W/O H. Eeva
9.10.1941
(SPK 17749)
Re: War experiences
Appendix to report no. 1034/I sal.
In the war during 1941 I have been posted as the CO of a 47mm Section, with the following experiences:
The guns were loaded with a crane from the jetty at Rauhala into two large boats. It took 1 hr 10 min to load four guns. The transport route was situated between islands and the boats, in a queue, wwere towed by two motor boats at a rate of four knots. The boats were well suited to this kind of transport in my opinion.
The gun mounts were built for winter use to be transported by horse or by lorry.
During the battle of Rahmansaari the said guns were moved by manhanding, several times it was with great difficulty due to the weight of the mount and available limited manpower.
There were two methods of moving the guns:
-Gun plus mount together
-Barrel and shield detached.
When moving a gun mounted at least 25 to 30 men were needed (the Rahmansaari terrain is very rocky) and the men had to be assembled from every part of the island – due to the ongoing fighting they could not be removed from the fighting line. It was attempted to move a gun with ten men using every available tool but in eight hours a gun was moved only less than one hundred meters.
A gun could be detached: the barrel and the shield were loaded in a boat. The platform including the gun carriage and mount was tied to a log on both sides and then towed with a boat. The weather was good and the transport distance 1500m . Time used to dismantle the gun, towing it and reassemblling comprised four hours. Eight men were available.
In my opinion the platform on which the gun has been mounted is too heavy for summer use. A new platform should be designed, preferably one with wheels so that the gun crew would be able to move it without help. A gun crew comprises 1 + 4.
The 47mm black powder shells we are using are too unreliable and weak, they fail to go off hitting soft soil or water. (For example the Russian 40mm shell (Sic!) is almost three times longer and its explosive effect much superior that of the 47mm shell). Hitting hard soil there is an explosion but splinter effect is weak, since it has vbeen found that a shell has just been split in two.
Time fuse shells do not explode at all unless hitting hard ground. Lacking HE shells we used time fuse shells as impact fuse shells, adjusting the time fuse long enough.
Having observed the motor boats in action I found that a MG on fixed mounting is absolutely superior to a LMG.
Signed: W/O H. Eeva
More about the 47mm gun can be found here:
https://www.jaegerplatoon.net/COASTAL_ARTILLERY1.htm
Using a cannon designed for fixed mounting in mobile warfare implies lack of resources. AT guns would have been superior in every respect – but unavailable.
Rahmansaari Island battle
Re: Rahmansaari Island battle
W/O H. Eeva
9.10.1941
(SPK 17749)
Re: War experiences
Appendix to report no. 1034/I sal.
In the war during 1941 I have been posted as the CO of a 47mm Section, with the following experiences:
The guns were loaded with a crane from the jetty at Rauhala into two large boats. It took 1 hr 10 min to load four guns. The transport route was situated between islands and the boats, in a queue, wwere towed by two motor boats at a rate of four knots. The boats were well suited to this kind of transport in my opinion.
The gun mounts were built for winter use to be transported by horse or by lorry.
During the battle of Rahmansaari the said guns were moved by manhanding, several times it was with great difficulty due to the weight of the mount and available limited manpower.
There were two methods of moving the guns:
-Gun plus mount together
-Barrel and shield detached.
When moving a gun mounted at least 25 to 30 men were needed (the Rahmansaari terrain is very rocky) and the men had to be assembled from every part of the island – due to the ongoing fighting they could not be removed from the fighting line. It was attempted to move a gun with ten men using every available tool but in eight hours a gun was moved only less than one hundred meters.
A gun could be detached: the barrel and the shield were loaded in a boat. The platform including the gun carriage and mount was tied to a log on both sides and then towed with a boat. The weather was good and the transport distance 1500m . Time used to dismantle the gun, towing it and reassemblling comprised four hours. Eight men were available.
In my opinion the platform on which the gun has been mounted is too heavy for summer use. A new platform should be designed, preferably one with wheels so that the gun crew would be able to move it without help. A gun crew comprises 1 + 4.
The 47mm black powder shells we are using are too unreliable and weak, they fail to go off hitting soft soil or water. (For example the Russian 40mm shell (Sic!) is almost three times longer and its explosive effect much superior that of the 47mm shell). Hitting hard soil there is an explosion but splinter effect is weak, since it has vbeen found that a shell has just been split in two.
Time fuse shells do not explode at all unless hitting hard ground. Lacking HE shells we used time fuse shells as impact fuse shells, adjusting the time fuse long enough.
Having observed the motor boats in action I found that a MG on fixed mounting is absolutely superior to a LMG.
