@Art
So the outcome of the war would be the same if Finns just agreed on these terms several months earlier than they did historically.
Theoretically you may be right, but to put the word 'just' in there is really not reasonable. It was certainly not that simple. In fact, the Finns had several reasons not to go along with these demands:
1. There was a rather naive hope that they could get the 1939 border back (which, of course, was legally their right).
2. There would be massive political problems internally, including a very real risk of a German supported coup, Quisling-style.
3. The country would find itself at war with Germany, and there were 200,000+ fresh, rested and well-equipped German troops in Lapland with no plans to leave the area (this was long before D-Day so there wasn't yet the urgent need for them further south as evolved later on).
4. The Finnish faith in promises made by the Kremlin was rather limited, which I believe is highly understandable if we look at the relationship between the two countries during the preceding c. 25 years.
This last view was shared by the Allied leaders. Hence, in addition to the Soviet plans for Finland presented in Tehran, it was requested that the Kremlin guarantee Finland's independence. To that Stalin replied that the USSR would guarantee not to threaten Finland's independence,
‘if Finland by its behaviour did not force Russia to do so’ (source: United States, Department of State, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs:
The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran 1943, Washington, United States Government Printing Office 1961, p. 593)
I wonder what a person like you, Art, who grew up under Soviet Communism feel such a statement is really worth?