Rahmansaari Island battle

[lupodimare89]

Greetings Finnish users!

In early September 1941, Rahmansaari Island in Ladoga Lake was defended by a company of 122 men (three machine-guns, three mortars and one 45-mm cannon). Commander was Lt. 3. N. Slobodov.

On 5 September 1941 begun amphibious landing with "9 boats" covered by "two gunboats" and two other boats with machineguns.
It is known the exact class/type and number of Finnish vessels employed?
According to Soviet acccount two of the boats used for the landing were destroyed during this first phase.

Soviet Ladoga Flottilla reacted with gunboat "Bira" sub.chaser MO-206 and five MK-boats, bringing reinforcement of 200 men.
(it was day 6 or 7 September?)
MO-206 claimed sinking of three finnish boats and "several" others carrying troops.


By 8 September, Soviet situation worseded and supplies could not be delivered due Finnish ground artillery.

On 9 September, "two gunboats" and another boat with machinegun dispatched by Finnish.
Soviet units involved the above mentioned "Bira" and MO-206 but also the gunboat "Konstructor". Soviet ships failed to approach the shore due intense shelling.

By Setpember 10 the battle was over. Soviets suffered 103 killed, 30 other bodies found in water, 130 POW.
What are Finnish figures? also what are Finnish casualties?

Source: http://www.semiotic.ru/la/islands/rahmansaari.html



PS:
Jurg Meister wrote of three Finnish units lost in the operation.

Финны потеряли 3 катера: LU 3, HI 24 и HI 7, при этом погиб 1 человек и двое получили ранения.

Details of these boats, and when/how they were lost (during the early landing or by MO-206 action?) are welcome.

[Mikko H.]

Hello, this link might be helpful:

http://uralica.com/rahmasaa.htm

[Mangrove]

Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by 11. Rannikkoprikaati
Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by Laatokan laivasto-osasto
Experiences gained from the Battle Of Rahmansaari - Laatokan laivasto-osasto

What are Finnish figures? also what are Finnish casualties?

FINNISH CLAIM OF SOVIET LOSSES:
1 pcs. of 45 mm anti-tank gun and 200 shells,
3 pcs. of 81 mm mortars and 30 grenades,

8 pcs. of machine guns,
20 pcs. of light-machine guns,
c. 40 pcs. of semi-automatic rifles,
c. 120 pcs. of rifles,
4 pcs. of sniper rifles,
20 pcs. of pistols,

100 pcs. of steel helmets,
100 pcs. of gas masks,
Numerous hand grenades,
2 pcs. of rubber boats,
5 pcs. of rowing boats and
Food etc.

103 KIA,
130 POW (including a Colonel, Captain and a Junior Lieutenant),
30 drowned,
20 escaped,
---------------
Altogether 283

FINNISH LOSSES:
3 motor boats,
16 KIA,
39 WIA.
-------------
Altogether 55

Jurg Meister wrote of three Finnish units lost in the operation.

Финны потеряли 3 катера: LU 3, HI 24 и HI 7, при этом погиб 1 человек и двое получили ранения.

Details of these boats, and when/how they were lost (during the early landing or by MO-206 action?) are welcome.

LU 3 and HI 24 were lost at a beach on the western side of the island at around 3.40 a.m. on 7 September 1941. HI 7 was destroyed at a beach on the eastern side of the island at around 3.50 a.m on the same day. The combat report suggest all of the boats were lost due to small arms fire.

[Juha Tompuri]

From http://sa-kuva.fi/

Col Karpin (Kargin?), the commander of Rahmansaari, at POW camp
SA-photo 46977

General Martin Wetzer shakes hands with Col Kurg (Kargin?)
SA-photo 46983

Soviet POWs from Rahmansaari
SA-photo 46979

Shore of Rahmansaari. A destroyed Finnish boat?
SA-photo 135216

Grave and Finnish erected cross at Rahmansaari...
SA-photo 138860

...mentioned being the final restplace 110 Soviet soldiers
SA-photo 135203

Regards, Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

A grave at Rahmansaari, mentioned of 110 Soviet soldiers

Today:
https://sites.google.com/site/rn4aczhom ... vgust-2013

Regards, Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

http://iv70.narod.ru/IV/2/4Warx.html.htm


Cenotaph of the Junior Commander Mikhail Nikolaevich Drozdov at St. Petersburg.
Drozdov being MIA at Rahmansaari.
judging from the reports on irretrievable losses, at that site, the Soviet defenders of Rahmansaari were not that young in general.
https://memgid.ru/object/3237

