Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?

[Nenonen]

The word lost here could mean destroyed. If I have understood correctly, a military unit is considered destroyed when it has lost a certain amount of it's living force dead or wounded. So lost doesn't necessarily mean captured or killed to the last man. Im my opinion several Russian units were destroyed in a sense that they ceased to be effective fighting units. They had to be replenished and according to Tapio Tiihonen's doctoral thesis they were replenished with old men or wounded men who hadn't yet recovered from their wounds. So even the replenished XXX Guard's Army Corps in July was only a shadow of what it had been in the beginning of the Russian major assault.

[Harri]

But the inclusion of sick and wounded into that number overstates the effect. What were Finnish total casualties, including sick and wounded?

Total Soviet combat losses (KIA, WIA, MIA, no sick included) in the summer 1944 more than 120.000 men (figure known today but not necessarily "the ultimate truth") of which about 30.000 KIA. Finnish total combat losses about 56.500 men of which 14.800 KIA. Finnish total combat losses in Karelian Isthmus were 41.700 men.

There is no overstating because these figures are accepted both by Russians and Finns. Soviet losses are based on Finnish and Soviet/Russian sources presented by Russian researcher Professor Yuri Kilin.

So, which figures are exxaggerated?

[Gregory Deych]

The "30 divisions destroyed" figures.

[Harri]

Total losses 120.000 men / 30 divisions = - 4.000 men / division. In other ways 120.000 men lost / 6.000 men in division = 20 divisions lost all their men. Much closer to your four divisions I think... :roll:

[Gregory Deych]

That's because you keep confusing "irrecoverable losses" with "total casualties". Do you need me to explain the difference?

[Tero]

By Gregory Deych

]That's because you keep confusing "irrecoverable losses" with "total casualties". Do you need me to explain the difference?

You seem to be hung up on the definition of destroyed. Does it mean IYO annihilated ?

If the total losses amount to the entire complement of 30 divisions are the divisions still combat worthy or not ?

Your guestions about the irrevocable losses vs total casualties is immaterial and beside the point since the irrevocable losses are KIA/POW/DOW/MIA and the total casualties includes also the WIA. It is however the number of total casualties which determines when a division is rendered uncombat worthy. To us that equals destroyed since they could not continue combat operations against us (or anybody for that matter) before they had been rotated back for refit.

[Tero]

By Gregory Deych

]That's because you keep confusing "irrecoverable losses" with "total casualties". Do you need me to explain the difference?

You seem to be hung up on the definition of destroyed. Does it mean IYO annihilated ?

If the total losses amount to the entire complement of 30 divisions are the divisions still combat worthy or not ?

Your guestions about the irrevocable losses vs total casualties is immaterial and beside the point since the irrevocable losses are KIA/POW/DOW/MIA and the total casualties includes also the WIA. It is however the number of total casualties which determines when a division is rendered uncombat worthy. To us that equals destroyed since they could not continue combat operations against us (or anybody for that matter) before they had been rotated back for refit.

[Gregory Deych]

You seem to be hung up on the definition of destroyed. Does it mean IYO annihilated ?

If the total losses amount to the entire complement of 30 divisions are the divisions still combat worthy or not ?

Apparently so - the Leningrad and Karelian fronts were not "combat incapable" at the end of July 1944.

Your guestions about the irrevocable losses vs total casualties is immaterial and beside the point since the irrevocable losses are KIA/POW/DOW/MIA and the total casualties includes also the WIA. It is however the number of total casualties which determines when a division is rendered uncombat worthy. To us that equals destroyed since they could not continue combat operations against us (or anybody for that matter) before they had been rotated back for refit.

Not necessarily. As an example, let us say that a 5000 strong division suffers 2000 total casualties over 2 months time. It does not mean that at the end of the month it's strength is 3000. Of those 2000 casualties, perhaps 600 are irrecoverable losses , the rest are WIA and sick. The strength of the division would probably hover around 4500-4000 mark, as wounded and sick are rehabilitated and returned into front line.

[Tero]

Gregory Deych

Apparently so - the Leningrad and Karelian fronts were not "combat incapable" at the end of July 1944.

Why do you insist on talking about the fronts and not the troops allocated for these specific operations ?

