Suho Lighthouse

Discussions on the Winter War and Continuation War, the wars between Finland and the USSR.
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Harri
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Post by Harri » 19 Dec 2005 00:57

batu wrote:The only motives publicly expressed by Mannreheim were military difficulty of such an attack:
Already at this stage Field Marshal Mannerheim presented to Erfurth those difficulties that Finns would have in breaching the strong line of defence of the Soviet troops, reinforced with permanent structures.


That was the explanation told to Germans of course. It is true that Finns lacked many essential means such as heavy and super heavy artillery to attack a fortified area but that is only a partial truth. The following expains the true attidue:

However, the main reason to the negative stance was the reluctance of the High Command of the Army to advance to Leningrad, as well as the political aspect of the issue. The Finnish Lead of State had already earlier decided that Finns will under no circumstances aim their war operations against Leningrad and President Ryti was keen to supervise the compliance with this decree


batu wrote:I didn't get what is Lead of State and which decree would president Ryti supervise? Again, the murky "poitical reasons" emerge, but apart from the social-democrats' stance there is no mentioning of any other particular reason.


It means President and the Government together (but during the war only certain key Ministers of the Government are needed). They in turn were supervised by numerous "advisors" of which Commander-in-Chief is probably the most important one. Basically exactly the same "system" would be used today although the recent policy is to reduce the power of President like you perhaps have noticed.

Why do you think there should have been any "particular reason"?

batu wrote:So, according to the History of Continuation War, Mannerheim refused to actively participate in the seige because (at least as it was officially anonunced to Germans) it was too difficult for Finnish military to attack such a fortifyed city. This sounds totally normal, Mannerheim saving lives of his soldiers restrains from direct attack, and lets Germans do the job, the fruits of wihch he would reap later. Paasikivi prepared speech to commemorate the coming fall of Leningrad,
Finns expected Germans to finnish off Lenignrad, while Finnish army would ocupy Eastern Karelia and create Greater Finland, uniting Finno-Ugric peoples living there. So, there is no evidence of Mannerheim "saving" Leningrad out of some personal feelings towards the city. He as everybody else expected it to be occupied by Germans and destroyed. With the German victory over Soviet Union Finland would get territories in the Karelia and part of former Leningrad untill the norhten bank of Neva.


Leningrad was a German project, not Finnish. Finnish and German plans and intentions should not be confused.

batu wrote:But in durign the battle of Stalingrad MAnnerheim realized that NAzis would lose.


That happened much earlier. Already in the summer after it was evident that the combat ability of German troops in Finland were much lower than of the Finnish divisions and Germans can't reach their planned goals Maj.Gen. Hj. Siilasvuo wrote a letter to FM Mannerheim and told his opinion on the war. Already in November 1941 Siilasvuo received an order from Mannerheim to stop advancing any closer to Murmansk railway. About at the same time was also decided that Finnish troops won't advance any further in Karelian Isthmus. Only actions on Karhumäki area continued until January 1941.

batu wrote:AS for Mannerheim and Ryti's statements of despise towards Nazis, I don't think it's "basic" info. In fact it would be quite revealing, if soembody came up with the quote of Mannerheim or Ryti about Hitler or Nazism. So don't feel shy to give me this "basics". The same goes towards MAnnerheim-saviour of Leningrad. The above quote didn't add anything to prove that myth. Sure, we can say Mannerheim didn't take part in the direct storm of the city but his motives are far from being clear. And as the factual evidence suggests, they were mostly of military matter rather than humanitarian or personal-sentimental.


These are only Soviet myths. Lt.Gen. W. Tuompo has quoted in his published diaries what Mannerheim has said about Nazis. Read from there. Finnish motives are quite clear: Finns had their own goals in war which should not be confused with the German goals or plans like I already said.

batu wrote:Besdies, what about the "Greater Finland" idea? Correct me if I am worng, but I guess that was the major propaganda of Finnish government before the Continuation war? Or was it just minor radical movement? What about Lapua movement, ryssän viha, Lotta Svärd?


You are wrong. Again your own "guessing" without any proves. Just claims in line with the "official" Soviet view (myths you talked about).

batu wrote:I've read that IKL- the ultra-naitonalist party that had been in the parliament (though in minority) before continuation war was suddenly invited into the cabinet. This doesn't seem to conform the notion of Finnish government despising NAzis. Besides, Finland seemed to be quite pro-German even before the Winter war:
In 1937 a German submarine flotilla visited Helsinki, and it was greeted warmly by the people and by the government. In April and in May 1938, the Finnish government presided over two great celebrations, marking the twentieth anniversary of the entry of German troops into Helsinki and of the entry of Mannerheim's forces into Helsinki, respectively, events that numerous prominent Germans attended. The Finns were also indiscreet in allowing a German naval squadron to visit Helsinki. Soviet suspicions were fuelled again by the visit to Finland in June 1939 of the German army chief of staff, General Franz Halder, who was received by the government in Helsinki and who viewed Finnish army maneuvers on the Karelian Isthmus.


I doubt this has something to do with the attack of Suho island?

