What If-Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

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Re: What If-Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

#316

Post by CanKiwi2 » 17 Feb 2012, 19:52

These are excerpts from the as yet-incomplete section on the Battle of Petsamo.

(And excuse the RAF roundels on the photos - haven't got around to substituing Ilmavoimat ones yet....)

The two Finnish submarines patrolling out of Petsamo launched a torpedo attack on the Red Fleet as it emerged from Murmansk. Already suffering casualties from the mines laid in the approaches to Murmansk, the first torpedo attacks crippled two destroyer escorts and a troop transport ship. A little later, the submarines had broadcast an alert by radio.

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First Blood to the Merivoimat Submarines....A Soviet Destroyer goes down...

…….
The Ilmavoimat responded in force. As the Soviet Ships were approaching the Rybachi Peninsula, the initial attack came in low at what passed for dawn in the Arctic Winter.
.........
Using the diversion of the air attack, the two Finnish submaries, who had used the long Arctic Night to surface and catch up with the Soviet fleet, recharging their batteries and reloading their torpedoe tubes, launched a fresh attack that went unnoticed in the chaoes engendered by the air strike. Approaching rapidly on the surface, they finished off two damaged troop transports with two torpedoes each, sending them to the bottom and leaving their troops drowning and freezing in the Artic Sea. Submerged, they closed slowly as the remnants of the Soviet Fleet attempted to get close enough to shore to unload onto the Rybachi Peninsula. Another two destroyers and a further troop transport were torpedoed before the remaining destroyers began a series of depth charge attacks that pinned the Finnish submarines down. As it was, between the submarines and the Ilmavoimat airstrike, the Soviet 104th Rifle Division had been eliminated before reaching the shore.

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Soviet Destroyer goes up early in the attack

Both Finnish submarines evaded the Soviet attacks and, their torpedoes expended, they entered Norwegian waters and, in an isolated Norwegian fjiord, linked up with a discretely pre-positioned Finnish “fishing trawler” provided them with reloads of torpedoes and filled their fuel tanks.
.........

The Battle of Petsamo

Yliluutnantti (1st Lieutenant) Juha Penttii hadn’t exactly been enthralled when, after completing his pilot training, he’d been sent to the first Skua squadron. Like every young pilot, he wanted to fly fighters. Even one of the old Fokker D.XXI’s would have been preferable to a Skua dive bomber. When he’d gone in to do his compulsory military service, he’d had no thought of becoming a pilot. “Do your twelve months in the Army,” his Dad had told him, “Then come back and Mr. Vertinen will take you on at the factory.” His Dad worked for a small factory in Tampere where they made parts for forestry machinery. “He’s expanding the factory, got some big orders, he told me he’d take you on.” Juha had nodded. It had seemed a good plan. Mr. Virtanen paid well, paid good overtime too, he was a good employer and he didn’t care about your political background like some did. His Dad had been a Red in the Civil War back in 1919. Had fought in the Red Guards for that matter, but they’d let him go after a short stint in a prison camp that he never talked about.

His Dad never did say much about that time. But Juha knew he didn’t like the Marski. “The old butcher” he used to call him, after downing a few shots. Juha thought that was a bit harsh. He admired the Marski. So he’d gone into the Army to do his compulsory military service. Done his six months of Basic Training through the first half of 1938. It had been tough. Tougher than Juha had expected, and he’d been in the Cadets all through Gymnasium. To his surprise, there’d been almost none of the military bullshit his Dad had warned him about. From the first, it had all been practical hands-on stuff. “Forget that parade ground crap,” their Training NCO had told them on Day One. “We’re not the English or the Germans, you’re not here to look pretty, you’re Finns and you’re here to learn how to fight.” And they had. Oh, how they had. Juha knew more ways than he cared to think about to kill someone. With a rifle, with a grenade launcher, a machinegun, with booby traps and explosives, with a knife, even with his hands. And he’d got fit and built muscle on the training and the food. At the end of his first six months, his Mum and Dad and younger brothers had looked at him in surprise. His Dad had whistled. “Whatever they did to you boy, you sure look the better for it.” The girls had thought so too.

He’d come back from his Leave and then there’d been the specialization selection process. His best friend in the Army, Erik, had all along planned on going for the Ilmavoimat. “Yeah, you gotta do two years,” he’d said, “but man, you can learn to fly a plane if you pass the Pilot Selection Board.” Juha had never intended anything like that. Another six months in the Army and he was done. But Erik had talked him in to coming along. “What the hell,” he’d said in the end, “Why not. They’ll only turn me down, my Dad was in the Red Guards, there’s not a hope in hell they’d take me as a trainee pilot even if I passed the tests.” Too his shocked surprise, he’d passed all the tests with flying colours and nobody had said a thing about his Dad, the Ylikersantti (Staff Sergeant) at the Placement Office had grinned as he’d shaken his hand. “Well done Sotamies (Private), this time next year I’ll be saluting you.” And off he’d gone.

He’d graduated after twelve months training. Including an Officers Training Course, of all things. He’d gone home on leave after six months of basic pilot training as Vanrikki (2nd Lieutenant) Penttii, resplendid in an Officers dress uniform. His younger brothers had looked at him in awe. His Mum had looked him up and down and then kissed him and hugged him. His Dad had looked at him and Juha could have sworn he’d blinked away tears before he’d said proudly, “never thought I’d see the day when my boy was an Officer in the Old Butcher’s Army.” “Ilmavoimat Dad, Ilmavoimat,” Juha had corrected him. “Ilmavoimat, Army, whatever. I’m proud of you son,” his Dad had said. And then, for the first time in Juha’s life, his Dad had taken him along to the local bar for a drink with his friends. Who’d been just as impressed, even if they’d given him shit all night for selling out the working class.

That was three months ago. He’d been with the squadron that long, one of the founding members in fact. He’d gtten over his disappointment about being assigned to a Skua Squadron, although his introduction to the Skua had been a bit hairy. But as he’d gotten used to the bird, he’d found he really enjoyed dive-bombing. It was designed as a dive-bomber and it was a good one. The pilot sat in a low-sided cockpit with really excellent visibility and the seat-adjustment ranged from almost sitting on the floor to standing upright. The dive brakes were amazing, the Skua dived slowly and, with practice, Juha achieved the highest practice scores in the Sqadron. His first dive bombing attempts proved just how suitable the Skua was for the job. With eight 11½ lb. practice bombs, diving from 3,000 feet and dropping them one per dive from 3,000 feet, he averaged (on three sorties) 22 yards (one direct hit), 24 yards and 17 yards (one direct hit). One of his greatest Skua dive-bombing triumphs occurred just before the war broke out. With is long experience, he held that the Skuas should attack targets--especially the Soviet Navy--by diving vertically. Ship's anti-aircraft guns, he argued, can seldom bear on a vertically diving aircraft and if the ship is rolling or pitching the chances of scoring a hit are nil. But the aircraft, especially a Skua, could easily hit the ship--and if the pilot knew that he was safe he could take plenty of time with his aiming.

He made one sortie against a Finnish Navy Destroyer - one of the newer ones just recently in service. He was armed with eight 1 lb. flour bombs (rock hard in paper bags after a few months in Ilmavoimat stores!). The destroyer fired live "bursts short "--in theory the shells exploded ahead of him! In seven dives he scored seven hits--and the "bursts short" were really "bursts wide." His eighth bomb hit exactly in the middle of the bridge- in fact it penetrated the chart table! Of course, it was a lucky hit -- He'd be the first one to admit it -- but the Navy were not amused.

And then he’d been asked to demo the Skua to the pilots who’d just been transferred in from Flying School to form the bulk of the second Skua squadron. They’d been a bit nervous after the first one of them to fly the bird had spun in on takeoff, damaging the aircraft badly and himself rather more badly in the process. The other new pilots, watching, had loudly declared that the aircraft was unsafe. Juha’s squadron leader had told him to prove that was bullshit to them. "Put on a demonstration," after all, he’d been reprimanded any number of times for flying the Skua like a fighter: "-and don't make it too hectic!" he warned him with his tongue in his cheek. Juha had landed primly, taxied back down the runway, turned into the wind and then he took straight back off. Directly the bird was airborne he slammed the undercart up, tipped her on her port wing, heaved back on the stick and took her over in a near-Immelman to 500 feet. Then he closed the throttle, lowered the undercarriage and flaps, slipped her through 180° from the downward leg almost dead over the runway into a final fishtail and three point landing on exactly the starting point he had left less than 60 seconds before. That, he thought, should show 'em that the Skua doesn't stall easily on take off.

For the next twenty minutes he enjoyed that rare thrill: a totally legal beat-up. He finished with his piéce de résistance – the one that the Squadron Leader had given him shit for when he’d done it to him. From 3,000 feet he half-rolled, with full flaps, and dived vertically- - vertically, not just steeply - at the growing crowd standing on the tarmac. At 500 feet they started to move; at 300 feet they were running wildly to dodge the seemingly crashing Skua. Then at 250 feet he eased her out of the dive, flattening out easily at 50 feet, and lifting those wonderful flaps for a zoom to gain altitude; no sign of squash or of high speed stalling. He would use that trick many times in the early days of the war to dodge trigger-happy pilots who were a bit vague on their aircraft recognition. Nothing could dive as slowly as a Skua, nor did he ever discover another aircraft which could pull out of a vertical dive at such a low level so safely. It was his favourite demonstration stunt.

He spent the next month working with the new pilots. Sitting down with the Squadron Leader, he’d worked out a training plan that had them working up and then he went on to train them. Hard. They all thought he was a bastard, one of the old school Officers from the old aristocratic families. That made him laugh. Six months later, the Squadron Leader handed him a set of tabs. ‘Congratulations Yliluutnantti Penttii,” the CO grinned, shaking his hand enthusiastically. The party in the Mess that night had been something else, even by Ilmavoimat standards. The two RAF pilots on attachment to help train the Finnish pilots had been under the table and completely unconcious before midnight. Juha was one of the few left standing.

(War breaks out).....

The CO had looked them over. “Our mission is to take out the Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet which has just left Murmansk,” he’d told them. “Intelligence says they’re heading for Petsamo with a Soviet Naval Marine Division embarked.” He grinned. “Our job is to make sure none of the bastards make it there. We fly out at midday for Rovaniemi where we’ll overnight and refuel. We’re going in at dawn tomorrow. All the Skuas dive-bombing from 30,000 feet, there’ll be a first wave of Blenheims and the Vihuris are going in low with guns and bombs to suppress any flak, a second wave to take out anything they missed and third wave to bomb. The SM79’s will be going in with torpedoes to take out the ships, we’ll get anything that’s left. We’ll have plenty of fighter cover.”

From 20,000 feet, Juha had a birds-eye view of the Soviet ships as the low-level attack went in. He didn’t have anything else to do, the Russians hadn’t provided their ships with any fighter cover and he could see his squadron’s escorting Hurricanes sitting up high on watch. They’d give him plenty of warning of any Soviet Fighters. The Blenheims and Wihuris seemed to be doing a good job down there, already at least two, maybe three Soviet ships had stopped dead in the water and another was belching smoke and flames. There was plenty of shooting going on down there but nothing coming his way.

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Ilmavoimat bomber going in and hitting them low....

The Forward Air Battle Controller came on the RT. “Green Bird Leader, you are cleared to attack. Concentrate on the troop ships. Over.” Juha flicked his RT to transmit. “Green Bird Leader acknowledging, cleared to attack, concentrate on the troop ships. Roger.”

He flicked to the squadron channel. “Green Bird Leader to all Green Birds, cleared to attack. Concentrate on the troop ships. Follow my lead. Over.” His nervousness dissipated instantly into a mood of grim determination. “Lets go fuck the bastards. Over.” Dive brakes now on, he half-rolled into a vertical dive, straight down, with all the time in the world to pick his target. There were half a dozen troop ships identifiable. As they dived, he farmed them out across the Squadron. Each flight of four concentrating on one ship. He had all the time in the world and the Russians didn’t even seem to notice his Skua’s coming. All the flak seemed to be concentrating on the SM-79’s going in on their torpedo runs, and the Blenheim and Wihuri gunships were doing their best to take out the anti-aircraft fire, which seemed to slacken noticeably as each wave screamed in.

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Photo sourced from: http://forum.valka.cz/files/blackburn_skua_2_.jpg
“Green Bird Leader to all Green Birds, cleared to attack. Concentrate on the troop ships. Follow my lead. Over.”

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Bombs striking around a Russian troopship....

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Russian troopship hit and on fire

The troopship he’d picked for his flight loomed closer and closer. He’d trained his squadron to bomb from point-blank range and then scream away just above the surface. His flight released almost simultaneously, four 500 pound bombs plunging straight down. His rear gunner came on the RT. “Three hit’s, one near miss, her back’s broken.” Juha lifted the dive brakes and concentrating on staying above the wave tops as he flew outwards, dodging a Soviet destroyer which didn’t even shoot at him. It seemed almost dead in the water and even as he glanced at it, a Wihuri screamed past him, nose seemingly on fire as the gunships 20mm cannon blazed a torrent of fire into the Soviet ship’s flanks. A voice came on the RT. “Green Bird Leader, this is Green Bird Four. I’m going in.” Juha glanced around and ahead. Martti’s Skua was pouring smoke from the engine, he could see flames inside the cockpit, yet Martti’s voice was calm, almost resigned. “Get out Martti,” someone yelled on the RT. “Too late for that,” Marttti came on one last time. “Have a drink for me tonight boys.” And as Juha watched, Martti put his nose down and flew his burning Skua straight into the bridge of a Soviet destroyer that was still fighting back, the resultant explosion destroying most of the destroyer;s mid-ships superstructure.

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A wounded Soviet Destroyer

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Another troopship hit......

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Red Army soldiers on a sinking transport ship ... waiting for a rescue that would never come.

Martti’s was the only aircraft lost, although not the only crew. One aircraft from the other squadron had been hit. It was the first plane to land, Lauri had told them his gunner was hit bad and so was he. He’d landed first, taxied off the runway and stopped. The rest of them landed, one by one, and each crew in turn gathered around Lauri’s aircraft. It was an unbelievable sight. He’d been hit by anti-aircraft fire, the rear gunner was dead, Lauri must have died right after landing, the fuselage was slashed to pieces with bullet holes everywhere, there was no windscreen or hood, no instrument panel, the top cylinder of the Perseus 12 had been shot clean away and there were nine bullet holes in just one propellor blade! And that plane had wallowed home--flying for at least one and a half hours with a dying pilot at the controls. Juha looked at the damaged plane. “Jesus, I didn’t realize they’re that tough,” he said, shaking his head.

They refuelled and rearmed before the CO came in. “Well done men,” he said. “We sank the lot, not one ship survived.” He looked around. “We lost two crews, the Blenhims two and two SM-79’s went in. No survivors. But it could have been worse.” He looked around again. “Now, against that, we sank six troop ships with an estimated 15,000 men on board, and we also sank six destroyers, two torpedo boats and two minesweepers. There were no survivors.” He smiled a little grimly. “Now we get to go back south and finish off the Soviet Baltic Fleet. We fly south at fourteen hundred hours.” Juha looked at his watch. Perkele, it wasn't even midday!

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Juha's flight of four Ilmavoimat Blackburn Skua's flew south down the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia that same afternoon.....
ex Ngāti Tumatauenga ("Tribe of the Maori War God") aka the New Zealand Army

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Aid and Assistance from France (continued)

#317

Post by CanKiwi2 » 27 Feb 2012, 23:53

Aid and Assistance from France (continued)

Arms and Artillery from France

And a note: thanks to http://www.jaegerplatoon.net and Jarkko for much of the information on, and photos of, the actual guns. All the alternative history around them is of course, mine.

Well prior to both the Winter War and the Defence Budgets of the 1930’s, the Maavoimat decided to test new and modern French field guns for possible further acquisitions intended to build up the Maavoimat’s artillery strength. To this end, four French Schneider-manufactured 76 K/22 (76 mm Cannon Model 1922) were purchased and arrived in 1926. Designed by Schneider in the early 1920’s, France didn't buy any as it had an enormous stock of surplus Canon de 75 modèle 1897 field guns on hand and as a result, the Schneider 76 mm Cannon Model 1922 was offered for export.The test guns were French export models manufactured specifically in 76.2-mm x 385R calibre for Finland, so they could use the same ammunition as the 76 K/02. The weight of the gun was 1,320kgs, maximum range was 12,000 meters, calibre was 76mm, shell weight was 4.82 to 6.35kgs.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.winterwar.com/images/GunsWrecoil/76k22c.jpg
The Schneider-manufactured 76 K/22 (76 mm Cannon Model 1922)

In addition, four St Chamond-manfactured guns in the same calibre, the model 76 K/23 (St. Chamond 76mm cannon model 1923) were bought for evaluation in 1926. This gun failed to meet expectations and no more were bought. The main weakness was that the carriage was too weak.

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Photo sourced from http://www.winterwar.com/images/GunsWrecoil/76k23c.jpg
The St Chamond-manfactured76 K/23 (76mm cannon model 1923)

In the end however, as will be mentioned in an upcoming Post on Maavoimat Artillery, the results of the evaluation of these guns had been disappointing and as the artillery arm of the Maavoimat was strengthened through the period between 1935 and 1938, a considerable number of the Skoda 75 mm Model 1935 Field Guns and a rather smaller number of the Škoda 149 mm K (149 H33) had been purchased. The Skoda 75 mm Model 1935 gun had been the Maavoimat’s light artillery weapon of choice - it was a mountain gun manufactured by Skoda Works, in Czechoslovakia (a variant was produced in Russia as the 76 mm mountain gun M1938) and Skoda delivered Finland a compatible 76mm version. The gun was light, easy to transport, could be broken down into 3 sections, and further broken down into ten horse loads (summer) or sledge loads (winter). The gun crew was given some protection by an armoured shield. As we will see, the Finnish Army had placed a large initial order with Skoda Works, the Czechoslovakian arms manufacturer, in 1935 with delivery scheduled over 5 years. Initial shipments commenced in mid-1936.

At the same time, the Maavoimat also licensed the design for the Skoda 76mm and Skoda worked with VTT (the Finnish State Gun Factory) to set up a production line. This was an involved process with specialised machinery and training required, resulting in the line being eventually up and running only by late 1937. Over 1938, approximately 100 guns were produced and even with the move to double shifts in late 1938 after the cancellation of the Skoda deliveries, output was raised by only 50% as there were serious bottlenecks in areas such as the supplies of barrel blanks and machined parts. In addition, contracts had been placed within Finland with Ammus Oy for the setting up of munitions production lines for both the Skoda 76mm and for the Bofors/Finnish designed and Tampella-built 105mm Howitzer.

Unfortunately for Finland, the Munich Crisis and the seizure and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia had led to deliveries of the Skoda 76mm being cut short as Germany took over all Czech arms output. Finland protested to Germany over this, but to no avail. Fortunately, payment was being made on delivery to Finland and while there were no financial losses involved, only 60% of the numbers ordered had been delivered when the order was abruptly curtailed. The planned TOE for artillery units being equipped with the Skoda 76mm was incomplete and as a result, in early 1939 the Maavoimat began looking for alternatives. In the end, this boiled down to the French as British manufacturing capacity was going towards equipping their own forces (although in the end, after the Winter War had started, they would sell artillery pieces to Finland) and France had the industrial manufacturing capacity and was willing (with suitable incentives to the appropriate French politicians – something that Finland reluctantly and rather distastefully arranged) to sell. The end result was the placement of two orders.

Schneider-manufactured 76 K/22 (76 mm Cannon Model 1922) – 100 ordered in March 1939, delivered between August and December 1939

In March 1939, an emergency order for 100 of the Schneider 76 K/22 (76 mm Cannon Model 1922) guns had been placed. The gun was not considered perfect but the French government had agreed to the sale and Schneider had agreed to rush the manufacturing through (although in practice they did no such thing). A first batch of 36 was delivered in August 1940 and the remainder of the order was delivered in December 1939, shortly after the outbreak of the Winter War.

Schneider 105 K/13 (105mm Cannon Model 1913 / Canon de 105 mle 1913 Schneider)

One of the Maavoimat’s major weaknesses that had been identified in the 1931 Defense Review was in Heavy Field Guns. This was a serious weakness in that without such guns, counter-battery capability and striking targets far behind enemy lines was impossible, placing the Maavoimat at a serious disadvantage in battle. Before the Winter War Finland had managed to improve the situation by buying a number of the Škoda 149 mm K (149 H33) guns from Czechoslovakia (again, the deliveries of these guns were cut short after the Munich Crisis). It had also proved possible to buy an additional 114 heavy field guns from the Germans (despite the somewhat icy relationship after the Skoda Works orders were cancelled). However, even after these purchases, Finnish long range artillery capabilities remained weak and were a source of serious concern, particularly as pressure and threats from the Soviet Union grew in intensity. The end result was that in conjunction with the March 1939 order for the Schneider 76 K/22 (76 mm Cannon Model 1922), the Maavoimat had contracted with the French government for the purchase of 150 pieces of the Canon de 105 mle 1913 Schneider.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/105K13_1.jpg
The Schneider 105 K/13 (105mm Cannon Model 1913)

The gun had its origins in the early 1900s when the French company, Schneider et Cie, began a collaboration with the Russian Putilov company. For this collaboration, it had developed a gun using the Russian 107 mm round, which was ordered by the Russian Army to be produced in Russia (though the initial batch of guns was made in France). Schneider then decided to modify the design for the French 105 mm round and offer it to France as well. Initially the French army was not interested in this weapon as they already had plenty of 75 mm field guns and not seeing the use, they ordered only a small number. However, the lighter 75 mm guns had proved of limited use in trench warfare of WWI and so the French army ordered large numbers of the L 13 S, which with its larger 15.74 kg (34.7 lb) shell was more effective against fortified positions. After the end of WWI, France had large numbers of these guns (some 1300 in all), many of which were considered surplus to requirements and so many Schneider 105 mm guns were sold or given away to various other countries, including Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Estonia. The gun was also manufactured under license in Italy, Poland and Yugoslavia.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/105K13_2.jpg
The Schneider 105 K/13 (105mm Cannon Model 1913) had a sturdy gun carriage.

The gun had a box trail, gun shield, wooden wheels with steel hoops (the maavoimat fitted rubber tired wheels on delivery) and a recoil system of hydraulic buffer + pneumatic recuperator independent from each other located under the gun barrel. The Breech System had a screw breech. Ammunition was the cartridge seated type with two propellant charge sizes and ammunition with reduced propellant charge. The guns were horse-towed with a maximum speed of about 10 km/h. Rate-of-fire was about 4 shots per minute. A Cannon Wagon was used in front of the gun when horse-towed and carried 14 shots for the gun. In France they remained in large-scale use even in 1940, when the Germans managed to capture about 700 of them. German military called the gun 10.5 cm Kanone 331 (f) and used them both as field guns and coastal guns.

The Finnish order of March 1939 for 100 of the Scheider 105mm Cannon Model 1913 was met with a single shipment of existing pieces from French Army storage depots. In addition, approximately 250,000 shells were supplied (again, from the large existing French stockpiles) and these were delivered in the Summer of 1939 by ship to Turku. In September 1939, after war with Poland had broken out, Finland placed an emergency order for a further 150 of the guns. After some considerable time, this was approved and a shipment of 12 guns was delivered in February 1940 together with 20,000 shells. In March 1940, an additional 38 guns together with a further shipment of 85,000 shells were shipped together with the Polish Division. The guns would enter service in May 1940. In Maavoimat service, they gained a reputation as an effective and durable artillery piece. They were only declared obsolete in the late 1960’s. The remaining 100 guns of the order would not be delivered.

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Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... inna_2.jpg
A French 105 mm M1913 Schneider gun, displayed in the Hämeenlinna Artillery Museum. The barrel of this particular gun was manufactured in 1918 and the gun carriage in 1916. The rubber tires were added after the gun was brought into Finnish service. The gun had a combat weight of 2,300kgs, a calibre of 105mm x 390R (cartridge seated ammunition) and a maxium range of 12kms. Shells weighed 14.9kg and were HE.

French Aid after the outbreak of the Winter War

The 90 K/77 (90mm Cannon Model 1877) – 136 of these were donated to Finland

France had lost the War of 1870 - 1871 was against Germany. One of the main reasons for that was that French artillery had not been as up to date as German artillery. This gave an impetus to the French to introduce new artillery weapons for their Army in the late 1870's. However, when in 1914 the French Army still found itself facing a shortage of \modern artillery weapons, the old "Mle 1877" and "Mle 1878" field guns were re-introduced for use even though they were verging on obsolete then. Over the course of WW1, France managed to replace most of these old guns with modern artillery pieces, but as the old "Mle 1877" and "Mle 1878" guns had served well and were still effective, they were carefully stored for possible future use by the Reserve units of the French Army. When WW2 started, the French considered issuing the old guns for use on theMaginot-line, but instead decided to leave them in their warehouses.

Despite the ongoing buildup of the Finnish Armed Forces through the 1930’s, there was still a shortage of Artillery within the Maavoimat when the Winter War started at the end of November 1939. The Maavoimat had built up a considerable strength in Artillery but with the first total mobilization in Finnish history, together with the arrival of thousands of volunteers, there was a serious shortage of artillery and ammunition. As a result of this situation, Finland was willing to buy just about any artillery any country was willing to sell and once more asked France about purchasing artillery. France refused to sell any modern artillery but with the political optics of being seen to assist Finland in mind, the French Prime Minister, Édouard Daladier advised that France was willing to donate large number of older "Mle 1877" and "Mle 1878" artillery guns (which the French no lionger had any use for) and that these guns could be delivered with large amounts of readily available ammunition. Large numbers of these guns were promised, and Finland gratefully accepted – particularly as they were being donated rather than sold.

Assembling and shipping the guns and ammunition took time. Not only did it take time to extract them from the storage depots in France, they needed to be moved to the docks, a suitable ship found and passage arranged. As it was, the first shipment of 24 guns (all the "90 K/77" model) reached frontline units only in mid-March 1940. These first guns were shipped from France to Narvik in Norway. From Narvik they were transported by rail through Norway and Sweden to the Finnish border at Torneå/Tornio. At Tornio they had to be reloaded onto Finnish trains, as the Finnish railways guage was different to the Norwegian and Swedish. Once in Finland, the guns were taken to artillery depots, where they were checked before being issued. These French guns proved to be in much better shape than the old Russian artillery pieces that the Finns already possessed - also originally introduced in 1870's. Not only were the guns in better condition, but the ammunition that the French ammunition supplied with the guns proved more reliable.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/90K77_1.jpg with permission
A French-supplied 90 K/77 (90mm Cannon Model 1877): Originally designed for direct fire only, they had later had been equipped for indirect fire capability. The gun had a box trail and wooden wheels with steel hoops. Ammunition used was the bagged-type typical of the period (the propellant was packed in bags and was loaded seperately from the projectile and primer). Even with the small caliber, these guns had a very slow rate of fire - only 1 shot per two minutes. France donated 100 of these guns together with 100,000 shells, primers and propellant. They weighed 1200kg, had a maxium range of 9.7kms and fired an HE shell weighing 8.2-8.4kg. A Goniometer, Aiming Ruler and Mirror were the usual instruments used for measuring the azimuth for these older French guns. Correct elevation was measured with a quadrant. Sometimes instruments had to be improvised: If the correct azimuth measuring instruments wasmissing or there was not enough light for using them, a Finnish military compass with its phosphorous needle could be used instead.