The Leningrad Front troops allocated for the Vyborg operation had lost their capability to conduct succesful offensive operations by mid July. STAVKA and LF troops were pulled back and the frontline was manned with fortified zone units. The Karelian Front troops allocated for the Petrozavodsk operation had lost their capability to conduct succesful offensive operations by mid August after two divisions were beaten back (with significant casualties and loss of all heavy weaponry) by the Finnish troops.

Not necessarily. As an example, let us say that a 5000 strong division suffers 2000 total casualties over 2 months time. It does not mean that at the end of the month it's strength is 3000. Of those 2000 casualties, perhaps 600 are irrecoverable losses , the rest are WIA and sick. The strength of the division would probably hover around 4500-4000 mark, as wounded and sick are rehabilitated and returned into front line.

Yes. But the realities of the operations in the Isthmus were: the divisions advanced 100 km in 10 days and were engaged in several fierce delaying engagements and then spent the rest of the time (from the fall of Viipurin in June 20th until ~July 15th when the attacks were stopped) pounding their heads on the Finnish defences. This means that the notion that two month period for total casualties is absolutely faulty since the divisions did not see the casualties inflicted steadily over that period. Instead they were lighter for the first 10 days and when the breakthrough attacks started the divisions expended their living force trying to break through (DUH ! ). Nor were the casualties inflicted steadily across the frontline. The RKKA shifted the schwehrpunct of the attack three times (Tali-Ihantala, the bay of Viipuri and Äyräpää-Vuosalmi) in an effort to break the defences. This means that the three prongs of the attack suffered heavy casualties consecutively and AFAIK there were no significant lateral movement of the attacking troops from one prong to the other.

[Gregory Deych]

Gregory Deych

Apparently so - the Leningrad and Karelian fronts were not "combat incapable" at the end of July 1944.

Why do you insist on talking about the fronts and not the troops allocated for these specific operations ?

Because by and large, most of the front troops were engaged in the operations. Neither front had very many reserves.

Yes. But the realities of the operations in the Isthmus were: the divisions advanced 100 km in 10 days and were engaged in several fierce delaying engagements and then spent the rest of the time (from the fall of Viipurin in June 20th until ~July 15th when the attacks were stopped) pounding their heads on the Finnish defences. This means that the notion that two month period for total casualties is absolutely faulty since the divisions did not see the casualties inflicted steadily over that period. Instead they were lighter for the first 10 days and when the breakthrough attacks started the divisions expended their living force trying to break through (DUH ! ). Nor were the casualties inflicted steadily across the frontline. The RKKA shifted the schwehrpunct of the attack three times (Tali-Ihantala, the bay of Viipuri and Äyräpää-Vuosalmi) in an effort to break the defences. This means that the three prongs of the attack suffered heavy casualties consecutively and AFAIK there were no significant lateral movement of the attacking troops from one prong to the other.

You've just reconfirmed my point - while the focus of the offensive shifted, the other areas of the front replaced their casualties from the wounded soldiers, returning from the hospitals.

[Tero]

By Gregory Deych

Because by and large, most of the front troops were engaged in the operations. Neither front had very many reserves.

I've been under the impression the Guards units were STAVKA. Like many other formations taking part in the operations in the Isthmus.

You've just reconfirmed my point - while the focus of the offensive shifted, the other areas of the front replaced their casualties from the wounded soldiers, returning from the hospitals.

Please check the starting dates EDIT and the forces involved in each EDIT of the different attacks before you decide your perception, assumptions and assements of the situation are the only correct ones.

Besides, where and when did they suffer the amount of non-irrevocable casualties in such numbers that they could replenish units conducting ongoing breakthrough attacks ? The Vyborg operation was planned ahead and all the units taking part were stocked up and with full complement.

[JariL]

If we are to believe Tapio Tiihonen Leningrad front was supplied with fresh troops before the attack. It was a standard practise to allocate men in their prime (militarily speaking) into the break through units. This means men from age classes 1920-25. Losses however, were replaced with older men and naturally those wounded that could be quickly returned into service. Thus even with new reserves coming in, the fighting power of the units deteriorated steadily.