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Post by Harri » 19 Dec 2005 01:33

batu wrote:
Colonel Järvinen was the Commander of Lake Ladoga Coastal Brigade and also the formal Commander of Naval Forces there. The situation was about the same as with the Finnish III Army Corps in the north which was under the German command but took orders and directives also from the Finnish Supreme HQ. On the joint forces on Lake Ladoga the largest one, EFO, was the most loosely under the command of Finns.

another example of Finno-German joint comand and still "totally separate war"? :roll:


There were either Finnish of German HQs, not mixed ones. A war would have been a total mess if the commands had not been arranged. Alone language problems were enormous although Germany was the number one language in Finland back then (it was also after the war until 1960's when England gradually replaced it).

batu wrote:
Harri wrote:You really seem hard to understand and rely on anything. I have also noticed that you are not familiar with the background of the Joint Naval Forces, are you? Baryshnikov perhaps isn't the best available source in this case
.
that sounds like a personal remark. Did I call you stupid?


Did I?

batu wrote:No need to entertain that arrogant tone here.


I agree. But need sources to back claims.

batu wrote:You've read one book and think you have monopoly on truth?


Did I say I have read only one book?

batu wrote:For example, in your source the head of the operation was Korvettenkapitän von Ramm.
In the other sourse also based on a Finnish book Lt.col. Wachtel is mentioned (though not clearly) as a person in charge.


Did I say von Ramm was the Commander [Kommandeur] of EFO? He was "Kommandant / EFO" and actually only "loaned" from the Kriegsmarine. As far as I know Lt.Col. Wachtel was the Chef / Fähre-Flottille (the combat part of EFO) while the whole EFO was led by Lt.Col. F. Siebel (but I have an impression that he was away from Finland most of the time when Wachtel acted also as Kommandeur but I'm not sure about that). As always German unit organizations are really confusing and I have to admit I'm still not sure about the positions of certain officers. (Actually that would be a good topic for another thread.)

batu wrote:I don't remember exactly on which sourse does Baryshnikov rely, so I'll get hold of the book and see.
If his claim is a lie than let's call it a lie.


I meant his book is perhaps not accurate enough in details. The book in quoted is basically not a very easy one to read bacause it is confusing and contains also lots of (spelling) mistakes. The text is partly from the Finnish war diaries and is in this respect "authentic". It is although the most accurate book (in details) on the Lake Ladoga Coastal Brigade with a huge amount of information not seen anywhere else.

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Post by batu » 19 Dec 2005 01:38

That's what I thought because that claim is straight in line with the typical Soviet view.


Batu, your attitude towards Finland, Finns and Mannerheim has already become quite clear for all of us. You have lots of claims but rather little proves. The so called "facts" which were told in USSR ("Soviet version") weren't necessarily true.


These are only Soviet myths. Lt.Gen. W. Tuompo has quoted in his published diaries what Mannerheim has said about Nazis
.
You are wrong. Again your own "guessing" without any proves. Just claims in line with the "official" Soviet view (myths you talked about


what exactly are "Soviet myths" you so often refer to?
did you read any single Soviet book on those wars?
Or do you just identify everything that doesn't fit your preconceived notions as "Soviet"?
the "myths" are actually the Finnish once and the myth is "MAnnerheim-saviour of Leningrad" And I am trying to address it.
why do you think Mannerheim didn't attack Leningrad wihle at the same time occupied Eastern Karelia and established concentration camps there? Becasue he was a noble man? Or maybe because it was easier?
Leningrad was a German project, not Finnish. Finnish and German plans and intentions should not be confused.

what about Paasikivi's speech? what about Greater Finland until the northen bank of Neva?

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Post by Juha Tompuri » 19 Dec 2005 07:38

batu wrote:
That's what I thought because that claim is straight in line with the typical Soviet view.


Batu, your attitude towards Finland, Finns and Mannerheim has already become quite clear for all of us. You have lots of claims but rather little proves. The so called "facts" which were told in USSR ("Soviet version") weren't necessarily true.


These are only Soviet myths. Lt.Gen. W. Tuompo has quoted in his published diaries what Mannerheim has said about Nazis
.
You are wrong. Again your own "guessing" without any proves. Just claims in line with the "official" Soviet view (myths you talked about


what exactly are "Soviet myths" you so often refer to?
did you read any single Soviet book on those wars?
Or do you just identify everything that doesn't fit your preconceived notions as "Soviet"?
the "myths" are actually the Finnish once and the myth is "MAnnerheim-saviour of Leningrad" And I am trying to address it.
why do you think Mannerheim didn't attack Leningrad wihle at the same time occupied Eastern Karelia and established concentration camps there? Becasue he was a noble man? Or maybe because it was easier?
Leningrad was a German project, not Finnish. Finnish and German plans and intentions should not be confused.

what about Paasikivi's speech? what about Greater Finland until the northen bank of Neva?
batu,

2nd time: viewtopic.php?p=817954&highlight=#817954

/Juha

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Post by batu » 20 Dec 2005 15:37

Finally got Baryshnikov's book.
According to him, the plan to open the war on Ladoga with the aim to cut off supplies to the starving city belonged to
Finnish general Talvela. I'll quote part of the book below. The sourse of the claim is Talvela's memoirs: "Sotilaan elämä. Muistelmat" Talvela P. , General Tuompo's diary, and Seppälä H "Leningradin saarto 1941-1944. Murhenäytelmän sävyttämä voitto.

