Let us examine some of the communist “evidence”:
At the 6th Congress of the Communist International in 1928, the Finnish delegate Yrjo Sirola emphasises the danger of Finland being used as a base by one or other great power for an attack on the Soviet Union:
"Comrades, little Finland is of considerable importance in the war preparations of the imperialists against the Soviet Union. Its frontier is only 40 kilometres distant from Leningrad. .. . ..
Finland's orientation upon England is well known. Considerable sums of British capital are invested in Finland. England has taken a direct part in the reorganisation of Finland's army and navy. . . .
A vicious (anti-Soviet -- Ed.) press campaign goes on uninterruptedly".
(Y.F.Sirola: Speech in Discussion on the War Danger, 6th Congress of Communist International, in: 'International Press Correspondence', Volume 8, No. 61 (11 September 1928); p. 1,081).
Anything surprising in that a Finnish communist uses his imagination trying to impress his comrades? Investments from England are hardly military preparations yet. The bit of “England’s direct part in the reorganisation of Finland's army and navy” were true to the extent that the young Republic requested advice from various Swedish, British, French, and German military experts in building the national defence, at times heeding their advice, at others rejecting it, and sent Finnish officers to receive training in foreign military academies. Beyond that, it is BS. The “press campaign” was simply a lie: in reality the press was applying normal Western journalistic principles in reporting about the USSR. Of course, the Civil War a decade earlier had an effect on the editors’ views, as expressed by each independent newspaper of a free press (with the exception of no communist press, as the party was then illegal).
Yes, imagination can play tricks in the mind of a hard core communist in a closed society, with Finnish communists and Soviet agents as the only source to feed information. The insinuated “preparations” unfortunately are never specifically described.A similar threatening picture was drawn by the Soviet Marxist-Leninist Andrey Zhdanov at the 8th Congress of Soviets on 29 November 1936:
"If in some of these little countries -- for example, Finland - feelings of hostility to the USSR are being kindled by larger and more adventurist countries, and preparations are being made to make their territory available for aggressive action by fascist powers, in the long run it is these little countries which alone will be the losers."
(A. Zhdanov: Speech at 8th Congress of Soviets, in: J. Degras (Ed.):
'Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy', Volume 3; London; 1953; p. 226).
Yes, fears can be very real, though their origin can be between one’s ears.Fred Singleton, in his 'A Short History of Finland', points out that:
"The Soviet leaders shared the fears which all Russian leaders have felt since the time of Peter the Great -- namely, that a hostile power might use Finland as a base for an attack upon Leningrad. In the 18th century the potential enemy was Sweden. In the 1930s the threat came from Germany".
(F. Singleton: 'A Short History of Finland'; Cambridge; 1989; p. 128).
The Soviet-Finnish Negotiations (1939)
Undisputable realism, no doubt.Stalin explained to Paasikivi that the motive behind the Soviet proposals was purely defensive:
"It is not the fault of either of us that geographical circumstances are as they are. We must be able to bar entrance to the Gulf of Finland. . . . .
Once a hostile fleet is in the Gulf, the Gulf can no longer be defended.
You ask what power might attack us. England or Germany. We are on good terms with Germany now, but everything in this world may change.”
Has its sound military logic, doesn’t it? But why does the writer never mention, what happened to Estonia with the newly acquired bases in 1940?The essence of the Soviet demands was aptly summarised by Lundin:
"The Soviet leaders were determined, above all, to do two things.
They wished to push the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus back a substantial distance from its closest approach to Leningrad. . . .
They also wished to establish a naval base on the Finnish coast at the mouth of the Gulf, opposite the newly acquired bases in Estonia, so that any hostile shipping coming up the Gulf of Finland would have to run the gauntlet of a cross fire".
And so on, and so on…It was at this point time that Stalin made a considerable concession, suggesting that if the Finns were adamant that Hanko was not negotiable, perhaps some other small island nearby could be leased:
"When we said once more that Hanko could not be discussed, to our great surprise Stalin proposed an alternative -- the group of islands to the east of it".
(V. Tanner: op. cit.; p. 67).
"Towards the end of the negotiations, Stalin asked whether, instead of Hanko, the Finns would cede three small islands nearby".
(C. L. Lundin: op. cit.; p. 53).
"Stabbing his finger at a spot on the map of Southern Finland, he asked:
'Do you need these islands?'
Little red circles had been drawn around three small islands . . . just east of the Hanko Peninsula. He was willing to settle for these if it really was impossible for Finland to part with Hanko itself".
At least every true communist must believe Stalin was willing to settle for these – and of course true believers must acknowledge that there were very good reasons for (exceptionally) not settling for bases only in the Baltic countries.
