The Winter War: Success or Failure for the Red Army?

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Rarog
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The Winter War: Success or Failure for the Red Army?

#1

Post by Rarog » 17 Jul 2004, 16:55

One point of view is well known and represented (for example) by opinion of Goebbels: the Winter War was a failure for the Red Army and proved it's inefficiency. The Soviets lost in that war 126.875, Finns lost 48.243.

Another point of view is less known and represented by Suvorov (Rezun): the Winter War was an incredible success and is the evidence of the Red Army might... as it was virtually impossible to break Finnish defence lines in such harsh condiitions.

Other authors mention WWI situations (and cite casualities), and absence of any success of German attempts to seize Murmansk in WWII.

So was it a success or a failure? I'm not talking about the results of the war, but about the Red Army efficiency in that war.

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Topspeed
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#2

Post by Topspeed » 17 Jul 2004, 17:38

Well if you think of their goals; to conquer Finland ( in six days ) and to put a puppet regime here they failed miserably.

They were able to make a peace with hard conditions for Finland ( 500 000 people lost their homes and possessions ).

Soviets were teached a lesson that they possibly were able to utilize against Germans in Stalingrad ( one needs more than 10/1 manpower to overtake dug in trenches in the wintertime ).

One ex-soviet general also says that Airacobra fighter was much better than the P-51 Mustang they tested. This makes me wonder what is the level of judgement they possess...or do they adapt so strongly to their own propaganda that it actually becomes a truth to them ?


just my 2 cents,

Juke T :?


Globalization41
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Operational Check

#3

Post by Globalization41 » 17 Jul 2004, 18:25

The Winter War turned out to be an exercise,
tune-up, and operational check for the Red
Army. The Winter War itself was a loss for
the Soviets since "reunification" with Finland
was never achieved. But the lessons learned
and the corrective actions initiated slowed
the Germans down in 1941.

Globalization41

Rarog
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Re: Operational Check

#4

Post by Rarog » 17 Jul 2004, 18:56

C'mon, gentlemen, I specifically specified :-) that I'm not talking about the RESULTS of the war (which were determined rather by the general situation in Europe imho than by the fact that the Soviets were able to crush last Finnish defense lines and could proceed to Helsinki), but about the Red Army efficiency.

Were the defence lines really that serious? Were weather conditons that harsh? Was resistance heavy indeed? If so, wasn't it a great success for the RED ARMY?

Taking into account that the Red Army by definiton was sturming prepared positions (and EVEN not taking into account that the defense positions were the masterpiece of the defense mind... if they really were... and harsh weather conditions... - 50) the ratio of casualties doesn't look abnormal: 1:2-3
Last edited by Rarog on 17 Jul 2004, 19:24, edited 1 time in total.

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Topspeed
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#5

Post by Topspeed » 17 Jul 2004, 19:15

Raroc,

Since your numbers are not correct and your location is unavailable I will not carry on in with this subject.
Finland lost 25 636 soldiers in combat during 3 month long Winter War. Soviets certainly lost over 200 000 men.


regards,

JT

Globalization41
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Winter War

#6

Post by Globalization41 » 17 Jul 2004, 19:24

Here's a supplementary link. I'll be adding
more to the link periodically.

The Winter War

Globalization41

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Juha Hujanen
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#7

Post by Juha Hujanen » 17 Jul 2004, 20:09

Well,i wouldn't count much for much famed Mannerheim Line.After the Winter War SU used to put much blame for their poor performance,against the Finnish fortifications.

The truth is much less clamorous.Mannerheim Line was nothing like Maginot or Westwall.From http://www.Winterwar.com:

The Mannerheim Line ready and powerful?



During the peaceful years of 20's and 30's, the bunkers were often built as cheap as possible. For instance, only ONE machine gun bunker had the mg-pedestal installed (the factory prototype) and no weapons had been installed. So after the mobilization began, the first thing to do was to quickly design a new pedestal from wood and build them by hand. The bunkers were not camouflaged and only occasionally guarded, so the Soviet intelligence was able to find out the exact positions and layouts for most of the fortifications before the war. This was partly possible because no restrictions were made for people to visit the bunker sites. (It was common to find detailed sketches and maps about Finnish defenses from fallen Soviet officers.)