MArch 21 1941. Accoridn to Tuompo's diary:
Gen. Talvela acting as a Finnihs liason officer at German headquorters, arrived at Mennrheims HQ form Germany to discuss operational and other matters. "Talvela is here", Tupmo noted in his diary. "He tld us some extremely interesting things about the Germans' military operations which he learned on the Leningrad front... Great adversity reigns in LEningrad. According to data provided by prisoners, 6000-7000 people are dying of hunger every day. There have been a number of cases of cannibalism. Noone is able to bury corspes, and there are huge piles of them in gardens and so on. In spring, there will seemengly be hideous scenes and epidemics" (Tuompo, WE Op. cit. pp 121,.122)
There can, it seems, be no doubt that Mannehreim had quite a clear idea of the mass deaths among the inhabitants of LEningrad, following the information received from Talvela. Getting supllies to the Lenignraders became even more difficult in the summer and autumn of 1942, when the ice road over Lake Ladoga melted and deliveries of provisions had to be made by what ships were available.
What did Talvela suggest to the Finnish command? To cut off the ships' route across the lake entirely. His plan in this conection was to capture the small islan of Suho, which occupied a key position in the transport zone between the western and eastern banks of Lake Ladoga.
Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen. The idea took shape that it would be necessary to involve not only Finnish ships but also boats from GErmany and Italian NAvies, thereby forming a special gourp of torpedo boats and other vessels for carrying out the requisite operations to achieve the aim that had been set. (Talvela's memoires). The German military command was informed about all of this, and it turn proposed preparations for operations to seize Suho. On May 17, 1942, MAnnerheim issued an order to create a special naval unit, codenamed K and commended by CAptain Third Class K. Kaijanen, on LAke LAdoga; the unit was to comprise mine-layers and torpedo boats form Germany and Italy, as well as Finnish torpedo boat Sisu. This unit, which was subordinated to Järvinen, received specific orders regarding its goal-oriented preparations for military operations (Seppälä, p. 143) However, ultimately, the German and ITalian boats tht arrived were combined into a single unit, Fere Ost, under command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Siebel and subordinated to the Finnish Ladoga Coastal Brigade.
The prinsipal task given to both of the newly formed naval units (K and Fere Ost) was to caputre Suho, and thereby to cut off supplies to LEningrad via LAdoga. NAturally, MAnnerheim's HQ in Mikkeli knew of the preparations for this operation"

Baryshnikov "Mannerheim without mask" pp125-126.

The battle itself is described by Baryshnikov from Russian historian Kovalchuk's book "MAgistrali muzhestva. Kommunikatsii blokadnogo Leningrada" 1491-1943.
He describes it in a couple of paragraphs, saying that "
German, Italian and Finnish assaoult boats made up the kernel of the landing force, toether with the flotilla of allocated ferries. Air power was also used, and some of the aeroplanes involved there were directed to carry out a bombing raid on the island..." the account of battle acc. to Kovalchuk differs to some extent of the previously discussed Finnish acocunt. "The island's garrison, supported by the timely arrival of Soviet aeroplanes, dislodged the enemy at aorund 10 a.m. form the positions they had occupied, and Italian, German, and Finnish boats were forced to effect a rapid withdrawal from the area under bomberdment from Soviet planes. The landing party sustained significant losses of seventeen boats, sixty one men of those engaged in the fighting, and fourteen aeroplanes"
(Kovalchuk)

While of course Soviet account stresses enemy losses, and Finno-German acocunt stresses their enemy's losses, it is stil unlcear whether or not there were Finnish participants. the Harri's quote with the number of boats and vessels doesn't contain any information on the nationality of the participants and "nationality" of the vessels. Neither K. Kijanen, Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla. Suomi Merellä 1950, 4 has anything on the nationality of the participants. For ome reason he mentioned only German losses and the course of Events only form German side.
http://users.tkk.fi/~jaromaa/Navygaller ... Ladoga.htm
But for Russians as well as for the general Western view it was a joint Finno-Italian-German operation and it was a failure:
A combined German, Finnish and Italian force launches an unsuccessful attack on Suho Island on Lake Ladoga to break the Soviet supply route to Leningrad.

http://www.angelfire.com/my/rememberww2/1942/10/21.htm
the same line on the Finnish webpage
Their attack on Suho island in October was a failure

http://www.rajajoki.com/asemasota.htm
Kijanen's sourse also ocncludes:
End of the operations
The losses at Suho ended naval operations in Laatokka

http://users.tkk.fi/~jaromaa/Navygaller ... Ladoga.htm
The most important point above is that the whole idea was general of Talvela's initiative, and Mannerheim gave its permission ot it.
I've heard some claims from our Finnish friends that the Italian-German boats came as a suprise to Finns. It owuld be interesting to see what is the osurse of this claim. Feel free to post constructive critique on this claim, but I would appreciate arguments backed by primary sourses.