In the end, France shipped 136 of these guns and some 305,000 shells. The remainder of the guns and ammunition were shipped on on the two cargo ships that made up a part of the small convoy to Lyngenfjiord and would only arrive in early April 1940. They were still being unloaded when the Germans attacked Norway and the Maavoimat seized the Finnmark in a pre-emptive action that has been mentioned previously. By the time the remaining guns reached the front, the Maavoimat had established defensive positions that stretched from the outskirts of Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus, along the Syväri and thence to the Veininmeri (White Sea). The 90 K/77’s were not suitable for mobile warfare, being slow to move. Consequently, the Maavoimat decided to use them on the Syväri Fortifications, and there they served through to the end of the Winter War, by which time their ammunition had started to run low and a considerable number had been lost in action.

After the Treaty with the USSR had been concluded, a small number of surviving guns were used to augment existing Coastal Defence positions and were fitted to static fortification gun-carriages. The gun-carriage could be bolted either to a concrete structure or to a heavy timber frame. Some 50 carriages were ordered from the Värtsilä factory in late 1940. By late 1943, these had been completed and installed in a number of existing coastal battery positions although they were never used in action and were finally declared obsolete in the 1960’s. The guns not ear-marked for use were placed in storage. After WW2 ended, these guns became popular for monumental use.

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Photo sourced from http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/90K77k_1.jpg and used with permission
French-supplied 90 K/77 (90mm Cannon Model 1877) fitted to static fortification gun-carriage and used in Coastal Defence positions

The 120 K/78 (120 mm Cannon Model 1878) – 72 of these were donated to Finland

The 120mm Cannon Model 1878 was the medium-calibre French de Bange gun. The Fremch had continued to use these throughout WWI and they also saw some use with the Serbs. The gun was usually used with cingali wheel plates (known as "Centure de Roues" by the French) fastened to the wheels with in order to reduce recoil. The gun used bagged ammunition. The weapon also had a specially designed recoil reduction system, which was installed in end of the box trail. The wheels were usually wooden with steel hoops. The gun had been intended to be towed by 6 - 8 horses, but it was slow to tow (only about 4 km/h) and getting the gun ready to fire once it had arrived in its position took about an hour. In the French use the average rate of fire for this gun was about 1 shot per minute (or 46 - 50 shots per hour).

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/120K78_1.jpg and used with permission
The 120 K/78 (120 mm Cannon Model 1878): France donated 72 of these guns early in the Winter War together with 96,000 shells. They weighed 3750kg, had a maxium range of 12.4kms and fired an HE shell weighing 18.8-20.0kg. The entire shipment arrived in early April together with the bulk of the 90 K/77 guns. They were issued to artillery units and usage was all on the Karelian Isthmus, where the heaviest of the Red Army offensives took place. As usual the gun was turned around to the correct azimuth by prying the end of the gun trail with crowbars. The aiming system was on top of the breech and a mirror used for determining the correct azimuth was on the left side of the gun carriage. In the early 1930's the Poles developed an improved version by installing the barrels of this 120-mm French gun onto the carriages of Russian 152-mm howitzers. The resulted combination was called "120mm wz. 1878/09/31" and "120mm wz 1878/10/31" by the Poles – and was also used by the Finns during WW2, becoming known as the "120 K/78-31" in Finland.

The Maavoimat had shortage of heavy long-range cannon and the 120 K/78’s were often used in roles which in other Armies were usually carried out using modern heavy cannon or howitzers. Finnish soldiers found the guns to be surprisingly accurate and with quite effective HE projectiles. The Maavoimat usually transported the guns with trucks. Towing the whole gun proved somewhat problematic, so the barrel was usually removed and transported in the truck while the rest of the gun was towed. The lifting ring on top of the gun barrel was useful for removing the barrel and reinstalling it, but a small crane was needed for the job – meaning the guns were not at all mobile. With hard training and experience Finnish gun crews also managed to raise the rate-of-fire to 2 shots per minute.

The guns saw heavy use on the Isthmus, in particular during the Red Army’s summer offensive – when 16 guns had to be left behind in June 1940 when Finnish troops temporarily retreating in the face of overwhelming Red Army numbers had to withdraw rather faster than anticipated. And in the final Soviet attacks of late August 1940, a Soviet unit managed to surprise the 78th Fortification Artillery Battery in the Karelian Isthmus sector, capturing its guns and taking two of them back to their own side of frontline. These guns fired their last shots of the Winter War on 24th of September 194, after which they were placed in storage.

The 155 K/77 (155 mm Cannon Model 1877) – 48 of these were donated to Finland

France had introduced two versions of the 155-mm de Bange gun in the late 1870's. From those two this was the long-barrelled version. Like other French de Bange guns they saw use during WW1 and the French kept them stored after that. They were the heaviest and largest-calibre cannons of the French de Bange artillery system. The basic structure of the gun was same as used in other smaller-calibre models: The gun had a de Bange screw breech and box trail. As typical the ammunition used was bagged type. But the gun also had steel wheels instead of the usual wooden ones.

During the Winter War France donated 48 guns of these guns and 48,000 shells to Finland. The Finnish military found the gun to have effective projectiles, good accuracy and quite a good range, but the bulk and weight of the gun made both using and transporting it difficult. Because of the shortage of heavy long-range guns the 155 K/77 guns were often used in roles such as counter-artillery, for which better equipped Armies used modern heavy guns and gun-howitzers. The transport method used was the same, as that used with the 120 K/78 guns. The barrel of the gun was usually placed on the truck body and the same truck towed the gun carriage.

The guns first saw use in battle on the Karelian Isthmus following which they were given to Syväri (Svir) Fortification Battalions, which used them until the Soviet offensive started on the Syväri/Svir in June/July 1940. The old guns were not a priority and there was little transport capacity available for transporting the old and heavy 155 K/77 guns to safety. So as they retreated the Finnish troops demolished 24 of the guns and left them behind. Very likely this was the last time in the whole world for cannons which had no recoil system to be used in battle.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/155K77_1.jpg
The 155 K/77. Notice the wheels, which have a rather unique look

The 155 H/15 (155 mm Howitzer model 1915, St Chamond) – 24 purchased from France

The French Saint-Chamond factory had designed this howitzer for the export market, but when WWI started the French Army instead becmme the main customer for this howitzer. Depending on the source, some 360 - 390 of these howitzers were manufactured for the French Army during WW1. However the Canon de 155C, mle 1917 Schneider Howitzer manufactured by the competing Schneider factory proved better during the war, so the manufacture of this Saint-Chamond howitzer was stopped. However, thse Howitzers already manufactured remained in use with the French military until 1940, when the Germans invaded France. The German military captured almost 200 of these howitzers intact (and reissued large number of them for their own units, mostly to coastal defences located in France).

Certain characteristics of the howitzer were quite advanced for its time: It had semi-automatic breech mechanism with a vertical sliding breech block, which ejected the used cartridge case after firing a shot. The Elevation system of the howitzer didn't tilt the barrel (as was usual), but lifted the forward part of gun carriage up from the axle. Instead of the usual dial-sight, the howitzer had collimator and angle-director as sights. It also had a conventional box trail (with a hole in middle for achieving more elevation), wood wheels with steel hoops and a recoil mechanism with a spring / hydraulic buffer / recuperator system located below the barrel. The gun shield was unusually low and gave only limited protection to the crew. Rate of fire was around 2 - 3 shots/minute.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/155H15_1.jpg
The 155 H/15 weighed 3,040kg, had a range of 6.9-9.0 kms, a caliber of 155mm x 250R (cartridge seated ammunition) and a shell weighed 43-43.5kgs.

Finland bought 24 of these howitzers from France during the Winter War. Depending on the source either 20,000 or 32,000 shots were bought with these howitzers. The howitzers arrived in early March 1940 and were issued to Heavy Artillery Battalions 27 and 29, who used the howitzers over the remaining 6 months of the Winter War to considerable effect. None of the howitzers were lost in battle. As mentioned the ammunition used was the cartridge seated type with six propellant charge sizes. The only kind of ammunition Finnish manuals list for these howitzers was the high-explosive (HE) type.

155 H/17 Tuhkaluukku (155 mm Howitzer Model 1917 "ash box door" / (Canon de 155 C, mle 1917 Schneider)

This howitzer was related to another Schneider design, the Russian 6 dm polevaja gaubitsa sistemy Schneidera (152 H/10) heavy howitzer. The howitzer first entered service with the French Army in 1917 and soon proved an excellent artillery weapon. A little more then 2,000 were still in use with the French Army in 1939 – 1940, although a considerable number of these were either warehourse or inventoried as parts. The howitzer was also sold very successful abroad. It was known as the "155 mm Howitzer M1917" in the United States, where the howitzer and its improved version, the "155 mm Howitzer M1917A1" were manufactured under license. In Poland the howitzer was known as the "155 mm Haubica wz. 1917" and in Italy it was known as the "Obice de 155/14 PB". Some where also delivered to Russia, where the Soviets later modified them to a caliber of 152.4-mm (this version is commonly known as the "152-17S"). Other user countries included: Belgium, Brazil, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. Being so numerous and widely spread, large number of these howitzers fell into German hands when they occupied these countries. The Germans called the most numerous version (previously owned by France) the "15,5 sFH 414" and the Soviet version the "15,2 cm sFH 449 (r)". The captured howitzers saw use with both German Field Artillery and coastal defence.

The howitzers basic design was quite conventional for its time. It had a box trail (with the usual hole in the middle of it), a screw breech, a recoil system with a hydraulic buffer and pneumatic recuperator and a curved gun shield. The wheels were wood with steel hoops. The howitzers were equipped so as to be suitable for both motorised towing and being towed with horses. A Limber was used while towing it with horses - this could also be used in slow motorised towing. In Maavoimat use, for faster motorised towing the howitzer had a Finnish-made special limber with pneumatic tires and a separate towing arm. During wintertime the maavoimat could also use its own special sledge in front of the howitzer to make towing of the howitzer on snow covered roads easier. The maximum speed for towing with horses was 8 km/h and maximum speed in motorised towing but without the special Finnish-made limber for motorised towing was only 10 km/h. The Finnish-made special limber allowed motorised towing with speed of up to 20 km/h. The weight of the howitzer when ready for transport was about 3,800 kg and the limber used with horses weight an additional 415-kg. The rate of fire for this howitzer was about 3 shots/minute.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/155H17_1.jpg
The 155 H/17 heavy howitzer. The 155 H/17 weighed 3,300kg in action, had a range of 10.3 – 11.0 kms, a caliber of 155mm, used cartridge seated ammunition and a shell weighed 43-43.6kgs. The Finnish manuals list all ammunition for this howitzer as being of the high explosive (HE) type with 7 propellant charge sizes (both full-charge and reduced-charge versions of propellant charges existed).

Finland bought 166 of these howitzers from France, with the order placed in December 1939. The first batch, which arrived in February of 1940, contained 15 howitzers. The remaining 151 howitzers were delivered in March 1940 together with a large quantity of shells (numbers not available, but despite heavy use there were large stocks of shells in existence after the Winter War ended so the shipment must have been of considerable size). Many of them arrived in very poor shape and it is entirely possible that the French had put them together from spare parts that were not part of the official inventory. However, the Maavoimat rapidly repaired them for operational use and they would go on to be heavily used by the Finnish Field Artillery over the remainder of the Winter War.

They were issued to five Heavy Artillery Battalions (1st, 20th, 25th, 26th and 29th) and saw use with no less then eight Field Artillery Regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 11th and 14th). Finnish soldiers liked the howitzer, even if the seals of its recoil system caused problems in winter and some gun carriages broke down. According to original documents at least 14 howitzers were lost in battle over the summer of 1940. Five of them belonging to Heavy Artillery Battalion 20 were lost on the 10th of June. The other lost howitzers were seven howitzers belonging to Field Artillery Regiment 3 and two howitzers belonging to Field Artillery Regiment 11, which were all lost in fighting on the Syvari front. After WW2 the howitzers remained warehoused for possible wartime use and in live-fire training use. The original wheels were replaced with new twin wheels with pneumatic tires in the 1960's. As the amount of already manufactured ammunition was quite large the howitzers remained in live-fire training use until the 1980's.

75 K/97 "Marianne" (75 mm Cannon Model 1897 / Materiel de 75, Modele 1897) – 48 purchased from France in early 1940

This French gun was the first field gun equipped with a modern recoil system and thew first field gun designed around the quick-fire concept. At the time France and Germany were having an arms race of sort. The French received (false) intelligence data claiming that the Germans had developed a field gun with a successful recoil system – and decided that they also had to get their own version of this, and fast. The vital buffer/recuperator system using oil and compressed air was based on an earlier design by Belgian Colonel Locard. Otherwise the gun design can be credited to French officers Colonel Albert Deport and Captain Sainte-Claire Deville. In recoil the gun barrel ran on top of 6 pairs of rollers with bronze sleeves being used as the sliding surface. The gun had a shield, the top part of which could be folded. The gun also had the typical wooden wheels with steel hoops. The wheel anchors were used to lock the wheels during firing and removed the last bit of recoil - because of this the gun, wich used a Nordenfelt screw breech, could achieve rate-of-fire as high as 20-shots/minute.

The gun proved to be excellent direct fire weapon and became the pride of the French field artillery before World War 1. However, the gun was not exactly easy to manufacture as some parts demanded a very exact fit. Despite this the Schneider factory manufactured an estimated 16,000 - 17,000 of them. During WW1 the admiration and trust that the French had placed in their excellent Materiel de 75, Modele 1897 proved to have its downside - the French Army had neglected developing heavier artillery, which proved to be vital against an entrenched enemy. As the French Army also lost their 75-mm guns in large numbers during the early part of WW1, they had to reintroduce older guns without recoil systems back into combat. During its versatile career the gun was adapted as a self-propelled artillery piece, for aircraft (B-25 bomber) and as an antiaircraft-gun. After WW1 the largest modification the French introduced for these guns was replacing the original wheels with ones that had rubber tires and but even this was not done for all guns. The French did introduce the modernized split-trail version, the Canon de 75 mle 97/33 in 1930's, but only in relatively small numbers.

Another large manufacturer of these guns was the United States, which acquired some 4,300 of them during World War 1 and kept using their own versions, the 1897A2 and 1897A4 during World War 2, (although the gun didn’t serve the US military as an actual field gun for long in that war). Other users included Estonia, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Romania. During WW2 the Germans captured French 75mm model 1897’s in many countries, with the largest numbers being about 1,000 in Poland and an estimated 3,000 - 4,000 in France. The Germans old some of the captured guns to Romania. After facing KV- and T-34 tanks on the Eastern Front the Germans found they had an immediate need for large-calibre anti-tank-guns. In 1942 they manufactured about 600 7.5 cm Pak 97/38 (75 PstK/97-38) anti-tank-guns by combining a re-chambered barrel from the French 75-mm model 1897 with the gun carriage from the 5.0 cm Pak 38 (50 PstK/38). Names used by some users:
• Poland: 75 mm armata polowa wz. 97/17
• Great Britain: Ord. QF 75 Mk 1
• USA: 75 Gun M 1897
• Germany: 7,5 FK 231 (f) and 7,5 FK 97 (f)
The gun remained in French use until the 1960's and in use even longer in some third world countries. It has been estimated that this gun might be the most numerous field gun model manufactured anywhere in the world.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/75K97_1.jpg
The Maavoimat’s 75 K/97 "Marianne" (75 mm Cannon Model 1897 / Materiel de 75, Modele 1897): With a caliber of 75mm x 350R (fixed ammunition), the weight in action was 1,140kg, maximum range was 7.9 km but with reduced charge ammunition the range was around 6.3 - 6.4 km. Muzzle velocity was 550m/sec and ammunition weight was 6.3-7.8kg (HE) and 6.4-6.1 kg (AP). The gun was designed to be horse-towed (but the Finnish troops sometimes transported it on the back of a truck) with a maximum speed of about 8 km/h. A Limber was used with the gun when horse-towed, this weighed 830 kg loaded and carried 27 shots for the gun.

Following the Munich Crisis, Finland drastically increased defence spending in all areas. In assessing the threat posed by the Red Army, it was evident that the large amroured formation and the many thousands of tanks the Red Army could mobilize would pose a considerable threat. While Maavoimat had ordered 37mm anti-tank guns from Bofors, and a Tampella version was also being manufactured under license, there was still a serious shortage of these particular weapons throughout the Maavoimat. In addition, the Maavoimat had started having doubts about the effectiveness of the Bofors 37mm during Spanish Civil War, hence the conversion program that had been initiated to convert the Bofors 76mm into an antitank gun in early 1938. Unfortunately, there seemed to be nothing else as effective available on the arms market that Finland could buy and so the Maavoimat began looking at alternatives. Germany declined to sell (although there were some exceptions) but France, a leading manufacturer of artillery and guns of all sorts, was amenable.

A suggestion was made (the origins of the suggestion are unknown but may have been from a Maavoimat artillery officer familiar with the then highly secret project to mount a Bofors 76mm in a turretless version of the Czech LT-38 that the Maavoimat had purchased a license to manufacture) that a number of the old Materiel de 75, Modele 1897’s in stock could be taken and modified for use by the Finns – an attractive proposition for the French as it meant they would sell weapons that had no real value except as scrap and in addition, could make money from the Finns by refurbishing them and fitting them to new carriages. Many of the guns in stock had barrels that were in a terribly worn down condition, causing dangerously large dispersion when used to shoot indirect fire from long range. However, they were available in large quantities and they were cheap. In the original configuration these guns were ill suited for fighting tanks because of their relatively low muzzle velocity, limited traverse (only 6°), and lack of a suitable suspension (which resulted in a transport speed of 10–12 km/h).

Scheider proposed to solve the traverse and mobility problems by mounting the 75 mm barrel on a modern split trail carriage. To soften the recoil, the barrel would be fitted with a large muzzle brake. The gun was primarily intended to use HEAT shells as the armor penetration of this type of ammunition doesn't depend on velocity (the 75 had a fairly low muzzle velocity of 550m/sec meaning it would have insufficient performance with an AP shell). And even with HEAT, the gun would have a low effective range – only about 500m. Finland had agreed to the French/Schneider proposal in February 1939, signing an order for 250 guns. The Schneider factory began refurbishing and rebuilding the guns and building gun carriages based on a design provided by the Maavoimat (who had in turn acquired this somewhat surreptitiously from the Germans through personal connections).

Work progressed slowly, with the first 48 guns and 50,000 HEAT shells delivered in July 1939. Thereafter, August saw the delivery of 52 guns and a further 50,000 shells, whilst in September another 40 guns were delivered. The outbreak of war between Germany and France put a hiatus to deliveries for some two months, but on the outbreak of the Winter War, the French Government saw fit to permit delivery to go ahead and the remaining 110 guns together with 150,000 HEAT shells were delivered in late December 1939. When the French delivered the guns to Finland in late December, they arrived disassembled but with two teams of advisors to help the Finns assemble and train with them. The first team, the "artillery equipment team" lead by Captain Garnier was quite small (2 officers + 3 NCO) and had the task of assisting the Finns with assembling the guns and preparing them for use. The second team, the "artillery training team" commanded by Lt.Col Dion was much larger (25 officers + 27 NCO) and was assigned the mission of training the Finnish troops in the use of the French guns. Both of these teams returned to France in May - June of 1940, by which time all 250 guns were already in service.

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Photo sourced fromL http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/75PstK9738_1.jpg
The Schneider-designed 75 PstK/97-38 "Mulatti" (75 mm antitank gun M/97-38 "Mulato"), derived from the 75 K/97 "Marianne" (75 mm Cannon Model 1897 / Materiel de 75, Modele 1897) and modified for the Maavoimat, this was an effective ant-tank gun during the Winter War. Together with light weight, good mobility and sufficient anti-armor performance with the HEAT shell (enough to penetrate a T-26 in most situations; the side armor of a KV could also be pierced), the gun was a decent anti-tank weapon. Some 140 were in service with the Maavoimat on the outbreak of the Winter War. A further 110 entered service through Jjanuary 1940.

The Maavoimat had three kinds of anti-tank-capable ammunition for these guns on the outbreak of the Winter War:
• 75 pspkrv 59/66-ps (French M/1910 APHE projectile with picric filling).
• 75 psa - Vj4 (AP-T projectile with 4 second tracer).
• 75 hkr 42-18/24-38 (Finnish 38 Hl/B HEAT-projectile).

The 75 pstpkrv 59/66-ps shell weighed 6.4 kg and had a muzzle velocity of 570 m/sec. The additional page concerning this ammunition was added to Finnish military manuals on the 1st of September 1939 (but was likely acquired a month or two earlier). This French pre-World War 1 APHE-shell achieved about 60-75mm armour penetration when fired from close range. The AP-shell – the 75 psa - Vj4 was more a modern AP-tracer design. It had a projectile weighing a bit under 6.1 kg and a muzzle velocity of 590 metres/second. A page containing information about this ammunition was added to Finnish military manuals on the 20th of November 11939, but as usual the actual ammunition had probably been introduced month or two before that. However firing of the "75 psa - Vj4" round was recommended in extreme emergency only – the recoil generated by the AP-rounds was fearsome and the gun carriage was not strong enough to endure a lot of shooting with this ammunition.

The recommended antitank ammunion was the Finnish designed and Ammus Oy manufactured HEAT-shells. This ammunition had warheads capable achieving about 60-75mm penetration from 60-degree point of impact when used at close range (500m or less). The gun was introduced into service in November 1939 and worked well in Finnish hands. The short shooting distances typically offered by Finnish terrain made them relatively effective even against the heavily armoured KV tanks. Against the lighter Soviet tanks that were used in large numbers during the Winter War, they were lethal.

Subsequent to the outbreak of the Winter War, Finland attempted to purchase more of the “modified” 75’s. The French government declined but offered to sell Finland 48 unmodified guns together with 50,000 shells. The Finns accepted, with 12 arriving in March 1940 and the remainder in April. The guns were in the same poor condition as the earlier ones had been prior to refurbishing. None of these guns were used during the Winter War and in 1941 they were scrapped.
ex Ngāti Tumatauenga ("Tribe of the Maori War God") aka the New Zealand Army


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Re: What If-Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

#318

Post by CanKiwi2 » 27 Feb 2012, 23:53

Other French Aid

In addition to the artillery and artillery shells listed above, France would also supply Finland with large quantities of machineguns, machinegun cartridges, rifles and 20,000,000 rifle bullets as well as more than 100 Brandt 81mm Mortars (similar to the Maavoimat’s Tampella-built 81mm Mortars, so we will not look at these in any detail here). Artillery Tractors and huge numbers of handgrenades were also supplied. Finland would have good reason to be grateful to France for what was in fact significant quantities of aid – not least among them the aircraft, two destroyers and artillery.
Some of the equipment supplied as aid was perhaps not particularly useful. In this category fell the 5,000 M/15 Chauchat 8 mm light machinegun (Fusil Mitrailleur Mle 1915). A small number (15 or so) of Chauchat light machineguns had accumulated in the hands of the Finnish Armed Forces by the end of the Finnish Civil War in 1918. Certain photographs suggest that they may have been captured from the Russians, but some the Finns may have received from the Germans.

At that time the Finnish military wasn't really interested in them and in 1937 they were sold abroad. During the Winter War the military equipment constraints that the maavoimat were under led to the second coming of these dubious weapons, as France "generously donated" some 5,000 Chauchat light machineguns and 10 million rounds of ammunition for them to Finland. The weapons were delivered to Finland in February - March of 1940. Due to the shortage of equipment that had resulted from a combination of full mobilization and the unforeseen volume of volunteers, many of them equipped with either no weapons (many of the Polish volunteers rescued from Latvia and Lithuania) or lightly armed with individual weapons only, the Maavoimat was desperate for additional support weapons. As a result, the Chauchat light machineguns were issued to some unfortunate front-line units of volunteers.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.jaegerplatoon.net/PK_M15_1.jpg
The French Chauchat m/1915 was one of the very first light machineguns. While it was cheaper to manufacture than its direct competitors, the Madsen and the Lewis guns, unfortunately the inexperience of its manufacturer showed in its quality.

Three French gentlemen - Chauchat, Ribeyrolle and Sutter - developed the Chauchat light machinegun, in fact the three first letters of it’s other name (C.S.R.G.) used for this weapon came from first letter of the surnames of these gentlemen. Chauchat was the main designer and Ribeyrolle his assistant. Sutter was an engineer and the owner of the Gladiator bicycle factory, the manufacturer of this weapon, from which the last letter "G" in C.S.R.G. originated. While the idea of giving the task to manufacture the new weapon to bicycle factory instead of further burdening the existing armaments industry with it may have looked good early on, in this case the outcome didn't go too well. In fact the outcome suggests that using established armament production facilities for manufacturing might have beem a more sensible choice for the introduction of a totally new type of weapon.

While the French were able to issue the Chauchat in large numbers during World War 1 (and it was certainly better than no light machinegun at all) it also proved to be quite a poor military weapon. The inexperience of the manufacturer was not the only reason for this. It used a long barrel-recoil system, which with hindsight can be considered maybe the most difficult option for a self-loading weapon to get work reliably. In addition the weapon’s magazine, which had large holes in its sides, was not really a well thought out design for use in muddy trenches either. The ergonomics of this light machinegun left a lot to be desired and the bipod, with its stick-shaped legs, likely didn't work too well on soft surfaces either. Not only was this weapon unsuitable for war in the trenches of the Western Front, it was also unreliable and parts were not interchangeable. Despite these flaws, manufacturing of the Chauchat continued from 1915 to 1924. While other early light machineguns also had their own share of issues, the Chauchat became obsolete practically in record time as other and better light machineguns became available.

