The document prepared for Finnish unconditional surrender?

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Harri
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#31

Post by Harri » 25 Oct 2004, 23:52

Calm down, gentlemen! 8)

No wonder Finnish Army was developed during the summer. I just red from a newspaper that surprisingly Finnish Army was in much better condition in September 1944 than it had been in June despite of the hard battles in June and July. I think these mentioned hard peace terms were one reason for this odd phenomenon (usully combat makes armies weaker). Finns could continue fighting and even stiffen the resistance but Soviets who hurried to Berlin couldn't receive equal supplement and reinforcements.

And maybe also the Ribbentrop pact was not as useless as has been stated? By September Finland had received lot more new weapons not yet used in combat and deliveries continued all the time. The date for armistice was at least partly selected according to known new weapon deliveries.

---

If we talk about the "Juha's documents" we can speculate forever what could have happened if these peace terms had been accepted. One thing is although clear: Finland would have been occupied by the Red Army. That would have meant that at least all members of Civil Guard had been sent to Gulag or executed. Stalin said that personally.

Although it is unclear if Finland had become similar satellite to Czechoslovakia or if we had had the fate of the Baltic States to me the latter one would have been more likely. Before 1940 USSR wanted to attach Finland to USSR. What would have changed that policy? Something must have been happened in the summer 1944 after these peace terms were rejected. Why exactly? That is what we still don't know for sure.

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#32

Post by Mikko H. » 26 Oct 2004, 07:52

No wonder Finnish Army was developed during the summer. I just red from a newspaper that surprisingly Finnish Army was in much better condition in September 1944 than it had been in June despite of the hard battles in June and July. I think these mentioned hard peace terms were one reason for this odd phenomenon (usully combat makes armies weaker). Finns could continue fighting and even stiffen the resistance but Soviets who hurried to Berlin couldn't receive equal supplement and reinforcements.
Harri, if you already haven't, read Jokisipilä's recent Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia?. He comes pretty much to the same conclusion regarding the strenght of the FDF, and how he comes to that conclusion makes very interesting reading.
Although it is unclear if Finland had become similar satellite to Czechoslovakia or if we had had the fate of the Baltic States to me the latter one would have been more likely. Before 1940 USSR wanted to attach Finland to USSR. What would have changed that policy? Something must have been happened in the summer 1944 after these peace terms were rejected. Why exactly? That is what we still don't know for sure.
Kimmo Rentola in his Kenen joukoissa seisot? points out that since the Continuation War began, the Soviet instructions to the Finnish communists dropped the aim of making Finland a Soviet republic (a part of the USSR), and instead began stressing the Finnish independence (against 'hitlerites'). Of course this doens't mean that this line was necessarily still in force in 1944, but it shows that Stalin wasn't too dogmatic in these questions. And in the Soviet parlance 'independence' could naturally also mean a Sovietized Finland.

(BTW, I'm going to answer that personal e-mail of yours soon enough, it's just that I try to have something more to say than just 'OK, yeah'. :) )


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#33

Post by Hanski » 26 Oct 2004, 08:17

Harri wrote: No wonder Finnish Army was developed during the summer. I just red from a newspaper that surprisingly Finnish Army was in much better condition in September 1944 than it had been in June despite of the hard battles in June and July. I think these mentioned hard peace terms were one reason for this odd phenomenon (usully combat makes armies weaker). Finns could continue fighting and even stiffen the resistance but Soviets who hurried to Berlin couldn't receive equal supplement and reinforcements.
This is true, but of course only for the time frame from September 1944 to the spring of 1945. Thereafter, when Germany was finally defeated, and if no armistice had been made between Finland and the U.S.S.R., we can speculate the Red Army could have concentrated all its strength against Finland (the last "Axis" country remaining at war in Europe!?), and even without the Lapland War and with the remaining German troops still fighting on along with the Finns, there would have been no doubt of the outcome.

