Yes indeed, the Soviet legitimate concerns for the safety of Leningrad… In the classic novel
The Unknown Soldier by Väinö Linna on the Continuation War, one of the soldier characters states with sarcasm to his mate, who reminds about territorial violation as they cross the old border:
“Yes, we indeed are the villains when crossing borders… others merely mind their security, when they move the borders!”
The Finns had their equally legitimate concerns for their own security, but history has taught them painful lessons what happens when two parties, unequal in size, have conflicting needs.
How real was then the threat against the USSR from Germany through Finnish territory?
Two excerpts from the Avalon Project website of Yale Law School (the emphasis is mine):
1. The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizsäcker) to German Missions Abroad, Dec 2 1939: “The foreign policy pursued by the Finnish Government has in the last few years stressed the idea of neutrality. It has relied on the Scandinavian states and has treated German-Russian opposition as axiomatic. As a result Finland has avoided any rapprochement with Germany and has even rejected the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany as compromising, even though Finland has a non-aggression pact with Russia. Also in the League of Nations, Finland, in spite of the debt of gratitude, which she owed to Germany for the latter's help in 1918, has never come out for German interests. Foreign Minister Holsti is typical of this point of view and particularly hostile to Germany. Extensive elements in Finland emphasize their economic and ideological orientation in the direction of democratic England. Correspondingly the attitude of most of the organs of the press is out-spokenly unfriendly to us. The platonic sympathy of England has confirmed Finland in her previous attitude and has done the country no good.”
2. The State Secretary in the German Foreign Office (Weizsäcker) to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg), BERLIN, December 6, 1939:
“Supplement to Instruction Poll VI 2651, Item II.
Supplementing telegraphic instruction of December 2, the following additional instruction was issued today to all the important missions:
In conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian conflict, you are requested to make use of the following considerations:
Only a few weeks ago Finland was about to come to an understanding with Russia, which might have been achieved by a prudent Finnish policy. An appeal to the League of Nations by the Finnish Government is the least suitable way of solving the crisis.
There is no doubt that British influence on the Finnish Government-partly operating through Scandinavian capitals-induced the Finnish Government to reject Russian proposals and thereby brought on the present conflict. England's guilt in the Russo-Finnish conflict should be especially emphasized.
Germany is not involved in these events. In conversations, sympathy is to be expressed for the Russian point of view. Please refrain from expressing any sympathy for the Finnish position. End of telegraphic instruction. WEIZSÄCKER”
For a third one, let me quote Ms Pirkko Kanervo, Master of Philosophy, from her paper
Italy and the Finnish Winter War
(For the whole article, see
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 04&start=0 )
3.“Italian relations towards Germany and the Soviet Union during the Winter War
When the Winter War broke out, Italy at once sided with the West and condemned the Soviet attack. Thousands turned out as volunteers. Students demonstrated their sympathy in Rome in front of the Finnish Embassy, while there were hostile demonstrations in front of the Soviet Embassy. The new Soviet Ambassador who had just arrived at Rome had to return to Moscow to no avail, unable to leave his credentials. Italy also called her own Ambassador home from Moscow.
Ciano’s first message to the Finnish Ambassador Mr Eero Järnefelt was that Italy was always against bolshevism, although she could not place herself in the lead of an anti-Soviet crusade. Already during the first days of the war Finland passed a request to Italy to allow pilots offering themselves for volunteers to leave with their aircraft to the aid of Finland. According to Ciano, Finland’s geographic position and the German attitude being unclear made the situation difficult. However he said that in principle Italy was prepared to help Finland just like she had been prepared to help Spain.
Clarity soon emerged on the German attitude. A week had not passed after the outbreak of the Winter War, as the leader of the German Labour Front arrived at Rome, Dr Robert Ley, whose task seems to have been to put the Italians in order in respect to the Winter War. Ley announced that the future of Finland did not interest the Third Reich. Finland’s attitude towards Germany had not been friendly, she had never related well with Germany, and neither had she ever been grateful for the great help she received while the independence of the country was being created. Ley reported the Führer having said that neither should Italy have reasons for sympathy towards the Nordic Countries and reminded about the sanctions of the League of Nations against Italy during the Abessinian War. These were the arguments that also Hitler and Ribbentrop later offered to the Italians. The importance of Ley’s visit is illustrated by the fact that when he returned from Rome there was Hitler’s adjutant meeting him at the Berlin station, taking him straight away to the Reich Chancery to report on the outcome of his visit. The Italians, however, did not heed Ley’s advice but continued supporting Finland. Between the Axis countries emerged a serious conflict also on the attitude towards the Soviet Union.”
So, in light of the above, does it sound likely that democratic Finland had offered herself to Germany as a staging area for an offensive against the USSR in the 1940’s?
Hardly, provided that Stalin had never himself attacked Finland in the Winter War. In guarding her own interests, Finland would have without hesitation turned down such German proposals if they had ever been made, and like they later proved in the Lapland War, Finns were quite capable of fighting the Germans as well if needed.
Stalin was either paranoid in his obsession of the Western capitalists plotting to invade the Soviet Union – at least through Finnish territory – or he knew himself that he only used the security concerns as a pretext for expansionism to take Finland back into the Empire.
Of course he also did demonstrate a degree of political realism in understanding how quickly 180-degree turns can take place in foreign policy, like Operation Barbarossa later was to prove. But Finland's decision to join it in 1941 does not justify "preventing" it in 1939 -- the cause of the Continuation War was precisely the Winter War, and nothing else.