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Post by Esa K » 20 Dec 2005 16:40

Batu wrote:Gen. Talvela acting as a Finnihs liason officer at German headquorters, arrived at Mennrheims HQ form Germany to discuss operational and other matters. "Talvela is here", Tupmo noted in his diary. "He tld us some extremely interesting things about the Germans' military operations which he learned on the Leningrad front... Great adversity reigns in LEningrad. According to data provided by prisoners, 6000-7000 people are dying of hunger every day. There have been a number of cases of cannibalism. Noone is able to bury corspes, and there are huge piles of them in gardens and so on. In spring, there will seemengly be hideous scenes and epidemics" (Tuompo, WE Op. cit. pp 121,.122)
There can, it seems, be no doubt that Mannehreim had quite a clear idea of the mass deaths among the inhabitants of LEningrad, following the information received from Talvela. Getting supllies to the Lenignraders became even more difficult in the summer and autumn of 1942, when the ice road over Lake Ladoga melted and deliveries of provisions had to be made by what ships were available.
What did Talvela suggest to the Finnish command? To cut off the ships' route across the lake entirely. His plan in this conection was to capture the small islan of Suho, which occupied a key position in the transport zone between the western and eastern banks of Lake Ladoga.
Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen. The idea took shape that it would be necessary to involve not only Finnish ships but also boats from GErmany and Italian NAvies, thereby forming a special gourp of torpedo boats and other vessels for carrying out the requisite operations to achieve the aim that had been set. (Talvela's memoires). The German military command was informed about all of this, and it turn proposed preparations for operations to seize Suho. On May 17, 1942, MAnnerheim issued an order to create a special naval unit, codenamed K and commended by CAptain Third Class K. Kaijanen, on LAke LAdoga; the unit was to comprise mine-layers and torpedo boats form Germany and Italy, as well as Finnish torpedo boat Sisu. This unit, which was subordinated to Järvinen, received specific orders regarding its goal-oriented preparations for military operations (Seppälä, p. 143) However, ultimately, the German and ITalian boats tht arrived were combined into a single unit, Fere Ost, under command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Siebel and subordinated to the Finnish Ladoga Coastal Brigade.
The prinsipal task given to both of the newly formed naval units (K and Fere Ost) was to caputre Suho, and thereby to cut off supplies to LEningrad via LAdoga. NAturally, MAnnerheim's HQ in Mikkeli knew of the preparations for this operation"


Batu, a question, is the Tuompo quote (my coloring in red), the Talvela quote (my coloring in blue), the Seppälä quote (my coloring in green)from the original sources, or are they from: Baryshnikov "Mannerheim without mask" pp125-126. If they are from the original sources could you point out on wich page/s Talvela in his memoirs is describing the Ladoga operations cause I couldnt find the info quoted in Talvela, Paavo: Sotilaan elämä.......?


regards

Esa K

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Post by Esa K » 20 Dec 2005 18:25

Batu, or Baryshnikov quoted, interpreted Talvela and wrote:Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen.



Found this in Talvelas memoirs:
28, 29 or 30 March 1942, a bit hard from the text to say wich date. But:
Talvela, Paavo: Sotilaan elämä : Muistelmat II, Jyväskylä 1977. Page 137. my translation of what Talvela wrote:”I spent the night in Lahdenpohja and discussed with Colonel Järvinen (Colonel, later Lieutant General E. I. Järvinen was then commander of the Ladoga Coastal Brigade) about the defence of Ladoga, the result of the discussion was in the end the formation of a German-Italian naval detatchment at Ladoga.


(titel translates to: The life of a solider : Memoirs II)



And comparing Talvelas text with Baryshnikov´s gives:
1. Is there an other version of Talvelas memoirs?
2. If not, from where did "Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942" came in to Baryshnikov´s text?


regards

Esa K

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Post by Harri » 20 Dec 2005 19:28

batu wrote:MArch 21 1941. Accoridn to Tuompo's diary:
Gen. Talvela acting as a Finnihs liason officer at German headquorters, arrived at Mennrheims HQ form Germany to discuss operational and other matters. "Talvela is here", Tupmo noted in his diary. "He tld us some extremely interesting things about the Germans' military operations which he learned on the Leningrad front... Great adversity reigns in LEningrad. According to data provided by prisoners, 6000-7000 people are dying of hunger every day. There have been a number of cases of cannibalism. Noone is able to bury corspes, and there are huge piles of them in gardens and so on. In spring, there will seemengly be hideous scenes and epidemics" (Tuompo, WE Op. cit. pp 121,.122)


I think the year is wrong in this? What is this suppose to prove?

batu wrote:There can, it seems, be no doubt that Mannehreim had quite a clear idea of the mass deaths among the inhabitants of LEningrad, following the information received from Talvela. Getting supllies to the Lenignraders became even more difficult in the summer and autumn of 1942, when the ice road over Lake Ladoga melted and deliveries of provisions had to be made by what ships were available.


Is that "conclusion" from "batu", "Baryshnikov" of someone else?

batu wrote:What did Talvela suggest to the Finnish command? To cut off the ships' route across the lake entirely. His plan in this conection was to capture the small islan of Suho, which occupied a key position in the transport zone between the western and eastern banks of Lake Ladoga.