By World War 2 practically every country in the world (including Finland) had better light machineguns. Still, the Chauchat continued to be used by France, Greece, Belgium and also by USA (the US used a version chambered for .30-06). The weapon had a flash hider at the end of the barrel and a tangent-type rear sight with settings 2 - 20 (for 200 - 2000 meters). Its selector switch had the typical three settings: C for semiautomatic-fire, M for full-automatic fire and S for safe. The 5,000 machineguns delivered to Finland also seem to have included antiaircraft-sights. The rather unique 180-degree arch shaped 20-round magazine weighed 910 grams fully loaded, while the empty one weighed 360 grams. As mentioned, these machineguns were issued to a number of unfortunate volunteer units and were roundly cursed almost from the start. At the earliest possible moment they were replaced with captured Soviet light machineguns (of which the Maavoimat soon had large numbers available) and were therafter only used by home-front units and some field artillery units. These might have found them marginally more useful, since they had been delivered with anti-aircraft sights and even with their slow rate of fire they were more effective against strafing ememy aircraft than shooting with bolt action rifles or throwing stones. After WW2 the Maavoimat’s Chauchat light machineguns remained warehoused until 1955 when selling them abroad began. The last ones were sold to Interarmco in 1959 - 1960.

Note: Once again, I should mention that information on the Chauchat, as with many other weapons mentioned here, is sourced from http://www.jaegerplatoon.net – with thanks to Jarkko for permission to reuse – all mistakes are however mine, as is the “alternative history” of the use of these weapons.

The last item of French Aid that we will look at in detail are the French supplied Artillery Tractors. Finland had brought a number of Artillery Tractors from France in the late 1930’s with the French Loan of 1937 (we will look at this loan and the equipment that was purchased in a bit more detail in a later Post). As part of the aid shipments that were received from France in February – March 1940, included were some 137 Latil M2Tl6 Artillery Tractors which augmented those already purchased in 1937. These were used for towing the Skoda 76mm Artillery pieces, Bofors 37mm Anti-tank guns, Bofors 40mm and 76mm AA guns and the small number of German-supplied 88mm AA guns that the Finns had managed to acquire. Some were also used by Mortar Platoons and Mortar Companies (with a trailer, they could easily carry either an 81mm or 120mm Mortar, Mortar Team and first-line ammunition supply). They were also used to tow Searchlights, Sound locators and (as they entered service) the new Nokia Radars. Relatively cheap and quite capable when towing lighter equipment, they equipped a large number of Maavoimat units and served until well after WW2. In one of the war-time emergency projects for which Finland had carried out some pre-planning and contingency preparation, a derivative of these vehicles was built by the Ford Helsinki plant after France was cut off as a source of supply.

Latil was a French automaker specializing in heavy duty vehicles, such as trucks, tractors and buses, from 1898 to 1955. In 1897, Auguste Joseph Frederic Georges Latil patented a system of "broken transmission", allowing the steerable wheels to also be the driving wheels (front-wheel drive). He went on to exploit his idea through different companies on the early years of the development of motor transport. In 1898 he founded "La société Korn et Latil" with a mechanic, Alois Korn, in Marseille. They invented a system that could be used to replace the steering axle of horse towed wagons with a motorised component. In 1903 the firm changed its name to "Avant-Train Latil" and had great success motorising all kinds of horse powered wagons. In 1908 Charles Blum joined the company, which became "Compagnie Française de Mécanique et d'Automobile - Avant-Train Latil" and began to build 3 ton trucks. In 1911, Latil designed and built the first four-wheel drive vehicle. This type of vehicle interested the French Army in 1913 for its ability to tow heavy artillery over all terrain and the TAR (Tracteur d'Artillerie Roulante) was built. In France, the buyers of this vehicle benefitted from a 30 percent rebate as compensation for mobilization in case of war. After WWI, Latil began to build tractors for agriculture and forestry as well as trucks for civilian use.

The Latil Artillery Tractor as in use within the Maavoimat had a 4 cylinder 68hp engine, used 40-100 litres per 100kms, had a 75 litre fuel tank and a 40 litre auxiliary fuel tank, a top speed of 50-60kph, interchangeable 2 and 4 wheel steering. Dimensions were 1.93m wide, 5.10m long and 2.5m height. Wheelbase was 2.7, and weight with full equipment was 4,000kgs. Crew space for 3 in the cab with up to 8 in the rear depending on configuration. With relatively large numbers of these and other artillery tractors purchased from France, the Maavoimat artillery

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/arkisto/arkisto09.jpg
Maavoimat AA Gun Battery – four Latil trucks with towed 76-mm Bofors antiaircraft-guns (either the Bofors 76 ItK/28 B or 76 ItK/29 B. The soldier in the photo is covering exactly those parts of the gun, which would allow identifying which of these two types it is) taking a break whilst on maneouvers: Summer 1939

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/wess/old02.jpg
While Finland acquired a large number of Latil’s for the Maavoimat from France over 1937-1938, they did not exactly sit idle in military warehouses and depots. Rather, -they were leased out to the civilian sector with the proviso that they be well-maintained and would be immediately available for military use in the event of mobilization. here, a Latil is used in the Logging industry.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/sa_lat ... il_ktl.jpg
The Latils were also used to tow heavier guns; here, lined up at an Artillery Unit Depot during the mobilization period over September-November 1930

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/arkisto/arkisto01.jpg
Maavoimat Latil M2Tl6 towing AA gun in the Winter War

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/latil1/latil176.jpg
Maavoimat Latil M2Tl6 towing AA gun in Summer 1940. Note the red swastika on the rear of the vehicle – Finnish AA-troops used this as their symbol (as opposed to the blue swastika of the Ilmavoimat)

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/arkisto/arkisto12.jpg
Maavoimat Latil M2Tl6’s on the move and towing AA guns, also in Summer 1940.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.latiltrucks.net/kuvat/arkisto/arkisto08.jpg
Latil Truck in background with trailer-mounted Finnish Sound Locator equipment in foreground. At the time of the Winter War, Sound Locator equipment was still in use with many AA gun batteries – it would not be completely superceded by the new Nokia Radar until late in 1940.

The large number of Latil all-wheel drive tractors in use with the Maavoimat by late 1939 aided the mobility of the Artillery, AA Gun, Anti-tank Gun and Mortar units considerably. The additional 137 Latil M2Tl6 tractors supplied by the French over February-March 1940 were sufficient to offset combat losses experienced in the first four months of the war, by which time the Ford Helsinki plant had managed to start up production of a Finnish more-or-less-copy which would start entering service in numbers in June 1940. By the end of the Winter War in late 1940, the Maavoimat would be perhaps the most mechanised military in Europe – although with dependency on imported oil in mind, vehicle usage was strictly controlled for all except actual combat situations. As an additional measure, many rear-area military vehicles and most of the vehicles remaining in civilian use (few and far between as they were) were converted to run on wood-gas (more on this suject in a later Post).

The wide-spread use of vehicles for towing of guns and movement of mortars and mortar crews largely arose from the Maavoimat’s heightened emphasis on mobility. This also meant that much of the new artillery and light guns (such as the Skoda 76mm, the Bofors 37mm anti-tank guns abd both the 81mm and 120mm Mortars) were capable of being broken down and moved on sleds in winter or on horses in summer – particularly critical on the often roadless terrain of eastern Karelia and the northern parts of Finland. This combination meant that in contrast to most european militaries of 1939, where the horse was still the most common source of motive, the Maavoimat had embraced motorisation to a large extent, but certainly not uncritically and to the exclusion of horses – which still remained an important component of the Maavoimat’s movement infrastructure.

One must also keep in mind that in 1939, pretty much all european nations were economically and industrially unable to fully motorise their forces. Finland was no exception, but government policies and the industrialisation of the 1920s and 1930s had lead to the completing of two major motor vehicle manufacturing factories – Sisu and Ford, both of which were capable of producing a wide range of vehicles without any reliance on foreign components. With the move to a war economy over the period between the Munich Crisis and early 1939, the development of this infrastructure in the preceding two decades paid off. In this combination of industrial infrastructure development, early move to a war footing and the overall planning and preparation for a total war involving the entire nation, Finland was able to put in place a motorised transport capability that gave the Maavoimat a mobility and logistical advantage which, when combined with the Maavoimat.s strategic and tactical doctrine gave them a marked qualitative advantage over the Red Army. The large numbers of Latil artillery tractors, Renault UE Chenillette’s, Souma MCG and Unic P107 half-tracks purchased over 1937 through to mid-1939 and in use by the Maavoimat in late 1939 were one aspect of this.

Note: Information on the Finnish Latil Artillery tractors is sourced from http://www.latiltrucks.net – a wonderful source of information with a gazillion photos of Latil Trucks – all mistakes are however mine, as is the “alternative history” of the use of these vehicles.

Potential French Intervention

Another aspect of French aid that we will not look at in any detail here was the potential Anglo-French intervention on a large scale in the Winter War. At this stage, suffice it to say that in February 1940, the Allies offered to help Finland: the Allied plan, approved on 4–5 February 1940 by the Allied High Command, consisted of 100,000 British and 35,000 French troops that were to disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and “support Finland” via Sweden while securing supply routes along the way. Plans were made to launch the operation on 20 March 1940 under the condition that the Finns first make a formal request for assistance (this was done to avoid German charges that the Franco-British forces constituted an invading army). On 2 March, transit rights were officially requested from the governments of Norway and Sweden.

The Allies hoped that Allied intervention would bring the two still neutral Nordic countries, Norway and Sweden, to the Allied side by strengthening their positions against Germany — although Hitler had already in December 1939 declared to the Swedish government that Franco-British troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.
However, Finnish Intelligence reported that only a small fraction of the Franco-British troops were intended for Finland. Proposals made by Finland for Anglo-French forces to enter Finland directly via the ice-free harbour of Petsamo had been previously dismissed. The capture of Murmansk and the Kola Peninsula by the Finns in February 1940 did not change the British and French position – neither did the Finnish request to use Lyngenfjiord as an alternative entry point, leading to speculation, encouraged by German sources, that the true objective of the operation was to occupy the Norwegian shipping harbour of Narvik and the vast mountainous areas of the north-Swedish iron ore fields, from which it was assumed that the Third Reich received a large share of its iron ore (actually 30% in 1938), regarded as critical to war production. A much much later Post will cover “The Appeal that was Never Made” in detail.

Sir R. Campbell to Viscount Halifax.—(Received March 12, 1940.)
(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.)En clair.
Paris, March 12, 1940
M. DALADIER made a statement in the Chamber this afternoon in reply to the interpellations regarding French aid to Finland. After describing the material assistance which France had given Finland, and the various expressions of thanks which had been received from the Finnish Government, he continued as follows:

" 'Will you also send men?' I was asked during the Secret Session. I replied : 'Yes.' The decision was taken at the Supreme War Council of 5th February (1940). As far as France is concerned, since 26th February French troops have been organised, specially equipped and assembled, and transports have been ready in two great ports on the Channel and the Atlantic. We were therefore ready to give assistance in men. The British Government, who were to be responsible for the greater part of the assistance in men and for the naval protection of the Expeditionary Force, have on their side shown the greatest activity. As regards diplomatic action, we have worked night and day with neutral and friendly Governments in favour of Finland.

"But military intervention in Finland is only possible if Finland appeals to the Allies. It may be possible to maintain a contrary view on the platform, but I declare that I do not consider that military assistance in the form of thousands of men is possible if Finland does not address a public appeal to France and the United Kingdom. To this day France and the United Kingdom have received no direct appeal for assistance from the Finnish Government. Why is an appeal of this nature necessary? Because the Swedish and Norwegian Governments are vigorously opposing any passage of Allied troops through their territory. An appeal is also necessary for reasons of international law, for even in the midst of war I do not wish my country to trample on international law.

"This appeal, in spite of our insistence, has not yet been addressed to us. On the 7th March I handed to the Finnish Minister in Paris a note saying in substance: “For some days we have only been waiting for an appeal from Finland in order to come to her assistance with every means. We find it difficult to understand why this appeal is still postponed. We are indeed, aware of the pressure exerted by Sweden to bring you to make peace but do you not fear that Russia, who dreads the intervention of the Allies' is tricking you in order to destroy you later? Aeroplanes and an Expeditionary Force are ready to start, but if Finland does not now appeal to the Allies, the latter will be unable at the end of the campaign to assume the slightest responsibility for the final territorial status of Finland. I would ask you to let us know your decision as a matter of extreme urgency.'

"M. Tanner has informed me that a final reply in one sense or the other will be sent us this very day. If an appeal is addressed to the Allies to-day or to-morrow, they will go to the help of Finland with all the forces they promised some weeks ago."

2. M. Daladier's statement was applauded by the Left and Centre, but received in silence by the Right.
3. M. Daladier then asked the Chamber to agree to the postponement of the debate until 19th March. After short statements by the various interpellators, this was put to the vote and the Government's proposal was accepted with only two dissentient votes.


Suffice it to say at this point that the plans made by the British and French involved the transit of British and French troops and equipment through neutral Norway and Sweden and were primarily directed at the seizure of Narvik and the Swedish iron ore fields using assistance for Finland as a mask for the main endeavour. That Sweden would not agree was self-evident. That the Finns were aware of this and played a delicate diplomatic game with the British and French was also evident – and the transfer of the Polish Division from France to Finland through Petsamo was proof enough of the ultimate intentions of the British and French if any further was needed. France itself was caught between the forces of the Left and the Right – the Left, who preferred fighting Germany and opposed any actions against the USSR, and the Right, who would have far preferred to be fighting the Soviet Union rather than Germany.

The major successes achieved by the Maavoimat against the Red Army over the period of February to April 1940 to a certain extent removed the need for any major foreign intervention to assist the Finns – and the large numbers of foreign volunteer units (primarily the Poles, Italians, Spanish, Hungarians and the scandanavian Viking Division) already in Finland by April 1940 had greatly augmented Finnish manpower. Thus there was no great advantage to the Finns in catering to the Anglo-French desire to precipitate a move which would in all likeliehood bring Germany and the Anglo-French Allies into open conflict in Sweden and Norway.

Despite this of course, the Allies were prepared to intervene in Norway for their own reasons. Churchill for example had from the beginning wanted a more resolute policy towards Norway. He was aware that the iron ore shipments to Germany via Narvik were important to Germany’s war effort. On September 19th, 1939, he told the British War Cabinet led by Chamberlain that the transportation of iron ore had to be stopped. On September 29th, he proposed that the water around Narvik should be mined if iron ore transportation started up again – shipments had been suspended at the start of the war. The Cabinet failed to support Churchill on this, as they did not want to breach Norway’s neutrality. Regardless of this, Churchill continued to press for it. Between September 1939 and April 1940 several incidents in Norwegian maritime waters, notably the Altmark incident in Jøssingfjord, put great strains on Norway's ability to assert its neutrality. Norway managed to negotiate favorable trade treaties both with the United Kingdom and Germany under these conditions, but it became increasingly clear that both countries had a strategic interest in denying the other access to Norway.

Norway, though neutral, was considered strategically important for both sides of the war for two main reasons. First was the importance of the port of Narvik, from which large quantities of Swedish iron ore, on which Germany depended, were exported; this route was especially important during the winter months when the Baltic Sea was frozen over. Narvik became of greater significance to the British when it became apparent that Operation Catherine, a British plan to gain control of the Baltic Sea, would not be practical. Second, the ports in Norway could serve as a hole in the blockade of Germany, allowing access to the Atlantic Ocean. One of the two reasons for Germany's invasion of Norway was its dependence on Swedish iron ore, which during the winter was shipped from the Norwegian port of Narvik as well as through the Swedish port of Lulea thanks to the Finnish ice-breakers. However, the hostility between Finland and Germany aroused by Germany’s alliance with the USSR and the refusal of Germany to sell Finland military equipment after the outbreak of the Winter War meant that Germany again considered access to Narvik as critical. This, by securing access to Norwegian ports, the Germans could more easily obtain the supply of iron ore they needed for their war effort.

The other main reason why control of Norway was considered to be crucially important was that possession of Norway enable Germany to use its sea power effectively against the Allies, particularly Britain. While Norway was strictly neutral, and unoccupied by either of the fighting powers, there was no threat. But the weakness of the Norwegian coastal defences, and the inability of her field army to resist effectively a determined invasion by a stronger power were clear. Großadmiral Erich Raeder had pointed out several times in 1939 the potential danger to Germany of Britain seizing the initiative and launching its own invasion in Scandinavia - if the powerful Royal Navy had bases at Bergen, Narvik and Trondheim, the North Sea would be virtually closed to Germany, and the Kriegsmarine would be at risk even in the Baltic. A successful invasion of Norway by either side had the potential to strike a major strategic blow against the other without getting bogged down in the large-scale trench warfare notable of the previous conflict.

Thus the outbreak of the Winter War presented the Allies with an opportunity to use the pretence of sending troop support to additionally occupy ore fields in Sweden and ports in Norway. The plan, promoted by the British General Edmund Ironside, included two divisions landing at Narvik, five battalions somewhere in mid-Norway, and another two divisions at Trondheim. The French government pushed for action to be taken to confront the Germans away from France. The Norwegian government was at the same time also increasingly pressured by Britain to direct ever larger parts of its massive merchant fleet to transport British goods at low rates, as well as to join the trade blockade against Germany. The new French prime minister, Paul Reynaud, took a more aggressive stance than his predecessor and wanted some form of action taken against Germany. At the same time, Churchill continued to be a strong agitator for attacking and occupying Norway as he saw this as a way to attack Germany from the north. Finland however, would refuse to be the excuse for this intervention and steadfastly rejected any use of the excuse of providing assistance to Finland, continuing to insist that any assistance could be routed through the rapidly expanding port of Petsamo.

Over March and April 1940, British plans for an invasion of Norway were prepared, mainly in order to reach and destroy the Swedish iron ore mines in Gällivare, continuing to use assistance for Finland as pretence. It was hoped that this would divert German forces away from France, and open a new fighting front in southern Sweden (as has been mentioned). The Allied High Command also agreed that mines would be laid in Norwegian waters (Operation Wilfred) and that the mining should be followed by the landing of troops at four Norwegian ports: Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen and Stavanger. Because of Anglo-French arguments, the date of the mining was postponed from April 5–8. The postponement was disastrous for the Allies. On April 1, Hitler had ordered the German invasion of Norway to begin on April 9 on the pretext that Norway needed protection from British and French interference; so, when on April 8, the Norwegian government was preoccupied with earnest protests about the Royal Navy’s mine-laying, the German expeditions were well on their way.

As we know, the German attack on Norway met its objectives and Norway was successfully occupied up to and including Narvik, despite some setbacks along the way. Not the least of these was the Finnish seizure in force of the Finnmark region of Norway and a standoff with the Germans. The Finns refused to intervene in the fighting in Narvik between the British, French and Germans but some French and Polish units would later end up in Finland after the debacle of the French and British intervention – falling back into the Finnmark – as would many Norwegian Army units. These units consisted of two battalions of the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade and the Polish Independent Highland Brigade under Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko. They were still in the Finnmark when Framce fell. Given the option of being returned to the UK or of assisting the Finns in their fight against the USSR, the men of both units opted to fight with the Finns. This, while not exactly volunteers, these two battalions of the French Army would fight in Finland though to the end of the Winter War, aftrer which they would return to the UK together with many of the Polish volunteers.

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Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... 13dble.jpg
Badge of the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade: The Phalange Magnifique (Magnificent Phalanx)

The 13e DBLE was raised in February 1939 at Sidi Bel Abbes in Algeria, with its cadre drawn from 1e REI (the 1st Foreign Regiment, the senior Regiment of the Foreign Legion). In January 1940, the British and French high commands had decided to dispatch an expedition to Finland, to support Finland against the Soviet Union in the Winter War. The French decided to allocate a demi-brigade of legionnaires to the expedition - and 13e DBLE was born. In March 1940, the 13e DBLE comprised 55 officers, 210 non-commissioned officers (sous-officiers), and 1,984 legionnaires. The average age of the legionnaires was between 26 and 28 years old, and most counted 4 to 5 years service. Many of its veteran NCOs had served in the Legion for 10 or more years. Its commander was Raoul Magrin-Vernerey, a hero of World War I, wounded 17 times in battle, who had served with the Legion since 1924.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/ima ... _Raoul.jpgRaoul Charles Magrin-Vernerey (born 7 February 1892, Budapest, Hungary - 3 June 1964, Paris, France): entered the École SpécialeMmilitaire de Saint-Cyr, where he graduated in 1914 as a sous-lieutenant. He was posted as a junior officer to the 60th infantry regiment, and ended the war as a Capitaine. During the war he was wounded seven times and became a chevalier of the Légion d'honneur. Between the wars, he served at various stations throughout French Syria, joining the Legion on March 1, 1924. He was promoted to Major in 1928. In 1931, he was transferred to service in Morocco with the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment and followed service there in French Indochina with the 4th Foreign Infantry Regiment. He was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel on 1 June 1938, after commanding a training regiment. On February 23, 1940, he was appointed to command two battalions of Legionaries, which would shortly be known as the 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade, commanding the 13 DBLE in the Battles of Narvik. He would go on to lead his men in battle against the Red Army through the remainder of the Winter War before joining the Free French in London, England with his surviving men. He was promoted to Major General during the war.

With the collapse of the French and British armies in France it was decided to cancel the Narvik operation and withdraw. The 13e DBLE evacutated Narvik on 7 June and withdrew into the Finnmark. The unit had lost 7 officers, 5 NCOs, and 55 legionnaires during the campaign. Before they could be withdrawn to the UK, French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud resigned on 16 June and Marshal Pétain took control of the French government. Pétain announced his intention to capitulate to the Germans and sign an armistice. On 18 June, General Charles de Gaulle, under-secretary of defence in the Reynaud government, broadcast an appeal to the French people to continue resistance. On 1 July, the Foreign Legion troops at in the Finnmark were given the choice of joining the Free French Forces under De Gaulle and being shipped to the UK, repatriation to Vichy-controlled North Africa, or remaining in Finland to fight with the Finns against the USSR. Whereas there had been a decided split within the 13e DBLE between pro-Vichy and pro-De Gaulle cliques, the option of fighting for Finland was a choice that appealed strongly, especiallyas the unit ahd originally expressly been formed to assist the Finns. Amongst the legionnaires and their officers, almost all volunteered to fight for Finland.

The 13e DBLE would go on to distinguish itself in battle over the remainder of the Winter War, after which the unit eventually returned to the UK and would join the Free French forces. The 13th included a number of junior officers who would later rise to general rank, such as Captain Marie-Pierre Koenig, Captain Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, and Lieutenant Bernard Saint-Hillier. Other officers, such as Captain Dimitri Amilakvari and Captain Gabriel Brunet de Sairigné would also achieve fame on the battlefield. Second Lieutenant Pierre Messmer would later serve as De Gaulle's defence minister.
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Zemsta Za Nóż w Plecy - The Polish Volunteers in Finland

#319

Post by CanKiwi2 » 02 Mar 2012, 20:01

Zemsta Za Nóż w Plecy - The Polish Volunteers in Finland

In an earlier Post, it was mentioned that in November 1939, there were already two foreign contingents in Finland that had been formed in Finland from Polish soldiers evacuated by the Merivoimat from Lithuania and Latvia in late September and early October after the fall of Poland. The Merivoimat had, in the face of direct opposition from both the USSR and Germany, done what nobody else could have done, and evacuated some 30,000 Poles from Latvia and Lithuania to Finland. In addition, Polish warships, submarines and a number of Polish Airforce aircraft had found safety and refuge in Finland. With the agreement of the Polish Government-in-Exile in London, the warships and aircraft had been incorporated into the Finnish military until such time as they could be transferred to the UK and France to resume the fight.

Arrangements were in progress through October 1939 to have the men themselves shipped out of Finland via Petsamo to the UK, from where they could join the British or French and resume the fight. However, with the rapid escalation of the situation between the USSR and Finland through October and November, events overtook the plans and under the circumstances of the Soviet attack on Finland, the Polish Government-in-Exile agreed that all Poles in Finland who volunteered to fight could stay. Almost to a man, the vast majority of the Poles in Finland had volunteered. The Poles with air force or naval experience were allocated to the Ilmavoimat or Merivoimat as appropriate, while the soldiers were assigned to six Regimental Battle Groups, loosely grouped into two Divisions. These two Divisions would be joined in April 1940 by the Polish Second Infantry Fusiliers Division (15,830 soldiers), shipped in from France and commanded by Brigadier-General Bronisław Prugar-Ketling. In une 1940, after the Allies retreated from Narvik, the Polish Independent Highland Brigade under Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko would join the Polish Volunteers in Finland.

Where we have not already done so, we will now look at these units as well as the Polish warships and Polish aircraft that would fight with the Finns against the USSR in the Winter War.

The Polish Navy-in-Exile in Finland

With the fall of Poland to both Germany and the Soviet Union in September 1939, a number of ships and submarines of the Polish Navy had escaped to Finland – something that had quietly been arranged between the two governments earlier in 1939 as a somewhat remote contingency plan that neither country expected to eventuate. The Polish Navy in 1939 was not large. The coastline was relatively short and included no major seaports. In the 1920s and 1930s, such ports were built in Gdynia and Hel, and the Polish Navy was built up under the leadership of Counter-Admiral Józef Unrug (CO of the Fleet) and Vice-Admiral Jerzy Świrski (Chief of Naval Staff), with ships acquired from France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and the Navy.

The Naval War Plan was primarily focused on securing Polish supply lines in case of a war against the Soviet Union and it was wih a war with the USSR in mind that most Polish war planning had been carried out. By September 1939 the Polish Navy consisted of 5 submarines, 4 destroyers, and various support vessels and mine-warfare ships. This force was no match for the large German Navy and in the event of war with Germany an alternative strategy of harassment and indirect engagement was planned (the “Peking Plan”). In the case of a war with Germany, the Polish Naval base at Gdynia was clearly likely to be overrun or rendered useless by air attack and the Peking Plan was created in order to remove the Destroyer Division (Dywizjon Kontrtorpedowców) from the immediate operational theatre and needless loss in the event of war with Germany. The Kriegsmarine had a significant numerical advantage over the Polish Navy and the Polish High Command realized that the ships which remained in the small and mostly landlocked Baltic were likely to be quickly sunk by the Germans. Also, the Danish straits were well within operation range of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, so there was little chance for the plan to succeed if implemented after hostilities began.

Originally intended to cover the withdrawal of three destroyers of the Polish Navy, the Burza ("Storm"), Błyskawica ("Lightning"), and Grom ("Thunder") to the United Kingdom, this Plan had been amended in early 1939 as a result of negotiations conducted between Marshal Mannerheim, the Polish Prime Minister, Major General Składkowski and the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces, Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz. While the early version of the Plan had focused on moving the newer Destroyers to the UK, the revisions made following the informal agreement with Finland made provision for the smaller warships and submarines to escape to Finland, something that was within their capabilities, whereas escape from the Baltic entirely was not (with the exception of the submarines). This agreement was undocumented and informal, but the arrangement was that in the event of either country being involved in a war with the USSR, each would assist in whatever way they could and provide a refuge for the others ships, aircraft and soldiers in the event of defeat.