Signed: W/O H. Eeva
More about the 47mm gun can be found here:
https://www.jaegerplatoon.net/COASTAL_ARTILLERY1.htm
Using a cannon designed for fixed mounting in mobile warfare implies lack of resources. AT guns would have been superior in every respect – but unavailable.
Information (Fin/Engl) about the infantry action on Rahmansaari is available here:
https://peacecountry0.tripod.com/rahmasaa.htm
The source is said to be the following book:
Väliaho, Olavi, Laatokan puolustajat Karjalaan, Karjalan Kirjapaino, Lappeenranta 1997
9.10.1941
(SPK 17749)
Re: War experiences
Appendix to report no. 1034/I sal.
In the war during 1941 I have been posted as the CO of a 47mm Section, with the following experiences:
The guns were loaded with a crane from the jetty at Rauhala into two large boats. It took 1 hr 10 min to load four guns. The transport route was situated between islands and the boats, in a queue, wwere towed by two motor boats at a rate of four knots. The boats were well suited to this kind of transport in my opinion.
The gun mounts were built for winter use to be transported by horse or by lorry.
During the battle of Rahmansaari the said guns were moved by manhanding, several times it was with great difficulty due to the weight of the mount and available limited manpower.
There were two methods of moving the guns:
-Gun plus mount together
-Barrel and shield detached.
When moving a gun mounted at least 25 to 30 men were needed (the Rahmansaari terrain is very rocky) and the men had to be assembled from every part of the island – due to the ongoing fighting they could not be removed from the fighting line. It was attempted to move a gun with ten men using every available tool but in eight hours a gun was moved only less than one hundred meters.
A gun could be detached: the barrel and the shield were loaded in a boat. The platform including the gun carriage and mount was tied to a log on both sides and then towed with a boat. The weather was good and the transport distance 1500m . Time used to dismantle the gun, towing it and reassemblling comprised four hours. Eight men were available.
In my opinion the platform on which the gun has been mounted is too heavy for summer use. A new platform should be designed, preferably one with wheels so that the gun crew would be able to move it without help. A gun crew comprises 1 + 4.
The 47mm black powder shells we are using are too unreliable and weak, they fail to go off hitting soft soil or water. (For example the Russian 40mm shell (Sic!) is almost three times longer and its explosive effect much superior that of the 47mm shell). Hitting hard soil there is an explosion but splinter effect is weak, since it has vbeen found that a shell has just been split in two.
Time fuse shells do not explode at all unless hitting hard ground. Lacking HE shells we used time fuse shells as impact fuse shells, adjusting the time fuse long enough.
Having observed the motor boats in action I found that a MG on fixed mounting is absolutely superior to a LMG.
Signed: W/O H. Eeva
More about the 47mm gun can be found here:
https://www.jaegerplatoon.net/COASTAL_ARTILLERY1.htm
Using a cannon designed for fixed mounting in mobile warfare implies lack of resources. AT guns would have been superior in every respect – but unavailable.
Information (Fin/Engl) about the infantry action on Rahmansaari is available here:
https://peacecountry0.tripod.com/rahmasaa.htm
The source is said to be the following book:
Väliaho, Olavi, Laatokan puolustajat Karjalaan, Karjalan Kirjapaino, Lappeenranta 1997
Re: Rahmansaari Island battle
Hi Lotvonen
Many thanks, fabulous work. It has inspired us to recreate this battle as a tabletop miniature wargame..
Has the report by Lt Sonninen survived?
Many thanks, fabulous work. It has inspired us to recreate this battle as a tabletop miniature wargame..
Has the report by Lt Sonninen survived?
Re: Rahmansaari Island battle, battle report
The actual battle report has been located.
SPK 21526 pp.13-
Battle report on taking Rahmansaari by Det. Sonninen
I received orders to take the island on the 6th September 1941 at 1900hrs from Capt. Koski. (Appx.1)
I went immediately with him and Col. Lt Rikama to the E tip of Kuhkaa personally liaising with Battery Maunu. From there I continued to Kärpänen in Kärpäsensaari where the troops assembled for the operation found themselves at 2300hrs:
Platoon Huhtiniemi 1./Lt.P. 9
Strike force Levas
Platoon Schroderus 6./Er.Lt.K.
Parts of LL
I issued orders to shift the troops to the jump-off positions I had defined at Kyynsaari where I issued the final attack order t 0130hrs having been briefed by Sailor Ovaska on the chances of landing on Rahmansaari.
1)._Information about enemy
5.9.1941 15.00hrs One Russki spotted on NW shore of the island.
5.9.1941 PM A submarine has been spotted at Verkkosaari.
Earlier smokes have been rising on the island from two places and a ship has been seen moving at the island.
2)._Battle Group Sonninen comprised:
Platoon Huhtiniemi
Platoon Levas
Platoon Schroderus
LL Detachment Lähde
2 motor gunboats
2 motor MG boats
Supporting battery Maunu.