Of course, after June 1944 Stalin would have had the option of refusing from further negotiations with the Finns ever, and pushed his plans to their final end. But I believe he was pragmatic enough rather than philanthropic in not choosing this strategy -- the U.S.S.R. had suffered enormously in the war, and Finnish industrial output plus the international status of the Soviet Union outweighed his possible desire to see it through with the frustrating Finns.

When speculating on "what if" scenarios, had the June 1944 unconditional surrender terms been implemented, let us not forget that Stalin's Soviet Union had a built-in system of mass executions and deportations of its own population, who were massacred by the millions in practice, not only in theory. All the logistics and infrastructure for this was in place, the terror was in place, and there was nobody to resist it, had Stalin chosen to use it against the Finns in occupied Finland.

Then again, in principle it is quite possible to go to great lengths in preparing to do something, and to cover it up from the world, but yet to abstain from doing it...

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#34

Post by varjag » 26 Oct 2004, 13:07

'The frustrating Finns' that Hanski reffered to may well have been a deciding factor in Stalins deliberations. He is reported to have made a comment to that effect to Churchill - suggesting that he recognised the inflated 'costs' of turning Finland into another vasall, let alone Soviet Republic...'perhaps they are best left alone...'
The Finnish republic was a very young creation and one cannot, but express admiration, for it's diplomacy in very difficult maneuvers in troubled waters. But as Mannerheim wrote - the army never failed - and it gave the diplomats 'their hour'.

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#35

Post by Juha Tompuri » 26 Oct 2004, 13:22

Hanski wrote:Can you tell us how this document became known in 1999 and how is its authenticity ensured?
Juha Tompuri wrote:They were found by Martti Turtola at Russian Foreign Office, MID, archives.
In the engineer book there is a mention that Docent Martti Turtola found them "last october" (1998 ?). The article about the secret document is a copy from either Helsingin Sanomat or Ilta-Sanomat newspapers, the author E. Vankka didn't remember which.
At the authenticity matter, I trust Docent Turtolas ability to estimate these kind of things.

Jari wrote: So, what do I think would have happened in the alternative scenario? Most likely Hertta Kuusinen's famous words "the road of Czechoslovakia is also the road of Finland" would then have proven true, Finland would have become a "People's Democracy" and Warsaw Pact member (and bloody uprisings, too). Had Stalin really, REALLY thought it to be worth all the trouble, he could have annexed all of Europe east of Elbe. That just wasn't necessary, nor desirable.
If there was a plan of a political solution by a Communist coup, why was it then necessary to demand the internment of all members of the Civic Guard, for example, and handing over every imaginable item of military hardware? This option remained available even without unconditional surrender of Finland, and like we know, it was attempted but failed to gain popular support.
True, Hanski.
If the unconditional surrender would have taken place, we would have had a Soviet organised government already.
Most likely led by Hertta Kuusinen's father.
Mikko wrote:Kimmo Rentola in his Kenen joukoissa seisot? points out that since the Continuation War began, the Soviet instructions to the Finnish communists dropped the aim of making Finland a Soviet republic (a part of the USSR), and instead began stressing the Finnish independence (against 'hitlerites'). Of course this doens't mean that this line was necessarily still in force in 1944, but it shows that Stalin wasn't too dogmatic in these questions. And in the Soviet parlance 'independence' could naturally also mean a Sovietized Finland.
A stupid question...are there documents availlble showing direct Soviet plans to make Finland a Soviet republic during WWII or after?

Regards, Juha

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Jari
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#36

Post by Jari » 26 Oct 2004, 18:36

Hanski wrote:

If there was a plan of a political solution by a Communist coup, why was it then necessary to demand the internment of all members of the Civic Guard, for example, and handing over every imaginable item of military hardware? This option remained available even without unconditional surrender of Finland, and like we know, it was attempted but failed to gain popular support.
Why not? Moscow may not have understood the scale or the nature of the Suojeluskunta organization. If they perceived it as a kind of "fascist paramilitary", like German SA, there is nothing surprising about wanting to intern them - Germany could have used them to start an uprising. Germans would of course have loved to use any such Finnish fascist organizations to take the country over in autumn 1944, but Suojeluskunta wasn't that. (Neither was Lotta Svärde...) I don't get your point about disarmament, though. What is so strange about that if Finland was meant to surrender?