The mounting strain in European politics reached a new tension-point in March 1939, with the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia - first, with the German-inspired secession of Slovakia, and then with the Bohemia "protectorate" enforced upon her at a gun-point. Soon after the "independent" Slovakia also asked to become a German protectorate, and Hitler, at the peak of his diplomatic successes, extorted Klaipeda from Lithuania, and voiced territorial claims in Poland, to which Poland answered with stern refusal. On 18 March 1939, three days after the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, while German preparations to annexate Klaipeda were under way, the Polish Navy was put on partial alert. The alert concerned primarily the destroyer squadron and the submarine squadron - the only forces of the Polish fleet of considerable combat value, which could be actively engaged in hostilities. Another large Polish warship, the heavy minesweeper Gryf, was kept in reserve. The Polish measures were not entirely unjustified - on 23 March a strong convoy of German ships heading for Klaipeda passed closely along the Polish coast en route from Germany to East Prussia. Under the escort of destroyers and trawlers, the battleship Deutschland carried the Chancellor of the Third Reich himself. After Klaipeda was incorporated into the Reich, the convoy returned along the same route, sparking fears that Hitler, intoxicated with another easy success, would decide to enter Danzig and triumphantly proclaim the return of the city and the whole territory of the Free City of Danzig to Germany. Polish naval ships remained on alert and the Polish outpost on the Westerplatte peninsula in Danzig was also readied to repel any hostile actions of Danzig Nazis. However, this time the German fleet returned to its bases.

In April 1939 political tensions eased and the Polish warships also returned to their bases for maintenance. The submarine squadron was reinforced by a new unit – the submarine Sęp, twin-sister of the Orzeł, had been commissioned in February 1939 amidst an enthusiastic reception following her arrival from the Netherlands. Sęp arrived unfinished, since the Polish command was afraid that on the outbreak of a war she might be trapped. The Poles anticipated that Sęp would return to Rotterdam for further fitting out as soon as the strains in the political situation were eased. Also at this time work on fortifications along the Polish coast and on the Hel peninsula were started. The Polish government opened talks with France and Italy concerning delivery of modern coastal artillery (230mm guns) and also consulted with the Finnish Coastal Defence Forces, whose expertise in this area was well known. As the talks stalled, the Poles approached the British asking them to send a monitor fitted with 381mm guns to the Baltic, but that initiative also failed.
In the summer of 1930, the activities of the Kreigsmarine in the Baltic intensified, as did the volume of merchant shipping between Germany and East Prussia.

The commander of the Polish destroyer Wicher, Captain Stefan de Walden, noted on this occasion:
“At that time our ships conducted round-the-clock duties in turns, during which the task of the ship on duty was to observe the activities of the German ships on the routes leading to East Prussia, as well as estimate, if possible, the type and quantity of the cargo they carried. Needless to say, we also closely observed the movements of the warships, and used to send detailed reports to the Fleet Headquarters immediately after passing the duties to the next ship. In their turn Polish ships, and especially the ship currently on duty, were under close observation of the swastika-marked aircraft, and it used to happen that this or that destroyer or cruiser showed interest in a Polish ship, which could be detected from their manoeuvres and general behaviour.

During such encounters both ships, as a rule, were on alert, having guns and torpedo tubes aimed at the counter-part. Simultaneously they minded respectful distance, which did not require a gun-salute, which could have grave consequences in the circumstances, when both ships aimed at each other. To use a rough naval saying - we were "sniffing" each other. It was an excellent opportunity to train the crews in bearing the elements of a target; a target, which at any time, at any second, might become a real combat target.”


The Polish Navy’s submarines were also kept busy with training and on various exercises preparing them for war, whose inevitability the Navy - due to constant contact with the soon-to-be enemy - was generally expected. While at sea, Polish submarines often found them-selves being used as targets for simulated attacks by German aircraft or submarine chasers – it was no wonder that their crews more often than their colleagues in the surface ships, or in other service branches, had the feeling that open war was just a matter of time.

Captain Włodzimierz Kodrębski thus summarized the atmosphere of those days:
“It rarely happened that ships stayed in ports; switching services to wartime routine ("combat watches"), patrolling and anti-air alert were permanent, and leaves were granted only by day, and only for few hours. Everybody gradually started getting weary of the wartime service conditions, without any satisfaction, since it was forbidden to shoot annoying planes and boats, which followed us everywhere. We were similarly helpless, when we watched Germans sending regular convoys of ships full of troops and war materials to East Prussia. And the real berserk got to all of us one morning, when from the Hel roadstead we saw the German battleship Schleswig-Holstein entering Gdańsk upon the consent of the government of the Republic of Poland, and greeted cheerfully by the hitlerised townfolks.”

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The German battleship Schleswig-Holstein entering Gdańsk The German battleship was ostensibly on a courtesy visit, but her real task was to take part in the invasion of Poland, according to the Fall Weiß plan. The Germans expected that the war with Poland would be a local conflict, since a Polish-Soviet rapproachment had never taken place and the Western democracies showed no real determination to commit to the Polish cause.

Prior to Poland being attacked by Germany, Mannerheim had, outside the normal government channels, contacted both Składkowski and Smigly-Rydz and informed them that Finland considered the arrangement to include the current situation. Lacking numerical superiority, Polish naval commanders decided in late August to execute the Peking Plan. The Burza ("Storm"), Błyskawica ("Lightning"), and Grom ("Thunder") were ordered to escape the Baltic and make for Lyngenfjiord or Petsamo, while the Wicher (“Gale”) and the heavy minelayer ORP Gryf were ordered to make for Finland in company with the Polish navy’s smaller Minelayers and Minesweepers, the frogman support ship ORP Nurek, the school of naval artillery ship ORP Mazur and two mobilized patrol boats of the Border Guard, the ORP Batory and the ORP Kaszub. The orders came as somewhat of a surprise to the ships Captains and crew - For six months then they had been preparing for the defence of Polish territorial waters, and now they were to abandon them. The Polish Navy’s five submarines were ordered to undertake whatever action against the Kreigsmarine was possible and then proceed to either the UK or Finland at the CO’s discretion.

Initially, Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Forces had resisted the implementation of the Peking Plan but he finally agreed., largely due to the plan for a Romanian Bridgehead. It was hoped the Polish forces could hold out in the southeast of the country, near the common border with Romania, until relieved by a Franco-British offensive. Munitions and arms could be delivered from the west via Romanian ports and railways. The Polish Navy outside the Baltic would then be able to assist in escorting the ships delivering military supplies to Romanian ports. As the tensions between Poland and Germany increased, the Commander of the Polish Fleet, Counter Admiral Józef Unrug signed the order for the operation on 26 August 1939, a day after the signing of the Polish-British Common Defence Pact; the order was delivered in sealed envelopes to the ships. On 29 August, the fleet received the signal "Peking, Peking, Peking" from the Polish Commander-in-Chief, Marshall Śmigły-Rydz: "Execute Peking". At 1255 hours, the ships received the signal via signal flags or radio from the signal tower at Oksywie, general quarters were sounded the respective captains of the ships opened the envelopes, and departed at 1415.

The Fleet split into two. The destroyers Błyskawica (commanded by Komandor porucznik Włodzimierz Kodrębski), Burza (commanded by Komandor podporucznik Stanisław Nahorski) and Grom (commanded by Komandor porucznik Włodzimierz Hulewicz) weighed anchor, formed and line and steamed towards Hel at 23 knots, heading for the Baltic exit under the command of Komandor porucznik Roman Stankiewicz. As soon as the squadron made away from the coast and the range of the observation posts, it changed its course again, making towards Bornholm in an attempt to evade German observation. This didn’t work - the German submarine U-31 (Lt.-Cdr. Johannes Habekost) from the squadron detached to trace the movements of the Polish fleet, spotted the Polish destroyers some 30 miles north of Rozewie and - undetected by the Poles - radioed their position to the German command in Swinemunde. Secondly, on the way to Bornholm the Polish destroyers passed a German passenger liner from the Seedienst Ostpreußen transporting German troops to East Prussia. It is not known whether the transport reported the position of the Polish ships, but since the encounter took place in broad daylight, there is little doubt that they were spotted.

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Polish destroyers during execution of the Peking Plan. View from ORP Blyskawica of ORP Grom and ORP Burza / Polskie niszczyciele płynące do Wielkiej Brytanii w ramach planu "Peking" - widok z rufy ORP Błyskawica na ORP Grom i ORP Burza.

As the Polish destroyers approached the Danish straits, another encounter took place close to the Falsterborev lightship, this time with unidentified warships steaming from the straits southward. Although the Polish commanders agreed that these might be Danish ships (a gunboat and a torpedo boat), the ships were blacked out, which aroused understandable concern and called for caution. The outbreak of the war was expected momentarily, a potential enemy could turn into a real one any time, and torpedoe tubes on the Polish destroyers were kept ready in case of any attack. Nevertheless, the two squadrons passed each other and disappeared in the darkness. It was not until many years later that it became known that the ships the Polish squadron encountered on that night of 30/31 August 1939 were actually the Kreigsmarine cruisers Köln and Königsberg with an escort of destroyers. What is more, the Germans knew whom they had encountered, while the Poles were left to more or less guess that the encountered squadron might be German, although they were not able to identify them positively.

The Polish warships passed the Falsterborev and around midnight entered the Øresund, full of shallows and banks, forcing a reduction in speed to 16 knots. It was the most difficult stage of the voyage, since the Poles were forced by the Danish regulations regarding foreign warships steaming in Danish territorial waters to take the more difficult of the sea routes through the Sund: the Flintrinne passage. Soon after, when only a few miles away from the Skagen lighthouse, the Polish squadron was spotted by German aircraft which followed until nightfall, when the Poles turned towards the Norwegian coast, and from there headed out into the North Sea. In the evening of 31 August the Polish squadron was also spotted from the German submarine U-19. The German conduct was correct and without any provocative action as there still was no state of war between Germany and Poland.

The small squadron changed course towards Norway in order to shake off the pursuit during the night. The ships entered the North Sea, and at 0925 on the morning of 1 September learned about the German invasion of Poland. At 1258 that day, they encountered the Merivoimat destroyer FNS Jylhä which had been sent south from Lyngenfjiord to meet them. Each of the three destroyers received a Merivoimat liaison officer together with Merivoimat signals personnel and were reflagged under the Merivoimat Naval Ensign. The crews were immediately sworn in as Finnish Citizens (with a special dispensation as per the Act of the Parliament passed on 1 Sepetember 1939, permitting dual Polish-Finnish citizenship for members of the Polish military). Two days later, at 17:37 on 3 September 1930, they dropped anchor in Lyngenfjord. Thoughtfully, the first deliveries to the three ex-Polish destroyers were complete sets of Merivoimat dinnerware for the Officers Messes.

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Merivoimat dinnerware - plate

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Merivoimat dinnerware – plate backstamp – manufactured by the Arabia Porcelain Factory

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The Polish Destroyer ORP Blyskawica anchored in Lyngenfjiord harbour – October 1939. ORP Blyskawica was commanded by Lt. Cmdr. Włodzimierz Kodrębski.

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Photo sourced from http://img.audiovis.nac.gov.pl/PIC/PIC_1-W-2090-1.jpg
Photo from August 1935: Wizyta niemieckiego krążownika "Konigsberg" w Polsce: Przedstawiciele załogi krążownika "Konigsberg" oraz witający ich wojskowi przed samolotem na lotnisku Okęcie. Widoczni m.in. komandor Hubert Schmundt (4 z lewej), niemiecki attache wojskowy gen. Max Schindler (2 z lewej), komandor Kodrębski (1 z prawej) / Visit of the German cruiser "Konigsberg" to Poland: Representatives of the crew of the cruiser "Konigsberg" being welcomed. Visible among others are Captain Hubert Schmundt (4th left), the German military attache, General Max Schindler (2nd left), Commander Kodrębski, Polish Navy (1st, right)

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The Polish Destroyers ORP Blyskawica and ORP Grom tied up together in Lyngenfjiord. ORP Grom was commanded by Komandor porucznik Włodzimierz Hulewicz. The Polish Navy’s Grom-class destroyers built by the British company of J. Samuel White, Cowes.They were laid down in 1935 and commissioned in 1937. The two Groms were some of the fastest and most heavily-armed pre-World War II destroyers. Despite having ordered its previous pair of destroyers (ORP Burza and ORP Wicher) from France, a country with which it had strong ties, Poland decided to acquire the second pair from the United Kingdom, possibly in recognition of the excellence of British destroyer designs at the time. The selected design resulted in large and powerful ships, superior to German and Soviet destroyers of the time, and comparable to the famous British Tribal class of 1936. The main armament was changed from the 130 mm used on the Wicher-class destroyer to the standard British destroyer calibre of 4.7 inch (120 mm). However, the guns were not British, but rather the Swedish Bofors 50cal QF M34/36, the same as those used previously on the minelayer ORP Gryf.

As was mentioned in an earlier Post on the Merivoimat, Finland had licensed the design for the Grom-class destroyers from the Polish Government even before construction of the Polish orders had started, an arrangement that suited both parties, although the Finnish Navy modified the design somewhat, reducing the number of 120mm guns and substantially increasing the anti-aircraft armament. The Finnish Navy Grom-class destroyers Jylhä and Jyry were commissioned in 1936 and 1937 respectively. Jymy and Jyske were delivered in mid-1938, Vasama and Vinha in mid-1939 and Viima and Vihuri in late 1939. A further 6 destroyers of this class would be constructed following the end of the Winter War and prior to Finland’s re-entry into WW2 in early 1944.

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The Polish Navy’s Wicher-class destroyer ORP Burza (Storm), commanded by Komandor podporucznik Stanisław Nahorski, en route to Lyngenfjiord: ORP Burza and her sister ship, ORP Wicher, were ordered on 2 April 1926 from the French shipyard Chantiers Naval Francais. She entered service in 1932 (roughly 4 years after the scheduled delivery date), and her first commander became Kmdr Bolesław Sokołowski. On 30 August 1939 the Polish Navy’s destroyers and submarines were ordered to execute the “Peking Plan”, and headed for Lyngenfjiord or Finland as their orders indicated. Burza fought with the Merivoimat against the Soviet Navy in late 1939. In April 1940 she was part of the Helsinki Convoy Escort as the Convoy entered the Baltic. She saw action againts the Kreigsmarine and then served as part of an FNS Baltic Convoy Escort Group for the remainder of the Winter War. After the Winter War, Burza became a Merivoimat Training Ship and then in 1944 she was transferred back to the Polish Navy and became a submarine tender for Polish submarines. At the end of WW2 she returned to Gdynia where she was later overhauled, remaining in serviced until 1955. In 1960, she became a museum ship. After Błyskawica replaced her in that role, she was scrapped in 1977.

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Komandor podporucznik (Lieutenant Commander) Stanisław Nahorski, Captain of ORP Burza.

The remainder of the Fleet, led by the destroyer Wicher and under the overall command of Wicher’s CO, Stefan de Walden, steamed for Finland on the same day, with the minelayers hastily deploying their final loads of mines to augment the minefields already laid. Accompanying the Wicher were the heavy minelayer ORP Gryf commanded by Stefan Kwiatkowski, the six small ships of the Minelayer/Minesweeper Flotilla (Flotylla Minowców), composed mostly of the so-called birdies (ptaszki, a nickname coined after the fact that all of the Jaskółka class ships were named after a different species of bird), the frogman support ship ORP Nurek, the school of naval artillery ship ORP Mazur, a small patrol boat of the Border Guard, the ORP Batory and two obsolete gunboats, the ORP Generał Haller and ORP Komendant Piłsudski. It was a sizable little flotilla and at the maximum speed of the slowest ship,

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ORP Wicher at speed in the Baltic Sea, 30 August 1939: ORP Wicher was commissioned into the Polish Navy on 8 July 1930 and was the first modern ship of the Polish Navy. During the Interbellum, Wicher served a variety of roles, mostly political. For instance, on 15 June 1932, she was sent to the port of the Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk) to meet two British destroyers entering the port and to underline the Polish political influence in that city. In March 1931 she sailed to Madeira, from where she brought the Marshal of Poland Józef Piłsudski and his family back to Poland. She also visited Stockholm in August 1932, Leningrad in July 1934, Kiel in June 1935 and Helsinki and Tallinn the following month.


Wicher i Burza w Leningradzie - 1934

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ORP Wicher and her sister ship ORP Burza side by side at Tallinn (Estonia) harbour during the goodwill visit of July 1935.

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Range-finder of the Polish destroyer ORP Wicher. Photo from 1931. Wicher could reach a maximum speed of 33.8 knots, had a crew of 162 and was armed with four 130 mm Schneider-Creusot Model 1924 guns (4xI), two 40 mm Vickers - Armstrong AA guns (2xI), four torpedo tubes 550/533 mm (2xII), two depth charge launchers, two Thornycroft depth charge throwers and 60 mines. By the late 1930s it was apparent that the armament was insufficient. The French guns had a low rate of fire and the ship had inadequate protection against aerial bombardment. To partially solve the problem, in the autumn of 1935 two additional double 13.2 mm Hotchkiss heavy machine guns were added.

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The heavy minelayer ORP Gryf (Griffin), commanded by Stefan Kwiatkowski. Laid down in 1934 at the French shipyard Chantiers et Ateliers A. Normand in Le Havre, she was launched in 1936. Built to Polish specifications, she was intended as a large minelayer with an armament close to that of a destroyer. Powered by two Sulzer 8SD48 engines of 6,000 horsepower (4,500 kW) each, she was capable of 20 knots (37 km/h/23 mph), fast for her size. She also had a remarkably long range of roughly 9,500 nautical miles (17,600 km) at 14 knots (26 km/h). As the Polish Navy was small and no other state expressed a need for such a vessel, she remained the only ship of the class. Whiler her usual complement of crew was 162, she also served as a school ship and could take on board up to 60 additional students. Her armament consisted of 6 × 120 mm (4.7 in) Bofors wz. 34/36 guns (2 × 2 and 2 × 1) in four turrets, 4 × 40 mm (1.6 in) Bofors wz. 36 AA guns (2 × 2), 4 × 13.2 mm (0.52 in) Hotchkiss wz. 30 HMG's (2 × 2) and 8 × naval mine racks, with up to 600 mines. With her heavy load of mines, she would prove a remarkably useful addition to the Merivoimat in the Winter War.

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The Polish minesweepers OORP Rybitwa, Czajka, Mewa, Jaskółka in 1937 The six small ships of the Minelayer/Minesweeper Flotilla (Flotylla Minowców) were of the Jaskółka class, built during the 1930's. They were the first sea going warships to be built in Poland and were of a versatile design allowing the ships to serve in the role of either a minesweeper, small minelayer or a sub chaser. All were named after birds, therefore the class was nicknamed: ptaszki (birdies) in Polish. The first 4 ships of the class were built at Gdynia in the Modlin shipyard. After they entered service they proved to be a good design so a further 2 were ordered in the mid 30s. They had a maximum speed of 17.5 knots, displaced 183 toms, had a crew of 30, were powered by 2 shaft diesel engines, 1040 BHP with a length of 45m and a beam of 5.5m. They were armed with 1 x 75mm or 76mm, 2 x 7.92mm machineguns and could carry 20 mines or depth charges.

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A model of ORP Jaskółka in the Pomorskim Muzeum Wojskowym. Jaskółka was under the command of Captain Tadeusz Borysiewicz. Of the other warships in this class, ORP Żuraw was under the command of Capt Mjr. Robert Kasperski, ORP Rybitwa was under the command of Lieutenant Commander Kazimierz Miładowski. The CO’s of Mewa, Czajka and Czapla are not recorded.

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ORP Jaskółka in action with the Merivoimat, Gulf of Finland, Summer 1940

The Polish Navy’s diver support ship ORP Nurek, a small ship, displacing only 110 tons and with a length of 26.5m and a beam of 5.8m. Her maximum speed was 10 knots. In the early 1930's the Navy with decided to build a modern ship to support naval divers, who made do with an old and battered support boat (a British M-52, purchased from surplus, which has been given the name "Nurek" (Diver) in 1922). After long deliberation, a design from engineer A. Potyrała was accepted. In the second half of 1935 construction started at the naval shipyard in Gdynia. This was an indication of the development of this yard, only a few years earlier, all orders received had of necessity, to be completed in the Gdansk Shipyard. In July 1936 the ship was completed. By order of the Minister of Defense she was named ORP "Diver". Her entry into service took place on 1 November 1936. The ship was equipped with a decompression chamber of Polish construction, a diving pump, winch and radio. Her commander was Warrant Officer W. Tomasiewicz. Until the outbreak of war and the execution of the Peking Plan, the ship served as a base for underwater work and training of Polish Navy divers.

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ORP Mazur was a former German torpedo boat (V-105). Originally built in 1914 by Stettiner Maschinenbau A.G. Vulcan in Stettin, Germany to meet an order for the Netherlands Navy (as Z-1, along with three sisterships Z-2, Z-3 and Z-4), she was confiscated by Germany and commissioned as torpedo boat V-105. During the division of German naval ships in December 1919, Poland was assigned only six torpedo boats, largely due to a reluctance of the British to strengthen new born navies. The V-105 was first assigned to Brasil, but then bought by a British dockyard and finally exchanged with Poland for another torpedo boat, the A-69, in 1921, for an extra charge of £900 to the Poles. Poland also received her sistership, V-108 (later the Polish ORP Kaszub), and four smaller torpedo boats. V-105 was in bad condition and after some repairs in Rosyth, in September 1921 she was towed from Great Britain to Gdańsk. After a refit, she was commissioned in the Polish Navy on August 2, 1922 under the name ORP Mazur. She served in the Torpedo Boat Unit (Dywizjon Torpedowców) with the identification letters MR. In 1931 she was rebuilt as a gunnery training ship and her armament was updated. In 1935 she underwent a modernization program and was returned to service in 1937. She displaced 421 tons fully loaded, had a length of 62.6m and a beam of 6.2m, had a maximum speed of 27 knots and a range of 1,400 nautical miles (2,600kms) at 17 knots. With a crew of 80, she was armed with 3 × Schneider 75 mm (3.0 in) guns, 1 x Vickers 40,, AA gun and 2 machineguns.

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Photo sourced from: http://img.audiovis.nac.gov.pl/SM0/SM0_1-P-3549-9.jpg
14 July 1937: Prezydent RP Ignacy Mościcki na mostku kapitańskim na ORP "Mazur". Widoczni także m.in.: kontradmirał Jerzy Świrski (na lewo za prezydentem), adiutant prezydenta RP kapitan Stefan Kryński (na lewo od kontradmirała Świrskiego), dowódca Zamkowego Szwadronu Żandarmerii kpt. Jan Huber (stoi przed kpt. Kryński) / Polish President Ignacy Mościcki on the bridge of ORP "Mazur". Also in the photo are: Admiral Jerzy Świrski (to the left of the president), the Polish President's adjutant, Captain Stefan Krynski (left of Admiral Świrski), the commander of the Squadron Castle Police Cpt. Jan Huber (standing in front of Cpt. Kryński)

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The two bow 75 mm guns of the Polish artillery training ship ORP Mazur (a former German torpedo boat) ater her refit in 1937

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ORP Mazur under attack by Soviet aircraft, December 1939, Gulf of Finland.

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One of the remaining warships in the small flotilla consisted of a small patrol boat of the Border Guard, the ORP Batory. She had been built by the State Engineering Works shipyard in Modlin, launched on 23 April 1932, and entered service with the Border Guard exactly two months later at Hel. Her main task was to suppress smuggling in Gdańsk Bay. She was the biggest and fastest vessel of the Border Guard, classified also as "pursuit cutter" (kuter pościgowy). Prior to the German invasion of Poland, the Batory was mobilized into the Polish Navy, and escaped to Finland, where she would serve as a harbour Patrol Boat based out of Turku for the remainder of WW2. She would return to Poland on 24 October 1945, where she was returned to the Border Defence Army service. She is now in the Polish Navy Museum in Gdynia, where she is going to be restored. She displaced 28 tons, had a length of 28m, was powered by 2 petrol and 1 diesel engine with a speed pf 24.3 knots (45kph) and a range of 245 nautical miles at 11 knots and 145 nautical miles at 24 knots. With a crew of 10, she was armed with 2 machineguns.

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ORP General Haller: The remaining warships of the small flotilla heading towards Finland consisted of two obsolete gunboats, the ORP Generał Haller and ORP Komendant Piłsudski. Both ships were Filin-class guard ships originally built for the Imperial Russian Navy at the Crichton-Vulcan naval yard in Turku, Finland. They were later acquired by the Polish Navy and served as school ships and minelayers. Under the command of Stanisław Mieszkowski, General Haller sucessfully escaped to Finland where she served with the Merivoimat until sunk in action in a Soviet air raid in the last stages of the Winter War. The General Haller displaced 342 tons, was 55m in length with a beam of 7m, had a maximim speed of 14.5 knopts and a crew of 60. Armament consisted of 2 x 76mm guns, 4 machineguns and 30 mines. ORP Komendant Piłsudski also escaped to Finland and was lost in action against the Kreigsmarine when minelaying off the Latvian coast in mid 1944 after Finland declared war on Germany.

Within the Baltic, on 14 September 1939 the Polish submarine ORP Orzeł (Eagle) reached Helsinki and over the next four days a further 3 of the 4 remaining Polish submarines – the Orzel-class sub ORP Sęp (Vulture) and the Wilk-class subs ORP Ryś (Lynx) and ORP Żbik (Wildcat) all arrived at various Finnish ports. Of all the Polish submarines, only the ORP Wilk (Wolf) would escape the Baltic and make it to the UK.

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ORP Orzeł was the lead ship of her class of submarines serving in the Polish Navy. Orzeł was laid down 14 August 1936 at the Dutch shipyard of De Schelde; she was launched on 15 January 1938, and commissioned on 2 February 1939. She was a modern design (designed by Polish and Dutch engineers), albeit a bit too large for the shallow Baltic Sea (she displaced 1,473 tons submerged). She had a surface speed of 19.4 knots, a submerged speed of 9 knots and a crew of 60. Armament consisted of 1 x Bofors 105mm gun, 1 x double barrelled Bofors 40mm AA gun, 1 x 13.2mm machinegun and 12 torpedo tubes (4 aft, 4 riudder, 4 waist). She carried 20 torpedoes.

At the start of hostilities Orzeł was on patrol in her designated sector of the Baltic Sea. After expending almost all her torpedoes on attacks on German ships, Orzel was unable to return to the Polish naval bases at Gdynia or Hel. Following orders, the now critically ill Captain of the Orzel ordered the executive officer, Lt.Cdr. Jan Grudzinski, to make for Helsinki. En-route in the Gulf of Finland, she torpedoed a Soviet merchant ship, sparking a major naval incident between the Soviet Navy and the Merivoimat. Following her arrival in Helsinki, both the Germans and the Soviets insisted that the Orzel be interned. Finland refused and instead, “seized” the submarine and granted the crew Finnish citizenship, as they did with all Polish military personnel who arrived in Finland at this time. Both the Soviet Union and Germany expressed outrage. Finland was unmoved.