I didn't quite get from what source this is from?

batu wrote:Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen. The idea took shape that it would be necessary to involve not only Finnish ships but also boats from GErmany and Italian NAvies, thereby forming a special gourp of torpedo boats and other vessels for carrying out the requisite operations to achieve the aim that had been set. (Talvela's memoires). The German military command was informed about all of this, and it turn proposed preparations for operations to seize Suho. On May 17, 1942, MAnnerheim issued an order to create a special naval unit, codenamed K and commended by CAptain Third Class K. Kaijanen, on LAke LAdoga; the unit was to comprise mine-layers and torpedo boats form Germany and Italy, as well as Finnish torpedo boat Sisu. This unit, which was subordinated to Järvinen, received specific orders regarding its goal-oriented preparations for military operations (Seppälä, p. 143) However, ultimately, the German and ITalian boats tht arrived were combined into a single unit, Fere Ost, under command of the German Lieutenant Colonel Siebel and subordinated to the Finnish Ladoga Coastal Brigade.


What is "Fere Ost"? Who is Captain Third Class K. Kaijanen?

Oh boy, what crap that is... Seems like joining some facts with certain book excerpts not necessary even connected to the same case...

batu wrote:The prinsipal task given to both of the newly formed naval units (K and Fere Ost) was to caputre Suho, and thereby to cut off supplies to LEningrad via LAdoga. NAturally, MAnnerheim's HQ in Mikkeli knew of the preparations for this operation" Baryshnikov "Mannerheim without mask" pp125-126.


Now I understand better why Baryshnikov in not rated very high in Finland...

batu wrote:The battle itself is described by Baryshnikov from Russian historian Kovalchuk's book "MAgistrali muzhestva. Kommunikatsii blokadnogo Leningrada" 1491-1943.
He describes it in a couple of paragraphs, saying that "
German, Italian and Finnish assaoult boats made up the kernel of the landing force, toether with the flotilla of allocated ferries. Air power was also used, and some of the aeroplanes involved there were directed to carry out a bombing raid on the island..." the account of battle acc. to Kovalchuk differs to some extent of the previously discussed Finnish acocunt. "The island's garrison, supported by the timely arrival of Soviet aeroplanes, dislodged the enemy at aorund 10 a.m. form the positions they had occupied, and Italian, German, and Finnish boats were forced to effect a rapid withdrawal from the area under bomberdment from Soviet planes. The landing party sustained significant losses of seventeen boats, sixty one men of those engaged in the fighting, and fourteen aeroplanes"
(Kovalchuk)


A typical Soviet fairy tale with a great inaccuracy and only a little facts. At least the author of this crap has not have very good information on the case. Should this describe the first or the second attack?

batu wrote:While of course Soviet account stresses enemy losses, and Finno-German acocunt stresses their enemy's losses, it is stil unlcear whether or not there were Finnish participants. the Harri's quote with the number of boats and vessels doesn't contain any information on the nationality of the participants and "nationality" of the vessels. Neither K. Kijanen, Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla. Suomi Merellä 1950, 4 has anything on the nationality of the participants. For ome reason he mentioned only German losses and the course of Events only form German side.


"Own" losses are mentioned in my source. There were only German losses because there were only Germans (and Italian MTBs only in securing duties.) BTW do you have these original sources you mentioned or are all the excerpts from the book by Baryshnikov?

batu wrote:But for Russians as well as for the general Western view it was a joint Finno-Italian-German operation and it was a failure:
A combined German, Finnish and Italian force launches an unsuccessful attack on Suho Island on Lake Ladoga to break the Soviet supply route to Leningrad.


There is a mistake probably because these forces were called "Joint Naval Forces". Again: which attack of the two this refers to?

batu wrote:the same line on the Finnish webpage
Their attack on Suho island in October was a failure


I don't know on which this is based on and what is the source of this.

batu wrote:Kijanen's sourse also ocncludes:
End of the operations
The losses at Suho ended naval operations in Laatokka


To me that sentence means that the operations were ended after the losses suffered in the last Suho operation. It does not mean that some losses would have been the reason for ending the operations.

batu wrote:The most important point above is that the whole idea was general of Talvela's initiative, and Mannerheim gave its permission ot it.


That is not true. The initiative and plan came most likely from the Commander of Lake Ladoga Coastal Brigade Col. E. Järvinen. It is known that Gen. Talvela visited in the brigade in winter 1942. It is also known (I think that is also disputable, not a fact) that Talvela could have been the person who proposed the plan to Germans but it was by no means accepted by the Finnish Supreme HQ.

So, Gen. Talvela was not the "inventor", more he was the "messenger".

batu wrote:I've heard some claims from our Finnish friends that the Italian-German boats came as a suprise to Finns. It owuld be interesting to see what is the osurse of this claim. Feel free to post constructive critique on this claim, but I would appreciate arguments backed by primary sourses.


Your sources are not primary ones either. Primary sources are original documents. Actually your source is as far from the primary sources as can be. Just excerpts collected from here and there by someone collected by Baryshnikov - or someone else. The whole point (which I although can well guess) remained unclear to me.

The mentioned surprise is told for example in the book I have mentioned.

----

Good try but not very convincing.

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Post by Harri » 20 Dec 2005 19:36

Esa K wrote:
Batu, or Baryshnikov quoted, interpreted Talvela and wrote:Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen.


