle in the battle.


Also as a blunder - assuming what i have read is true - i could place the whole 'Naval Detachment K & Einsatzstab Fähre Ost' episode - both how it came to be and on what it achieved.

Jan-Christian
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#17

Post by Jan-Christian » 28 Aug 2010, 09:19

My 5 cents:
First: It's easy to critisize using hindsight. To me blunders means bad decisions (or no decisions) when the relevant facts where available when the desicion had to be made. The fact that it years later becomes appearent that a decision was wrong, does not make it a blunder!

Then, applying the the above to some previous statements in this thread:

1. The coastal defence ships could well be defended as a correct choise in the late 20s. Not building the escorts is another story..

2. Delaying the 20 mm antitank rifle was a major blunder.

3. Selecting the Blenheim bomber was a defendable decision, it's obsolecence 3 years later doesn't change that. There were quit a number of planes in many other airforces that didn't stand up to the test against the latest technology in 1940!

4. One of the basic principles pushed by general Adolf Ehrnrooth was to counterattack immediately, "better with two men after two minutes than with ten after ten minutes" was what he said. So maybe the Winter War quick counterattacs were not such a bad idea...

5. The Myrsky was a failure but that doesnt make the concept wrong. Sweden managed to design and build a similiar wooden fighter, J22, which was a success. Ok, it was an inspired design and the Swedich industrial base was on another level than Finlands, but still it should have been possible to do something along that line here.
(And most remarkably, the J22 was not designed by SAAB, where most of the Swedish aeroplane experience was located!)

6. There are a number of cases were Finnish officers should have been relieved of their posts because of alcohol problems or just pure lack of skills. ("Promoted above their level of incomptence") But in a small army competent officers is not an unlimited resource so you have to manage with what is available. It is easy to say that Laatikainen lacked some essential qualifications but on the other hand he was strong in some other. Whom should he have been replaced with and when? (And who should have replaced this replacee and so on...!) Don' take me wrong, I think his whole IV corps, and i particular its headquarters, needed a big shakeup in early -44. But that doesnt mean that replacing the boss is the only solution, just make sure his staff has the right qualifications tho compensate for his weaknesses!

Enough philosphy for know!
Jan-Christian


Steady
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#18

Post by Steady » 30 Aug 2010, 20:02

Vaeltaja wrote: Had Soviets been seriously bent on landing on Ahvenanmaa then two slow and thinly armored coastal defense ships with ten inch guns would not have prevented them. There are quite good comparisons in "Meidän Panssarilaivamme" ("Our Armoured Ships") by Tauno Niklander where it is nicely represented that assuming rough parity in accuracy and without amazing flukes like with Bismark when firing at Hood both coastal defense ships would have been sunk in an encounter with heavy element (they did have two battleships) of the Soviet Baltic Fleet which would have suffered only minor to moderate damage - though it wouldn't certainly have been a free ride without risks.

Could add to the last the Niklander thought that coastal defense ships were a real threat to Soviet landing supported only by a cruiser sized ship (Kirov) but would have been outclassed by more than 1 cruiser or if enemy would have had even 1 battleship present in the engagement. And all of this assuming that torpedo equipped escorts of the cruiser(s) (and/or battleships) would have stood idle in the battle.
I believe Nikander wrote a "anatomy of a ship" type book about the ships? And that in the end of the book was a hypothetical scenario about a fight between Soviet and Finnish ships.

Well, a couple points:

1) If the coastal defence ships were not meant for fight against Soviet ships, what were they meant for then? Obviously Finnish naval planners had done the best they could to develop a heavy firepower ship in order to have something with which to attack heavy Soviet ships.

2) During both the beginning of Winter War and Continuation War both coastal defence ships travelled to Ahvenanmaa. So in my opinion, thats proof enough. That was what they were built for: that was what they did.

Vaeltaja
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#19

Post by Vaeltaja » 30 Aug 2010, 22:37

They were indeed meant to fighting of Soviet naval force. And yes the armored ships were impressive sight - IMHO the best looking war ships Finns have ever had - and heavily armed. However they were not heavily armored and had bad seagoing ability. Biggest problem wasn't the quality of the armored ships though. It was total lack of supporting elements.

And yes the armored ships acted as mobile coastal artillery as there were no escorts available for them to operate in any other role. Lack of proper escorts and/or minesweepers was already sorely felt in 1941 though the loss of the Ilmarinen can not really blamed solely on lack of proper escorts.

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John Hilly
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#20

Post by John Hilly » 02 Sep 2010, 09:55

Vaeltaja wrote:They were indeed meant to fighting of Soviet naval force. And yes the armored ships were impressive sight - IMHO the best looking war ships Finns have ever had - and heavily armed. However they were not heavily armored and had bad seagoing ability. Biggest problem wasn't the quality of the armored ships though. It was total lack of supporting elements.
The construction of these "panssarilaivat" - "armoured ships" - was naturally full of compromises.

The most important ones were that the main Cannons must be as heavy as possible (in fact the heaviest in the world compared to the displacement ). :o
The second was that the displacement of the ships must allow sailing in very shallow waters.

The whole idea of these two ships wasn't to fight on the high seas, but hide in shallow waters the Turku-Ahvenanmaa archipelago and from there use their 10 inch guns against enemy ships approaching from the high seas, a kind of "Hide and seek".

This operational concept forced the designers to lighten the armour under the water level, leaving the ships vulnerable to mines and torpedoes.

This project with the building of submarines took most of the military funding in late 20's and early 30's.
It is a hindsight to question these decions made in a shadow of the great depression.

Btw, these decision were made before Mannerheim's nomination as the Chief of the Defence Council IIRC.

Greets
Juha-Pekka :milwink:
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"

Vaeltaja
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Re: Blunders of Finnish Military

#21

Post by Vaeltaja » 02 Sep 2010, 14:24

They did not only shave the underwater armor. Original side armor was designed as 100 mm thick - by usual rule this should be enough to shield it against 4 or even 5 inch guns (destroyer and the likes). What it actually got was 55 mm which would not protect it even against the standard main guns of aging WW I era destroyers (102 mm - 4 inch) let alone more modern destroyers (5 inch) unless the shots would come at a considerable angle. And it was roughly 1/3 to 1/4 of typical side armor of a coastal defense ship of its era. Whole design was lightly armored for its type. Only deck armor was adequate for its era if insufficient in reality - but that cant really be criticized. And the side armor was never meant to take torpedoes or mines - just enemy artillery shells. Torpedo/mine or underwater defense was build in deeper into the hull.

Väinämöinen (Niklander)
  • Conning Tower - 120 mm
  • Turret - 100 mm
  • Deck - 15 + 30 mm
  • Side - 55 mm
Niklander compares the ships armor to its contemporary cruisers and it seems like Väinämöinen is armored roughly like normal WW II era light cruisers - though several light cruisers had considerably thicker side armor - with the exception of conning tower and main turrets which had armor equivalent to average armor of a cruiser.

Of the underwater protection he criticizes the longitudinal bulkheads (pitkittäissuuntaiset laipiot) - though important in containing the damage - present in the design as they prevented the water coming in from a breach or a hole in the hull to spread around the damaged compared evenly. Instead of just sinking the ship a bit deeper the longitudinal bulkheads made sure it would a cause severe list to or even capsize the ship. He admits that ships as small as the coastal defense ships were could not really be protected against mines or torpedoes.

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