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#37

Post by Harri » 26 Oct 2004, 19:45

Mikko H. wrote:Harri, if you already haven't, read Jokisipilä's recent Aseveljiä vai liittolaisia?. He comes pretty much to the same conclusion regarding the strenght of the FDF, and how he comes to that conclusion makes very interesting reading.
I think it was a review of that book I red. I have not red the book yet but I have to try to find it.
Mikko H. wrote:Kimmo Rentola in his Kenen joukoissa seisot? points out that since the Continuation War began, the Soviet instructions to the Finnish communists dropped the aim of making Finland a Soviet republic (a part of the USSR), and instead began stressing the Finnish independence (against 'hitlerites'). Of course this doens't mean that this line was necessarily still in force in 1944, but it shows that Stalin wasn't too dogmatic in these questions. And in the Soviet arlance 'independence' could naturally also mean a Sovietized Finland.
Yes, I agree.

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#38

Post by Hanski » 26 Oct 2004, 20:19

Jari wrote: Moscow may not have understood the scale or the nature of the Suojeluskunta organization. If they perceived it as a kind of "fascist paramilitary", like German SA, there is nothing surprising about wanting to intern them - Germany could have used them to start an uprising. Germans would of course have loved to use any such Finnish fascist organizations to take the country over in autumn 1944, but Suojeluskunta wasn't that. (Neither was Lotta Svärde...)
This is indeed an interesting question: did the Soviets really genuinely misunderstand the nature of Suojeluskunta, or did they understand it quite correctly, but pretend, just to get an excuse to abolish it (and persecute its members, had the paragraph 32 of the draft document been implemented)?

During all the years at war 1939-44, they had ample opportunities to obtain truthful intelligence about Suojeluskunta by captured documents, interrogation of POWs and the like. Any objective and honest person could have seen from all the evidence it was merely a voluntary organization to strengthen national defence and to support the regular Army, and not an instrument of any political movement.

But was the strengthening of Finnish national defence as such a "Fascist" goal from the Soviet prespective, or was this propagandist label deliberately used against better knowledge to justify false allegations? Was the very existence of an independent Finland a "Fascist" phenomenon to the Soviets? How sincerely did they believe in their own propaganda?
Jari wrote: I don't get your point about disarmament, though. What is so strange about that if Finland was meant to surrender?
I am certainly no expert in common practices followed in implementing procedures of unconditional surrender, and it would be interesting to compare them, if they are available for the surrendering countries of WWII.

Paragraph 15 decrees handing over of "in its entirety the infantry armament, ..." (plus all conceivable heavy armament). Why was the former demanded, if there was an unsettled, chaotic political situation, with men returning from years of bloody war, and yet the Finns were responsibile for maintaining order in their unoccupied territories (see paragraph 11)? One would expect at least the Military Police to be allowed to keep their weapons to be able to use force if needed against elements generating unstability in the society (compare the situation with present-day Iraq). It is easy to understand why heavy weapons should be handed over, but why the need of such absolute disarmament of even infantry rifles, when the heavily armed Red Army could have overwhelmed any serious challenge against them anyway?

Is it strange or not, depends if orderly demobilization is expected (which would speak for gradual and relative reduction of firepower in planned order), or whether unrest was even hoped for, to prove the Finns had failed in fulfilling the surrendering terms and to justify ruthless Soviet reaction thereafter.

To use a metaphor: it is normal and all right if a policeman stops you and demands to see your driving license, but if on top of that he also handcuffs, blindfolds, and gags you, ordering you to lie down, it becomes strange. In my opinion, the demanded Soviet surrender terms were far exaggerated to merely guarantee a peaceful surrender and occupation for a limited period of time -- much less would have sufficed in the prevailing circumstances of 1944.