Regards, Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

By Setpember 10 the battle was over. Soviets suffered 103 killed, 30 other bodies found in water

Согласно спискам безвозвратных потерь в бою на Рахмансаари погибли 117 человек без привязки к ротам, 82 человека из 1-й роты вместе с командиром роты капитаном Я.Н.КУРБАТОВЫМ, 50 человек из 2-й роты, 24 человека из саперного взвода вместе со своим командиром военинженером 3-го ранга А.Я.ФИШБЕЙНОМ и 25 человек из пульроты. Всего – 298 офицеров и матросов.

According to the lists of irretrievable losses in battle on Rakhmansaari, 117 people were killed without attachment to the companies, 82 people from the 1 st company along with the company commander, captain Ya. N. Kurbatov, 50 men from the 2nd company, 24 men from the engineer platoon along with their commander of the 3rd rank ranked AY FISHBEYNOM and 25 men from the barrot. A total of 298 officers and sailors.

https://vk.com/topic-13466415_21892688

Regards, Juha

[Lotvonen]

Post by Mangrove » 12 Sep 2018 22:23
Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by 11. Rannikkoprikaati
Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by Laatokan laivasto-osasto
Experiences gained from the Battle Of Rahmansaari - Laatokan laivasto-osasto

Is anyone interested in reading any of these reports in English ?

[lupodimare89]

Is anyone interested in reading any of these reports in English ?

I was mainly interested in the naval aspect of the battle (losses in crafts, boats, potential surface-encounter etc.). But I am sure there could be people interested eventually in reading it ^^

[Robert M Hammond]

Post by Mangrove » 12 Sep 2018 22:23
Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by 11. Rannikkoprikaati
Battle of Rahmansaari - Combat Report by Laatokan laivasto-osasto
Experiences gained from the Battle Of Rahmansaari - Laatokan laivasto-osasto

Is anyone interested in reading any of these reports in English ?

Dear Lotvonen,

Hello! Yes, I would be very interested in reading these reports in English? What may I do to encourage you and support you in this?

All the best,
Robert Hammond

[Lotvonen]

Translation in process, have patience.

[Lotvonen]

11.Rannikkoprikaati SPK21526
8 typed pages

Dd. 17. Sept. 1941 5/KK/VL

Report on taking Rahmansaari island 7th to 10th September 1941
(Maps 1:20000 Rahmansaari and 1: 100 000 Lahdenpohja and Käkisalmi)

1._General situation and the period before the operation at the sector, orders and instructions received.

By the early September 1941 the Laat.P. Jaakkima Sector (Jaa.Lo.) had been cleared of enemy except Rahmansaari. 11.RpR issued order dated 28.Aug.1941: “ Jaa.Lo. Shall take Kilpisaari islands and Rahmansaari.”. The order also stated that in case reconnoitring proves that the islands are well held, taking them shall not be started without expressed order. Kilpisaari islands were checked on the 28th Aug with two strike platoons secured by two gun boats and two motor boasts with MG s. No enemy was encountered.

Information about the enemy on the Ladoga island was minimal, next to none. As to Rahmansaari it was known that there were enemies, but their number was unknown and could not be found out.
Continuous observation from Kyysaari and Kotasaari had stated campfire smokes at two spots, one at the N shore and another at the fishermen's saunas. Also an enemy had been seen fetching water at the N tip of the island. Often one of motor boats had been ordered, for reconnoitring purposes, to sail E and W of the island at a distance of 1,5 to 2 km observing the shore, to entice the enemy auto weapons to open fire and reveal themselves. The motor boat missions were in vain, no enemies were spotted.