It is equally clear that the occupation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were also no threats to these respective countries, but only served the same noble purpose. Unfortunately, the later fates of civilians and soldiers alike in these countries are not covered in this brilliant testimony.It is clear that the Soviet government 's proposals were neither a threat to Finland's independence nor based on territorial expansion, but were designed solely to increase the Soviet Union's defensive capacity.
Again, these “one or more foreign powers” are not identified, neither is the nature of their “backing” explained.The Finnish government’s rejection of the Soviet proposals and its categorical rejection of the compromises proposed by Moscow demonstrated that it was being backed by one or more foreign powers to cling to a boundary which represented a serious threat to the security of the Soviet Union.
The quote from this political commentator, whose name is first misspelled, fails to explain the aggression and menace that 3.8 million people represent to a neighbouring 50-fold population, and for some reason, the numerous commentators with contrary opinions are not cited here at all.The Finnish political commentator Martti Turola, has admitted:
"It simply cannot be overlooked that Finland pursued a dangerously aggressive, menacing foreign policy prior to the war".
(N. Turtola: 'Guilty or Innocent? Approaches to the "'inter War in Research and Memoirs', in: 'Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy: 1990'; Helsinki; 1990; p. 45).
An impressive, accurate account on the Finnish mobilization follows – to give the illusion of credibility.
The criminal artillery fire only came from Soviet artillery pieces, which is omitted from the commie version of history writing. There was no Finnish artillery within reach of Mainila village, where this incident was staged.On 28 November, Molotov handed a further Note to the Finnish Minister stating that, in view of the conduct of the Finnish government, the Soviet government considered the non-aggression pact between the two countries signed in 1932 to be null and void:
"In concentrating a large number of regular troops in the immediate vicinity of Leningrad and subjecting that important vital centre of the USSR to a direct threat, the Finnish Government have committed a hostile act against the USSR which is incompatible with the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded between the two States. The refusal of the Finnish Government, after the criminal artillery fire directed at the Soviet troops , to withdraw their troops a distance of 20-25 km., shows that the Finnish Government desire to persist in their hostile attitude towards the USSR. . . . In consequence, the Government of the USSR are obliged to state that they consider themselves, as from today, released from the obligations ensuing from the Treaty of Non-Aggression concluded between the USSR and Finland".
No evidence of such continuing attacks exists elsewhere than in Soviet propaganda.On the following day, 29 November, Molotov handed a further Note to Yrjo-Koskinen complaining that Finnish attacks on Soviet troops were continuing and effectively breaking off diplomatic relations with Finland:
"Attacks on Soviet troops by Finnish troops are known to be continuing, not only on the Karelian Isthmus, but also at other parts of the frontier between the USSR and Finland. The Government of the USSR can no longer tolerate such a situation. As a result of the situation thus created, . . . the Government of the USSR . . . find themselves compelled to recall their political and economic representatives from Finland".
Now, here comes a tidbit:
And how the hell did Sir Winston come to know that, if this quote is accurate? Was he an eyewitness, or perhaps he heard the story…. from whom?? The Finns certainly must have sent undisciplined idiots to the spot, just to cause something like this…!The above version of the facts -- that the Finnish armed forces were the instigators of the frontier incidents which had occurred -- was confirmed by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in February 1945:
"The Finnish war began in the following way. . . . Some Russian frontier guards were shot at by the Finns and killed. . . . The frontier guard detachment complained to the Red Army troops. . . . Moscow was asked for instructions. These contained the order to return the fire". (W. S. Churchill: 'The Second World War', Volume 6: 'Triumph and Tragedy'; London; 1954;.
Surprise, surprise! What an impressive group of witnesses! And they still keep doing it in 2004…More than twenty-five years after Stalin's death, most Soviet sources agree that the war was initiated by Finnish forces.
For example, the 'Great Soviet Encyclopaedia', published in the 1980s, asserts:
Indeed, this is the very reason, the hidden origin of the Winter War! Indeed, it was an example of an a) Just war, an unselfish attempt at liberating the whole of Finland from the slavery of Finns themselves, to replace it with a far better slavery. Anything else, even truth, is entirely irrelevant when such noble aims are pursued by the chosen ones, and the true believers in commie propaganda will persistently keep repeating this enigmatic and hidden secret, beyond all conventional wisdom, till the end of the world.Marxist-Leninists maintain that some wars are just, while some are unjust:
"The Bolsheviks held that there are two kinds of war:
a) Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate people from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism, and;
b) Unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations."
('History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union'; Moscow; 1939.