3)._Task: Take Rahmansaari island
4)._ Execution of the order;
I wave, Platoons Huhtiniemi and Levas shall be transported with motor boats towing row boats to the island beach as described in the sketch. Having gained beachhead positions both platoons shall secure with their main force to South while mopping the N tip of the island with one Squad each.
Having reached line A the I wave is to signal it with one white flare where-after the II wave, platoon Schroderus shall land joining the mopping of the inner parts of the island if needed and be immediately available as a reserve at my disposal.
After the II wave has landed the taking and mopping the island shall be completed. The beach shall be secured immediately with the 4 MG_s that we have and the landing troops. Motor gunboats and MG gunboats shall secure the flanks of our landing and provide us with fire cover. A radio transceiver shall follow the II Wave (Code passed to the troops). Battery Maunu shall support our attack. There shall be a F.O.O at my disposal.
C.C.S at Kesvalahti where the wounded shall be evacuated with motor boats. II wave shall include a paramedic squad. Assembly at 0230hrs. Setting out at 0300hrs. Password “Kyynsaari”.
I Wave set out from Kyynsaari at 03.10hrs the II at 03.30hrs.
Having arrived to open sea I spotted that the I wave was approaching Rahmansaari in the manner
as I had ordered.
I wave landed at 03.50hrs. Det. Levas was fired at not until their boat had reached the beach line. Landing was successful due to rapid action of the Detachment even though an enemy MG opened up from Mikinniemi. The detachment gained at once a beachhead and pushed a wedge through the island up to the E beach. Sailor Reinikainen fell to MG fire in his motor boat.
Det. Huhtiniemi took MG fire while still some 150m from the beach. There was an AT gun and MG_s firing from both wings of the planned landing beach. Due to rapid action the landing was successful without casualties. A beachhead was created and the defenders of Hilonniemi cape were soon pushed to Mikinniemi. At the same time the enemies left between Det. Levas and Det. H were eliminated at the NE part of the island. Russkies who had withdrawn to Mikinniemi and a MG nest defending it stood their ground and could not be finally destroyed until the first elements of the II Wave had landed (Appx.2).
I was cruising with the II wave waiting for the signal but since the N tip of the island had not been taken the I wave was not able to launch it. Due to the unclear firefight I was not able to determine how the situation on the island was developing. Also enemy gunboats and mortars were firing a barrage at the landing beach and the N part of the island. So the landing of the II wave was delayed. I requested orders via the liaison officer from my CO, Capt. Koski. I was issued an order to land. I considered it best, after reconnoitring, to land in two stages. Both stages landed without casualties although under fire from a MG nest at Mikinniemi.
The CO of the first element of the II wave 2nd Lt. Schroderus managed in co-operation of the men from the I wave to take out the said MG nest where-after the surviving 9 Russkies surrendered led by their Jr.Lt. So we had reached line A by 06.00hrs (Appx.3) . We had the radio at our disposal at 05.30hrs.
I issued orders to assemble the troops, partly mixed up at landing, and to continue the attack and mopping up. The attack proceeded swiftly up to line B (Appx.4) where Russki launched a counter-strike which stalled us for a while. Enemy gunboats were busy visiting to shell our flanks also the mortar was hampering our progress.
The attack was relaunched at 14.00hrs and supported by artillery and with brisk enterprise we reached line C (Appx.5).
Det. Turunen of 1./Lt.P.10 arrived to support us at 1600hrs. Immediately I dispatched them to support the center where the Russki pressure was the strongest them having received reinforcement with motor boats. I relieved elements of the I wave for meals because I did not have any supply troops at my disposal.
At about 17.15hrs again one gunboat arrived to shell the N tip of the island. Therefore I ordered to move the radio into a Russki dugout at Hilonniemi. 5 min later a shell fired by a gunboat hit the very spot where our radio had been.
We kept trying to advance but in spite of artillery preparation and our tenacious attempts we failed to advance. Since the darkness was falling and Russkies had been reinforced I ordered to secure and keep the line we had gained.
On the 7.9.1941 at 1930hrs one 47mm Obuhoff was transported to the island and I ordered it to be positioned some 300m S of Mikinniemi tasked to cover our resupplying and secure our “harbour”. The positioning of the gun was disturbed by an enemy “VMV” at a distance of 3 to 4000m from the direction of Heinäsenmaa. At the same time a 20mm Madsen arrived.
On the 7.9. at 2100hrs I was reinforced with Det. Korhonen and Jaeger Platoon Toivio. I ordered Det. Korhonen to secure the W beach with their MG s reinforced with the two MG s taken from Russkies.