One has to remember that the Mannerheim Line did not exactly follow the "Enckell Line". So the bunkers of "Muolaa"(Mu), "Sikniemi"(Mu) and "Salmenkaita "(Mä) were actually not a direct part of Mannerheim Line. Instead as the line along the many isthmi between Lakes Muolaanjärvi and Vuoksi, that portion of the Mannerheim Line had only field fortifications.
So at the end of October 1939, when the war started, the actual Mannerheim Line had in the area between the Gulf of Finland and Vuoksi, some 80 km wide, 41 concrete fortifications (10 of them built in the 1920's and not repaired/modernized during the 1930's) and in the Vuoksi-Suvanto-Taipale area, some 55 km wide, 25 concrete fortifications (all of them built during the 1920's) see the map below. If the concrete fortifications had been dispersed evenly along the line, the distance between two of them would've been some 2 km, i.e. an average density of about 0.5 concrete bunkers / km.

And if counting concrete bunkers which had machine guns or cannons (thus excluding passive concrete shelters), a total of 48 bunkers, there was one such bunker for each 3 km of front, i.e. roughly 0,35 armed bunkers / km.

(Compare the above figure with the average number of concrete fortifications / km in the following lines;
- some 10 in the Maginot Line, in the weaker part at the Belgian border
- Westwall had at least 15)

As the primary AT-obstacle, from a wide variety of possibilities, the "rock obstacle"(also "rock rows") was chosen to be the primary type. There were several sound reasons for that. First, the soil of Finland has large deposits of granite (less expensive than concrete, which was on short supply). Second, the shortage of equipment capable of mixing the cement at the construction sites.And third, the relatively low number of trucks in Finland (a nationwide total of 13 000), which forced to the use of carts drawn by horses, thereby limiting the practical transportation distance from quarry to construction site.
Some AT-ditches were made and some "slope cuts" ("rinneleikkaus" in Finnish) where in the base of the slope, soil was dug out to produce a vertical "wall".

The main problem to arise was that the obstacles were tested by Finnish Renault FT 17 and Vickers 6-ton tanks thus giving a wrong idea of their effectiveness (which was usually overestimated). There handicap became even greater when the ground was covered with snow.
The AT-obstacles of the Mannerheim Line were built in the most threatened areas, such as "Inkilä", Summa and the nearby areas, the isthmi between Lakes Muolaanjärvi and Vuoksi, and Taipale.

Also, the flooding of some areas was planned, but they produced only small results, partly because of the exceptionally cold winter.

The sheer volume of work and too small resources resulted in a line that practically lacked depth. Only in the Summa sector on the "Gateway of Karelia" was the back line (2 km from the front-line) of the main defense line with adequate field fortifications. In most places, tactical depth was achieved by locating some front-line unit shelters 200 -300 meters back from the front.

The Mannerheim Line was a line, which used natural barriers. The cold winter made this however in many cases a threat as the ice on the lakes and Ladoga and Gulf of Finland could carry the weight of Soviet light tanks (BT-series and T-26 types). This wouldn't have been a serious problem if

a) the Finnish artillery had had enough ammunition
b) there would've been more AT-guns, and
c) the testing of "ice mines" would've been conducted before 1939 (the bitter experience led to the development of the effective "Arsa-mines" after Winter War).

The result of the ice cover on the lakes and sea was, that Soviet tanks could easily launch attacks against Finnish isles and make flanking maneuvers, while the Finns tried to prevent this by both blowing and sawing gaps in the ice, which after a few hours froze up again.
Also, the frozen lakes provided the Red Army good supply routes and deleted the need of bridging equipment in many places (Taipale, for instance). In many places the Finns were forced to build temporary defensive positions on the ice of Lakes. These were built mainly of snow and logs, but soon pulp cubes were noted to be quite useful after first being watered and then allowed to freeze solid before covering them with snow. However on most cases the breastwork offered cover from small arms only, therefore the positions were manned during the dark hours only, the Soviet air superiority and the abundance of enemy artillery forced the Finns to withdraw from them before dawn.It's indeed fair to say that the cornerstone of the Finnish defenses were the concrete fortifications, but unlike the Soviet propaganda during and after the war painted, the Mannerheim Line was light-years behind the massive fortress complexes of the Maginot Line. The strength of the Mannerheim Line was mostly based on common field fortifications, which were built during the summer of '39 and mobilization.