2.9.1941:
The first section of Battery Maunu (3 pcs 75K97) had been stationed at the E tip of Kuhkaa island to support the future landing (at Rahmansaari).
3.9.1941:
05.40hrs the said Battery opened fire at a Russki artillery vessel converted from a freighter. She had been regularly spotted visiting Heinäsenmaa, also the motor launch of the ship had often landed at the Rahmansaari sauna beach. After the very first landed shells the ship laid a smokescreen (by dropping smoke buyous) and departed in a hurry, dodging, in the direction of Valamo.
Immediately afterwards at
08.45hrs, 09.30hrs about 11.41hrs the spotted bivouac areas at Rahmansaari were harassed by shelling.
09.30hrs After the first shells had landed at the sauna beach a motor boat full of men left it. The boat attempted to land at the E shore but every time she approached the beach our F.O.O in Kyysaari sent some shells at the boat whereby she sailed farther away from the beach.
11.30hrs The boat started heading for Heinäsenmaa.
It was supposed that the boat had tried to pick up the sentries of the N beach of the island.
After 3.9.1941 no enemies were spotted until -
5.9.1941:
One Russki was spotted walking on the N beach of the island.
The observer was the F.O.O of Battery Maunu, LT. Mikkonen and the Sector Intel Officer 2nd Lt. Kangasaho had been posted as the F.O.O at Kotasaari where constant observation was carried out by the Signals men of Battery Maunu (4 men).
It was suggested that a recon patrol be sent to the island but it was not allowed.
The same day the II_ Section (2 pcs 75K97) of Battery Maunu had been stationed at Palosaari, CO 2nd Lt. Kangasaho (starting 7.9.41) and Battery Officer the Annala Battery Batt Off. 2nd Lt. Moring.
It was on the 4th Sept as the Brigade HQ informed (Col. Lt Rikama) that the 48.Lt. Ptri (Lt. Huuskonen) had been ordered to take positions at Lamminpää in Kalksalo to provide support for the taking of Rahmansaari.
In the morning of 5.9.41 the Sector HQ (the undersigned) had been issued an telephoned order to prepare to take Rahmansaari.
During 5.9. and 6.9.AM 1941 the Lin.Jv. Companies carried out landing exercises with their strike troops in accordance with my orders.
On the 5.9. the Lumivaara Sub-Sector CO Lt. A. Sonninen was ordered over telephone by the Undersigned to collect boats at Kesvalahti, also a large motor boat was subordinated to him from the Kelppä fort, so he had four motor boats. Simultaneously it was informed that Rahmansaari would soon to be taken.
PM 5.9. it was informed by phone that Rahmansaari was to be taken and it was asked when the Sector would be able to do this. The response: earliest in the night 6./7. Sept.
When negotiating with the Brigade CO it was decided to carry out the attempt on the nights of 6./7. September 1941.
In the evening of 5.9.41 it was agreed with the Ladoga fleet CO that two gunboats (motorboats with a 47mm O Gun) (Obuhoff?) and two MG motor boats (1 MG each) would cover the landing. Also motor boats to tow landing boats were provided.
In the evening of 5.9.the Laat.P CO enquired about the operation and with what troops it was to be carried out, also ordering that not only the Sector strike platoons but also the Lahdenpohja strike platoon should be employed.
Observation results were still negative and the observers (F.O.O s) had the opinion that the island would not have any stronger enemy manning than maybe a NCO sentry stronghold. I, too, agreed with this because I often had visited the observation posts at Kyysaari and Kotasaari, Rahmansaari appeared to be “dead”.
6.9.1941:
The last artillery harassment shelling at Rahmansaari was launched.
The day was spent for preparations. Each Company and Battery was phoned to assemble the troops at the Kärpänen strait of Kuuhka. 11.RPr CO Col. Lt Rikama and the undersigned arrived at the Kasvalahti schoolhouse, the C.P of Lt. Sonninen on the 6.9.41 at 1830hrs. There the order was issued in writing (in the appendix). (The same matters had been issued by phone earlier).
The attack force was directed to Kyysaari where the final attack plan was confirmed, and the landing force CO issued his final orders.
The advisor concerning the landing points during the negotiation was a fisherman who knew in detail the beaches of the island, he was Res. Seaman Antti Ovaska hailing from Kalksalo n Kuhkaa. He was also posted to steer the leading boat of the second landing wave.
7.9.941:
03.05hrs the first wave boats left Kyysaari and half an hour later the second wave led by the landing force CO Lt. Sonninen.