The night passed fairly calmly with occasional firefights . During the night 3 more 47mm Obuhoffs arrived, 2 of which I set to secure the E beach and one on the W beach with the previous one.
At 2300hrs the enemy tried to land with 30 motor and rowing boats but the attempt was repelled with MG fire.
On the 8.9. AM firefight with the reinforced enemy continued, being lively at times. We tried to break through in the center but due to heavy casualties we gave up. Simultaneously it was informed from the left wing that the enemy had pulled back a little there. Immediately I set up an attack plan to utilize my reinforcements Det. Laamanen and Det. Pesonen plus my present troops.
My plan: Since enemy is showing signs of weakness on the left wing we shall strike there thusly: Detachments Toivio ad Korhonen shall launch an attack on the left wing supported by Det. Pesonen with eight MG s. On the right Det. Schroderus shall attack as the hinge force at the open ground . The manning force between the attacking wing and the hinge force shall join the attack and roll to the right. The beach shall be defended by Det. Korhonen, and Det. Pesonen shall secure the beach with MG s. Motor gunboats shall support and secure the flanks. The Madsen gun shall fire at the MG nests. There shall be an artillery preparation.
Motor gunboat CO Lt. Lähde was issued orders on action at 1200hrs.
The attack was launched at 1230hrs. Immediately it started successfully for us on the left wing. The hinge force failed to advance, also the CO Lt. Schroderus was wounded when fetching more hand grenades. I ordered 2nd Lt. Laamanen to take over the outfit.
AT 1230 to 1330hrs an enemy “VMV” was firing at the beach. Our 47mm gun and motor gunboats forced the enemy to retreat.
At 1400hrs our motor gunboats withdrew having spent almost all of their ammunition.
At 1440hrs an enemy destroyer shelled the beach.
Col. Lt Rikama arrived at my C.P in Siikaniemi at 1450hrs. I briefed him about the situation.
At 15.00hrs the CO of the attacking wing 2nd Lt. Toivio reported that the attack had progressed to line D which meant that the entire E coast including Koroniemi was ours. This meant that our artillery could no more shell the island. Enemy resistance stiffened once again and so 2nd Lt. Toivio reported at 1800hrs that Russkies had again broken through to Koronniemi. Det. Korhonen however struck a wedge through to the edge of the open ground with houses whereby the enemy on the Koronniemi were destroyed while some (21 of them) surrendered.
So by 2000hrs we had reached line F which constituted the final perimeter of the Motti.
9.9.1941.
We started to soften up the Motti first by trying to roll from the beach but the terrain was unfavourable for advancing under intense enemy fire. Therefore I considered it best to spare men, specially as we had already taken relatively high casualties. We did the following, methodically:
1._Intense firing for 5 to 10 min.
2._PFC Raikaslehto who speaks the Russki language informed Russkies about the hopelessness of their situation.
3._A break of 10 to 20 min.
We continued this during the day. At the first time Russkies opened intense fire. At the second time they already were listening the sound of reason, yet firing at us. A 45mm light mortar was subordinated to us and it fired 25 bombs – at our line... (Our artillery sometimes also hit our positions probably due to worn out barrels. Casualties: one rifle broken).
In spite of our attempts we did not manage to subdue the motti during the day. So I set up sentries for the night at the motti and at the beach, too.
At 23.30hrs two destroyers approached the island and shelled it. They were followed by a motor gunboat towing a rowing boat. I did not let our guns and MG s reveal themselves before absolutely necessary. The motor gunboat passed Koronniemi at a distance of about 1 km releasing the rowing boat drifting towards the harbour. At a range of about 50m rowers stood up from the bottom of the boat whereby our MG opened fire, sinking the boat.
10.9.1941:
Softening the motti went on with the 45mm AT gun taken from Russkies which 2nd Lt. Laamanen had fixed and with 81 mm mortar. Their accurate fire and the method applied yesterday ripened the motti. As the AT gun had fired 150 shells and the mortar 60 bombs, ten POWs surrendered. Immediately our lads led by 2nd Lt. Toivio boldly and briskly stood up, exhorting the Russkies to surrender. Russkies were so dumbfounded by this that they failed to put up resistance. Soon the entire motti area was mopped up.
At 11.30hrs I was able to report that Rahmansaari had been returned to the rightful owners.
Immediately I issued orders about caring for the POWs, sweeping the area and continuing action of our troops.
12.00hrs the first POWs arrived. Their total number was 99.
As to the KIA, I estimated there would be 65. Later it was found there was a lot more of them.
List of Russki casualties and losses:
Rahmansaari
1 45mm AT gun m/40, 200 shells
3 81mm mortars, 30 bombs
8 MG_s
20 LMGs
some 40 semiauto rifles
some 120 rifles
4 sniper rifles
20 pistols
100 steel helmets
100 gas masks
Hand grenades, plenty of.