In service with the Merivoimat as FNS Orzel, she was assigned (with her Polish crew) to the 1st Submarine Flotilla based out of Helsinki and patrolled the Gulf of Finland where sank one, possibly two Soviet submarines as they attempted to break out into the Baltic. In early April 1940, she was part of the Merivoimat submarine task force that was sent south to assist in safeguarding the “Helsinki Convoy.” When the convoy was attacked by a Kreigsmarine flotilla, the FNS Orzel aggressively attacked, launching four torpedoes, two of which hit and sank a Kreigsmarine destroyer. She evaded repeated depth charge attacks and as darkness fell, surfaced and ran head on into the Kreigsmarine flotilla, now returning after taking a beating from the Merivoimat in what would become known as the “Battle of Bornholm.” Orzel managed to launch a further torpedo attack in the darkness and observed a single hit, but was forced to dive before any actual damage could be confirmed.

She returned to Helsinki and on 23 May 1940 departed on her seventh patrol of the Gulf of Finland. No radio signals were received from her after she had sailed, and on 5 June she was ordered to return to base. She never acknowledged reception, and never returned to base. 8 June 1940 was officially accepted as the day of her loss. It was suspected she might have run into a minefield, of which there were many in the Gulf, but the true cause of her loss remains unknown even today. Her remains have never been located.

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ORP Sep (Vulture) anchored somewhere in the Finnish Archipelago shortly after her arrival, late-Spetember 1939

The second Polish submarine to arrive was also the second Orzel-class submarine in the Polish Navy. ORP Sep (Vulture) was built at the Dutch shipyard Rotterdamse Droogdok Maatschappij, laid down in November 1936 and launched on 17 October 1938. In early 1939 the Polish team supervising the building of the ship noticed a significant slowdown in her construction, which it attributed to the action of German agents. Because of fears that German pressure on Holland would prevent that country from delivering the ship into Polish hands, it was decided to bring the ship to Poland earlier than scheduled. On April 2nd, the ship left for deep water sea trials in Horten, Norway, with a crew of Polish sailors and Dutch technicians, under the Dutch flag. After completing the trials, the Polish crew took control of the ship (against the will of the Dutch technicians on board), raised the Polish flag and left Horten to rendezvous with the Polish destroyer ORP Burza outside the harbour. All but two Dutch workers were left ashore in Norway. From Burza the submarine received additional crew and supplies, then sailed under her escort to Poland. On the way the ship ran out of diesel fuel and had to be taken in tow by the destroyer. On April 18 Sęp arrived in Gdynia, entering the harbour on her electric engines, and was officially commissioned into the Polish Navy. The remaining two Dutch technicians were released and allowed to return home.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.1939.pl/uzbrojenie/polskie/o ... dowa01.jpg
ORP Sep shortly prior to being launched

The fitting out of the ship continued in Poland, with parts arriving from Holland after relations with the Dutch were repaired following the "hijacking." Work was not finished before the war broke out, hence the ship was not at full readiness by September 1939. A visit to Rotterdam to finish the fitting out was contemplated but the outbreak of war prevented this. Sęp sailed into the naval port of Hel a few days before the war started, commanded by Kmdr ppor. Władysław Salamon. On 1st September 1939, the first day of the war, the submarine took up her patrol sector in accordance with the Worek Plan. On 2 September she attacked the German destroyer Friedrich Ihn (Z14) with a single torpedo which missed. The destroyer responded with heavy depth-charging which damaged the submarine, causing water leaks. On 3 September Sęp was attacked again and suffered more damage, which caused more leaks. With her position clearly revealed to the enemy, the submarine left her assigned sector and began to sail in the direction of Gotland Island. Over the next few days she operated without contact with the enemy in the vicinity of Sweden, her crew trying to repair the damage, and her captain requesting permission to return to base in order to carry out more repairs, which was denied.

On September 13 the submarine received orders permitting her to sail to England if possible and otherwise to proceed to Finland. The crew at first decided to sail for England but over the next few days the ship's condition deteriorated further with serious leaks when submerged, and the submerging itself taking up to 30 minutes, unacceptably long if the ship was to successfully pass through German patrols on the way to the UK. On September 15 her commander decided to sail for Finland. On September 18 the submarine appeared off Turku and requested permission to enter the harbor. With the political furore over the Orzel still in progress, ORP Sep was discretely moved at night to an offshore island where she was hidden until the fuss had died down, after which she was promptly moved into the Crichton-Vulcan yards and repair work started. Work was completed over the winter and she re-entered service in March 1940. Survi9ving the Winter War, she would be again officially commissioned into the Polish Navy on 1 May 1944, shortly after Finland re-entered WW2 as a belligerent. In a 1959 Polish film the ship was used to portray her twin, ORP Orzeł. In 1959 the submarine became a training ship. She remained the largest submarine of the postwar Polish Navy until 1962. In 1964 she suffered a serious fire (8 crewmembers died), after which she was repaired, but was not fully operational. In 1969 the ship suffered another accident while submerged. The ship was decommissioned on 15 September 1969 and subsequently scrapped in 1972. In 2002 the Polish Navy commissioned the second ORP Sęp, a Kobben class submarine obtained from Norway.

Over the next few days, two of the Wilk-class subs, ORP Ryś (Lynx) and ORP Żbik (Wildcat) would arrive at various Finnish ports. ORP Wilk (Wolf) would leave the Polish coast after deploying her mines and unsuccessfully attacking German shipping, successfully passing the Danish straits (Oresund) on September 14/15, escaping from the Baltic Sea and arriving in Great Britain on September 20. ORP Wilk undertook nine patrols from British bases, without success. The last patrol was between 8 and 20 January 1941, after which the submarine was assigned to training duties. Due to her poor mechanical shape, ORP Wilk was decommissioned as a reserve submarine on April 2, 1942. Because of her poor condition, she was towed to Poland only in October 1952. She was declared unfit to service, decommissioned from the Polish Navy, and scrapped in 1954.

Of the remaining two submarines, ORP Ryś (Lynx) took part in the Worek Plan for the defense of the Polish coast. After suffering battle damage, the submarine withdrew to Finland and was taken into the Merivoimat, along with her crew. After serving through the Winter War on Baltic Patrols from Ahvenanmaa (the Åland Islands), she was officially returned to the Polish Navy on 1 May 1944 where she served until 1955. She was scrapped in 1956. ORP Żbik also took part in the Worek Plan for the defense of the Polish coast. According to the plan she laid her mines, one of which sank the small (525 t) German minesweeper M-85 on 1 October. After suffering battle damage and shortages of fuel, the submarine withdrew to to Finland and was taken into the Merivoimat, along with her crew. After serving through the Winter War on Baltic Patrols from Ahvenanmaa (the Åland Islands), she was officially returned to the Polish Navy on 1 May 1944 where she too served until 1955. As with her sistership, the Ryś, she was scrapped in 1956.

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Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... P_Lwow.jpg
The Polish submarine ORP Zbik together with the Polish sail training ship Lwow. On the outbreak of WW2, the Zbik was commanded by Lieutenant M. Zebrowski.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.weu1918-1939.pl/kmw/podwodne/zbik/zbik_5.jpg
ORP Zbik: The ORP Ryś and ORP Żbik were Wilk class submarines of the Polish Navy, with their design based on that of the French submarine Pierre Chailley, which had been laid down in 1917 and was in service from 1923 to 1936. Wilk, Ryś and Żbik were all laid down in 1927 at Chantiers Augustine Normand shipyard at Le Havre in France. Launched in 1929, they were commissioned into the Polish Navy in 1931 and 1932. The Wilk-class submarines displaced 1,250 tons submerged, were 78.5m long with a beam of 5.9m, had a range of 3,500 nautical miles (4,000 miles), a surface speed pf 14.5 knots and a submerged speed of 9.5 knots. They had a crew of between 46 and 54 and were armed with 1 x 100mm deck gun, 2 x 23.2mm machineguns, 4 bow tubes, 2 rotating midship tubes and carried 16 torpedoes (6 in the tubes and 10 reloads) and 40 mines.

Finland refused demands from the Soviet Union and Germany that these submarines and ships and their crews be turned over to them. Rather than interning the ships and their crews as international law demanded, Finland (again, with the prior agreement of the Polish Government), announced that the ships were being “seized”, re-flagged and integrated into the Finnish Navy, while their crews were granted immediate Finnish citizenhip by special Act of Parliament. As a result, Finland's neutrality was strongly questioned by both the Soviet Union.and Germany over the same period. The protests from both Germany and the Soviet Union were not muted. On the other hand, with Finnish Intelligence knowing what they knew of the secret clauses to the Soviet and German Agreement, Finland simply ignored the protests. Particularly as the 4 Destroyers and 4 Submarines together with the smaller ships were a very useful addition to the Finnish Navy’s strength for a war that the Finnish High Command was almost certain was coming regardless of how Finland acted.

The two Grom-class Destroyers were a known quantity and were excellent destroyers – the Merivoimat had used the design as the basis for their own Destroyers, even calling the class by the same name. The two Wicher-class Destroyers were another story. They were modified versions of the Bourrasque class destroyers built for the French Navy. The Wicher class had severe problems: the destroyers were relatively slow, had a large silhouette with three large funnels, and were inadequately armoured. Additionally, flaws in the design resulted in poorly designed water-resistant chambers and pipelines, which could result in the ship being immobilized after only minor damage. Also the ships suffered from poor stability due to fuel tanks being located high up on the superstructure just below the bridge. Nevertheless, they were destroyers, thay had guns and they could fight. And they would see a great deal of action with the Merivoimat over the course of the Winter War.

Next Post: The escape of remnants of the Polish Air Force to Finland
Last edited by CanKiwi2 on 03 Mar 2012, 20:00, edited 1 time in total.
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The escape of Remnants of the Polish Air Force to Finland

#320

Post by CanKiwi2 » 03 Mar 2012, 00:21

The escape of Remnants of the Polish Air Force to Finland

Contrary to what many people believe, the Polish Air Force was NOT destroyed on the ground in the first few hours of the conflict and, despite being numerically and technically inferior to the German Luftwaffe, managed to put on a brave defence. German Quartermaster General’s reports admitted the loss of 258 planes throughout the Polish Campaign, and it can be stated with absolute certainty that more than 100 of these aircraft were shot down by Polish fighter pilots. Here’s a brief history of this gruelling battle against all odds....and of the escape of the remnants of the Polish Air Force to Finland.

The Luftwaffe order of battle included Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4 which on 1st September 1939 consisted of 1,538 combat aircraft. Of these, 339 were Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters, mostly the 109E (Emil) variant, 82 Messerschmitt Bf 110 twin-engine fighters and 258 Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers. The remainder were various subtypes of Heinkel He 111 and Dornier Do 17 bombers, there was also a Staffel of Henschel Hs 123 ground attack planes. Additionally, some 102 Bf 109 fighters formally assigned to the defence of the Reich were also used, though on limited scale. Some 200 reconnaissance aircraft were assigned to the army units involved in the offensive, which brings us to a total of 1,942 combat aircraft used operationally against Poland. Replacements and reinforcements of over 100 aircraft in total were brought in at various stages of the campaign.

The Polish Lotnictwo Wojskowe order of battle included two large units, the Pursuit Brigade (Brygada Poscigowa) and the Bomber Brigade (Brygada Bombowa), both under the command of the General Staff, as well as the Army Air Force (Lotnictwo Armijne) which consisted of individual wings (dywizjony) and squadrons (eskadry) assigned in groups to seven different Polish Army commands. During the mobilization waves of March and August of that year, all peace-time units were deployed to airfields throughout the country and attached to respective commands of the Air Force, Naval Air Service and squadrons supporting each of the Polish armies. In the last stages of the air campaign, whole units coordinated all actions in the fight against the invaders.

The Pursuit Brigade comprised five fighter escadrille’s grouped into 2 Squadrons with a total of 53 aircraft (43 PZL P.11a and P.11c, and 10 P.7a) and was given the task of defending Warsaw and its environs.

The Bomber Brigade, commanded by płk obs. Władysław Heller was equipped with 36 excellent PZL P.37 Los medium bombers, and 50 PZL P.23 Karas light bombers and consisted of 9 Escadrille’s grouped into 4 Squadrons. The Brigade constituted a considerable force, but outdated concepts of air warfare adhered to by the Polish command severely limited its effectiveness.

In addition to the above mentioned units, Squadrons and Escadrilles of the Polish Air Force were attached to land units of corps- and army-size. They were to provide necessary support to the Army in all roles. Aircraft consisted of Fighters, Reconnaissance aircraft and Observation aircraft. In all, various units of the Polish Army had 288 planes at their disposal, including 246 combat planes and 42 support planes.

In total, in its hour of need, Poland was able to muster 404 first-line aircraft, of which some 308 had combat value. Of these, 128 were PZL P.11 fighters, all 3 to 5 years old which, sturdiness and maneuverability notwithstanding, had very limited performance compared to their German counterparts. The rest of the fighters in first-line units – 30 PZL P.7a aircraft – were totally obsolete. The 36 P.37 Los bombers were the only equipment on a par with the Luftwaffe, and the 114 P.23 Karas reconnaissance/light bomber aircraft could be considered barely adequate for the time.

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Map sourced from: http://warandgame.files.wordpress.com/2 ... polish.jpg
Location of Polish Air Force Units on 1 September 1939

The first clash between Luftwaffe and Polish fighters took place on September the 1st, shortly before 7 am over the secret Polish airfield of Balice, near Cracow. A three-airplane section of 121 Eskadra was surprised during take-off by three Ju 87s and Capt. Medwecki, the Commanding Officer of the Cracow Army Fighter Wing was killed. 2nd Lt. Wladyslaw Gnys managed to evade the attack, and damage one of the Stukas. A few minutes later, having climbed for altitude, he attacked two Do 17s returning from a raid on Cracow, scoring several hits on each of them. After his second dive, he lost visual contact with them and returned to the airfield not knowing that he had just scored the first two victories over the Luftwaffe in World War 2. The two German bombers collided with each other after his attack and fell to the ground near the village of Zurada.

Meanwhile, a far bigger engagement was to take place over the outskirts of Warsaw. Forewarned by a well-organized network of observation posts, the Pursuit Brigade in full force (52 aircraft) intercepted a large formation of He 111 bombers from KG27 escorted by Bf 110s of I/LG1. As a result of well-executed attack, six He 111s were shot down at the expense of one P.11c, which crashed during a forced landing. What was supposed to be Der Spaziergang uber Warshau – a “stroll over Warsaw” – turned into a bitter escape for the Luftwaffe bomber crews. During the fighting, 2nd Lt. Borowski of 113 Eskadra shot down a stray Bf 109, which became the first aircraft of that type destroyed in World War 2.
Heavy fighting over Warsaw resumed in the afternoon, when second large German raid, escorted by both Bf 110 and Bf 109 fighters, was intercepted by the Pursuit Brigade. This time the escorts were able to engage Polish fighters before they reached the bombers, and soon first German bombs fell on Warsaw. Before they were able to enter the fight, four P.7s of 123 Eskadra were shot down in a surprise attack by Bf 110s of I/LG1. Capt. Olszewski, the C/O was killed and the other three pilots bailed out, two of them shot at and heavily wounded by the Germans after opening their parachutes. These were the first victories for German fighter pilots in World War 2.The fighting was fierce, and Germans lost two Bf 109s, one of them shot down by Lt. Col. Leopold Pamula, deputy C/O of the Brigade, who himself had to bail out soon afterwards. Polish losses amounted to three P.11s.

In the following days, the Luftwaffe changed its tactics. Taking advantage of the superior characteristics of its aircraft (German twin-engined bombers were faster than Polish fighters), it used small groups of bomber aircraft approaching the target from several directions at different altitudes, while Bf 109s and Bf 110s flew sweeps in the area. These tactics proved quite successful – despite valiant efforts, the Brigade was unable to prevent German bombs from falling on Warsaw. Its pilots managed to shoot down 47 German planes from 1 to 6 September, but combat attrition was very high, and on September 7 the remnants of the Brigade were moved to the Lublin area, leaving the capital virtually defenseless against heavy Luftwaffe raids (Warsaw was never captured by the Germans – it was to be bombed into submission during 20 days of successful defence against German assault).

In other parts of the country the Army fighter units fought with varying degrees of success. As they were lacking the observation facilities of the Pursuit Brigade, they either flew sweeps, or detached small formations of fighters to improvised airfields with the task of intercepting sighted German aircraft. The latter tactic, called ‘ambushes’, was soon abandoned, as the P.11 fighters were usually unable to intercept their targets, no matter how quick the take-off.
The often desperate situation of Polish ground units sometimes resulted in equally desperate measures taken by the supporting air forces. On September 2nd, the Pomorze Army Fighter Wing was ordered to strafe a German motorized column making a rapid advance into Polish territory near Grudziadz. As the P.11 fighters were totally unsuitable for the task, armed only with two (a few aircraft had four) 7.92mm machine guns and offering no armor protection, the C/O, Capt. Florian Laskowski decided that while he would lead 141 Eskadra to attack the troops, 142 Eskadra would fly a regular fighter sweep. When nine P.11s of 141 Eskadra approached the target, they were met by heavy machine gun fire and three planes were shot down, with their pilots killed. Among the casualties – and first to be downed – was Capt. Laskowski. Another pilot had to make a forced landing; all the other planes took scores of hits. Needless to say, the effect of the attack on the Germans was marginal at best. Meanwhile, 142 Eskadra intercepted two unescorted German raids in succession and claimed 7 victories, with no losses on its part.

Not surprisingly, combat attrition proved high for Army fighter squadrons, and by September 10 all but one of the fighter wings were moved east of Vistula, where a futile attempt to rebuild the Pursuit Brigade and charge it with the defence of Lublin area was being made. Faced with fuel and spare parts shortages, devoid of any organized observation network, these pilots fought only isolated skirmishes with the Luftwaffe, claiming only 5 victories till September 17th. On that day the Red Army crossed Poland’s eastern borders, and all the remaining aircraft were ordered to fly to either Finland or Romania. The only Dywizjon that remained with its Army was the Poznan Army Fighter Wing. Under the excellent command of Mjr. Mieczyslaw Mumler, it was able to fight effectively, up to September 17th, scoring no fewer than 36 kills throughout the campaign. This in spite of the fact that on 9th September Mjr. Mumler was forced to disband 131 Eskadra and transfer its remaining aircraft to 132 Eskadra, (it was also reinforced by three pilots from the disbanded unit, the rest simply had no aircraft to fly).

While their colleagues of the fighter squadrons were busy trying to fight off swarms of enemy aircraft, the crews of the Bomber Brigade spent the first two days of September in readiness, waiting for orders to take-off – which never came. There was a great deal of confusion in the Brigade headquarters, and aside from reconnaissance no missions were flown. As the Polish command had promised their West-European allies not to bomb any targets on German territory, it was decided that the Brigade would support ground troops by attacking enemy motorized and Panzer columns. Little thought was given to attacking enemy airfields or supply lines, which would definitely have been more effective in delaying German advance. Thus, beginning on September 3rd, the Brigade’s P.23s and – on the next day – P.37s started flying bombing missions against advancing German troops.

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Picture sourced from: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_5j6bgPsLaF4/T ... 390913.jpg
Polish Air Force PZL 37’s in action – 13 September 1939

Surprisingly enough, these actions enjoyed a reasonable success. Attacks on German Panzer columns near Radomsko on September 3rd, carried out by some 30 P.23s of the Brigade, stopped their advance for about two days. While other actions weren’t nearly as successful, over all the attacks proved enough of a nuisance that the Luftwaffe was forced to provide fighter patrols to cover the advancing troops. However, the tactics of nuisance attacks in small formations (usually of three aircraft) and strafing the columns after dropping the bomb load (crews had specific orders to do so) in aircraft unsuitable for the task quickly proved very costly. Devoid of fighter escort, many bombers fell to the guns of patrolling Bf 109s, while more yet were shot down or heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Even so the missions were carried out till the Brigade was left with virtually no aircraft. On September 1, 1939, Poland had had about 86 PZL.37s in service. On September 17th only 17 P.37s of Brigade’s initial strength of 86 aircraft were left. With Poland on the verge of defeat and under attack from both Germany and the Soviet Union, twenty-seven PZL.37s (17 from the Bomber Brigade and ten training aircraft) loaded as many of their squadron personnel as was possible into the aircraft and flew north to Finland.All their P.23 Karas bombers had been either destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

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Photo sourced from: http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_5j6bgPsLaF4/T ... _karas.jpg
The PZL.23 Karaś was a Polish light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft designed in the mid-1930s by PZL in Warsaw. It was the main Polish bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at the start of WW2. The aircraft was a low-wing cantilever monoplane of all-metal, metal-covered construction. The crew consisted of three: pilot, bombardier and a rear gunner. The bombardier's combat station was situated in a gondola underneath the hull, where he could also operate an underbelly machine gun. The fixed undercarriage was well spatted, but despite a massive look, it was not suited for rough airfields. Bombs were carried under the wings: the maximum load was 700 kg (1,500 lb) (6 x 100 kg and 2 x 50 kg). The aircraft were equipped with one of the following engines: Bristol Pegasus IIM2 normal: 570 hp (425 kW), maximum: 670 hp (500 kW) - PZL.23A; Pegasus VIII normal: 650 hp (485 kW), maximum: 720 (537 kW) - PZL.23B. Regardless of the engine, the aircraft had a two-blade propeller.

Forty PZL.23As were delivered to the Polish Air Force in late 1936. A total of 210 PZL.23Bs were delivered to the Air Force from 1937. By 1939, the aircraft was obsolescent. Its main deficiency was its low speed but a lack of manoeuvrability was also a problem (it was noted, that the maximum speed of the PZL.23B was 189mph, but it was forbidden to exceed 319 km/h due to dangerous flight characteristics). At the outbreak of World War II on 1 September 1939, during the invasion of Poland. Some aircraft were also used in wartime improvised units, 114 PZL.23Bs were deployed in combat units (a further 75 PZL.23B’s and 35 PZL.23A’s were in air schools, held in reserve or under repair). The PZL.23B’s were operational in five bomber squadrons (Eskadra Bombowa) of the Bomber Brigade and seven Army reconnaissance squadrons, each with 10 aircraft.

Life wasn’t much different for the Army reconnaissance squadrons which, armed with the same P.23 light bombers as the Brigade, often took up ground support missions, trying to relieve at least some of the relentless pressure experienced by the ground units. Again, these actions did enjoy a limited success. On September 2nd, P.23s of 24 Eskadra escorted by 6 P.11s from 122 Eskadra – an extremely rare comfort for Polish bomber crews – totally surprised a German column near Czestochowa, causing many casualties and heavy confusion. On the next day crews from the same Eskadra successfully bombed German Panzer column near Rabka, scoring direct hits on several tanks. Only one P.23 was lost in these attacks, but that, again, was to prove an exception rather than the rule. In a similar attack on September 3rd, 31 Eskadra – even though it’s six P.23s caught the Germans unaware during a rest period and caused heavy casualties – losing two aircraft; the remaining four were more or less seriously damaged. Reconnaissance missions, usually flown by single aircraft, were also dangerous – the Luftwaffe’s dominance in the air was evident and the crews could rarely count on help from Polish fighters. In general, combat attrition was extremely high and only 21 of the P.23s made it to Finland on September 17th.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.airwar.ru/image/idop/bww2/pzl23/pzl23-8.jpg
Polish Air Force PZL.23 Karaś on arrival in Finland: 17th September 1939

A small number of other Polish Air Force aircraft managed to fly out to Finland around the same time. Given the choice between probable internement in Romania, versus flying out to Finland as they were ordered to do if they had a chance, most of the airmen with aircraft still capable of flying the distance opted for Finland. Among these were some 36 PZL P.11 fighters, a dozen PZL P.7a Fighters and 10 RWD-17 trainers which flew to Finland after a refueling stop in Sweden (the Swedes wanted to avoid any part of the conflict and quickly refueled the aircraft and sent them on their way, eager to be rid of the troublesome Poles).

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Picture sourced from: http://images.wikia.com/turtledove/imag ... -11caa.jpg
A Polish Air Force PZL P.11 Fighter: The PZL P.11 was designed in the early 1930s by PZL in Warsaw. The aircraft was conventional in layout, with high wings, all-metal, metal-covered. The cockpit was open. An internal fuel tank in a hull could be dropped in case of fire emergency. The armament was two 7.92 mm machine guns on hull sides, though a third of the P.11cs had two additional machine guns in the wings. It was briefly considered to be the most advanced fighter aircraft design in the world and served as Poland's primary fighter defence in the Polish campaign of 1939. By that point it was outdated due to rapid advances in aircraft design – especially in comparison to more advanced contemporary fighters, including the Hawker Hurricane and Messerschmitt Bf 109. Production of the P.11c started in 1934 and 175 were produced. Such limited production may appear irresponsible on the part of the Polish government, with Red Army aviation reaching into the thousands and Germany ramping up production at an unprecedented scale.

Even without the new WP2 plant at Mielec, the PZL works could produce at least 10 fighters every month. However, the Lotnictwo Wojskowe (Military Aviation) command was still studying different concepts for the use of fighters and bombers, while the Polish design bureaus were also developing very advanced fighter designs. The untimely death of the aircraft designer Zygmunt Puławski also complicated the matter. When the P.11 entered service in 1934, as a contemporary of the British Gloster Gladiator and German Heinkel He 51 it was arguably the most advanced fighter in the world. However, due to the rapid progress in aircraft technology, the P.11 was obsolete by 1939, overtaken by cantilever designs with retractable landing gear such as the Soviet Polikarpov I-16 and German Messerschmitt Bf 109. Together with the older P.7, the P.11 remained the only Polish fighter in service, with about 185 P.11s available, distributed within six air regiments and the aviation school in Deblin.

Although aware that the P.11 was outdated, the Polish Air Force had pinned their hopes on the new PZL.50 Jastrząb, which suffered extended delays. When it became apparent that the PZL.50 would not be in widespread service in time for a war that was clearly looming, consideration was given to producing an updated P.11 version with the 840 hp (626 kW) Mercury VIII and an enclosed cockpit, known as the P.11g Kobuz. Only the prototype of the P.11g with a maximum speed increase to a still-slow 390 km/h (~240 mph) was flown before the war, in August 1939. In light of the unavailability of PZL.50, the only hope of replacing the obsolete P.11 lay in acquiring modern fighters from abroad. In 1939, after receiving the necessary credits, Poland ordered from France 120 Morane-Saulnier M.S.406s, and from Britain, 14 Hurricane Is (the P.11's chosen replacement), plus one Spitfire I for testing, in addition to 100 Fairey Battle light bombers. None of these aircraft were delivered to Poland before September 1939, however some of the Polish orders would be delivered to Finland to equip the Polish Air Force units fighting with the Ilmavoimat.