The maps on the right show "the greatness of the Finnish defenses on the Karelian Isthmus" according to Soviet sources. The defensive "lines" before the "Mannerheim Line" are close to the Finnish delay positions, but the few sparse fortifications in those positions don't deserve the name "defensive line".

I'll guess the bottom line is:

And if counting concrete bunkers which had machine guns or cannons (thus excluding passive concrete shelters), a total of 48 bunkers, there was one such bunker for each 3 km of front, i.e. roughly 0,35 armed bunkers / km.

(Compare the above figure with the average number of concrete fortifications / km in the following lines;
- some 10 in the Maginot Line, in the weaker part at the Belgian border
- Westwall had at least 15)

Some other figures:

SU=population of some 170 million
Finland=less than 4 million

Ratios (Finland/SU)

Men 1:4
Artillery 1:10
Tanks 1:192
Aircraft 1:12

In end of war SU had some 47-49 (some sources say up to 60) Divisions) against Finland's 15 Divisions.Despide of these overwhelming superioritys,Red Army was unable to reach its goals.

Weather conditions were indeed harsh but sub-zero tempeature is demoratic in that way that it will affect all sides.Also Finnish troops suffered from cold and in generally Red Army's winter equipment was sufficient.What they lacked was tactic skills.

With that amount of men and material,they should have runn over Finland in 2 weeks...

Few links of Mannerheim Line:

http://www.winterwar.com/M-Line.htm
http://www.mannerheim-line.com/

Cheers/Juha

ps.Bair,i didn't realise you had an travel company :D

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Alter Mann
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Russia's Winter War

#8

Post by Alter Mann » 17 Jul 2004, 20:23

From what I have read in several sources, the Soviets expected Finland to be a 'walk-over', but it didn't turn out that way.

There seem to have been two phases to the war. During the first phase, the Soviets attacked and Mannerheim's defenses ate them up. This required some re-thinking on the Soviet part. Tactics were changed, commanders were replaced, supply was improved, more troops were made available, etc.

The second phase seems to have been a slogging match, with the Finns greatly outnumbered but still managing to make Soviet attrition so serious that the Soviets decided to agree to a settlement without achieving their objectives.

It would be difficult for me to agree that either side won, but it certainly appears that the Finns lost less than the Soviets did.

As to the weather conditions and hardships, remember that both sides experienced them. The Soviet units involved were supposed to be trained to survive in the conditions and the Finns didn't have any choice but to be trained in the prevailing conditions. I don't think that climatic conditions should be considered a factor. IMHO, during the first phase, the Soviet's main problems were poor leadership and preparation. During the second phase the Soviets got better leadership and better planning and supply, but the Finns still didn't back off.

There has been a lot written about the Winter War that I have not read, but I still think that the Soviet excuses for their failure, and even the fact that they felt they had to make excuses, indicate that the Finns taught them several lessons in warfare. A truly great effort based on the relative sizes of the two populations.

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#9

Post by Rarog » 17 Jul 2004, 20:45

As the thread was hijacked and turned into discussion of the brave and efficient Finnish soldiers (the best soldiers in the world, one has to conclude) I'd like to make a little poll:

How many of you gentlemen trust the opinion of Victor Suvorov (Rezun) that the SU was planning to invade Germany? And how many of you disagree with him when he says that the Red Army was highly efficient in the Winter war? And if you disagree, what makes you think that the SU was planning to envade Fortress Europe after such shitty performance?

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#10

Post by Rarog » 17 Jul 2004, 20:48

>>>The second phase seems to have been a slogging match, with the Finns greatly outnumbered but still managing to make Soviet attrition so serious that the Soviets decided to agree to a settlement without achieving their objectives.

Wasn't the line broken finally and Finns faced re-settlement to Siberia, but the international situation forced the Soviets to leave those plans and compromise?

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#11

Post by Topspeed » 17 Jul 2004, 21:28

Rorag,

I think we won; where is Soviet Union today ?

Helsinki and London were only two capitals in Europe never to face occupation.

No Rorag we were never faced with the fact of going to Siberia. We made a peace treaty twice; 1940 and 1944 to avoid more bloodshedding.

Where did you get those Goebbels figures ?