2 rubber dinghies
5 rowing boats
Food and other material
KIA 100
POW 130
Drowned 30
Escaped 20
Total 283
Among the POWs one Colonel, one Captain and one Sub-Lieutenant.
Our casualties and losses:
5 motor boats
16 fallen
39 wounded
Total 55 of our men
Reported by the attack force CO Lt. Ahti Sonninen
(Signed)
Appendices N.A.
To honour the Finnish soldiers fallen in the action their names are listed below.
Several of them were family fathers.
Source: War dead database
Reinikainen, Arvo Tuomas Rikhard Sotamies
B. 26.09.1914 Kymi D. 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
3.Mv.K/LL KIA Buried at Kotka
Civilian occupation: Foreman No children
Asikainen, Veikko Juho Sotamies
28.12.1907 Kesälahti 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 33
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA Buried at Kitee, Kesälahti
Farmer, no children
Hukkanen, Eino Einari Sotamies
18.10.1908 Kerimäki 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 32
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania
KIA buried at Savonlinna, Kerimäki
Labourer 3 children
Hämäläinen, Onni Sotamies
25.07.1917 Puumala 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 24
Linnoituspataljoona 10 KIA Buried at Lappeenranta, military cemetry
Labourer, no children
Kankkunen, Eino Johannes Alikersantti
08.11.1912 Kitee 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 28
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania
KIA buried at Kitee
Farmer, no children 0
Karvinen, Paavo Sotamies
06.07.1910 Savonranta 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 31
I Os./LTK KIA buried at Savonlinna, Savonranta
1 child
Kuisma, Eino Sotamies
19.05.1910 Kirvu 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 31
6. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA
Farm worker 2 children
Kyyrö, Aarne Olavi Sotamies
30.03.1918 Jääski 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 23
Linnoituspataljoona 9, 1. komppania KIA Imatra, Imatrankoski military cemetry
Farmer, 1 child
Nyman, Heikki Tapio Sotamies
19.01.1923 Urjala 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age18
I-Os./LL KIA Buried at Akaa, Kylmäkoski military cemetry
Worker
Nyrhinen, Teuvo Sotamies 2
6.06.1917 Kerimäki 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 24
Linnoituspataljoona 10 KIA Buried at Savonlinna, Kerimäki
Forest worker no children
Poutiainen, Martti Sotamies
19.09.1914 Kesälahti 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania KIA Buried at Kitee, Kesälahti
Labourer, no children
Putkuri, Eino Sotamies
18.08.1916 Kitee 10.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age25
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA Buried at Kitee
Labourer , 2 children
Pöhö, Reino Nestori Sotamies
15.04.1914 Antrea 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 27
I-Os./LL KIA
Labourer, no children
Reinikainen, Arvo Tuomas Rikhard Sotamies
26.09.1914 Kymi 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
3.Mv.K/LL KIA buried at Kotka
Foreman, no children
Rouhiainen, Viljo Alikersantti
27.01.1909 Kaukola 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 32
Linnoituspataljoona 9, 1. komppania KIA
Farmer
Saukkonen, Onni Sotamies
04.07.1905 Polvijärvi 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 36
I-Os./LL KIA Buried at Polvijärvi
5 children.
Soikkeli, Matti Alikersantti
05.08.1906 Hiitola 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 35
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA
Farmer 7 children (sic!)
Tukia, Ilmari Alikersantti
23.01.1914 Valkjärvi 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 27
I-Os./LL KIA
Carpenter 2 children
The men with no indicated place of burial were buried in their home parishes in what is now ceded Carelia.
SPK 21526 pp.13-
Battle report on taking Rahmansaari by Det. Sonninen
I received orders to take the island on the 6th September 1941 at 1900hrs from Capt. Koski. (Appx.1)
I went immediately with him and Col. Lt Rikama to the E tip of Kuhkaa personally liaising with Battery Maunu. From there I continued to Kärpänen in Kärpäsensaari where the troops assembled for the operation found themselves at 2300hrs:
Platoon Huhtiniemi 1./Lt.P. 9
Strike force Levas
Platoon Schroderus 6./Er.Lt.K.
Parts of LL
I issued orders to shift the troops to the jump-off positions I had defined at Kyynsaari where I issued the final attack order t 0130hrs having been briefed by Sailor Ovaska on the chances of landing on Rahmansaari.
1)._Information about enemy
5.9.1941 15.00hrs One Russki spotted on NW shore of the island.
5.9.1941 PM A submarine has been spotted at Verkkosaari.
Earlier smokes have been rising on the island from two places and a ship has been seen moving at the island.