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#39

Post by Hanski » 27 Oct 2004, 05:56

varjag wrote:'The frustrating Finns' that Hanski reffered to may well have been a deciding factor in Stalins deliberations. He is reported to have made a comment to that effect to Churchill - suggesting that he recognised the inflated 'costs' of turning Finland into another vasall, let alone Soviet Republic...'perhaps they are best left alone...'
The Finnish republic was a very young creation and one cannot, but express admiration, for it's diplomacy in very difficult maneuvers in troubled waters. But as Mannerheim wrote - the army never failed - and it gave the diplomats 'their hour'.
I subscribe to the above. And after the war, Stalin himself publicly paid tribute to the Finnish Army, drinking a toast to it with a Finnish delegation.

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#40

Post by Mikko H. » 27 Oct 2004, 07:30

During all the years at war 1939-44, they had ample opportunities to obtain truthful intelligence about Suojeluskunta by captured documents, interrogation of POWs and the like. Any objective and honest person could have seen from all the evidence it was merely a voluntary organization to strengthen national defence and to support the regular Army, and not an instrument of any political movement.
Just a point: history of the Soviet (and other) intelligence services is full of examples how correct and relevant intelligence was interpreted by the higher-ups to suit their ideological preconceptions (or twisted by subordinates to suit what they knew were their superiors' preconceptions). Classic example is how Stalin before 22 June 1941 dismissed the evidence pointing to a massive German attack.

Certainly the way Finnish POWs were interrogated indicates that the Soviets (apart from the tactical and strategic information of immediate relevance) were more concerned in strenghtening their ideological misconceptions of the Finnish society than receiving pertinent information of the conditions in the Finnish home front.

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#41

Post by Hanski » 27 Oct 2004, 20:58

I had the opportunity to listen to docent Rentola's presentation today, titled "Finland's road to peace". It clarified a lot what we have been discussing on this thread.

Those ruthless terms of Finland's unconditional surrender that we have presented and discussed here (which are also included in a biography of President Risto Ryti by Martti Turtola) had actually been prepared already in 1943.

At the Tehran conference between the Allied in February 1944, all the Allied powers agreed on minimum terms to be demanded of countries fighting on the Axis side. President Roosevelt wanted to take Finland and Rumania out of the Axis side and get Sweden and Turkey to fight against Germany. The Western Allies generally preferred the Winter War borders to be restored for Finland, but the provision was left that if the events of war so developed, any Axis side country could also be occupied, in Finland's case it might fall to the U.S.S.R. altogether.

There were initial contacts prospecting for peace in Stockholm between the Finnish main negotiator Paasikivi and the Soviet Ambassador, Madame Kollontay, on three occasions in February 1944, which then led to Paasikivi and Enckell traveling to Moscow in March to negotiate with Molotov.

The terms Molotov presented were formally those agreed among the Allied in Tehran, including a war reparations bill of $ 600 million, which was calculated on the estimated performance of Finnish national economy (and not "the damage inflicted on the Soviet Union", which was the official explanation). Finland rejected those terms, which then was regarded as folly by the Western Allies, but the matter is not that simple: there were extra terms for the deal in store, added by the Soviets, that could have made the outcome much worse than what it eventually became.

In May 1944 Stalin got to know via his agents in Washington that the Americans had begun considering Finland's fate in earnest. Stalin became busy to get ahead of them: in order to avoid an inter-Allied conflict on the issue of Finland with the USA, he hurried to launch his strategic offensive to make Finland collapse before the Americans had fixed their viewpoints.

After the strategic offensive of June 1944 had got underway on the Karelian Isthmus, there was of course a most nervous atmosphere in Helsinki, especially after Viipuri had fallen in Soviet hands. Stalin was already quoted saying "the Finns are not the same Finns any more". But the Soviet intelligence had exaggerated the chaos and despair of the Finns out of proportion, which then led Stalin to present his brief demand on unconditional surrender via Mme Kollontai on 23 June 1944. Finland then rejected the demand, which made Stalin furious, and he complained to the Americans "the Finns had betrayed him" although it was actually his own blunder, based on false intelligence, and the Finns proved him wrong with their resilience in battle.

When June turned to July, Moscow dropped the demand, and a commission led by Marshal Voroshilov was assigned to draft a new document, which was completed by 29 July, and kept secret from the British, contrary to the principles of Allied co-operation.