On 1 September 1939, the Polish Air Force had 109 PZL P.11cs, 20 P.11as and 30 P.7as in combat units. A further 43 P.11c aircraft were in reserve or undergoing repairs. Only a third of the P.11c’s were armed with four machine guns, the rest had only two, even fewer had a radio. The P.11’s were used in 12 squadrons, each with 10 aircraft (two squadrons constituted a group, in Polish: dywizjon). Two groups - four squadrons - were in the Pursuit Brigade deployed around Warsaw, the rest were assigned to Armies. All of them took part in defense during the Invasion of Poland. Apart from combat units, several P.11 aircraft, including a prototype P.11g, were used in improvised units. During the Polish campaign, the P.11 fought against more modern German bombers and fighters. Not only were the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Bf 110 faster and better armed, but also most German bombers were faster. Since the P.11 fighters had seen years of intensive use before the war, their maximum speed was even lower than the theoretical 375 km/h. The P.11a’s were in an even worse condition. Another serious deficiency was their small number which meant that missions involving groups larger than about 20 aircraft were rarely undertaken and reserve machines were practically unavailable.

On the other hand, the Polish fighter aircraft had better manoeuvrability and because of their design, had much better vision from the cockpit than the German aircraft. The P.11 had a strong construction, good rate of climb and could operate from short fields, even rough ones. It was also of a very durable construction and could dive at up to 600 km/h without risk of the wings falling apart. Theoretically the only limit in manoeuvres was the pilot's ability to sustain high g forces. Despite the German superiority, the P.11 managed to shoot down a considerable number of German aircraft, including fighters, but suffered heavy losses as well. Most of the P.11s were destroyed in 1939, though 36 were flown to Finland and taken over by the Ilmavoimat. Due to their obsolescence, these veteran aircraft were only initially used in combat – as the experienced Polish pilots were allocated new aircraft, the old P.11’s were instead assigned for training.


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Photo sourced from: http://www.elknet.pl/acestory/foto1/p11_1.jpg
PZL P.7a Fighter: designed in early-1930s, on forst entering service this was s state-of-the-art aircraft, one of the first all-metal monoplane fighters in the world, in 1933–1935 it was a main fighter of the Polish Air Force. It was replaced in Polish service by its follow-up design, the PZL P.11c. More than 30 P.7 fighters remained in service in the Polish Defensive War of 1939, scoring several kills despite their obsolescence. On 1 September 1939, the Polish Air Force still had 30 PZL P.7a fighters in combat units. A further 40 were in air schools, 35 in reserve or repairs – a total of 106 available aircraft. The P.7as were used in three squadrons, each with 10 aircraft. The 123rd Squadron was in the Pursuit Brigade, deployed around Warsaw, the 151st and the 162nd Squadrons were assigned to land Armies. Despite being obsolete, they took part in the defense of the country. Apart from combat units, at least 18 P.7a fighters were mobilized in units improvised at air bases in Dęblin and Ułęż. Most of the P.7a fighters were destroyed in 1939, in combat or on the ground, some dozen were withdrawn to Finland but were not used in combat there.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.aviastar.org/pictures/poland/rwd-17.jpg
RWD-17 trainer: Originally designed to meet an order of the LOPP paramilitary organization, this was an interim trainer aircraft between a primary trainer RWD-8 and a single-seater aircraft, The first prototype was flown in August 1937 in Warsaw. After state trials in 1937, it was accepted for production, and in 1938 a short series of RWD-17 was produced (23 serial RWD-17 were in the Polish registry). There were plans to order 50-120 aircraft, with a likely designation RWD-17bis, but they were not built due to outbreak of the war. Ten RWD-17s flew to Finland with a transit stop in Finland, and continued to be used as trainers within the Ilmavoimat until the late 1940s. None returned to Poland after the war, and none have survived to today.

The pilots that flew their surviving PZL P.7a’s and PZL P.11’s to Finland were blooded combat veterans by mid-September, having survived daily combat with the Luftwaffe. Their experiences provided a useful lesson to the Ilmavoimat, some of whose Pilots had their own experiences in air combat from the Spanish Civil War. The lessons learned by the Polish Air Force fighter pilots would also be studied and absorbed by the Ilmavoimat.

1 September 1939 over Warsaw - The first air battle of WW2

Before the beginning of the Second World War, which started on 1 September 1939, the Polish Air Forces had seven fighter squadrons (Dywizjon Mysliwski) equipped with about 20 planes each. These squadrons were grouped in two Eskadra (sections) in each Squadron. In operational use at that time were mainly the PZL P.11 fighters in either the 'a' or 'c' versions. Only three Eskadrilles were armed with the older version - the PZL P.7 fighter. Most fighter squadrons were allocated to support and defend the Army's ground forces. Only the units of the 1st Warsaw Air Regiment (Sq No: III/1 and IV/1) were allocated to the Brygada Poscigowa (Pursuit Brigade) with the assigned task of the defence of the Polish capital.

Just before the German attack, the IV/1 Squadron was strengthened with the addition of the 123rd Eskadra Mysliwska (Fighter Eskadrille) of the 2. Krakow Air Regiment. This fighter Eskadrille was equipped with P.7 fighters. Colonel (Col.) Stefan Pawlikowski, a veteran of the French skies in the period of WW1 and the Polish-Bolshevist war of 1920, took command of the Brigade.

On 1 September 1939, at 6:30 A.M., from observation points in Mlawa city, there arrived at the Brigade HQ a message about incoming enemy bomber groups attacking Warsaw. Colonel Pawlikowski ordered the launch of the entire Pursuit Brigade. After take-off, the Polish fighters joined formation over Legionowo. At about 7:00, in the Bugo-Narew area, the Brigade attacked a group of about 80 He 111s of the LG 1 and KG 27 "Boelcke". This German bomber formation was given fighter protection by 20 Bf 110s from the I(Z)/LG 1. In this very intense aerial engagement, which lasted over a 40 minute period, combat took place between 154 aircraft from both sides.

The first Polish pilot to engage the enemy formation was from the section led by Lieutenant (Lt.) Aleksander Gabszewicz, the tactical officer of IV/1 Squadron. After machine-gun fire from both Gabszewicz and Corporal Andrzej Niewiara, one of the damaged He 111s came down in a northerly direction and soon crashed during an emergency landing, hitting one of its wing in a tree. In the area of Wyszkow, Second Lieutenant (Sec.Lt.) Jerzy Palusinski attacked a formation of twelve (12) Luftwaffe bombers. After shooting down one of the bombers Palusinski was wounded in the hand, his wrist-watch saved him from more serious injuries. Palusinski was forced to make an emergency landing near the village of Kobylka. There were also other Polish fighter pilots that achieved their first kills. Some of those that scored aerial victories were Captains (Cpt.) Adam Kowalczyk, commander of IV/1 F.Sq, and Juliusz Frey, the Escadrille leader. Second Lieutenant Hieronim Dudwal also gained his first victory, which would amount to four in the September campaign.

In this first aerial combat there were only three P.7 fighters from the 123rd Eskadrille that took part. The reason for so few P.7 fighters to be committed to this first combat was because the commander of IV/1 FS decided to check the ability this old fighter's ability in air combat against the Luftwaffe. Pilots from the Krakow Regiment attacked a group of seven He 111 bombers. Second Lieutenant Jerzy Czerniak, together with Corporal Stanislaw Widlarz shared one of the He 111 bombers. The Polish side did not avoid losses. Boleslaw Olewinski bailed out from his flamming P.11 fighter, both with injuries and burns. Second Lieutenant Stanislaw Szmejl was forced to amke an emergency landing with a damaged fuel tank. A number of the Polish planes received combat damage from machine-gun and cannon fire and needed service and repair. On the German side in these combats, Major (Maj.) Walter Grabmann, one of the famous "Legion Condor" from Spain and the commander of I(Z)/LG 1, was wounded.

At about 12:00 P.M., another group of German bombers flew in the direction of Warsaw. Two sections of P.11 fighters from the 112nd Escadrille took off to intercept the German intruders. The two groups clashed over Wilanow. A formation of nine Do 17 bombers were intercepted by the Polish fighters and a running fight ensued. The German planes attempted to escape in the direction of East Prussia. After the attack of Lt. Stefan Okrzeja, one of bombers exploded in the air. Evidence of Okrzeja's victory was established when small pieces of the exploded bomber were found between the cylinders of his victorious P.11's engine.

The second big air combat that first day of the war started in the Modlin area about 16:30. This time Polish aviators battled against 30 He 111 and Do 17 bombers and nine Ju 87 Stukas, which were escorted by 20 Bf 109 and Bf 110 fighters. Second Lieutenant Jan Borowski was patroling over teh Las Kabacki (Kabacki Forest) area. Borowski intercepted a single Bf 109 piloted by Oberst (Colonel) Henschke, another veteran of the "Legion Condor". Another Bf 109 was shot down by Cadet Jerzy Radomski, who after landing reported that he shot down an "avionette" (a sporting light plane!). Not so luckily were Cadet Janusz Macinski, who emergency landed near Sulejowek, and Lt. Gabszewicz, who was forced to bail out. Hanging from his parachute, Gabszewicz was attacked by an agressive Bf 110 fighter. The attacking German fighter left a lot of holes in his parchute. Flying nearby was Sec.Lt. Tadeusz Sawicz, who arrived with help and at the last moments saved Gabszewicz's life. The German pilot was forced to retire from the scene. Bofore reaching ground surface defenseless Gabszewicz was covered by another pilot, Wladyslaw Kiedrzynski.

Because these morning missions were so successful, the pilots of the 123rd Escarlille, flying P.7 fighters, decided that the next time they started on aerial combat missions, they would not fly with just sections, but all their planes. On this unit's next combat mission they were bounced by Bf 110s. During the initial attack, Cpt. Mieczyslaw Olszewski, the Escadrille commander was killed. Olszewski's P.7 crashed near Legionow. Other pilots that survived this combat by parachute were: Sec.Lt. Stanislaw Czternastek, Sec.Lt. Feliks Szyszka and Cadet Antoni Danek. Stanislaw Czternastek, the first pilot just mentioned above landed safely in the Nowy Dwor Mazowiecki area. The other two pilots were attacked by the Luftwaffe pilots. Szyszka, while hanging in his parachute, was hit sixteen times and landed on the bank of the Wisla river. After receiving help from civilians Szyszka was transported to the hospital. Another two P.7 pilots, Sec.Lt. Erwin Kawnik and Corp. Henryk Flamme were forced to emergency land near Zakroczyn in heavily damaged planes. The Luftwaffe's adversaries, Bf 110s of I.(Z)/LG 1, claimed 5 PZL-fighters shot down - 3 by Hauptmann Fritz Schleif, one each by Unteroffizier Sturm and Unteroffizier Lauffs.

In another aerial combat Lt.Col. Leopold Pamula, second commander of the Pursuit Brigade, also took part. Pamula arrived directly from HQ and immediately ordered one of pilots to leave the cockpit of his fighter. Lieutenant Colonel Leopold Pamula directly entered the battle. In a duel with two Bf 109s he was shot down and bailed out. Also wounded during this aerial combat was also pilot Zdzislaw Horn, who entered into a comma just after returning, upon landing Horn could not exit his cockpit. Over Praga Cpt. Gustaw Sidorowicz, commander of the 111 F.Esc., clashed with pair of Bf 109 fighters. The result of this combat was 1:1 -- one of the Germans was probably shot down, but the injured Sidorowicz was forced to make an emergency landing.

During most of the day of 1 September 1939, most of the German bombers were not able to reach their targets of the Polish capital city. The German bombers were forced to drop their bombs on fields near Warsaw and then made their return to East Prussia. In Warsaw itself, very few bombs fell on the city. During the entire day's combats, the Pursuit Brigade lost one pilot killed, and another eight were hospitalized. Ten aircraft were lost, while another 24 were heavy damaged. At 20:00, the Brigade had only 20 fighters ready for take off. Aviators of the Brigade downed twelve Luftwaffe planes and four were shared with the 152nd Escadrille pilots, which took part in the afternoon battle. Another five kills were claimed as probable and ten enemy planes were damaged.

The pilots of the 152nd Fighter Eskadrille awaited for their take off signals since the early morning. The first message about enemy aerial activity arrived at about 16:00, with a large formation of Luftwaffe aircraft coming toward the direction of the Modlin area. To defend the city immediately, nine P.11 fighters took off. When the Polish pilots spotted the enemy group they forgot about their main task, the defence of the city. Sections led by Lt. Marian Imiela and Sec.Lt. Anatol Piotrowski entered in pursuit. The Polish fighters caught the German planes far of Warsaw, in the Jablonna and Legionow area. First to attack was Sec.Lt. Piotrowski who bounced a He 111 with a good targeted series of shots. The German plane went down, however the defencive gunner's fire hit the Polish fighter. The P.11 came down in an attempted forced landing. Unfortunately for Piotrowski, Bf 109s then come out from clouds, and at a very low altitude, they flammed the defenceless P.11. The Polish pilot had no chance so survive. Another aviator of the 152nd Eskadrille was Sec.Lt. Jan Bury-Burzymski. In a vertical atack in the Buchnika area, Bury-Burzymski was able to down a He 111. This Eskadrille, together with the Pursuit Brigade, scored four additional kills. After this battle, which lasted over one hour, the Polish pilots returned to their airfield.


Of about 2000 aircraft used against Poland, the Luftwaffe lost 258 to all causes, and of an additional 263 damaged only 40% made it back to the front-line units after repairs. An estimated 230 aircraft were destroyed in action, primarily by Polish fighters and anti-aircraft artillery. About 400 aircrew were killed or missing, and an additional 120 wounded. Of 217 German tanks destroyed and 457 seriously damaged in the campaign, a significant proportion can be attributed to the Bomber Brigade and the P.23s of the Army reconnaissance squadrons.

The Lotnictwo Wojskowe lost 333 aircraft, 260 as the result of enemy action. Of these, around 100 were destroyed in combat and a further 120 as the result of sustained damage. Only 25 combat aircraft (as opposed to many training and civilian airplanes) were destroyed on the ground. Aircrew killed numbered 61 with 110 were missing and 63 wounded. When comparing the combat potential of both sides, this is by no means a bad result for the Polish Air Force.
An interesting observation was that, throughout the campaign, more than 30 Polish aircraft were shot down by Polish anti-aircraft fire. This sad testimony to the efficiency of Polish AA gunners (who also took a heavy toll – considering the small number of AA guns available – of the Luftwaffe) is easy to explain. Constantly harassed by the Luftwaffe, mauled by the horrifying Stuka attacks, Polish ground troops fired at anything that flew. Polish aircraft were indeed a rare sight in those days, thus, when they did appear, they were almost automatically assumed to be German. Probably the worst incident happened on September 8th. When P.11s of III/2 Dywizjon were chasing a He 111 formation near Pulawy, Polish AA opened fire, and shot down four aircraft, killing two pilots – one of them the C/O of 121 Eskadra – and wounding one. More frequent, though, were cases of downing Polish liaison and reconnaissance aircraft, which, because of German mastery of the air, usually kept close to the ground and were often hit by Polish machine gun or even small arms fire. In debriefing the arriving Polish airmen, this was a lesson that the Ilmavoimat would take to heart, with a strong emphasis placed on aircraft recognition training for Maavoimat AA gunners.

Another interesting statistic is the number of defensive kills by Polish bomber and reconnaissance crews – 14 – as compared to the number of these aircraft shot down by German fighters (31). As Polish bombers had a relatively weak defensive armament (three 7.92mm guns) and no armor, even assuming top-quality gunnery on part of the Polish crews, there is no escaping the conclusion that many German fighter pilots were only learning their trade (by comparison: the Pursuit Brigade claimed 38 victories over German bombers and lost only 4 fighters to their defensive fire).

The Ilmavoimat incorporated all of these aircraft and personnel immediately and they went on to fly in Polish Volunteer Squadrons in the Winter War. Polish flying skills were well-developed and the Polish pilots and aircrew flying for Finland in the Winter War were regarded as fearless bordering on reckless. Success rates were very high, on a par with the Ilmavoimat pilots in point of fact. German war booty from Poland also included 50 brand new PZL Pegasus engines that were sold to Sweden – these were promptly resold by Sweden to Finland for use by the Ilmavoimat as spares.

Image
Polish Air Force PZL 37 Łoś aircraft on a bombing mission during the Winter War. After the Winter War started, the Polish aircraft reapplied the Polish insignia and fought as a “Polish Air Force unit attached to the Ilmavoimat” during the Winter War, considering themselves at war with the USSR. A considerable number of Polish Air Force personnel managed to find their way to Finland over the course of the Winter War, as eager to continue the fight against the USSR, which had "stabbed Poland in the back" as they were to also fight Germany. This attitude would not change throughout WW2, the Poles would always regard the USSR as an enemy as real the Germany.This was something the British and Americans would not understand (or which they refused to understand) until after the end of WW2.

Next Post: Escape from Latvia and Lithuania – the Polish Army’s miraculous “Dunkirk”
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Escape from Latvia and Lithuania – the Polish Army’s Dunkirk

#321

Post by CanKiwi2 » 07 Mar 2012, 23:43

In September 1939, the Polish armed forces had battled the Germans for two weeks before being blindsided by the Soviet Union’s attack from the east. With only minimal help from Poland’s allies, France and Great Britain, and with most of his forces fighting the Germans, Poland’s commander-in-chief Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz ordered his soldiers in eastern Poland to withdraw south into Romania or Hungary, hoping to save them for future battles. By the end of the month, some 90,000 Poles had made their way into those two countries. Another 30,000 members of the Polish Army and Polish Aior Force escaped the Red Army and the Heer by crossing the border into Latvia and Lithuania where they were disarmed and interned.

One of the Polish soldiers who escaped from Latvia in the Evacuation was Henryk Wroblewski, a serving member of the Polish Air Force. Henryk was born in St. Petersburg in 1921. His mother was a maid in the household of a Russian general, his father was a member of the Czar's Palace Guard. Although his father had been regarded as too old to fight against the Finns in 1914, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 persuaded the family to return to Poland. In 1922 when Henryk was aged one, the family settled in Vilno. Here is Henryk's account:

(see http://www.polandinexile.com/henry.htm for the real story...)

“On the 17th September 1939, early on a Sunday morning, Soviet Russia invaded Poland. A small Polish unit was leaving town (Vilno). With a few of my colleagues from the Air Force, we joined this unit as volunteers. Equipped and armed, we marched west, but did not get very far as Soviet troops had cut us off. On 20th September we decided to cross the Latvian border where we knew we would be interned. We were dis-armed and interned temporarily in a barbed-wire surrounded camp at Dyneburg.

After a few weeks I was sent to a camp at Liepaja, a port on the Baltic Sea, where there were about 8,000 Poles from all the services. At the camp, we were well treated by the Latvian guards, but there was little to do. We all knew about the demanded from the USSR that the Baltic countries allow the USSR to establish military bases and station troops on their soil for the duration of the European war and this worried us – we had heard many stories about what was happening back in Poland. Latvia signed an agreement on 5 October 1939 that gave the USSR bases at Liepāja, Ventspils, and Pitrags and allowed the Red Army to garrison 30,000 troops in Latvia as well as build airbases and that really worried us. We all wanted to somehow get to France or Britain where we had heard Polish military units were being reformed. But we had no contacts and no way that we knew to escape from Latvia.

Image
Map sourced from: http://www.chessbase.com/news/2005/liepaja01.gif
Liepaja: the Latvian Port from where some 20,000 of the 30,000 Poles in Latvia and Lithuania were evacuated on the morning of 14th October 1939 in a well-planned and organized operation by the Merivoimat.

Things changed for us very suddenly on the morning of 14th October 1939. At 1am in the morning, we were woken by men of the Aizsargi, the Latvian “Guards” organisation and told to assemble with whatever we possessed. At 3am, the Aizsargi began directing us on to an assortment of trucks and buses while other groups were started off on foot. We were told we were being taken to the Port area from where we would be shipped out of Latvia. Lots of rumours flew around as we moved out, among them that we were bring shipped off to Germany or the the USSR, but nobody paniced and tried to run – there were a lot of Aizsargi, and they were all armed and besides, where could we go? In my case, I was lucky enough to be packed into a truck – standing room only – so at least I didn’t have to walk like many of the others did.

We got to the port and were driven directly onto a wharf next to a large ship. We were told to get off the truck and line up with the others already waiting and we did, after which the truck left immediately and the next took its place. There were some large groups of men stationed along the wharf at intervals in strange looking uniforms and armed with rifles and submachineguns that were different from anything we had seen. They wore German style helmets which caused a certain amount of concern, but the rest of their equipment was unlike anything we’d seen in photos of Germans or of the Red Army. We wondered who they were and rumours flew around that it was the Swedes or the British or even the Americans. We’d only been there 5 minutes, and head of us we could see rows of men filing up gangplanks onto the ship. Further down, we could see another ship and then another with the same thing happening. It seemed every Pole in Latvia was there. Which was not quite correct as it turned out – it was every Pole in Lithuania plus all of us that were at the camp outside the city.

We could see the group next us was being addressed by someone in wearing that German style helment, after which they started to move onto the ship and then he walked over to us. Every eye was on him. He started to address us in very badly accented Polish. Very very badly accented and very broken Polish, Well, he might not have spoken good Polisg but his first words bought a huge relief to all of us. “We are from Finland. All of you keep quiet and listen.” He had that sort of Senior NCO voice that commands instant obedience. Even in bad Polish! Nobody made a sound. “You will make No Noise. There Will Be No Questions. Listen and follow instructions. I am from the Finnish Navy and we are here to evacuate you to Finland. From this moment you are under the protection of the Finnish Navy. You will board the ship as instructed and take the places you are told. Do it quickly and do not argue. Follow all instructions. We are sailing for Finland as soon as everybody is safely on board. We must move quickly before the Germans or the Russians become aware of what is happening.” He gestured to the man standing next to him. “Ylivääpeli (that’s Master Sergeant to you) Sinkonen will take over and see you onto the ship. Do not argue with him, he does not speak Polish.” “Neither do you,” I thought but didn’t say. Without any further word he turned and moved on to the next group.

Ylivääpeli (we eventually got used to Finnish ranks but it took a long time) Sinkonen looked at us and smiled. He was 6 feet six and looked like he could carry a pine tree under either arm. His smile might have been friendly, it was hard to tell. While he did not speak Polish but his instructions were obvious. We fell in at the rear of the group ahead of us and filed up the gangplank and onto the ship as fast as we could. There was no delay. Finnish sailor’s were every few feet and they pointed and pushed us in the direction we were to go in. The ship must already have been fairly full. We were directed upwards and then packed into cabins. It looked like a passenger ship, maybe a ferry of some sort and we were packed in like sardines. Nobody complained. There was not one protest – we were all elated that we were leaving Latvia. There were 30 of us packed into a small cabin with 6 bunks but at least we had a porthole that could open and let fresh air in. Two hours after we had boarded, the ship began to pull away from the berth and head out to sea. From our porthole, we could see other ships as crowded as ours, even the decks were packed and we could see warships as well. “Finnish destroyers,” someone said as one raced past us, visible through our small porthole. Because it was getting lighter, we could make out the large Finnish flag and see that all the guns were manned and it was ready to fight. That was very reassuring.

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Photo sourced from: http://seattlehistory.org/media/images/ ... /39200.jpg
Polish soldiers lined up on the wharves at the Latvian port of Liepaja and filing aboard Finnish transport ships. Operatives of the secretive covert action wing of the Finnish Intelligence Service coordinated the move with the Latvian Aizsargi and Lithuanian paramilitary organisation, the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga. Some 30,000 Poles were moved over a period of two days from Camps in both Latvian and Lithuania to the Latvian ports of Liepaja, Ventspils and Riga, from where they were embarked on Finnish transports. Loading started at midnight on 14th October and had been completed by midday on the 15th, after which the ships were on the move.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.vilnaghetto.com/gallery2/d/2 ... 26+-+2.jpg
Lithuanian Men of the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga (photo from 1926): The Lithuanian Riflemen‘s Union was a nationalistic paramilitary organisation similar in many ways to the Finnish Suojeluskuntas (and indeed, in the interwar decades had established ties with the Suojeluskuntas). Being a member was seen as prestigious, and a "šaulys" was regarded as a defender of the state, with many state officials such as Police and Foresters being members of this organisation, which was some 60,000 strong in the 1930’s. Following the Soviet occupation of June 1940, many members of the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga would pay with their lives for the assistance they had given to the Poles in escaping to Finland.

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http://myimages.bravenet.com/244/915/87 ... i_1940.jpg
Latvia: Men of the Aizsargi (Guards) paramilitary organisation. As in Lithuania, many of the Aizsargi that helped the Poles escape paid with their lives after the Soviet occupation. Some would escape to Finland before the Soviet vice clamped down irrevocably, and the Finns would clandestinely rescue many between June and September 1940 as well as over the period of the Soviet and German occupations. These men would become the core of the Latvian Regiments that would fight in the Maavoimat-led Liberation of Latvia in 1944.

Shortly after that the ship picked up speed and we could see the other ships moving with us. Passenger ships crowded with fellow Poles, Destroyers and small fast warships of some type we had never heard of – but they were very fast. We could feel the ship’s engines vibrating the whole vessel and it seemed like she was going as fast as she could. It was a wonderful feeling and everybody was talking – at least until the sea got rougher and some started feeling seasick. Shortly after, the same Finnish Senior NCO who could speak Polish stuck his head in our cabin. “Listen,” he barked, and we all fell silent. It was that tone of voice again. “It will take us twenty hours to get to Finland. We will bring food and water round later, but there are 2,500 of you on a ship built to carry 700, it will take a while. In meantime, you stay in your cabins. There are bathrooms down the passageway. Only leave to use them and come right back. A sailor is on duty in the passageway to make sure you obey. He does not speak Polish so don’t bother asking him anything. I am only Finn on this ship that speaks Polish and I have all of you to talk to. Don’t waste my time asking questions. All I know is we take you to Finland with your Government’s agreement.” He looked around. “Do not make trouble on this ship. You will not enjoy the results.” Then he smiled at us. “Finland will welcome you.”