Found this in Talvelas memoirs:
28, 29 or 30 March 1942, a bit hard from the text to say wich date. But:
Talvela, Paavo: Sotilaan elämä : Muistelmat II, Jyväskylä 1977. Page 137. my translation of what Talvela wrote:”I spent the night in Lahdenpohja and discussed with Colonel Järvinen (Colonel, later Lieutant General E. I. Järvinen was then commander of the Ladoga Coastal Brigade) about the defence of Ladoga, the result of the discussion was in the end the formation of a German-Italian naval detatchment at Ladoga.

(titel translates to: The life of a solider : Memoirs II)

And comparing Talvelas text with Baryshnikov´s gives:
1. Is there an other version of Talvelas memoirs?
2. If not, from where did "Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942" came in to Baryshnikov´s text?



:lol: (That was something I expected.... :roll: )

What is the lesson of this? Well, if you quote do it as accurately and as correctly as you can but if you only think (or guess), don't quote at all... :wink:

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Post by batu » 20 Dec 2005 20:13

Esa K wrote:
Batu, or Baryshnikov quoted, interpreted Talvela and wrote:Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942, when he went to LAndehpohja on the North Shore of the LAke to discuss the quesiton with the commander of the LAdoga Coastal Brigade Colonel E.I. Järvinen.



Found this in Talvelas memoirs:
28, 29 or 30 March 1942, a bit hard from the text to say wich date. But talvela wrote:
”I spent the night in Lahdenpohja and discussed with Colonel Järvinen (Colonel, later Lieutant General E. I. Järvinen was then commander of the Ladoga Coastal Brigade) about the defence of Ladoga, the result of the discussion was in the end the formation of a German-Italian naval detatchment at Ladoga.

(My translation)

Talvela, Paavo: Sotilaan elämä : Muistelmat II, Jyväskylä 1977. Page 137. (titel translates to: The life of a solider : Memoirs II)

And comparing Talvelas text with Baryshnikov´s gives:
1. Is there an other version of Talvelas memoirs?
2. If not, from where did "Talvela began work on implementing the plan to cut off the supply route for foodstuffs and other goods to Leningrad over Lake Ladoga at the end of MArch 1942" came in to Baryshnikov´s text?


regards

Esa K


the text with the Talvela's implementing of plan apparently didn't come from Talvela's memoirs. Only the part referring to Talvela's initiative at establishing the fleet. It is Baryshnikov's conclusion, which actually doesn't differ much from Finnish accounts.
For example, Seppälä's text on the same matter:(my rough translation) the words in the brackets are the Finnish original.
"during the visit, he said in his so-called memoirs that "the result of the discussion was in the end the formation of a German-Italian naval detatchment at Ladoga." The way, in which this final desicion was taken, was totally Talelva's thing (business?) (Talvelan asia). In any case, Taleva was behind the written estimation of the situation, issued on 2.4.1942, where according to Kalervo Kijanen "in the case when the Leningrad seige (motti) is not finished (done? selvitetty) before the open water season (avovesi). it is of utmost importance to deliver mt-boats to Ladoga in order to prevent the free fleet movement (laivaliikenne) between New Lagoda annd Osinovets or Morji. Obviously the boat activity should be established with the good results (hard phrase, which sounds in Finnish like "on todennäköistä että veneiden toiminta tulisi muodostumaan hyvin tuloksellisesti).
Talvela doesn't tell in his memoirs, how he managed the business, but to get it done the way he wanted, he intentionally bysided the commander-in-chief (ylipällikkö), HQ and and the Naval commander, who was in the first place responsible for the defence of Ladoga, and presented the matter in his own way to German highest command. Talvela was apparently sure that Finnish HQ wouln't make such a presentation after Tihvin incident.
13.5.1942 The German Naval HQ informed General Lieutenant Väinö Valve that the Finnish request for the support addressed to Hitler would be accepted according to the possibilities. The report said that the delivery relates to German KM boats (mineboats) and Italian MAS-motorboats, which Germans asked from Italians, becasue they themselves didn't have the motorboats fit for Lagoda. The message that arrived from Germany came as a surprise to General Lieutenant Valve. In any case the HQ was immideately informed about the matter and it appears that it (HQ) was already aware of the arrival of the German boats, because according to the Commander-in-Chief's order of 17.4.1942 the Ladoga Naval-unit K (Kijanen) was established, which provided for the boats coming from Germany and Italy together with Finnish torpedoboat Sisu. The Naval unit was under comand of the Costal Brigade or, in other words, the Naval operations against Leningrad's supply routes were planned to start under Finnish command.
After especially complicated and multistage delivery 4 modern MAS-torpedo boats with the crew were ready for the action in Ladoga's Sortalnlahti at 22.6.1942. 4 mineboats arrived at Sortahlahti across Helsinki at 8.7. Also German Luftflotte 1 sent several Siebel-Boats (heavy battleferry?raskas taistelulautta) together with some lighter boats to Ladoga. Einatz Fare OSt was establisehd out of them (EFO) which was given under command of Costal Bigade chief.
The Naval force given to Finns and brought into LAgoda was a comparatively large fleet..."

