Grigorenko according to Suvorov wrote:They had completely prepared us for a war of aggression. And it was not our fault that the aggression had not come from us.
Grigorenko according to his own memoirs wrote:We were also convinced that the Party would from one moment to the next call upon us for the “final decisive battle”. Only it was not then our fault that the attack did not come from our side.
Starinov wrote:Both sentences are very similar in sense. The only difference that Suvorov says openly about a war of aggression while Grigorenko talks about a "final decisive battle".
No. The main difference is that Grigorenko is talking about himself and his bellicose fellow cadets in 1931
whose willingness to go into battle the military leadership would not take advantage of, whereas Suvorov makes it look as if "us" meant the Soviet Union and its armed forces in general, and that in 1941
Starinov wrote:Don't forget that the soviet propaganda was telling people for years that a war against the capitalists is coming since they all want to start a war against USSR. Soviet people should be prepared for any circumstances, etc, etc.
That may be so, but Grigorenko was referring only to himself and his fellow cadets in 1931, as opposed to a military leadership that
...neutralized our military preparedness by violently destroying the army’s best cadres.
Starinov wrote:Also, According to the article cited by Roberto above, Grigorenko states that the RKKA was not prepared for any actions at Khalkin-Gol.
Even if wrong, it would still be Grigorenko's statement. But he is not stating that the Soviet Army was not prepared for any actions at Khalkin-Gol. He states ("in connection with the border clashes at Khalkin-Gol", according to Kolthoff) that
Already then we, all freshly baked general staff officers, understood that our gigantic empire was completely unprepared for a war.
However, according to Colonel David M. Glantz in his book "When Titans Clashed" (page 14)
David M. Glantz wrote:Khalkin-Gol demonstrated the vialibilty of Soviet theory and force structure.
Which does not invalidate the existence of severe shortcomings in the Soviet armed forces, which the same author points out in Stumbling Colossus
Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.
Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns--and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.
Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete order of battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces for the first time available texts of Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.
At a time when the war in eastern Europe is being blamed on a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness, as well as its willingness, to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.
This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
From the Amazon review under http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... ce&s=books
Starinov wrote:It proved the RKKA's force so well that the Japanese started to search for another enemy knowing that the USSR is too powerful for them. I, personnaly, consider that Grigorenko was wrong on that one... My point is that Grigorenko could not be right about everything since he was a lieutenant in the first stages of the war...
The issue here is not whether Grigorenko's assessment was right or wrong.
The issue is that Suvorov misrepresented his statements and what this tells us about the man's integrity and his reliability as a writer of history.
I wouldn't go out of my way to defend the fellow, if I were you. It seems there are better Russian historians you may refer to, such as Vladimir A. Nieviezhin, whose book about Soviet propaganda promises to be quite interesting according to the review you posted under
What is the source of that review, by the way?