Suvorov is totally unknown to me. Certainly the Soviets wanted to make a world communist at least around them. SU figured it was a victory since the 3 mio finns did not occupy Soviet Union, no matter if they losses were multiple compared to finns. They were able to gain land areas from a country that was lead by ex-czar officer Finlands marschal C.G.E.Mannerheim. They certainly considered that a victory.

JT
Last edited by Topspeed on 17 Jul 2004, 21:42, edited 1 time in total.

Globalization41
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Finnish Soldiers Save Finland

#12

Post by Globalization41 » 17 Jul 2004, 21:29

Stalin did not plan to invade Germany unless
it lost its war with France. ... The Red Army
was never efficient. It used standard chess
strategy of exploiting a material advantage by
trading pieces and promoting pawns. ... Had
it not been for international political pressure
on the Soviet Union, the Finns would have
faced resettlement and/or liquidation. The
United States declined to follow Britain's lead
when the U.K. declared war on Finland a few
hours before Pearl Harbor. Congress refused
to consider a declaration of war on Finland,
even after Hitler declared war on America.
... Stalin knew he would lose Roosevelt's
political support if he bolshevised Finland. ...
The A-bomb probably helped attenuate Stalin's
expansionism after Germany's defeat. ... But
despite any clever sarcasms, it's the brave
Finnish soldiers who get the save.

Globalization41

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Alter Mann
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Finnish Winter War

#13

Post by Alter Mann » 17 Jul 2004, 21:30

Rarog, I have never heard of anything like that. It really appears to me that, especially due to the tangible results, the Finns were negotiating from a position of strength.

I think it was more important for the Soviets to get out of there and cut their losses and the Finns helped by making some token concessions that they hoped to take back later.

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Alter Mann
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Soviet Motives

#14

Post by Alter Mann » 17 Jul 2004, 21:40

I would like to add, in response to Rarog's poll, that I have never had a very good idea of Soviet war plans. They didn't invoke their treaty with Germany until the Germans were well into Poland, and they refused to declare war on Japan until Japan was essentially already beaten.

Sometimes it seems to me that the Soviets would rather have grabbed as many crumbs off the table, after someone else had done the fighting, than get involved in a big conflict.

I have a feeling that many US politicians and military officers were worried about the Soviets staying out of the war and waiting until all the other significant military forces had been seriously weakend before they made their true plans known.

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Re: Finnish Winter War

#15

Post by Mark V » 17 Jul 2004, 22:56

Alte Mann wrote:Rarog, I have never heard of anything like that. It really appears to me that, especially due to the tangible results, the Finns were negotiating from a position of strength.
By the second week of March 1940 the situation in southern part of front was desparate. From beginning of February furious battle had raged almost continuously. Troops were exhausted, ammo supplies were exhausted. Reserves were nearly non-existant. There weren't room for retreat (it was last line that could atleast be somehow manned - after that front would widen too much).

Soviets had bent the non-prepared defence line (running from Viipuri to Taipale in coast of Ladoga). They still hadn't made an breakthrough, but weren't far from it. Ofcourse within few weeks the spring thaw would had came and significantly hindered operations. Still, by brute force Soviets would had continued their advance, even if it would had been just 100 metres a day. Timoshenko had Stalins promise that casualty numbers would not be asked from him afterwards - so he could had built firm roads through spring thaw from Red Army soldiers dead bodies if needed...

It was the last moment to make peace.

On the long front north of Ladoga till Lapland situation was kinda reversed. In many places Finns had advanced back to their border, and were they hadn't the situation was under Finnish control (save Kollaa). The peace saved one encircled Soviet division from destruction.

There was the option to accept British and French offer to help, but it was correctly estimated that help could not come in time or quantity to make any difference. Also, the motives of that offer weren't secrets to Finns either. Helping Finland was just an excuse for actions directed against Germany. Though, the possibility to have British and French troops (and with them propably Germans) in Scandinavia was not on Soviets interests. This simple operation was in danger to escalate seriously. Soviet Union surely didn't wanted to get involved in WW2 at that point. Finns did had an strong card on British and French offer to get involved (though, it would had been ace of spades - because it would not had saved Finland), but it would had caused a lot of trouble to Soviets.

Diplomacy from the so-called "free World" played little or no role. To Stalin other than power politics had non what so ever meaning (and before nuclear bomb that means - how many divisions they have ??).

So, by early March both Soviet Union and Finland had strong reasons to seek an end to this conflict.


Regards, Mark V

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