.... then he lists the the units of the fleet, mentions that Soviet sourses understood this as an agreement between German and Finnish high command according to which the fleet arrived to Ladoga. He writes that "hardly anybody would believe that the whole "hässäkkä"(?) would be one man's achievement (aikaansaama)."
He goes then about the military activity of the Naval-unit K. As for the Suho attack, Seppälä attributes the idea to Germans, though the fleet was opertively under Finnish Costal brigade command. He dosen't mention any Finns participating in the attack. He mentions German reports about the attack and Soviet reports, and says that Finnish sourses "paid very little attention to the war on Ladoga in 1942, because this relates to the operations agaisnt Lenigrad, and Finns always wanted to wash their hands of it. The "official" history of the Cintinuation war doesn't mention Suho battle at all at the "German and Italian fleet in Ladoga 1942" chapter. Instead, it says that Commandr-In-Chief gave order (21.10.1942) to the Naval-unit K to move the fleet to the Finnish gulf. on 30.10 the boats were in Helsinki, where the Naval unit was dismantled..."
... Then he mentions Soviet Military dictionary 7(sotilastietosanakirja) where under the title Suho, ther is a short mentioning of the operation and it is mentioned that Suho had an important meanning for the New LAgoda and Osinovets or Morji supplies movement. It says "After the victory the enemy activity on Ladoga finished"
"
In reality after the failure of Suho's operation K and EFO were disbanded, foreigners left Ladoga's territory. Finns bought from Germans 6 gunferries (tykkilautta). Before the leave of the "tourists" Mannerheim gave them medals and was apparently satisfied to get rid of them. After this, Finns or Finnish zone of occupation wasn't used to make the seige of Leningrad more effective. In any case Finns were at North the guards (vartijoina) of the big seige"

Then, he comes to the conlcusion of the chapter that "
In 1942, German and Finnish sea and airfroces clearly cooperated in the tightenning of the Leningrad's seige in the Finnish gulf as well as in LAdoga, even though they (Finns) wouldn't say it straight (vaikka sitä ei sanotakaan suoraan)."
Seppälä H. "Leningradin saarto" pp143-146.

Though, Baryshnikov seems to overstress Finnish role in Suho island attack,
mostly because the description of the battle itself Baryshnikov took from Kovalchuk descprition and it refers to Finns, though there is no direct mentioning of Finnish marines or ships taking part in it in any Finnish or German sourses. But it is hard to deny Talvela's role in it, as well as Mannerheim's awarenes and approval of the whole operation. And even though Finns didn't have own strong fleet and the majority of boats were Italian or German, it is clear that Finns played their part in this joint operation and that's why the war on Ladoga is usually considered joint Finnish-German-Italian operation. But I understand that Finnish historians would like to downplay Finnish role in this, since it doesn't really fit the general Finnish idea of Finland staying away from the seige.
Last edited by batu on 20 Dec 2005 20:40, edited 1 time in total.

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Post by batu » 20 Dec 2005 20:19

:lol: (That was something I expected.... :roll: )

What is the lesson of this? Well, if you quote do it as accurately and as correctly as you can but if you only think (or guess), don't quote at all... :wink


Harri, cheerful as always :) the quote is correct, the reply is above. :wink:
you can make fun of the battle description itself taken from Kovalchuk's book, and you can even make point about Baryshnikov's
tying the whole activity on Ladoga to the Suho operation and find many little facutal mistakes (after all Baryshnikov doesn't seem to be a military historian) but you cannot deny Finnish role in the war on Ladoga, or of course you can ignore the uneasy side of it, since in your last comment there wasn't a word about Talvela and his role. So let's see how you put a spin on Seppälä's acount :wink:

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Post by Harri » 20 Dec 2005 20:34

The book by Olavi Väliaho tells about the departure of the Italian torpedo boats:
[Page 113]"21 October 1941. Mas 529 returned from Lahdenpohja, where its bottom had been cleaned. Capitano di corvetta [Giuseppe] Bianchini [Commander of Italian 12. Squadriglia MAS] announced in the evening that the Italian Naval Ministry had ordered squadron to move to Tallinn [Estonia] for winter."


So, no mentions of other reasons, just a simple order.

About the returning back and the losses in the last attack against Suho:
[Page 114 - 115]"22 October 1941. ... The returning was started at 9.14 O'clock. Barges were constantly under air raid. [Soviet] Gun boats followed and shot beyond the horizon about at the distance of 18.000 metres.
Colonel Järvinen ordered Mas Squadron to the point 146 a 31 where according to an observation was a smoking gun boat in fight with two barges. There was also one MTB. Napa [code name] announced after an hour: Mas 526 has left and 527 will left within ten minutes. Pump is being repaired. The results of the latest information of reconnaissance was announced to Napa:
- One gun boat at point 146 a 31, burning in full flames, the two other gun boats have left protected by the fog screen. The wounded ones were ordered to be brought away from the barges unless the attack is under way.
During returning barges could not keep the formation because of engine and other flaws, three times had to be returned back to gather the formation. Then P 21 had to be abandoned and exploded. During the battle one I [= Infanterie] boat lost and it had been seen towed by the enemy. Crew has been saved.
Mas 256 announced to get the wounded ones from the barges at 17.15. After half an hour arrived Mas 526 and 527 with about 20 seriously wounded ones. Mas 528 arrived, vessel had been since the last evening at 21 O'clock been with the barges of E.F.O. in the attack against Suho.
Own losses were 18 fallen, 22 seriously wounded and 21 slighty wounded ones. In combat two heavy barge, two light barges and one I boat were lost.
According to German announcement 21 enemy aircraft were shot down, of which Finns (of Flying Regiment 3) four."