Voroshilov's proposal included harsh terms, including further territorial demands following the peace of 1793 frontiers, moving the border westwards from the present-day border, to make a population of 250 000 more Finns lose their homes, but after a "test offensive" with two ill-fated divisions Stalin did not push it, as he had to rush for Berlin now.

The proposal finally leading to armistice in August was made along the lines the Allies had agreed upon in Tehran, with some extras added like the lease (= occupation) of Porkkala, and abolishing the "fascist" organizations.

To sum up, the afore quoted terms of unconditional surrender were prepared much earlier, and used opportunistically after a strategic push hoping that Finns would accept them in despair, while in reality the desperation and chaos were not that bad as Soviet intelligence had led Stalin to believe. The detailed document was thus never presented to the Finns in 1944 (instead of being hidden from Finnish publicity for political reasons, like I falsely concluded), and although the document is truly authentic, it was soon abandoned to archives only by the Soviets, after it had become clear the Finns were not ready to surrender unconditionally despite the best efforts of the RKKA.

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#42

Post by Harri » 27 Oct 2004, 22:56

Very interesting, Hanski.

I'm now reading a book "Salaisen sodan sivut - Tiedustelua, vakoilua ja salatoimintaa jatkosodassa" [Pages of Secret War - Reconnaissance, Espionage and Secret Activity in Continuation War] by various authors published by Maanpuolustukorkeakoulu, Sotahistorian laitos, 2003
[Military Academy - Institute of Military History]. There is an article written by Kimmo Rentola called "Residenttimme Ilmoittaa...- Tiedustelun vaikutus Stalinin päätöksiin talvisodassa" [Our Resident Informs...-Intelligence's Effect on Stalin's Decisions in Winter War]. It seems that what you have heard handled much the same in Continuation War. I suggest reading this too.

According to this article after the Winter War Stalin blamed Intelligence in feeding wrong information on Finland and the plans of Great Britain and France. I doubt Intelligence could have done that same mistake once again in 1944? No, in 1944 Soviets must have had much better information of the situation on Finland than in 1939. If they knew most German plans and groupings there is no need to believe Finnish ones would have been any more "in safe" in 1944.

That chaos Hanski mentioned didn't last for many days after the start of the Soviet attack. Finnish Radio Intelligence solved the code keys of Soviet encrypted messages within a few days and after that Finns could read all Soviet orders almost in real time. That is one of the main reasons why our resistance became much harder. Red Army had still enough power to smash Finland any day it wanted. Why they didn't do that is a really good question. What changed the minds in Moscow? Finnish resistance? Western Allies? Finland was anyway one of the few enemies of USSR they didn't occupy. The other ones were Italy and Japan.

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#43

Post by Sami_K » 27 Oct 2004, 23:06

First of all Hanski, damn good notes!
:)

Hanski wrote:...but after a "test offensive" with two ill-fated divisions Stalin did not push it, as he had to rush for Berlin now.
For the others, it's the battle of Ilomantsi, of which he was talking about.

Note that according to docent Kilin's research, the Red Army units along the front in the Karelian Isthmus as well as along the U-asema, remained ready to continue the offensive, in case the Ilomantsi operation succeeded. Thus battle of Ilomantsi does deserve respect as a "deciding battle".

Cheers,
Sami

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#44

Post by Juha Tompuri » 27 Oct 2004, 23:35

Sami_K wrote:
Note that according to docent Kilin's research, the Red Army units along the front in the Karelian Isthmus as well as along the U-asema, remained ready to continue the offensive
...to try again to continue... ?

Regards, Juha

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#45

Post by Harri » 27 Oct 2004, 23:55

Yes, the truth is that many Soviet divisions were in bad condition and needed refreshment and supplements. I think there would have been no immediate chances for any bigger attack north from Lake Ladoga.

Additionally some of the Soviet divisions were partly equipped with obsolete equipment (for example the ones at Ilomantsi). After suffering heavy losses the actual performance of many Soviet divisions was rather low.

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