2)._Battle Group Sonninen comprised:
Platoon Huhtiniemi
Platoon Levas
Platoon Schroderus
LL Detachment Lähde
2 motor gunboats
2 motor MG boats
Supporting battery Maunu.
3)._Task: Take Rahmansaari island
4)._ Execution of the order;
I wave, Platoons Huhtiniemi and Levas shall be transported with motor boats towing row boats to the island beach as described in the sketch. Having gained beachhead positions both platoons shall secure with their main force to South while mopping the N tip of the island with one Squad each.
Having reached line A the I wave is to signal it with one white flare where-after the II wave, platoon Schroderus shall land joining the mopping of the inner parts of the island if needed and be immediately available as a reserve at my disposal.
After the II wave has landed the taking and mopping the island shall be completed. The beach shall be secured immediately with the 4 MG_s that we have and the landing troops. Motor gunboats and MG gunboats shall secure the flanks of our landing and provide us with fire cover. A radio transceiver shall follow the II Wave (Code passed to the troops). Battery Maunu shall support our attack. There shall be a F.O.O at my disposal.
C.C.S at Kesvalahti where the wounded shall be evacuated with motor boats. II wave shall include a paramedic squad. Assembly at 0230hrs. Setting out at 0300hrs. Password “Kyynsaari”.
I Wave set out from Kyynsaari at 03.10hrs the II at 03.30hrs.
Having arrived to open sea I spotted that the I wave was approaching Rahmansaari in the manner
as I had ordered.
I wave landed at 03.50hrs. Det. Levas was fired at not until their boat had reached the beach line. Landing was successful due to rapid action of the Detachment even though an enemy MG opened up from Mikinniemi. The detachment gained at once a beachhead and pushed a wedge through the island up to the E beach. Sailor Reinikainen fell to MG fire in his motor boat.
Det. Huhtiniemi took MG fire while still some 150m from the beach. There was an AT gun and MG_s firing from both wings of the planned landing beach. Due to rapid action the landing was successful without casualties. A beachhead was created and the defenders of Hilonniemi cape were soon pushed to Mikinniemi. At the same time the enemies left between Det. Levas and Det. H were eliminated at the NE part of the island. Russkies who had withdrawn to Mikinniemi and a MG nest defending it stood their ground and could not be finally destroyed until the first elements of the II Wave had landed (Appx.2).
I was cruising with the II wave waiting for the signal but since the N tip of the island had not been taken the I wave was not able to launch it. Due to the unclear firefight I was not able to determine how the situation on the island was developing. Also enemy gunboats and mortars were firing a barrage at the landing beach and the N part of the island. So the landing of the II wave was delayed. I requested orders via the liaison officer from my CO, Capt. Koski. I was issued an order to land. I considered it best, after reconnoitring, to land in two stages. Both stages landed without casualties although under fire from a MG nest at Mikinniemi.
The CO of the first element of the II wave 2nd Lt. Schroderus managed in co-operation of the men from the I wave to take out the said MG nest where-after the surviving 9 Russkies surrendered led by their Jr.Lt. So we had reached line A by 06.00hrs (Appx.3) . We had the radio at our disposal at 05.30hrs.
I issued orders to assemble the troops, partly mixed up at landing, and to continue the attack and mopping up. The attack proceeded swiftly up to line B (Appx.4) where Russki launched a counter-strike which stalled us for a while. Enemy gunboats were busy visiting to shell our flanks also the mortar was hampering our progress.
The attack was relaunched at 14.00hrs and supported by artillery and with brisk enterprise we reached line C (Appx.5).
Det. Turunen of 1./Lt.P.10 arrived to support us at 1600hrs. Immediately I dispatched them to support the center where the Russki pressure was the strongest them having received reinforcement with motor boats. I relieved elements of the I wave for meals because I did not have any supply troops at my disposal.
At about 17.15hrs again one gunboat arrived to shell the N tip of the island. Therefore I ordered to move the radio into a Russki dugout at Hilonniemi. 5 min later a shell fired by a gunboat hit the very spot where our radio had been.
We kept trying to advance but in spite of artillery preparation and our tenacious attempts we failed to advance. Since the darkness was falling and Russkies had been reinforced I ordered to secure and keep the line we had gained.
On the 7.9.1941 at 1930hrs one 47mm Obuhoff was transported to the island and I ordered it to be positioned some 300m S of Mikinniemi tasked to cover our resupplying and secure our “harbour”. The positioning of the gun was disturbed by an enemy “VMV” at a distance of 3 to 4000m from the direction of Heinäsenmaa. At the same time a 20mm Madsen arrived.