2._Infantry action
The action of the landed infantry is described in the battle report by their CO Lt. Sonninen.
As soon as the first wave had landed the enemy fire encountered implied that the manning of the island was larger than expected. In my C.P at the observation rock in Kyysaari I ordered Lt. Mutikainen, 6.Er.Lin.K CO who was present with me, to detach the MG half Platoon at Kelppä fort (4 MG led by 2nd Lt. Laamanen) and subordinate them to Lt. Sonninen. The Platoon arrived at Rahmansaari on the 7.9.a 1500hrs.
I also ordered the Sector Adjutant to relay my order to the 7.Er.Lin.K CO to detach their reserve Platoon (Lt. Pesonen) and move them on lorries to Lahdenpohja to be ferried on to Kyysaari.
11.RPr CO Col. Lt Rikama issued an order to his CoS Capt. Härmänsuo to send one Platoon of Lin.P.10 from Kurkijoki to Kyysaari . We also agreed with Capt. Härmänsuo on sending the Kurkijoki Sector Jaeger Platoon to Kyysaari (2nd Lt. Toivio).
From my C.P I and the Brigade CO could easily observe the development of the situation as well as the action of enemy vessels. On the 7.9. on the scene there were the following Russki vessels in action:
One canal barge converted to gunboat (POW information), 2000 ton draught
One larger coastal guard motor boat
Four smaller coastal guard motor boats (about like our VMV)

Enemy managed to land more troops at 7.9. noon despite our indirect fire (led from my C.P.) by using smaller motor boats, in my estimate more than one hundred men. The presumed landing beach was shelled constantly by Battery Maunu although the fire could not be observed but by the smoke clouds seen above the forest. Later the POW s recounted that their landing had been difficult because just that portion of the beach was being shelled. Maybe it was just this experience that discouraged the inexperienced Russki troops from serious resistance (according to the POW s it was the first time they were in battle). They did not launch any counter-strikes, instead they used the reinforcements for stiffening their defence.
The most critical moment was the noon of 7.9. and it was over by 1600hrs as Lt. Sonninen had been reinforced with the Platoons of 2nd Lts Laamanen and Turunen.
After that our Infantry started pushing forward and the men proved to exceed expectations as fighters.

3._Artillery action
Placement described at 1. chapter and Appx no.2. (Overlay diagram)
48.Lt.Ptri (Lt. Huuskonen) with 1x 105K 36B did not make it by the beginning of the battle . They were ready on the 7.9.41 at 1330hrs when ranging shots were fired.
F.O.O connections consisted of command connections and they are listed in Appx.no.2.
Initially there was but a radio contact from Kyysaari and a custom code was applied. Locations were indicated by using a target grid. The communication was working well.

Due to the rapid action of the Br. Signals Officer a field cable connection was created from Lauvatsaari (laying out a cable in water) to the Palosaari battery by the 7.9. evening. On the 8./9.9. another field cable was laid out between Kyysaari and Rahmansaari. The line was working well during the entire battle. On the 10./11.9. also a 6/2 sea cable was laid out on the same location.
4 pcs 47mm O guns were made available at Kyysaari on the 7.9.42 by the Laat.P CO as he came in the morning to observe the action. The guns arrived in the evening of the 7.9. and they were set in direct fire positions on the beach.
One 75K 97 was moved on the 7.9. afternoon from the I Section of Batt. Maunu, having three of them, to a direct fire position at Kyysaari. Lt. Repo from the Kur.Lo. HQ was posted as the Gun Commander and the fire of this gun continuously prevented the enemy vessel attempts to land at the Rahmansaari beach.