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Post by Harri » 20 Dec 2005 21:00

batu wrote:Harri, cheerful as always :) the quote is correct, the reply is above. :wink:


:lol: (Yes...even more....)

batu wrote:you can make fun of the battle description itself taken from Kovalchuk's book, and you can even make point about Baryshnikov's tying the whole activity on Ladoga to the Suho operation and find many little facutal mistakes (after all Baryshnikov doesn't seem to be a military historian) but you cannot deny Finnish role in the war on Ladoga, or of course you can ignore the uneasy side of it, since in your last comment there wasn't a word about Talvela and his role. So let's see how you put a spin on Seppälä's acount :wink:


Mistakes in a serious book despite of its origin (Finnish, German, American, Russian...) may mean that also its conclusions are questionable. Finns don't have to accept anything which is not true, or claims that can not be proven correct using any serious sources. I have explained Talvela's role in my previous posts, like I did with Col. Järvinen. That is quite clear. Knowing the reputation of Talvela (he was one of the few Finnish extreme right wing Generals) and his earlier career I'm not surprised at all.

Seppälä in turn is a two-sided person among the Finnish military historians and a known supporter of certain Soviet views. No wonder he is used as a source by Baryshnikov. Some of his books have been translated in Russian but as far as I have understood (based on the excerpts seen in this forum) the translation is really bad and influnced by the "official Soviet view".

BTW "hässäkkä" = "hell of a mess" ("härdelli" means about the same) :P

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Post by batu » 21 Dec 2005 20:00

The most important point above is that the whole idea was general of Talvela's initiative, and Mannerheim gave its permission ot it.



That is not true. The initiative and plan came most likely from the Commander of Lake Ladoga Coastal Brigade Col. E. Järvinen. It is known that Gen. Talvela visited in the brigade in winter 1942. It is also known (I think that is also disputable, not a fact) that Talvela could have been the person who proposed the plan to Germans but it was by no means accepted by the Finnish Supreme HQ.

So, Gen. Talvela was not the "inventor", more he was the "messenger".


Well, it's just your personal opinion against Seppälä's opinion. Beides, instead of "it's not true", you should've written "I personally think, it's not true". But anyway you haven't presented any proof or argument behind your opinion.
And at the end, it doesn't matter much whether it was Talvela's or Kijanen's idea. It was Fininsh idea. Mannerheim was aware of it and he didn't do anything to stop it. WE don't know whether he was happy about it or not, but he gave medals to all German and Italian participants of the war on Ladoga, which suggests that he appreciated their job.

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Post by Harri » 21 Dec 2005 23:15

batu wrote:
batu wrote:The most important point above is that the whole idea was general of Talvela's initiative, and Mannerheim gave its permission ot it.
Harri wrote:That is not true. The initiative and plan came most likely from the Commander of Lake Ladoga Coastal Brigade Col. E. Järvinen. It is known that Gen. Talvela visited in the brigade in winter 1942. It is also known (I think that is also disputable, not a fact) that Talvela could have been the person who proposed the plan to Germans but it was by no means accepted by the Finnish Supreme HQ.
So, Gen. Talvela was not the "inventor", more he was the "messenger".

Well, it's just your personal opinion against Seppälä's opinion.


No, it is not. There are also other sources than Seppälä. If Seppälä is so excellent in your eyes then why do you then quote Seppälä instead of Baryshnikov?

batu wrote:Beides, instead of "it's not true", you should've written "I personally think, it's not true". But anyway you haven't presented any proof or argument behind your opinion.


You don't have to tell me what I can write. I have told the Finnish view. You have told yours based on Baryshnikov's view.

batu wrote:And at the end, it doesn't matter much whether it was Talvela's or Kijanen's idea.


Of course it does. If that is not known or true then also the rest of your argumentation is on a very weak ground. There is no room for inaccuracies in serious history research because if the interpretation in that level is wrong then also the conclusions are wrong.

What do you know about the plan Col. Järvinen presented to Talvela? What do you know what Talvela has discussed with Mannerheim (if he had)? What do you know what Talvela has discussed or proposed to Germans? And the last question: what do you know about the reaction in Finland when the German message that these naval units will be sent was received in Finland? Show us that essential information and the plan, and we will believe in you. If you can't do it then you or someone else (Baryshnikov?) have again "guessed" a bit.

You don't know anything directly from the original Finnish sources, all has come through Baryshnikov and the rest is either Baryshnikov's or your own "guesses"?

batu wrote:It was Fininsh idea.


So what? That's what I have said for the very beginning. Am I now guilty of killing people of Leningrad?

batu wrote:Mannerheim was aware of it and he didn't do anything to stop it.


Whose opinion is that?

batu wrote:WE don't know whether he was happy about it or not, but he gave medals to all German and Italian participants of the war on Ladoga, which suggests that he appreciated their job.


WE = ?

But we know.

Giving medals to each others is a common practise. If you finally would read the mentioned Gen. Wiljo Tuompo's diaries then you'd get much information also on that side (Tuompo was actually the General who made the final proposals of awards to Mannerheim who accepted them).

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