On the 7.9. at 2100hrs I was reinforced with Det. Korhonen and Jaeger Platoon Toivio. I ordered Det. Korhonen to secure the W beach with their MG s reinforced with the two MG s taken from Russkies.
The night passed fairly calmly with occasional firefights . During the night 3 more 47mm Obuhoffs arrived, 2 of which I set to secure the E beach and one on the W beach with the previous one.
At 2300hrs the enemy tried to land with 30 motor and rowing boats but the attempt was repelled with MG fire.
On the 8.9. AM firefight with the reinforced enemy continued, being lively at times. We tried to break through in the center but due to heavy casualties we gave up. Simultaneously it was informed from the left wing that the enemy had pulled back a little there. Immediately I set up an attack plan to utilize my reinforcements Det. Laamanen and Det. Pesonen plus my present troops.
My plan: Since enemy is showing signs of weakness on the left wing we shall strike there thusly: Detachments Toivio ad Korhonen shall launch an attack on the left wing supported by Det. Pesonen with eight MG s. On the right Det. Schroderus shall attack as the hinge force at the open ground . The manning force between the attacking wing and the hinge force shall join the attack and roll to the right. The beach shall be defended by Det. Korhonen, and Det. Pesonen shall secure the beach with MG s. Motor gunboats shall support and secure the flanks. The Madsen gun shall fire at the MG nests. There shall be an artillery preparation.
Motor gunboat CO Lt. Lähde was issued orders on action at 1200hrs.
The attack was launched at 1230hrs. Immediately it started successfully for us on the left wing. The hinge force failed to advance, also the CO Lt. Schroderus was wounded when fetching more hand grenades. I ordered 2nd Lt. Laamanen to take over the outfit.
AT 1230 to 1330hrs an enemy “VMV” was firing at the beach. Our 47mm gun and motor gunboats forced the enemy to retreat.
At 1400hrs our motor gunboats withdrew having spent almost all of their ammunition.
At 1440hrs an enemy destroyer shelled the beach.
Col. Lt Rikama arrived at my C.P in Siikaniemi at 1450hrs. I briefed him about the situation.
At 15.00hrs the CO of the attacking wing 2nd Lt. Toivio reported that the attack had progressed to line D which meant that the entire E coast including Koroniemi was ours. This meant that our artillery could no more shell the island. Enemy resistance stiffened once again and so 2nd Lt. Toivio reported at 1800hrs that Russkies had again broken through to Koronniemi. Det. Korhonen however struck a wedge through to the edge of the open ground with houses whereby the enemy on the Koronniemi were destroyed while some (21 of them) surrendered.
So by 2000hrs we had reached line F which constituted the final perimeter of the Motti.
9.9.1941.
We started to soften up the Motti first by trying to roll from the beach but the terrain was unfavourable for advancing under intense enemy fire. Therefore I considered it best to spare men, specially as we had already taken relatively high casualties. We did the following, methodically:
1._Intense firing for 5 to 10 min.
2._PFC Raikaslehto who speaks the Russki language informed Russkies about the hopelessness of their situation.
3._A break of 10 to 20 min.
We continued this during the day. At the first time Russkies opened intense fire. At the second time they already were listening the sound of reason, yet firing at us. A 45mm light mortar was subordinated to us and it fired 25 bombs – at our line... (Our artillery sometimes also hit our positions probably due to worn out barrels. Casualties: one rifle broken).
In spite of our attempts we did not manage to subdue the motti during the day. So I set up sentries for the night at the motti and at the beach, too.
At 23.30hrs two destroyers approached the island and shelled it. They were followed by a motor gunboat towing a rowing boat. I did not let our guns and MG s reveal themselves before absolutely necessary. The motor gunboat passed Koronniemi at a distance of about 1 km releasing the rowing boat drifting towards the harbour. At a range of about 50m rowers stood up from the bottom of the boat whereby our MG opened fire, sinking the boat.
10.9.1941:
Softening the motti went on with the 45mm AT gun taken from Russkies which 2nd Lt. Laamanen had fixed and with 81 mm mortar. Their accurate fire and the method applied yesterday ripened the motti. As the AT gun had fired 150 shells and the mortar 60 bombs, ten POWs surrendered. Immediately our lads led by 2nd Lt. Toivio boldly and briskly stood up, exhorting the Russkies to surrender. Russkies were so dumbfounded by this that they failed to put up resistance. Soon the entire motti area was mopped up.
At 11.30hrs I was able to report that Rahmansaari had been returned to the rightful owners.
Immediately I issued orders about caring for the POWs, sweeping the area and continuing action of our troops.
12.00hrs the first POWs arrived. Their total number was 99.
As to the KIA, I estimated there would be 65. Later it was found there was a lot more of them.