Finland did. We had left Latvia early in the morning of the 14 of October and we arrived in Helsinki on the morning of the next day, all 30,000 of us in one day in a small convoy of fifteen passenger and cargo ships. God knows how the Finns had done it but us Poles, we were all elated. We had escaped! Tired as we were, we could not stop talking, nobody wanted to sleep, we all just wanted to find out what was happening and where we were to go. At last, after three hours in our cabin, a real genuine Polish Officer stood in the doorway or our cabin, with a Finnish soldier next to him. He looked us over and grinned. “Welcome to Finland,” he said. “You are going to follow this NCO off the ship. The Finns have set up camps for us and you will stay there for now until we can arrange for you to be shipped out to Britain to join the Polish Army and continue the fight.” We all cheered, this was the best news we could imagine. After we quietened down, he continued, “It may take some time to organize, but in the meantime, do not cause any trouble and be on your best behavior. We are all guests here and the Finns have helped us more than anyone else. I have to go now to the next cabin but the NCO here will take charge of you.” He gave us another grin and left.

Image
Photo sourced from: http://img85.imageshack.us/img85/4372/stlouishavana.jpg
Polish soldiers being evacuated from Latvia and Lithuania to Finland – packed into and onto Finnish transports and escorted by almost the entire Merivoimat, 30,000 members of the Polish military were evacuated to Finland in a move that took both the Germans and the Soviets by surprise. It was a mammoth logistical and naval effort involving some 15-20 transport ships and 25 warships that took place with a flawless precision that was evidence of the complete professionalism and expertise of the Merivoimat. The Rannikkojääkärit Regimental Battle Group that supplied the “land force” component of the move operated with a precision and élan that reinforced this impression to any observers (of which, outside the Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles, there were none….).

The Finnish NCO looked at us and said something incomprehensible, then gestured to us to follow him. We did, all thirty of us filing out of the cabin and following him through the ship like a group of school children on an outing. As we came onto the deck, we paused. It seemed like the entire population of Helsinki was lining the wharves and cheering. There were even Polish flags being waved. It was enough to bring tears to the eyes, and more than one of us was crying openly at the welcome. Filing down the gangplank, “our” NCO first led us towards a row of Field Kitchens and trestle tables staffed by rows of Finnish women in uniform with armband that read “Lotta.” It was our first experience of the Finnish womens paramilitary organisation, the Lotta Svard. It would not be the last. We were handed large mugs of coffee and told to drink up, then given sandwiches to eat on the truck which we were promptly gestured to get in. From the back of the truck, we got a good luck around as we were driven out of Helsinki and into the countryside, one of a long line of trucks and buses going in both directions – which seemed to indicate we weren’t going far.

Within the hour we were being offloaded at a Finnish military camp. Our group of thirty was allocated to three ten man tents with bedding. Our Finnish NCO remained with us, taking us to eat in a large mess hall which seemed to be serving food non-stop, then to a warehouse where we were issued with new clothing. “Our” NCO remained with us for the next two weeks, by which time we were being reorganized into “Polish” units. It was at that stage that I was moved into a Polish Air Force unit within the camp, saying goodbye to my Army comrades with whom I had made the trip from Latvia and spent my first two weeks in Finland. By then, we were all in love with Finland. While we were being reorganized, we were allowed out of Camp and we made a number of trips to Helsinki. The Finnish Army even paid us and the Finns in Helsinki welcomed us with open arms. It was difficult to even pay for a meal or a drink and we often found ourselves guests in Finnish houses. After Latvia and Lithuania, where we were tolerated but not welcome, it was a refreshing and invigorating change.

Peripherally, we were aware of the ongoing tensions between Finland and the USSR – and we none of us had any love for the USSR, which had stabbed Poland in the back as we fought the Germans. Thus, as tensions in Finland rose and we saw the Finnish military being mobilized and moving to the frontiers, with even women and teenagers amed and ready to fight, many of us asked our Officers what we could do to help the country that had rescued us. It was in late October as I recall that we were paraded as a unit and our CO told us that Finland had formally asked the Polish Government for our help – and that our Government had replied that any Pole who volunteered to fight for Finland could do so with their official blessing. The CO asked for volunteers to step forward and as one man, our entire “Squadron” moved forward. The situation was the same across evyer Polish Camp in Finland. With very few exceptions, we all volunteered.

Next Post: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units.
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Re: Zemsta Za Nóż w Plecy - The Polish Volunteers in Finland

#322

Post by Juha Tompuri » 08 Mar 2012, 00:12

CanKiwi2 wrote:Image
Picture sourced from: http://facta-nautica.graptolite.net/sit ... 47x579.jpg
ORP General Haller: The remaining warships of the small flotilla heading towards Finland consisted of two obsolete gunboats, the ORP Generał Haller and ORP Komendant Piłsudski. Both ships were Filin-class guard ships originally built for the Imperial Russian Navy at the Crichton-Vulcan naval yard in Turku, Finland. They were later acquired by the Polish Navy and served as school ships and minelayers. Under the command of Stanisław Mieszkowski, General Haller sucessfully escaped to Finland where she served with the Merivoimat until sunk in action in a Soviet air raid in the last stages of the Winter War. The General Haller displaced 342 tons, was 55m in length with a beam of 7m, had a maximim speed of 14.5 knopts and a crew of 60. Armament consisted of 2 x 76mm guns, 4 machineguns and 30 mines. ORP Komendant Piłsudski also escaped to Finland and was lost in action against the Kriegsmarine when minelaying off the Latvian coast in mid 1944 after Finland declared war on Germany.
Thank you very much for the detailed and interesting work Nigel!

ORP Generał Haller and ORP Komendant Piłsudski did also have sisterships at Finnish Navy - the gunboats Karjala and Turunmaa:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... it#p874214

Regards, Juha

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Re: Escape from Latvia and Lithuania – the Polish Army’s Dun

#323

Post by CanKiwi2 » 09 Mar 2012, 00:12

Thx Juha, didn't know that. Knew the Polish ones were built in Finland.....

OK, amended my previous Post but the time limit for edits expired so I've reposted - additional chunk on internees in Latvia added in at the start....

In September 1939, the Polish armed forces had battled the Germans for two weeks before being blindsided by the Soviet Union’s attack from the east. With only minimal help from Poland’s allies, France and Great Britain, and with most of his forces fighting the Germans, Poland’s commander-in-chief Marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz ordered his soldiers in eastern Poland to withdraw south into Romania or Hungary, hoping to save them for future battles. By the end of the month, some 90,000 Poles had made their way into those two countries. Another 30,000 members of the Polish Army and Polish Aior Force escaped the Red Army and the Heer by crossing the border into Latvia and Lithuania where they were disarmed and interned.

In 1939, Latvia shared a common border with Poland of some 100kms in length and the attack on Poland by Germany coaused widespread concern (as it did to a lesser extent in Lithuania). To fully understand the attitude of the Latvian Government to Poland and to the internment of Polish military personnel crossing into Latvia in 1939, we must briefly look at the international situation. In 1919 the Baltic states, Poland and Finland had started working intermittently towards creating an agreement for joint defense – we will cover this and other efforts in a subsequent post, suffice it to say that nothing concrete came from these efforts. Latvia's subsequent attempts to create an alliance, at least with Estonia and Lithuania also came to nothing (the 1923 military convention concluded with Estonia was more of a formality than a concrete treaty, and an agreement in 1934 provided only a diplomatic cooperation, which in the years 1939-1940 did not lead to any solid military cooperation, giving the USSR, one of the pretexts it used for the occupation of the Baltic states in June 1940). Attempts to obtain guarantee of independence from the Western powers also failed. In such circumstances, in early September 1939, the only hope of the authoritarian governments of the small Baltic states remained a policy of neutrality and respect towards the potential aggressors - the Germans and the Soviet Union.

Following the outbreak of war between Poland and Germany, Latvian President K. Ulmanis issued a statement on September 1st affirming the neutrality of Latvia, and on September 3rd the government once again stated: "In this troubled time the government kindly requests all citizens to dutifully and unanimously support the policy of neutrality determined by the President of the State, which the Government will implement in all areas of business. Calmly and with dignity, without giving anything away and not giving in to panic, the whole nation will continue its work and will overcome all the difficulties and limitations that war between foreign states can also bring to our land. The sense of responsibility and sense of duty should be strong in every citizen, and everyone should know that the government expects an active and judicious support from all citizens. We will work together, to pray for peace for the peoples who today raise weapons one against another, and together we will give all our strength to strengthen and honor our homeland. God, bless Latvia! "

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Photo sourced from : http://blogs.krustaskola.lv/wp-content/ ... sdiena.jpg
Latvian President Karlis Ulmanis: Kārlis Augusts Vilhelms Ulmanis (September 4, 1877 in Bērze, Bērze Parish, Latvia — September 20, 1942 in Krasnovodsk prison, Soviet Union) was a prominent Latvian politician in independent Latvia from 1918 to 1940. Ulmanis studied agriculture at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich and at Leipzig University. He then worked in Latvia as a writer, lecturer, and manager in agricultural positions. He was politically active during the 1905 Revolution, was briefly imprisoned in Pskov, and subsequently fled Latvia to avoid incarceration by the Russian authorities. During this period of exile, Ulmanis studied at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in the United States, earning a Bachelor of Science degree in agriculture. After working briefly at that university as a lecturer, Ulmanis moved to Houston, Texas, where he had purchased a dairy business. Ulmanis returned to Latvia from exile in 1913, after being informed that it was safe to return due to the declaration of a general amnesty by the Russian tsar. This safety was short-lived WWI broke out one year later.

Ulmanis was one of the principal founders of the Latvian People's Council (Tautas Padome), which proclaimed Latvia's independence from Russia on November 18, 1918. Ulmanis was the first Prime Minister of a Latvia which had become independent for the first time in 700 years. He also served as Prime Minister in several subsequent Latvian government administrations during the period of Latvian independence from 1918 to 1940. In addition, he founded the Latvian Farmers' Union, one of the two most prominent political parties in Latvia at that time. On May 15, 1934, in order to protect the country from a coup by right-wing extremists led by Lt. Col. Voldemārs Ozols, Ulmanis as Prime Minister dissolved the Saeima (Parliament) and established executive non-parliamentary authoritarian rule. Officers from the Army and units of the Aizsargi loyal to Ulmanis moved against key government offices, communications and transportation facilities. Many elected officials were illegally detained, as were any military officers that resisted the coup d'etat.

Ulmanis was a popular leader, especially among the farmers, during whose leadership Latvia recorded major economic achievements. During Ulmanis' rule, education was strongly emphasized and literacy rates in Latvia reached high levels. The United Kingdom and Germany became Latvia's major trade partners, while trade with the USSR was reduced. The economy, especially the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, were micromanaged to an extreme degree. Ulmanis nationalised many industries and there was rapid economic growth, during which Latvia attained a very high standard of living. At a time when most of the world's economy was suffering, Latvia could point to increases in both gross national product and in exports of Latvian goods overseas. This, however, came at the cost of liberty and civil rights. Ulmanis was a Latvian nationalist, who espoused the slogan "Latvia for Latvians". As the result, the economic share of minorities - Germans, Jews, Russians, Lithuanians - declined. However, Ulmanis didn't allow any physical violence or unlawful acts towards minorities and dealt harshly with right- and left- wing extremists, and with both Nazi and Communist sympathisers. Latvia was also open to refugees and many from both Germany and the USSR found refuge in Latvia between 1920 and 1938.

In June 1940, when Latvia was completely occupied by the Soviet Union, Ulmanis ordered Latvians to show no resistance to the Soviet Army. The phrase "I will remain in my place and you remain in your places" from his radio speech on this occasion is still famous. On July 21, 1940 Ulmanis was forced to resign and he then asked the Soviet government for a pension and to allow him to emigrate to Switzerland. Instead, he ended up in Stavropol in the USSR, where he worked in his original profession for a year. In July 1941, he was imprisoned. A year later, as German armies were closing in on Stavropol, he and other inmates were evacuated to a prison in Krasnovodsk in the present Turkmenistan. On the way there, he contracted dysentery and died on 20 September 1942. His grand-nephew, Guntis Ulmanis was elected President of Latvia in 1993.

Although in some publications, the press (especially in the first week of the war) expressed not-so-well-hidden sympathy for the Police, officials and newspapers tried to maintain strict neutrality. For example, on September 1, Polish MEP S. Klopotowski gave an interview to the Latvian press, but the Foreign Ministry prohibited its publication, giving the press a hint that in the case of similar interviews, the texts must be agreed prior to publication by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On September 4th the PAT Correspondent in Riga approached the Director of the State Telegraph Agency, indicating that the Polish press office would provide the latest news about the war to the Latvian press. The Director politely replied that "given the neutral position, we will supply only official announcements”. Simultaneously the Latvian government through diplomatic channels desperately tried to determine the basis of rumors of the liaison pact between Germany and the USSR which had been made on August 23. The Baltic states, however, received only vague answers from the representatives of both countries.

Meanwhile the Latvian-Polish border was not entirely peaceful. From the beginning of September, Poles had begun seeking refuge in Latvia (few were returned back) and Latvia Poles were crossing the other way, seeking to join the Polish Army. Polish border guards by September 3rd had already sent back to Latvia two young Poles from Daugavpils (Daugavpils), who wanted to join the Polish Army (other Polish-Latvian volunteers made it to Wilno). This situation changed abruptly on September 17th, when hundreds of refugees began flooding into Latvia. In a meeting of the government, a proposal was made by President K. Ulmanis and the Foreign Minister V. Munters to suspend diplomatic relations with Poland. September 21 Munters invited the Polish envoy, Kłopotowskiego to a meeting and read him the note. Trying to ease the tenor of the note, Munuters advised that " if the Polish government will start operations again, then - we'll see what comes next", but the conversation "was a tragic moment". On the same day (21 September) in accordance with the Foreign Ministry statement that "relations with the Polish military attaché have been interrupted" – the Polish embassy was refused a permit for an attaché, Major F. Brzeskwińskiego, to visit the internment camp for Poles that had been set up.

In attempting to placate Germany and the USSR, Latvia had ceased to be a neutral party. In turn, the governments of Estonia and Lithuania were in s similar situation. Polish relations with both Lithuania and Latvia were interrupted in a milder form in October. Other neutral countries, especially Scandinavian countries, had not considered this possibility and the Polish delegations continued their diplomatic work. The Latvian Government and Foreign Ministry on September 25 justified this step to representatives of Britain, and later to France, both of whose representatives gave expression to their displeasure. The Polish embassy building in Riga and the Polish consulate building in Daugavpils were at this stage taken over by representatives from Finland, who quickly acted to set up a Polish affairs section and from which they began to work to assist Poles in moving out from Latvia and Lithuania to Sweden and Finland. In early October (5 October) Latvia was forced to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union, authorising the deployment of Soviet garrisons. The number of soldiers in the Soviet military garrisons was close to or even exceeded the number of soldiers of the national armies of each of the Baltic states. However, by the time the Red Army garrisons arrived, Finland had already acted and the Poles at least were gone.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.occupation.lv/images/items/2 ... 44076p.jpg
The signining of the Latvia-USSR Mutual Assistance Pact in Moscow on 5th October, 1939. The signatories: Seated, Molotov. Standing (from left): USSR political representative to Latvia I. Zotov, Stalin, the Latvia Foreign Minister Vilhelms Munters, the Latvian envoy to the USSR Fricis Kocins and the USSR’s First Assistamt Foreign Affairs Commisar V Potjomkin.

Internment

On the evening of September 17 the flood of Polish refugees crossing the border began in earnest. Rail traffic was stopped between stations in Poland and Latvia and on September 18 border security in the region was strengthened with local aizsargów (members of the paramilitary Aizsargi). Refugees gave the Latvian officers weapon. One of the interned Poles, M. Zawiło, recalled that the border had been strengthened and that “we could see a lot of cavalry and infantry patrols on the railway line. Poles gave up their arms and ammunition. The railway station waiting room had several tables where the personal data of Polish soldiers was recorded. Then we were taken to Daugavpils in passenger cars. At the border taking pictures was strictly forbidden, the whole area was closed to civilians.”

On September 18 and 19 83 Polish aircraft arrived and the crews were interned: these aircraft consisted of 38 RWD-8, 35 PWS-26, 1 PZL-11A, 2 RWD-10, 2 RWD-17 RWD-21 1, 2 Lublin R XIII, 1 R XIIIC Lublin, Lublin R-XIV 1. Mostly these were training aircraft from north-eastern Polamd, which in the first half of September centered on Wilnoi. The only combat units that arrived were 3 RWD-8’s from Pinsk. Aircraft landed at the airport in Daugavpils, but in some cases it was necessary to use anti-aircraft artillery fire and machine guns to force the aircraft to land. On September 19 an aircraft which did not want to land and flew of in the direction of Jēkabpils was shot down near Daugavpils. Afterwards, 20 RWD-8’s were used as instructional aircraft in the Latvian Army aviation regiment, and six aircraft were handed over to Aeroklubowi Latvia, while several went to the Aviation Aizsargi. The greater number remained in warehouses in Riga.

Correspondent daugavpilskiej "Daugavas Vēstnesis" was in Wilno in September. On the morning of 18 September he was at the Wino airport and observed the situation. There was nervousness, the weather was not favorable, but some pilots flew to Latvia. Shouts accompanied each aircraft flying out. At least four pilots flew together with their wives. The airmen interned most came from the fifth Lida Aviation Regiment, some from the fifth Regiment in Torun, some from the Wilno flight school and a few from the 1st Aviation Regiment. They were relatively well armed. The number of pilots along with the technical personnel of air regiments escaping to Latvia reached several hundred people. The same correspondent describes the situation of Polish refugees on the Polish-Latvian border, which he witnessed: “When I arrived at the Zemgale station there remained in the Polish side a long line of cars, and many refugees. It did not last long. By September 21 the influx of refugees was over, but there had as yet been no contact with Red Army Border Protection units.” The border was closed by Soviet units on the evening of September 22, by which time many thousands of Poles, both military and civilian, had sought refuge in Latvia.

The official registration and the initial internment work took place in Daugavpils where refugeers received medical care. Refugees behaved calmly and seemed reconciled to their fate. By September 20 most of the first arrivals had been sent to the newly formed camp in Liepaja, later many were sent to camps in Sigulda and Valmiera. The camp in Daugavpils was temporary, with Liepāja becoming the main internment centre. Further camps were set up at Liten and Lilaste and the Latvian military assigned one company of Aizsargi to supervise each camp. (When the time came for Finland to act, this facilitated the evacuation as the Finnish Suojeluskuntas had close ties with the Aizsargi and these were used from the start). By October 7th no refugees remained in Daugavpils.

Within the internment camps, good order prevailed. Wake-up call was scheduled for 7.00, followed by breakfast, working, learning, walking in the courtyard from 9:00 to 12:30 pm and later - lunch, after which there was free time for dinner (18.00) and then at 21.00 the call for evening, and from 22.00 lights out. On holidays, waking up was an hour later. Officers and others - each in their own particular time could bathe in the lake in the territory of the camp, but the water temperature was to be no lower than 18 degrees (a doctor measured the temperature at 7.00 in the morning). Radio could be listened to in the camp throughout the day. In the Liepaja Camp, Col. E. Perkowicz served as senior officer, and received orders directly from the Latvian camp commander. Already by early October there was offered the opportunity to learn Latvian, Russian, English, German and French, to continue their primary and secondary education, participation in agricultural courses, drainage and cultivation of bees. Playing of sports was encouraged (the Latvian Red Cross donated for this purpose footballs, skates, as well as chess, checkers and dominoes).

Guests could visit every day from 12.00 to 20.00. Within one week you could send a post card at no charge (postage was paid by the International Red Cross). Those who in Latvia had friends or relatives were able to leave camp two times a month, to get 2 days off to visit family in Sigulda, a civilian refugee camp, or to visit relatives in Riga (once per month). In fact, the internees, regardless of whether they had relatives in Latvia or not, got leave frequently. Everyone had to sign a declaration that outside of the camp they would behave impeccably and that in the event of default all internees would loose the right to leave. From 11th of October 1939 the internees were allowed to meet with people who were their spouses, relatives or relatives of their spouses, but - judging from the entries in guest books - to obtain a formal statement of the meeting was enough to establish a relationship with the internees.

Starting as early as 21-22 September, the Latvian authorities began to pay interned Polish Officers and NCO’s. The Latvian Polish community also banded together to help the internees. Some internees began plans to escape while the Latvia government debated what to do with the Polish internees. According to the Polish military attache in Lithuania, Leon Mitkiewicz, he received an instruction from General Mieczyslaw Norvid-Neugebauer on 23rd September, 1939, instructing him to send large groups of the internees to France …… by railroad. Mitkiewitcz recorded that the instruction was somewhat naive and he had some doubts about the geographical knowledg of the author of the instruction. Needless to say, it was not complied with. Between September 10th and October 15th about 400 internees got French and British visas, but only about 150 left, all via Sweden. The Swedish Government was very reluctant to give visas, even for transit.

However, unknown to the Polish internees in Latvia and Lithuania – and to the British, French and the Polish Government-n-Exile, such as it was in late September and early October 1939, Finland was already planning the evacuation of the Poles in Latvia and Lithuania for her own reasons. As has been previously noted, Finnish Intelligence (and key Government Ministers and senior Military Commanders) were aware of the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, of which they had been made aware from two sources – a sympathetic source in Germany (where Finland had many well-wishers) and also personally to the Finnish Ambassador in the US from US President Roosevelt himself. After the immediate invasion of Poland and the Soviet pressure on Finland and the Baltic States, Finland took this seriously and was moving rapidly to a full war footing. As such, 25-30,000 Polish military personnel were a valuable asset, either as additional soldiers should that eventuate or as additional leverage with the British and French. Not that the Finns counted on this, just as they did not count on Stalin’s goodwill and his abiding by any agreement signed.

Thus the decision to act. In the decade of the 1930’s, the Merivoimat had made considerable progress, both in size and in the ability to plan and act rapidly. On the 20th September 1939, the Government instructed the Navy to begin planning for the evacuation of Polish military personnel from Latvia and Lithuania in a rapid and secret move. Reserve personnel for the Merivoimat, including the three Rannikkojääkärit Regimental Battle Groups, had already been mobilized and this additional troop and ship movements were not surprising. Scattered in various locations, a number of cargo and passenger ships departed Finland on the evening of 13 October 1939 and steamed south at an average speed of 20 knots. They had been preceded by five Merivoimat Submarines who were already well on their way. Early the next morning (14 October), a naval task force consisting of four of the Merivoimat’s Grom-class destroyers, six of the ASW Corvettes and some twenty five Motor Gunboats headed south at thirty five knots, linking up south of the Aland Islands and continuing as a single force. By nightfall they had joined the cargo and passenger ships off the Latvia coast and in the early evening, they began to enter Latvian waters and dock.

Starting in the early evening on 14 October 1939, covert operations soldiers of the Finnish Intelligence Service based from the Finnish Embassies in Lithuania and Latvia began to activate the plans that had been prepared with their paramilitary contacts in Latvia and Lithuania. Trucks and Buses [acked with Poles from the internment camps began to roll down the Lithuanian and Latvian roads. Confused Poles began to be packed into Finnish ships as Marines of the Rannikkojääkärit moved ashore in local displays of force – just in case any misguided Police or local Army units attempted to intervene. At the same time, the Finnish Ambassadors in each country paid a midnight call on the respective Presidents and advised them that in six hours there would no longer be any issues they need concern themselves with over Polosh internees. The high-handed Finnish move was not welcomed, but neither was it resisted.

One of the Polish soldiers who escaped from Latvia in the Evacuation was Henryk Wroblewski, a serving member of the Polish Air Force. Henryk was born in St. Petersburg in 1921. His mother was a maid in the household of a Russian general, his father was a member of the Czar's Palace Guard. Although his father had been regarded as too old to fight against the Finns in 1914, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 persuaded the family to return to Poland. In 1922 when Henryk was aged one, the family settled in Vilno. Here is Henryk's account:

(see http://www.polandinexile.com/henry.htm for the real story...)

“On the 17th September 1939, early on a Sunday morning, Soviet Russia invaded Poland. A small Polish unit was leaving town (Vilno). With a few of my colleagues from the Air Force, we joined this unit as volunteers. Equipped and armed, we marched west, but did not get very far as Soviet troops had cut us off. On 20th September we decided to cross the Latvian border where we knew we would be interned. We were dis-armed and interned temporarily in a barbed-wire surrounded camp at Dyneburg.

After a few weeks I was sent to a camp at Liepaja, a port on the Baltic Sea, where there were about 8,000 Poles from all the services. At the camp, we were well treated by the Latvian guards, but there was little to do. We all knew about the demanded from the USSR that the Baltic countries allow the USSR to establish military bases and station troops on their soil for the duration of the European war and this worried us – we had heard many stories about what was happening back in Poland. Latvia signed an agreement on 5 October 1939 that gave the USSR bases at Liepāja, Ventspils, and Pitrags and allowed the Red Army to garrison 30,000 troops in Latvia as well as build airbases and that really worried us. We all wanted to somehow get to France or Britain where we had heard Polish military units were being reformed. But we had no contacts and no way that we knew to escape from Latvia.

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Map sourced from: http://www.chessbase.com/news/2005/liepaja01.gif
Liepaja: the Latvian Port from where some 20,000 of the 30,000 Poles in Latvia and Lithuania were evacuated on the morning of 14th October 1939 in a well-planned and organized operation by the Merivoimat.

Things changed for us very suddenly on the morning of 14th October 1939. At 1am in the morning, we were woken by men of the Aizsargi, the Latvian “Guards” organisation and told to assemble with whatever we possessed. At 3am, the Aizsargi began directing us on to an assortment of trucks and buses while other groups were started off on foot. We were told we were being taken to the Port area from where we would be shipped out of Latvia. Lots of rumours flew around as we moved out, among them that we were bring shipped off to Germany or the the USSR, but nobody paniced and tried to run – there were a lot of Aizsargi, and they were all armed and besides, where could we go? In my case, I was lucky enough to be packed into a truck – standing room only – so at least I didn’t have to walk like many of the others did.

We got to the port and were driven directly onto a wharf next to a large ship. We were told to get off the truck and line up with the others already waiting and we did, after which the truck left immediately and the next took its place. There were some large groups of men stationed along the wharf at intervals in strange looking uniforms and armed with rifles and submachineguns that were different from anything we had seen. They wore German style helmets which caused a certain amount of concern, but the rest of their equipment was unlike anything we’d seen in photos of Germans or of the Red Army. We wondered who they were and rumours flew around that it was the Swedes or the British or even the Americans. We’d only been there 5 minutes, and head of us we could see rows of men filing up gangplanks onto the ship. Further down, we could see another ship and then another with the same thing happening. It seemed every Pole in Latvia was there. Which was not quite correct as it turned out – it was every Pole in Lithuania plus all of us that were at the camp outside the city.