Artillery fire action
Fire was led by the F.O.O following the infantry (Lt. Mikkonen) and from my C.P at the Kyysaari observation rock.
All infantry commanders (Platoon leaders) had been issued prior to the attack an overlay diagram of Rahmansaari with a numbered grid on it. Fire could be requested or a target indicated by a grid number and a letter indicating the sub-grid. This grid was employed during the entire battle to inform the artillery of the location of the front line.
The island is entirely covered by forest and the F.O.O was able to lead shelling not until the front line had reached Siikaniemi line. Up to that the infantry always indicated their fighting line and changes thereof. The Southern part of the island was shelled basing on the map. In the morning of the 8.9. before the attack that resulted in a Motti the S part of the island was partitioned into one hectare area targets which Battery Huuskonen, “Jyrä” (Bofors, Huuskonen) and Battery Palosaari shelled several times in succession using 2 to 3 volleys for each hectare
After the attack had been launched on the 8.9.at 1230hrs shelling was shifted to the S tip of the island, Koronniemi, and fire was not opened unless requested by the F.O.O.
The agreed attack launch codeword “Freezing here” was not used by the infantry which is why the last area shelling volleys landed dangerously near to our men.
After the Motti had been created indirect artillery fire to soften up it could no more be used. The Motti area comprised about 1 hectare and our lines were 30 to 40 m from the Russki weapons nests and trenches. The infantry Cdr Lt. Sonninen considered it would have been dangerous to pull back our troops to enable shelling because in his opinion Russki would spot our withdrawal and would follow us. The Brigade CO and the undersigned agreed . The only weapon that could have been employed would have been the mortar. Action had been taken by the Laat.P. CO to get a mortar platoon to soften the Motti. The Mortars were expected to arrive early on the 9.9.b but they did not arrive until at night dusk. The next morning on the 10.9. they were already in action as described in the report by Lt. Sonninen and they did soften the Motti up.

Naval targets
On the 7.9., the first day of the battle, the following enemy vessels showed up:
One merchant vessel (canal barge) converted to gunboat, firing one cannon.
One larger coastal guard motor boat with auto cannons
Four smaller coastal guard motor boats with auto cannons
On the second day of the battle the above vessels were joined by a minor destroyer (700ton)
Starting on the 7.9. having just arrived the CG motor boats moved daringly in the strait between Rahmansaari and Heinäsenmaa firing at landing beaches. Palosaari Battery would have been able to shell the strait with indirect fire but failed to open fire. Therefore I sent the Sector Intel Officer 2nd Lt. Kangasaho to replace the Battery CO under orders to use the Palosaari battery to prevent the enemy vessels from penetrating into the strait between Rahmansaari and Heinäsenmaa. Thereafter the fire of the battery mostly quickly repelled the enemy trying to enter the strait.
Indirect fire by Batt Maunu repelled during the 7.9.AM several enemy motor boat attempts to approach but we were not able to prevent the vessels totally from landing at the SE tip of the island where the enemy transported reinforcements. The landing area was shelled as an area target (Ref. Pt. 1)

In the afternoon of the 7.9. after Batt Maunu had handed over one gun to direct fire task at Kyysaari enemy vessels stayed at a distance of 10 to 11 km from Kyysaari and 5 to 6 km from Rahmansaari, occasionally firing harassment at Rahmansaari and the liaison motor boats without causing casualties. In general the “freighter gunboat” gunnery was poor. The destroyer that joined the battle later was firing better, her shells hit the island . The same destroyer managed to hit one of our MG s in the evening of 9.9. and in the morning of 10.9. resulting in two fallen men, four wounded and one destroyed MG. These were the only casualties caused by enemy artillery.

On the 8./9.9.41 one of Batt Maunu's guns was shifted from Kuhkaa to Rahmansaari, in the N part of the island tasked to engage naval targets. After this enemy vessels used to keep a distance of at least 10 km from Rahmansaari except in the SSE direction where the Rahmansaari 75mm gun was not able to fire direct fire. On the 9./10.9.41 the other gun of the battery was shifted to Rahmansaari and placed on the E shore some 400m S of Ahoniemi.

The 48.Lin.Ptri single 107K 36B that was available on the 7.9.41 at 1330 hrs was employed mainly to engage naval targets but also on the 8.9.41 AM for attack preparation. The fire of the battery held enemy ships during daylight generally out of their effective artillery range, so we suffered no casualties due to their shelling. Moving targets were not hit with indirect fire using small number of shells, yet the purpose was to keep the vessels away from the infantry action in the island, that is to prevent them from supporting the Russki infantry with their fire.

To make an enemy vessel retreat it was usually enough to make a shell land in the general direction of her. Then the vessel turned around and got out of range at full speed and evading.