List of Russki casualties and losses:
Rahmansaari
1 45mm AT gun m/40, 200 shells
3 81mm mortars, 30 bombs
8 MG_s
20 LMGs
some 40 semiauto rifles
some 120 rifles
4 sniper rifles
20 pistols
100 steel helmets
100 gas masks
Hand grenades, plenty of.
2 rubber dinghies
5 rowing boats
Food and other material
KIA 100
POW 130
Drowned 30
Escaped 20
Total 283
Among the POWs one Colonel, one Captain and one Sub-Lieutenant.
Our casualties and losses:
5 motor boats
16 fallen
39 wounded
Total 55 of our men
Reported by the attack force CO Lt. Ahti Sonninen
(Signed)
Appendices N.A.
To honour the Finnish soldiers fallen in the action their names are listed below.
Several of them were family fathers.
Source: War dead database
Reinikainen, Arvo Tuomas Rikhard Sotamies
B. 26.09.1914 Kymi D. 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
3.Mv.K/LL KIA Buried at Kotka
Civilian occupation: Foreman No children
Asikainen, Veikko Juho Sotamies
28.12.1907 Kesälahti 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 33
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA Buried at Kitee, Kesälahti
Farmer, no children
Hukkanen, Eino Einari Sotamies
18.10.1908 Kerimäki 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 32
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania
KIA buried at Savonlinna, Kerimäki
Labourer 3 children
Hämäläinen, Onni Sotamies
25.07.1917 Puumala 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 24
Linnoituspataljoona 10 KIA Buried at Lappeenranta, military cemetry
Labourer, no children
Kankkunen, Eino Johannes Alikersantti
08.11.1912 Kitee 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 28
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania
KIA buried at Kitee
Farmer, no children 0
Karvinen, Paavo Sotamies
06.07.1910 Savonranta 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 31
I Os./LTK KIA buried at Savonlinna, Savonranta
1 child
Kuisma, Eino Sotamies
19.05.1910 Kirvu 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 31
6. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA
Farm worker 2 children
Kyyrö, Aarne Olavi Sotamies
30.03.1918 Jääski 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 23
Linnoituspataljoona 9, 1. komppania KIA Imatra, Imatrankoski military cemetry
Farmer, 1 child
Nyman, Heikki Tapio Sotamies
19.01.1923 Urjala 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age18
I-Os./LL KIA Buried at Akaa, Kylmäkoski military cemetry
Worker
Nyrhinen, Teuvo Sotamies 2
6.06.1917 Kerimäki 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 24
Linnoituspataljoona 10 KIA Buried at Savonlinna, Kerimäki
Forest worker no children
Poutiainen, Martti Sotamies
19.09.1914 Kesälahti 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
Linnoituspataljoona 10, 1. komppania KIA Buried at Kitee, Kesälahti
Labourer, no children
Putkuri, Eino Sotamies
18.08.1916 Kitee 10.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age25
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA Buried at Kitee
Labourer , 2 children
Pöhö, Reino Nestori Sotamies
15.04.1914 Antrea 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 27
I-Os./LL KIA
Labourer, no children
Reinikainen, Arvo Tuomas Rikhard Sotamies
26.09.1914 Kymi 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 26
3.Mv.K/LL KIA buried at Kotka
Foreman, no children
Rouhiainen, Viljo Alikersantti
27.01.1909 Kaukola 09.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 32
Linnoituspataljoona 9, 1. komppania KIA
Farmer
Saukkonen, Onni Sotamies
04.07.1905 Polvijärvi 07.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 36
I-Os./LL KIA Buried at Polvijärvi
5 children.
Soikkeli, Matti Alikersantti
05.08.1906 Hiitola 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 35
7. erillinen linnoituskomppania KIA
Farmer 7 children (sic!)
Tukia, Ilmari Alikersantti
23.01.1914 Valkjärvi 08.09.1941 Rahmansaari, Kurkijoki Age 27
I-Os./LL KIA
Carpenter 2 children
The men with no indicated place of burial were buried in their home parishes in what is now ceded Carelia.
Re: Rahmansaari Island battle
Absolutely cracking information, bless you for translating it.
The only question to ask is - what was the difference between 'platoons' and 'detachments'. I am assuming the platoons were standard Finnish infantry platoons (or jaeger platoon, in the case of the Toivio platoon) while the detachments were more 'ad hoc' formations. Any idea on the distribution of the heavy machine guns?
Thanks again
K
The only question to ask is - what was the difference between 'platoons' and 'detachments'. I am assuming the platoons were standard Finnish infantry platoons (or jaeger platoon, in the case of the Toivio platoon) while the detachments were more 'ad hoc' formations. Any idea on the distribution of the heavy machine guns?
Thanks again
K