That is how it pretty much happened locally. I'm thinking about the strategic goals of the entire operation. IMO the Red Army plan against the Germans was to keep up the pressure while the Germans were feeding in reinforcements piecemeal until the weight of the attack would simply bring the entire defensive system down. What Finns did was not feed in reinforcement divisions on the spot but they were instead concentrated behind Viipuri. This negated the effects of the RKKA machine as it had to fight a running battle and then do another big scale breakthrough attack at the end.Do you have information on Russian plan during the first two days of the offensive? As we know Russians started on the 9th with massive bombardment and some minor infantry attacks. Since, in the Russian view, the pure force of the offensive was such, that all counter measures were considered irrelevant, was the purpose of this first day to make the Finns commit their reserves to the battle only to be destroyed by the massive bombardment?
Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?
By Nenonen
By Karri
However, the pullout from Eastern Karelia did start before the Petrozavodsk operation started. There would not have been anywhere near the amount of reserves available to be deployed in the Isthmus had the attacks started simultaneously. In that case the Leningrad Front plan may have actually succeeded.
Also, the manpower of the army peaked at 500 000 (all time high surpassing even the 1941-42 attack phase) which means that there were ample, if somewhat brittle, reserves available at the most critical time of the offensive.
That is true.There are alternative theories too, I remember reading that one of the reasons why finnish reserves were not sent in immediatly, was because there were none. Mannerheim was expecting the attack to be made in East-Karelia, not in Isthmus, thus the divisions had to be moved from there.
However, the pullout from Eastern Karelia did start before the Petrozavodsk operation started. There would not have been anywhere near the amount of reserves available to be deployed in the Isthmus had the attacks started simultaneously. In that case the Leningrad Front plan may have actually succeeded.
Also, the manpower of the army peaked at 500 000 (all time high surpassing even the 1941-42 attack phase) which means that there were ample, if somewhat brittle, reserves available at the most critical time of the offensive.
As far as I know Soviet attack should have been simultaneous operation but the operation was hurried and there were some kind of logistical problems north from Lake Ladoga. So the attack in Karelian Isthmus was started earlier than elsewhere. And probably Soviets also waited for the moment when Finns had moved reserves away from East Karelia. These railway transports were not much interfered by the Soviet aircraft - I'd consider this a major failure. If they had been more effective these movements could have been much slowlier.
After the effective delay period virtually without any reserves the remaining troops north from Lake Ladoga (15.Pr., 5.D, 8.D, 7.D, 1.D, 21.Pr.) with the help of three brigades ("new" Frontier Guard Jäger Brigade, 20th Brigade and Cavalry Brigade) managed to stop Soviet advance and even start new offensive at Ilomantsi. All these mentioned units had very experienced Commanders and the results achieved were in no way any "miracles". In the sector of 14th Division which was spcialized in forest campaigns Soviets could not do nothing serious and division kept its positions until the end of the war.
I think Gen. Talvela proposed that one reserve division would have been located somewhere at Sortavala area so it could operate both for Karelian Isthmus and north from Lake Ladoga. Finnish Army had also lots of separate battalions of which three was subordinated to Germans (Er.Os.Sau, Os.P, Er.P 8 or formerly better known as VHSP).
The main problem in Karelian Isthmus were not the insufficient amount of troops but the defence lines under construction. If VT line had been in full planned strength there wouldn't have any danger of breakthroughs for several days or even weeks. Because Soviets knew the lines in details thanks to aerial photo reconnaissance and spying they could direct their attacks against rather weak points.
There were lots of reserves: two infantry divisions (3.D, 18.D), Armoured Division and Cavalry Brigade in Karelian Isthmus, one infantry division (17.D) and one brigade (20.Pr.) in Olonets Isthmus, and one infantry division (4.D) in Maaselkä Isthmus. Additionally there were 3rd Brigade at Salla behind German XXXIV Geb.-AK. In reality all mentioned reserves were moved to Karelian Isthmus and also one additional division from both Olonets and Maaselkä Isthmus (11.D and 6.D).Karri wrote:I remember reading that one of the reasons why finnish reserves were not sent in immediatly, was because there were none.
After the effective delay period virtually without any reserves the remaining troops north from Lake Ladoga (15.Pr., 5.D, 8.D, 7.D, 1.D, 21.Pr.) with the help of three brigades ("new" Frontier Guard Jäger Brigade, 20th Brigade and Cavalry Brigade) managed to stop Soviet advance and even start new offensive at Ilomantsi. All these mentioned units had very experienced Commanders and the results achieved were in no way any "miracles". In the sector of 14th Division which was spcialized in forest campaigns Soviets could not do nothing serious and division kept its positions until the end of the war.