We could see the group next us was being addressed by someone in wearing that German style helment, after which they started to move onto the ship and then he walked over to us. Every eye was on him. He started to address us in very badly accented Polish. Very very badly accented and very broken Polish, Well, he might not have spoken good Polisg but his first words bought a huge relief to all of us. “We are from Finland. All of you keep quiet and listen.” He had that sort of Senior NCO voice that commands instant obedience. Even in bad Polish! Nobody made a sound. “You will make No Noise. There Will Be No Questions. Listen and follow instructions. I am from the Finnish Navy and we are here to evacuate you to Finland. From this moment you are under the protection of the Finnish Navy. You will board the ship as instructed and take the places you are told. Do it quickly and do not argue. Follow all instructions. We are sailing for Finland as soon as everybody is safely on board. We must move quickly before the Germans or the Russians become aware of what is happening.” He gestured to the man standing next to him. “Ylivääpeli (that’s Master Sergeant to you) Sinkonen will take over and see you onto the ship. Do not argue with him, he does not speak Polish.” “Neither do you,” I thought but didn’t say. Without any further word he turned and moved on to the next group.

Ylivääpeli (we eventually got used to Finnish ranks but it took a long time) Sinkonen looked at us and smiled. He was 6 feet six and looked like he could carry a pine tree under either arm. His smile might have been friendly, it was hard to tell. While he did not speak Polish but his instructions were obvious. We fell in at the rear of the group ahead of us and filed up the gangplank and onto the ship as fast as we could. There was no delay. Finnish sailor’s were every few feet and they pointed and pushed us in the direction we were to go in. The ship must already have been fairly full. We were directed upwards and then packed into cabins. It looked like a passenger ship, maybe a ferry of some sort and we were packed in like sardines. Nobody complained. There was not one protest – we were all elated that we were leaving Latvia. There were 30 of us packed into a small cabin with 6 bunks but at least we had a porthole that could open and let fresh air in. Two hours after we had boarded, the ship began to pull away from the berth and head out to sea. From our porthole, we could see other ships as crowded as ours, even the decks were packed and we could see warships as well. “Finnish destroyers,” someone said as one raced past us, visible through our small porthole. Because it was getting lighter, we could make out the large Finnish flag and see that all the guns were manned and it was ready to fight. That was very reassuring.

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Photo sourced from: http://seattlehistory.org/media/images/ ... /39200.jpg
Polish soldiers lined up on the wharves at the Latvian port of Liepaja and filing aboard Finnish transport ships. Operatives of the secretive covert action wing of the Finnish Intelligence Service coordinated the move with the Latvian Aizsargi and Lithuanian paramilitary organisation, the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga. Some 30,000 Poles were moved over a period of two days from Camps in both Latvian and Lithuania to the Latvian ports of Liepaja, Ventspils and Riga, from where they were embarked on Finnish transports. Loading started at midnight on 14th October and had been completed by midday on the 15th, after which the ships were on the move.

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Photo sourced from: http://www.vilnaghetto.com/gallery2/d/2 ... 26+-+2.jpg
Lithuanian Men of the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga (photo from 1926): The Lithuanian Riflemen‘s Union was a nationalistic paramilitary organisation similar in many ways to the Finnish Suojeluskuntas (and indeed, in the interwar decades had established ties with the Suojeluskuntas). Being a member was seen as prestigious, and a "šaulys" was regarded as a defender of the state, with many state officials such as Police and Foresters being members of this organisation, which was some 60,000 strong in the 1930’s. Following the Soviet occupation of June 1940, many members of the Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga would pay with their lives for the assistance they had given to the Poles in escaping to Finland.

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Latvia: Men of the Aizsargi (Guards) paramilitary organisation. As in Lithuania, many of the Aizsargi that helped the Poles escape paid with their lives after the Soviet occupation. Some would escape to Finland before the Soviet vice clamped down irrevocably, and the Finns would clandestinely rescue many between June and September 1940 as well as over the period of the Soviet and German occupations. These men would become the core of the Latvian Regiments that would fight in the Maavoimat-led Liberation of Latvia in 1944.

Shortly after that the ship picked up speed and we could see the other ships moving with us. Passenger ships crowded with fellow Poles, Destroyers and small fast warships of some type we had never heard of – but they were very fast. We could feel the ship’s engines vibrating the whole vessel and it seemed like she was going as fast as she could. It was a wonderful feeling and everybody was talking – at least until the sea got rougher and some started feeling seasick. Shortly after, the same Finnish Senior NCO who could speak Polish stuck his head in our cabin. “Listen,” he barked, and we all fell silent. It was that tone of voice again. “It will take us twenty hours to get to Finland. We will bring food and water round later, but there are 2,500 of you on a ship built to carry 700, it will take a while. In meantime, you stay in your cabins. There are bathrooms down the passageway. Only leave to use them and come right back. A sailor is on duty in the passageway to make sure you obey. He does not speak Polish so don’t bother asking him anything. I am only Finn on this ship that speaks Polish and I have all of you to talk to. Don’t waste my time asking questions. All I know is we take you to Finland with your Government’s agreement.” He looked around. “Do not make trouble on this ship. You will not enjoy the results.” Then he smiled at us. “Finland will welcome you.”

Finland did. We had left Latvia early in the morning of the 14 of October and we arrived in Helsinki on the morning of the next day, all 30,000 of us in one day in a small convoy of fifteen passenger and cargo ships. God knows how the Finns had done it but us Poles, we were all elated. We had escaped! Tired as we were, we could not stop talking, nobody wanted to sleep, we all just wanted to find out what was happening and where we were to go. At last, after three hours in our cabin, a real genuine Polish Officer stood in the doorway or our cabin, with a Finnish soldier next to him. He looked us over and grinned. “Welcome to Finland,” he said. “You are going to follow this NCO off the ship. The Finns have set up camps for us and you will stay there for now until we can arrange for you to be shipped out to Britain to join the Polish Army and continue the fight.” We all cheered, this was the best news we could imagine. After we quietened down, he continued, “It may take some time to organize, but in the meantime, do not cause any trouble and be on your best behavior. We are all guests here and the Finns have helped us more than anyone else. I have to go now to the next cabin but the NCO here will take charge of you.” He gave us another grin and left.

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Photo sourced from: http://img85.imageshack.us/img85/4372/stlouishavana.jpg
Polish soldiers being evacuated from Latvia and Lithuania to Finland – packed into and onto Finnish transports and escorted by almost the entire Merivoimat, 30,000 members of the Polish military were evacuated to Finland in a move that took both the Germans and the Soviets by surprise. It was a mammoth logistical and naval effort involving some 15-20 transport ships and 25 warships that took place with a flawless precision that was evidence of the complete professionalism and expertise of the Merivoimat. The Rannikkojääkärit Regimental Battle Group that supplied the “land force” component of the move operated with a precision and élan that reinforced this impression to any observers (of which, outside the Latvians, Lithuanians and Poles, there were none….).

The Finnish NCO looked at us and said something incomprehensible, then gestured to us to follow him. We did, all thirty of us filing out of the cabin and following him through the ship like a group of school children on an outing. As we came onto the deck, we paused. It seemed like the entire population of Helsinki was lining the wharves and cheering. There were even Polish flags being waved. It was enough to bring tears to the eyes, and more than one of us was crying openly at the welcome. Filing down the gangplank, “our” NCO first led us towards a row of Field Kitchens and trestle tables staffed by rows of Finnish women in uniform with armband that read “Lotta.” It was our first experience of the Finnish womens paramilitary organisation, the Lotta Svard. It would not be the last. We were handed large mugs of coffee and told to drink up, then given sandwiches to eat on the truck which we were promptly gestured to get in. From the back of the truck, we got a good luck around as we were driven out of Helsinki and into the countryside, one of a long line of trucks and buses going in both directions – which seemed to indicate we weren’t going far.

Within the hour we were being offloaded at a Finnish military camp. Our group of thirty was allocated to three ten man tents with bedding. Our Finnish NCO remained with us, taking us to eat in a large mess hall which seemed to be serving food non-stop, then to a warehouse where we were issued with new clothing. “Our” NCO remained with us for the next two weeks, by which time we were being reorganized into “Polish” units. It was at that stage that I was moved into a Polish Air Force unit within the camp, saying goodbye to my Army comrades with whom I had made the trip from Latvia and spent my first two weeks in Finland. By then, we were all in love with Finland. While we were being reorganized, we were allowed out of Camp and we made a number of trips to Helsinki. The Finnish Army even paid us and the Finns in Helsinki welcomed us with open arms. It was difficult to even pay for a meal or a drink and we often found ourselves guests in Finnish houses. After Latvia and Lithuania, where we were tolerated but not welcome, it was a refreshing and invigorating change.

Peripherally, we were aware of the ongoing tensions between Finland and the USSR – and we none of us had any love for the USSR, which had stabbed Poland in the back as we fought the Germans. Thus, as tensions in Finland rose and we saw the Finnish military being mobilized and moving to the frontiers, with even women and teenagers amed and ready to fight, many of us asked our Officers what we could do to help the country that had rescued us. It was in late October as I recall that we were paraded as a unit and our CO told us that Finland had formally asked the Polish Government for our help – and that our Government had replied that any Pole who volunteered to fight for Finland could do so with their official blessing. The CO asked for volunteers to step forward and as one man, our entire “Squadron” moved forward. The situation was the same across evyer Polish Camp in Finland. With very few exceptions, we all volunteered.

Next Post: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units.
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The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

#324

Post by CanKiwi2 » 10 Mar 2012, 00:16

The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

The first Polish units to be absorbed into the Finnish military were, as has been previously covered, the Polish warships that escaped to Finland. Reflagged, absorbed into the Merivoimat, their crews sworn in as Finnish Citizens and members of the Merivoimat, the requirements of international law that warships of a foreign belligerent in a neutral port be impounded and their crews interned was bypassed. In this way, Finland added 4 Destroyers, 4 Submarines and a number of smaller warships to the Merivoimat’s naval strength. This strategy, as with that for Polish Air Force aircraft and personnel arriving by air, had been previously discussed and agreed on by both Finland and Poland at the highest political and military levels as a remote contingency measure. At the time these measures were taken, Poland was collapsing under the combined German-Soviet onslaught and neither of Polands “Allies”, Britain or France, were consulted or involved in any way. In the event there was no reaction at all from France, and a very muted one from the UK – the Admiralty’s view was that three Polish destroyers were of no real consequence to the Royal Navy, and their location in the remote Norwegian port of Lyngenfjiord was of no relevance whatsoever to the Navy’s war against Germany.

In the same way, we have noted that a number of Polish Airforce aircraft made it to Finland in mid-Spetember. These consisted of twenty-seven of the modern PZL.37 Łoś bombers, 21 P.23 Karas light bombers / reconnaisance aircraft, 36 PZL P.11 fighters, 11 PZL P.7a Fighters and 10 RWD-17 trainers. The Ilmavoimat began to form these aircraft into 4 additional Squadrons – one of the PZL.37’s, one of the P.23’s and two of the PZL P.11 Fighters. The P.7’s and RWD-17’s were assigned to Ilmavoimat training units. The two P.11 Fighter squadrons were used as “second-line” fighters and patrol aircraft. Their performance was insufficient to catch the Soviet bombers but if flown well, they could at least take on the Soviet fighters with a chance – and if they had altitude on the Soviet bombers they could catch them by diving. However, the Polish pilots were also seasoned survivors and they were provided with more modern fighter aircraft as soon as these were available (after which the surviving P.11’s were also relegated to use as advanced trainers), flying these to great effect over the course of the Winter War, as we will see.

The 27 PZL.37 Łoś bombers were formed into a single squadron and immediately assigned to the same bomber group as the Ilmavoimat’s Swedish-built PZL.37 Łoś’s, 12 of which had been delivered and were in service by November 1939. From October 1939 on, the Ilmavoimat began to modify the Polish aircraft to resemble the Ilamvoimat’s P.37’s – replacing the glazed nose with a solid nose with 4 machine guns and a single 20mm cannon under each wing root in an external blister, adding armour to the pilots position, fitting additional fuel cells into two of the wing bombbays, eliminating the Radio Operator / Ventral Gunner position, removing the ventral gun and upgrading the rear gun position to two machineguns. By the outbreak of the Winter War, some aircraft had had modficatins completed, some had not. The remaining squadron of P.23’s would be used primarily in an observation and reconnaissance role in the Winter War, flying in support of the 2 Polich Volunteer Divisions that would be formed from the Polish soldiers evacuated to Finland from Latvia and Lithuania.

The political ins and outs and ramifactions of the formation of the Polish volunteer units in Finland will be covered in detail in a later Post. In this Post we will concentrate on the formation of the Polish volunteer units and their organisation and equipping.

Of the 30,000 Poles who had been evacuated, some 5,000 were either suffering from injuries, had no prior military experience or were otherwise considered unfit for service or (very few) they didn’t volunteer. Almost all of these men would take up positions working in Finnish factories or on Finnish farms, where they would make an ongoing and valuable contribution through the war years. Many would end up remaining in Finland after the end of WW2. Of the remaining 25,000, some 2,000 men were members of the Polish Air Force and were assigned to newly formed squadrons within the Ilmavoimat. The remaining men were formed into a Polish Corps within the Maavoimat. The Corps was structured on the Maavoimat model of self-sufficent Heavy Brigade-sized battle groups loosely structured within a Divisonal organisation. Over the last half of October and most of November, further numbers of Poles managed to cross the borders into Latvia and Lithuania and once there, were moved north via a Finnish-managed clandestine escape network over roads to Estonia from where they were shipped across to Finland. An additional 7,500 Poles escaped via this network, and more would continue to trickle through up until June 1940. These men would be added to the strength of the Polish Corps.
The Corps was commanded by Lt-Gen. Wladyslaw Anders, the senior Polish Officer in Finland. Major units and commanders included:

Polish Corps Commander – Lt-Gen. Wladyslaw Anders
Polish Corps Deputy Commander: Lt. Gen Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko
Polish Corps Chief of Staff: Col. Kazimerz Wisniowski
Polish Corps Engineers: Col. J. Sochocki
Polish Corps Artillery: Maj. Gen R. Odierzynski

663 Polish Air Force Observation Squadron (21 P.23 Karas reconnaisance aircraft)

3rd Carpathian Division (3 Dywizja Strzelców Karpackich): Commander – Maj-General Bronislaw Duch

Divisional Artillery: Col. K. Zabkowski (9 Polish Heavy Artillery Regiment - Mixed), 13 Polish Artillery Regiment, 8 Polish Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment)
25 Wielkopolski Recon Battalion

1st Polish Armoured Brigade Commander – Col. Walenty Peszek
(1 Polish Armored Cavalry Battalion, 4 Polish Armored Battalion, 6 Lwowski Armored Battalion, 10 Polish Artillery Regiment, 9 Polish Field Troop – Engineers, Logistical and Support units)

2nd Carpathian Rifle Brigade (2 Brygada Strzelców Karpackich): Commander – Col Roman Szymanski
(4, 5 and 6 Carpathian Rifle Battalions, 11 Polish Artillery Regiment, Logistical and Support units)

3rd Carpathian Rifle Brigade Commander – Lt.-Col G. Lowezowski
(7, 8 and 9 Carpathian Rifle Battalions, 12 Polish Artillery Regiment, Logistical and Support units)

Image
Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... SK_CoA.png
Emblem of the 3rd Carpathian Division (3 Dywizja Strzelców Karpackich), worn as a shoulder patch and painted on vehicles

Image
Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... w_Duch.jpg
Bolesław Bronisław Duch (1885–1980). Polish Army Major General, Duch served during WWI in the Polish Legion. After Poland regained independence, he served in the Polish Army. In 1935-1938 he commanded the 73rd Infantry Regiment. At the outbreak of WW2 he became the de-facto commander of the 39th Reserve Infantry Division after it’s CO, General Brunon Olbrycht became too ill to command. After Poland was overrun by Germany and the Soviet Union in September 1939, Duch managed to evade capture and escaped via Lithuania to Finland, where he was appointed commande of the 3rd Carpathian Infantry Division.

5th Kresowa Division (5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty) Commander: Maj-General Nikodem Sulik

Divsional Artillery – Col. J. Orski (7 Polish Horse Artillery Regiment, 78 Medium Artillery Regiment, 5 Kresowa AA Regiment)

15th Poznań Uhlans Regiment (15 Pułk Ułanów Poznańskich): Commander: LtCol. Zbigniew Kiedacz

4th Wolynska Infantry Brigade: Commander: Lt. Col. W Stoczkowski
(10, 11 and 12 Wolynska Rifle Battalions, 2 Kresowa Field Artillery Regiment, 4 Kresowa Anti-Tank Battalion, 4 Kresowa Field Company - Engineers, Logistical and Support units)

5th Wilenska Infantry Brigade – Commander: Col. Wincenty Kurek
(13, 15 and 15 Wilenska Rifle Battalions, 5 Wilenska Field Artillery Regiment, 5 Wilenska Anti-Tank Battalion, 5 Kresowa Polish Field Company - Engineers, Logistical and Support units)

6th Lwoski Infantry Brigade Commander: Col. Witold Nowina-Sawicki
(16, 17 and 18 Lwowski Rifle Battalions, 23 Field Artillery Regiment, 5 Kresowa Anti-Tank Battalion, 6 Kresowa Field Company – Engineers, Logistical and Support units)

Image
Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... Zubr_2.png
Emblem of the 5th Kresowa Division (5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty), worn as a shoulder patch and painted on vehicles

Image
Photo sourced from: http://www.okulicki.ipn.gov.pl/dokument ... 7-5673.jpg
Lt. Gen Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko, L. Okulicki I, Maj-General Nikodem Sulik, CO of the 5th Kresowa Division (5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty)

Formation and Training of the Polish Corps (Maavoimat)

The rescued Polish soldiers were made up in many cases of entire units that had crossed the borders into Latvia and Lithuania to escape the Germans and the Soviets, as well as many who had successfully escaped while the occupation forces were still moving in to Poland. Many officers and NCO’s had also escaped either with their men or independently, and the Polish Army was fortunate in that many of these officers were excellent material, well-trained and capable. Many of them had also now had experience fighting the Germans and the Maavoimat took advantage of their experience to conduct in-depth debriefing sessions, the results of which were passed out through the Maavoimat.

The Maavoimat officers assigned to work with the Poles moved rapidly, using the Polish officers and NCO’s to carry out the detailed organizational work necessary to select and allocate men to units as they were formed. Generally, the Poles were structured into units styled after the Maavoimat’s organizational structure. There were language and communication difficulties, with most of the communication being carried out in French, English or German – the languages common to both sides. The Poles had escaped without any weapons and the issuing of these, together with winter military clothing and equipment was the first priority. In this, the Maavoimat fell back on their stockpiles of reserve rifles, largely the old Mosin-Nagant’s that were being replaced within the Maavoimat by the new Lahtoi Salaranta SLR 7.62mm. Enough of these had entered service that there were more than enough rifles for the Poles.

Likewise machineguns, mortars, anti-tank guns and artillery to equip the Polish units was cobbled together from older equipment and “war reserve” stockpiles that the Maavoimat and retained in storage for emergency use. Fortunately, there was enough of the older material available to fully equip the Polish units, but much of the artillery was the old guns the Finns had been retiring, the rest of the equipment was similar material, although the ant-tank guns were relatively new – almost all of them were the Bofors 37mm, supplemented with the Lahti 20mm Anti-tank Rifle.

The Maavoimat strung together a series of intense training courses for the Poles which were started in November and which ended up running well into the early weeks of the Winter War. Still, this also allowed for war material to be shipped into Finland from overseas and the end result was that by the time the Polish Corps entered battle, they had experienced two and a half months of Maavoimat training and were a far more combat effective force than they had been when they arrived in Finland.

Image
Photo sourced from: http://katyncrime.pl/resize/w/640/galle ... ia/703.jpg
General Władysław Anders, Commander, Polish Corps (Maavoimat) watching exercising Polish troops. Northern Finland: January 1940

Image
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... n_1919.jpg
Polish Soldiers of the Polish Corps 5th Kresowa Division moving up to the front after completion of Maavoimat Training, early February 1940.

The Polish Corps would move up to the front in early February 1940, taking part in the last great defensive battles on the Karelian Isthmus and then in the Spring Offensive on the Isthmus that shattered the Red Army and took the Maavoimat to the suburbs of Leningrad.

Image
Photo sourced from: http://img.audiovis.nac.gov.pl/PIC/PIC_37-658-1.jpg
Gen. Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Gen. Bronisław Duch, Gen. Stanisław Kopański, Col Walenty Peszek (CO, 1st Polish Armoured Brigade – Outskirts of Leningrad, July 1940. Polish Army Divisions fought alongside the Maavoimat through both the Winter War and the Continuation War (the name the Finns came to use for the period from April 1994 through to the end of WW2 where they again fought in WW2, albeit for different reasons to the Winter War). The 1st Polish Armoured Brigade would be equipped with Renault R35 tanks that had been intended for Poland but which, after the Fall of Poland and the Soviet attack on Finland, were shipped to Finland to help equip the Polish units there.

Image
Photo sourced from: http://tyrannosaur.tripod.com/pol/renault-r35.jpg
French-supplied Renault R-35 tanks of the 1st Polish Armoured Brigade roll through Viipuri prior to moving to the front – May 1940

Image
Photo sourced from: http://mbc.malopolska.pl/Content/12474/original/17.jpg
The Polish Army was the first to fight in WW2 – men of the Polish Army would fight in many theatres of WW2 but as many of the survivors would say, they owed the freedom of Poland after 1945 to the Maavoimat and to the toughness of the Finns in first defeating the USSR in the Winter War, and then in ignoring the British and US agreements with the USSR as they and the Polish Divisions fighting with them surged southwards down the Baltic peripheral from mid-1944 in an offensive that took them to Wilno and the old Polish borders, and then to the Relief of Warsaw before turning East and driving into Germany.


US General Patton and Polish Army General Anders review Polish troops in the Middle East in 1943. Late in 1943, these troops would be shipped to Finland in preparation for the surprise Finnish offensive on the Germans in April 1944. General Anders would again return to Finland with an enlarged Polish Corps, this time equipped by the Americans and British. General Patton would command the combined British/American Corps that fought with the Maavoimat and the Polish Army. Released from British/American political control and now under the command of Marshal Mannerheim, Patton would be given his head - and Patton, Anders and Kenraaliluutnantti Karl Lennart Oesch of the Maavoimat made a truely terrifying triumvirate of military commanders - Junkyard Pitbulls let off the leash!

Next Post: The British Commonwealth Volunteer Units
Last edited by CanKiwi2 on 10 Mar 2012, 19:46, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: What If-Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

#325

Post by CanKiwi2 » 10 Mar 2012, 18:43

And here are a few video clips of the Polish ships and aircraft mentioned in the previous posts:


Polish Navy 1918 - 1939


1939 - The Polish Army on Maneuvers


Poland mobilizes - 1939


Polish military equipment as of September 1939


ORP Blyskawica Polish Navy - Escape from the Baltic, August 1939, early action with the Mervoimat - Atlantic Convoy escort of Finnish convoys from North America to Narvik and Lyngenfjiord


The Polish Navy submarine ORP Orzel in action against Soviet aircraft, Gulf of Finland, Spring 1940


The Polish Destroyers ORP Grom and ORP Blyskawica in Lyngenfjiord - 1939 - Finnish newsreel - (the location was undisclosed, although probably known to the Germans and Soviets - filmreel made for the international audience and thus in English)
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Re: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

#326

Post by Slon-76 » 11 Mar 2012, 19:49

CanKiwi2 wrote: The Polish Corps would move up to the front in early February 1940, taking part in the last great defensive battles on the Karelian Isthmus and then in the Spring Offensive on the Isthmus that shattered the Red Army and took the Maavoimat to the suburbs of Leningrad.
You do seriously think that such could be? 8O 8O 8O

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Re: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

#327

Post by CanKiwi2 » 11 Mar 2012, 20:57

Slon-76 wrote:
CanKiwi2 wrote: The Polish Corps would move up to the front in early February 1940, taking part in the last great defensive battles on the Karelian Isthmus and then in the Spring Offensive on the Isthmus that shattered the Red Army and took the Maavoimat to the suburbs of Leningrad.
You do seriously think that such could be? 8O 8O 8O
Well, it is a fictional Alternative History :)

But with the potential correlation of forces in this ATL (and keep in mind I have not yet worked thru the changes to the Maavoimat nor all the air force stuff for this ATL), could have been (I have also yet to run through a few more volunteer units augmenting the Finnish forces as well as Finnish defence spending and the results). To be honest, when I get to the Finnish offensive phase of my ATL Winter War, I plan to model it somewhat on the start of the Continuation War, except it will be a bit faster moving.

I mean, such weapons as pigeon-guided glider bombs available in large numbers as anti-tank and ground attack weapons, Nokia Radar, Artillery (which I have not yet run thru), 250 x 75mm anti-tank guns (plus larger numbers of the Bofors 37mm AT gun), a much larger and more highly trained Finnish Army with far more automatic weapons and no shortage of ammo for mortars or artillery and command of the air, together with an effective ground attack force. 1939 Body Armour reduces casualties. The equivalent of a few divisions of volunteers. All sorts of minor things come together.

All that aside, I would really appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you offline the potential Soviet / Red Army units that could have been available in late 1939 / through 1940 in response to the increased strength of the Finnish Army. And what likely Soviet responses would have been. Anyhow, still lots of preparation details to document before the fighting starts.

Cheers........Nigel
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Re: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

#328

Post by Seppo Koivisto » 11 Mar 2012, 22:22

CanKiwi2 wrote: Image
Photo sourced from: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/c ... Zubr_2.png
Emblem of the 5th Kresowa Division (5 Kresowa Dywizja Piechoty), worn as a shoulder patch and painted on vehicles
Lentolaivue 46 had very similar emblem. I remember reading that it came from a Polish vodka bottle.
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http://forum.valka.cz/viewtopic.php/p/396189#396189

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Re: The formation of the Polish Volunteer Units in Finland

#329

Post by Juha Tompuri » 12 Mar 2012, 10:33

Seppo Koivisto wrote:Lentolaivue 46 had very similar emblem. I remember reading that it came from a Polish vodka bottle.
Interesting, I never have thought about that.
Thanks for the info.

Seems that the Polish Zubrowka "Bison (grass) Vodka" would be a good candidate here.
Zubr = (European) Bison/Wisent

Image
http://wine-by-benito.blogspot.com/2009 ... ystok.html

Here War-time (Soviet) production, photo form Chamberlain & Gander WW Fact Files Anti-Tank Weapons
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Re: What If-Finland had been prepared for the Winter War?

#330

Post by CanKiwi2 » 12 Mar 2012, 11:54

Seppo / Juha

Thanks for that information - I am going to weave that in to the story later!!!! Its too good to eave out :)

Cheers............Nigel
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