Enemy vessels could not be sunk with the artillery available but the purpose to keep them out of the battle on the island was achieved.

4._Motor boat Company action

The action of the Ladoga Navy Lahdenpohja base motor boats is described in Appx. No.3.
The taking of the island proved that even equipment of lesser quality have a decisive effect in these constrained sea waters as long as you know how to employ them in accordance with the circumstances.

It is remarkable that among the crews of the motor boats only two seamen were Ladoga fishermen hailing from the very location. Also two Cadre NCO_s were well acquainted with the actual theatre.

On the fourth day of fighting Wed 10.9.41 at about 1130hrs Batt Maunu F.O.O Lt. Mikkonen was directing mortar fire about 40m from an enemy dugout. He called me up and reported that the enemy is showing signs of surrendering. I ordered the line to be kept open and Lt. Mikkonen described what he was seeing in the fighting line like this:
“I can hear yelling – Russki is moving about in their trench at the saunas – now a Russki is standing up at the saunas - they are surrendering – if only the boys would not fire – P*le, someone is shooting (a brief LMG burst in the background) – now someone is wagging a white flag – more men are standing up – what a lot of them there are – this show is now over.”

Next there was a silence of a couple of minutes until Lt. Mikkonen reported:
“I have counted the POWs and it seems there are 96 of them”. We ended our phone call. I had a look at the radio station clock, it was 11.05hrs.

Rahmansaari had been taken.

Jaakkima Sector CO Capt. K.Koski (signed)

[John Hilly]

What might Jaa.Lo be?

[Lotvonen]

What might Jaa.Lo be?

Jaakkiman Lohko = Jaakkima sector

BTW it is remarkable that neither side of the battle had any aerial support. FAF was always short of resources, but the fact that VVS did not participate is surprising.

[Lotvonen]

Laatokan Laivasto-osasto (Ladoga naval detachment )
Lahdenpohja base
14th September 1941 2.PL/OH
SPK17749

Battle report
Rahmansaari battle 6th September to 10th September 1941

6.9.1941:
At 1930hrs from Rauhala set out two gunboats, two boats equipped with machine guns and nine transport motor boats (ref. Appx.1.) led by Lt. P. Lähde under orders to proceed to Kärpäsensalmi strait and once there to liaise with the Jaakkima Sector CO Capt. Koski in the Kärpänen farmhouse. Included were two strike platoons from Rauhala ( Platoons Levas and Schroderus).

At 2200hrs the motor boats arrived at the said Kärpänen beach and immediately having arrived Capt. Koski issued a written order to take Rahmansaari.

At 2300hrs the entire motor boat detachment moved to Kyysaari where Capt. Koski explained in detail the order to take Rahmansaari. Next the invading force CO Lt. Sonninen explained his attack plan.

7.9.1941:
As soon as signals and password were agreed upon, at 0300hrs platoons Levas and Huhtiniemi being in the first wave set out from Kyysaari. Platoon Levas had embarked in three transport motor boats (Lu 3, Hi 23, Na 24) and in rowing boats towed by them. This platoon's transport was covered by gunboat Kukkapää and one boat equipped with a MG (La 5) .
Platoon Huhtiniemi followed the gunboat 26 in two transport motor boats (7 and 5) already subordinated to Lt. Sonninen and rowing boats towed by them. One boat equipped with a MG (44 alias Haukka) escorted this transport.

According to the attack plan Platoon Levas was to land at the “A” beach (ref. Drawing). At this spot the enemy offered relatively weak resistance and the Platoon managed to land very rapidly at 0340 hrs. Two of the transport motor boats were destroyed at the beach (Lu 5 and Hi 24).

Platoon Huhtiniemi was to land at “B” beach according to the plan (ref. Drawing). Here Russkies resisted considerably more yet the Platoon landed at 0350hrs at the ordered location while one transport motor boasts (The 7) was destroyed at the beach. The manoeuvring of the gunboats and transport boats are marked on the drawing.

In the second wave Platoon Schroderus had five transport motor boats (12 alias Pääskylahti, Es/32, 4, PO/7, Na 25). According to the plan they were to land SW of the N tip of the island but since the Platoon was not able to land here they landed where Platoon Levas had landed (“A”).