I think Gen. Talvela proposed that one reserve division would have been located somewhere at Sortavala area so it could operate both for Karelian Isthmus and north from Lake Ladoga. Finnish Army had also lots of separate battalions of which three was subordinated to Germans (Er.Os.Sau, Os.P, Er.P 8 or formerly better known as VHSP).
The main problem in Karelian Isthmus were not the insufficient amount of troops but the defence lines under construction. If VT line had been in full planned strength there wouldn't have any danger of breakthroughs for several days or even weeks. Because Soviets knew the lines in details thanks to aerial photo reconnaissance and spying they could direct their attacks against rather weak points.
Re: Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?
No offence to the Finnish members of this Forum, but it is worth mentioning that the post-WW2 relationship between Finland ("a truly free state") and the USSR gave the world a new term: "finlandization" (from http://www.answers.com/topic/finlandization):cipiao wrote: Why didn't USSR occupied all Finland in 1944, but instead allowed a truelly free state to go on...
As one can see without installing a Communist goverment, the USSR, never the less, influenced Finnish politics.International usage
As the term was used in Germany and other NATO countries, it expressed the process of turning into a neutral country which, although maintaining national sovereignty, in foreign politics resolves not to challenge a more powerful neighbor. Commonly in reference to Finland's policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but could refer to similar international relations, such as Denmark's attitude toward Germany 1871-1940.
Finnish perception
In Finland the use (by others) of the term "Finlandization" was perceived as a brickbat stemming from an inability to understand the practicalities of how a small nation might hope to make a deal with a culturally and ideologically alien superpower without losing its sovereignty. Finland cut such a deal with Stalin's government in the late 1940s, and it was largely respected by both parties — and to the gain of both parties — until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. While the Finnish political and intellectual elite mostly understood the term to refer more to foreign policy problems of other countries, and meant mostly for domestic consumption in the speakers own country; many ordinary Finns considered the term highly offensive.
Re: Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?
This is true. However it would be interesting, if you could point out a country, to the politics of which USSR had no influence whatsoever.bratello wrote:No offence to the Finnish members of this Forum, but it is worth mentioning that the post-WW2 relationship between Finland ("a truly free state") and the USSR gave the world a new term: "finlandization" (from http://www.answers.com/topic/finlandization):
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As one can see without installing a Communist goverment, the USSR, never the less, influenced Finnish politics.
There has to be a clear distinction made between Finland and the Eastern Europe countries under socialist regime, and that, I believe, is what was ment by the notion "truly free state".
Re: Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?
Nenonen wrote:...it would be interesting, if you could point out a country, to the politics of which USSR had no influence whatsoever.
Papua New Guinea. (I am joking, of course.) "Whatsoever" in your question makes only one answer possible: none. Everything in this world interconnected, so the USSR influence was obviously felt to a bigger or lesser degree in all 4 corners of the world.
"Finlandization" presupposes, among other things, an influence greater than normally accepted by an independent country over its affairs, ie when making political decisions Finland had to consider the interests of the USSR to a greater degree than, say, Switzerland would have done when making a political decision.
There is "a clear distinction" between Finland and East European countries. But only cipiao could tell what he meant by a "truly free state".Nenonen wrote:There has to be a clear distinction made between Finland and the Eastern Europe countries under socialist regime, and that, I believe, is what was ment by the notion "truly free state".
Last edited by bratello on 15 Apr 2005, 13:06, edited 1 time in total.
- finnjaeger
- Member
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- Joined: 14 Jan 2003, 17:48
- Location: Finland
I read once a arcticle about a possible russian attempt of cutting the railway line from East Karelia. In the article it was said that russians launched a fleet of bombers which were ment to cut the line thus preventing finns from moving troops to other important sectors. Before they russians were able to reach their target a huge thunder storm rise and forced them to return without accomplishing their task.Harri: And probably Soviets also waited for the moment when Finns had moved reserves away from East Karelia. These railway transports were not much interfered by the Soviet aircraft - I'd consider this a major failure. If they had been more effective these movements could have been much slowlier.
Unfortunately i cannot remember from where i read it and i have no sources to back it up, but maybe someone can give light to that issue, if it is true or not?
best regards, TK
Re: Why didn't USSR occupied Finland in 1944?
Well then there were many countries suffering from "finlandization" even before the Finns did. For instance Sweden conducted her foreign policy towards Finns according to Soviet wishes before the Winter War. I would say that any bordering country to the USSR had to take into account Soviet interests to a greater degree than the countries that had the luxury of lying further away.bratello wrote:"Finlandization" presupposes, among other things, an influence greater than normally accepted by an independent country over its affairs, ie when making political decisions Finland had to consider the interests of the USSR to a greater degree than, say, Switzerland would have done when making a political decision.