There was also an other importnat factor that contributed to deteriorating fighting power. When the operation started Soviet troops were told that they were going to drive the facists out of Soviet Union also in the Isthmus and that Finns only fought because Germans forced them. This made the Red Army soldiers expect to fight also German troops not only Finns. When they advanced along the Isthmus, they did not encounter any Germans only Finns. And in many cases Finnish units fought stubbornly. At the same time Red Army soldiers noticed that buildings etc. in the area were not Russian and realised that the enemy was fighting on his own soil -events of Winter War were not generally known and even if they were the surroundings still told their story. Both of the above started to errode the morale of the troops. In Tali-Ihantala one sign of this was that the ratio between killed and wounded was 1:6 or 1:7 when it is usually around to 1:3. There were complaints that the men were "voting", that is lifted their hand or leg under artillery fire in order to get a wound and get out of the front. This was not the usual behaviour of a victorious army.

Armour units and air force were also given a certain quota from STAVKA and any losses could be replaced a)by STAVKA or b) by Leningrad front. Stavla did replace some of the armopur losses before and during Tali-Ihantala battle but refused any further requests for reserves. Leningrad Front then used what ever they could find and used for example T-26 tanks and possibly some T-28's to replace part of the lost tanks. This naturally meant deteriorating fighting power of the units in question.

Again, if we are to believe Tiihonen, there was some friction between Leningrad Front and Stvaka regarding the attack to Finland. Stavka set a limit to losses and time but Leningrad Front was eager to take their revenge on Finns and wanted to advance deep into Southern Finland -even to an extent that could have jeopardized the operation against Army Group Nord. Stavka naturally won the dispute but not without some harsh words. For example the order to stop the attacks in the Isthmus ended with words that effectivley meant that the commander pays with his head if the order is not immediately executed.

Ïn the recent book by Jokisipilä there was an interesting report from the Finnish military intelligence from the summer of 1944. In the report it was estimated that the troops allocated to the Soviet attack were not sufficient to break through the Finnish defence and that occupation of Finland could not be the goal. Given that the report was made before the battle at Tali-Ihantala had culminated it was remarkably accurate prediction. Naturally if Finnish army had not fought as it did the whole country would most likely have been occupied. The opportunity would have been too good not to grab.

[Topspeed]

I think one major obstacle for USSR was the small but powerfull AF and AAA.

Start of the summer offensive in june 1944 meant that 1500 soviet aeroplanes flew continuously missions in finnish airspace. Finns had couple dozen worn out Me 109 G-2 left at that moment. On 20th of June more 109 G-6s arrived. By July 15th 1944 ( when soviet assault ended ) none of the FAF Ju-88 bombers that had fighter cover were harmed by the VVS fighters.

Getting the G-6s meant that president Ryti had to sign a treaty with Germany.

After resignation of President RYTI Finland was able to sign a peace treaty later in the fall of 1944.

Altogether FAF and AAA had destroyed 2 500 aeroplanes in the both wars.

Pace of the aerial battles can be described as hectic since alone captain Hans Wind and is wingman Nils Katajainen had scored 45 VVS planes in just two weeks.

[Tero]

By JariL

Ïn the recent book by Jokisipilä there was an interesting report from the Finnish military intelligence from the summer of 1944. In the report it was estimated that the troops allocated to the Soviet attack were not sufficient to break through the Finnish defence and that occupation of Finland could not be the goal. Given that the report was made before the battle at Tali-Ihantala had culminated it was remarkably accurate prediction. Naturally if Finnish army had not fought as it did the whole country would most likely have been occupied. The opportunity would have been too good not to grab.

The Finnish High Command has been accused of arrogance and complacency when the summer of 1944 has been discussed. I wonder how much of that same trait was present in Stavka and the Leningrad Front CHQ.

The report would indeed indicate that the entire attack plan was drawn as if the force would be attacking Germans who would stand and fight (and die) under "Stand Fast" orders trying to hold on to the MLD at the old border. The Finnish army did not play with the same play book so the Finnish strategy and tactics foiled the Red Army plan right after the Finns made the decision to widraw and concetrate the defensive effort along the VKT line.

If this is what really happened the gambit struck air and the followup, which had been planned to be a cake walk (relatively speaking) all the way to Kotka and beyond turned into a slog in the bog which culminated in the slugfest along the VKT line. This was in the wrong place vis-a-vis the attack plans and hence the Finnish intelligence report could make the conclusions it did.

[Nenonen]

Do you have information on Russian plan during the first two days of the offensive? As we know Russians started on the 9th with massive bombardment and some minor infantry attacks. Since, in the Russian view, the pure force of the offensive was such, that all counter measures were considered irrelevant, was the purpose of this first day to make the Finns commit their reserves to the battle only to be destroyed by the massive bombardment?