Gunboats supported the landing by firing at the enemy positions on the island-

As soon as the landing had happened enemy opened mortar barrages at the N tip of the island and at the locations held by our troops. After landing the gunboats stayed cruising near Rahmansaari. During AM at about 0900 to 1100hrs two enemy “VMV” type vessels tried to approach Rahmansaari at first from the E and later from the direction of Heinäsenmaa. Our gunboats opened fire at them at a range of some 4000m. Enemy boats approached our boats, firing intensely, to a distance of about 2500m . Then our boats started disengaging while firing at maximum rate at the enemy vessels. Simultaneously an enemy transport vessel supported their “VMVs” by gunfire from the sea farther off. Having pursued for a while the “VMVs” turned back to open sea.

In the afternoon one enemy “VMV” tried to approach Rahmansaari but our gunboats managed to repel it with their fire.

At1700hrs arrived from Lahdenpohja led by Lt. Kakko two transport motor boats (RA 10 alias Vikla and RV14 alias 27) (Ref. Appx. no.2) towing two barges loaded with 4 pcs 47mm guns and one Madsen gun.

At 1930hrs One of the barges with one 47mm gun and all gunners was towed to Rahmansaari. One enemy “VMV” fired at a range of 3000 to 4000 m in the strait between Heinäsenmaa and Rahmansaari at the barge without hitting, however. Our gunboats retaliated and the enemy vessel retreated to the sea.

At 2200hrs arrived from Lahdenpohja led by 2nd Lt. Savolainen nine transport motor boats at Kyysaari (Ref. Appx. no.3) with one Madsen gun.

At 2400hrs one of the barges with three 47mm guns and one Madsen gun was towed to Rahmansaari.

8.9.1941:
Our gunboats patrolled the entire night between the 7. and 8. E, W, and N of Rahmansaari, there was also one motor boat guarding E of Kyysaari.

At 11.30hrs the gunboats were issued orders by Capt. Koski to support with gunfire the taking of the SE tip of Rahmansaari.

At 12.00hrs both gunboats and one boat with a MG headed for Rahmansaari. Having liaised with Lt. Sonninen the boats proceeded at the area in front of the SE tip of the island intending to fire at enemy positions at Koronniemi and Saunalahti simultaneously as the enemy would be engaged by our forces on the island.

At 12.30hrs two enemy “VMV” boats appeared and the gunboats had to engage them. At a range of 3500 to 4000m both enemy vessels, one in the direction of Heinäsenmaa and the other one NW of Koronniemi, turned back. Next our gunboats spent their remaining shells, 38 of them, at the said enemy position on the island then returning for ammunition resupply.

During the day our gunboats secured the motor boat transports to Rahmansaari and back and patrolled the next night as the previous one in the vicinity of Rahmansaari.

9.9.1941:
At 15.40hrs the gunboats left Kyysaari having been issued orders to make themselves be seen by the Russkies in the Motti. Our gunboats were then to liaise with Lt. Sonninen on Rahmansaari and then return to fire at enemy positions. The gunboats proceeded to a distance of 500m in front of the Motti. Yet the small target area and our troops behind it made it impossible to open fire while on waving water without risking our men. The gunboats returned right to Kyysaari.
At the same time an enemy destroyer had appeared and it started shelling Rahmansaari and our boats at a range of about 15000m from the direction of Vossinansaari.

The gunboats again patrolled the night of 9. to 10. 9. around Rahmansaari.

Our land-based artillery supported our gunboats fighting enemy vessels.

Concerning the action of the transport motor boats after the landing, they were constantly carrying out supply and other transports to Rahmansaari. During their missions the boats were often subjected to enemy naval gun fire but it could not be retaliated since the range of the enemy artillery exceeded ours.

Casualties:
KIA 1
WIA 3
Equipment losses: 3 motor boats.

In the battle distinguished themselves specially motor boat crews that transported in the first assault wave Platoons Levas and Huhtiniemi to Rahmansaari and also the gunboat crews.

Signed: Motor boat detachment CO
Lt. Pentti Lähde

Rahmansaari (2).jpg