But what I meant with my first remark about Soviet influence was that it is quite impossible to make a distinction between truly free states and those that are not. In fact there are no truly free states if you look deep enough.
The Soviet long-distance bomber aviation was tasked to bomb Viipuri on 9 June 1944, but was forced to turn back to its bases in southern Russia because a major thunderstorm blocked its way over central Russia.I read once a arcticle about a possible russian attempt of cutting the railway line from East Karelia. In the article it was said that russians launched a fleet of bombers which were ment to cut the line thus preventing finns from moving troops to other important sectors. Before they russians were able to reach their target a huge thunder storm rise and forced them to return without accomplishing their task.
Unfortunately i cannot remember from where i read it and i have no sources to back it up, but maybe someone can give light to that issue, if it is true or not?
Bratello, what I meant by «truly free state» is that Finland kept a democratic form of goverment, total control over its internal affairs and even being subjected to a form of pression by USSR kept some options free in foreign policy; it had no occupition army in its soil---it is more then Poland, Romania, West Germany, etc had----Of course Finland was allways under the Soviet eyes but the Finnish people could choose its leaders, a free way of developement---Yes they have limitations in some aspects of its foreign relations, but it was not much different in the West for the majority of the countries of NATO under american eyes-----we can tell of «Italianization» or «Portugueseanization»---see what happenned with Italy when it try to develop «nukes» in the 70's or when Portugal try to have an independent policy in Africa----and yet both coutries were independent---of course in both cases and in many others, the degree of «finladization» it depends from the importance of the nation but it exists------------And yes, Finland kept its independence not as a formal state as the countries of Eastern block, but as a truly independent nation---a small one with a near by big neigbhour and with what this means, but an independent nation.....
Whether we want it or not, whether it is fair or not, but there is a reason why the particular Finnish situation (not Swedish, nor Norvegian or Portuguese), as seen from abroad, came to Messrs Walther Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal's minds when they were looking for a convincing arguement and gave birth to a term "finlandization". We'll have to live with it.Finlandization (Finnlandisierung in German) is a negatively charged term originating in West German political debate of the 1960s and 1970s. It was used mainly by proponents of closer adaptation to US interests, chiefly Franz Josef Strauss, but was initially coined in scholarly debate and made known by the German political scientists Walther Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal, reflecting feared effects of withdrawal of US troops from Germany. It came to be used in the debate of the NATO countries in response to Willy Brandt's attempts to normalize relations with East-Germany, and the following widespread skepticism in Germany against NATO's Dual-Track Decision. Later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the term has been used in Finland for the post-1968 radicalization in the latter half of the Kekkonen era.
Regards.
Last edited by bratello on 10 Oct 2005, 13:34, edited 1 time in total.
Finlandizierung is a good word what happened when a communist goliath takes a toll in a small country like Finland. Knowing this term and what it meant finns were able to even better fight against good and bad. All thing soviets believed in were not bad, unfortunately what they believed and what took place in USSR were not the same thing. Finns if anyone saw this very clearly.
What finlandizierung lead to in BRD was just what was mentioned in an earlier post.
What finlandizierung lead to in BRD was just what was mentioned in an earlier post.
Then there is the teeny-weeny little factoid that the Germans coined the term. The Finns had been a brother-in-arms with Germany and (in the German POV) betrayed her in her hour of need. Instead of going through the Götterdämmerung like proper warrior nation should the Finns chose a negotiated settlement. With this in mind the term Finlandization and IMO to picking of Finland as an example in BRD did carry connotations which presupposed negative predisposition into the facts and situation being evaluated and described.bratello wrote:Whether we want it or not, whether it is fair or not, but there is a reason why the particular Finnish situation, as seen from abroad (not Swedish, nor Portuguese or Italian), came to Messrs Walther Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal's minds when they were looking for a convincing arguement and gave birth to a term "finlandization". We'll have to live with it.Finlandization (Finnlandisierung in German) is a negatively charged term originating in West German political debate of the 1960s and 1970s. It was used mainly by proponents of closer adaptation to US interests, chiefly Franz Josef Strauss, but was initially coined in scholarly debate and made known by the German political scientists Walther Hallstein and Richard Löwenthal, reflecting feared effects of withdrawal of US troops from Germany. It came to be used in the debate of the NATO countries in response to Willy Brandt's attempts to normalize relations with East-Germany, and the following widespread skepticism in Germany against NATO's Dual-Track Decision. Later, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the term has been used in Finland for the post-1968 radicalization in the latter half of the Kekkonen era.
Regards.
The term could have been Germanization but it was too close to home, what with DDR being right across the border and all.