"Stalin's War of Extermination", by Joachim Hoffma

[Caldric]

Interesting discussion! I would like to run something by you to see what you think. Ernst Topitsch, in his "Stalins Krieg" (Stalins war), writes about a meeting between Hitler/Ribbentrop-Molotov on Nov. 12. 1940. He, Topitsch, claims that this meeting has been covered up by historians. In fact, he states, mention of it was disallowed in Nuremberg. As well, an order went out to the Soviet secret police to secure the minutes of this meeting as soon as the Red Army enters Berlin. At this meeting, just roughly, Molotov brought a list of demands from Stalin dealing with spheres of influence. If Topitsch is right and his sources are reliable, and why not, Hitler could never have accepted those demands. He had two options, accept and wait for further orders/demands, or war. Are any of you learned folk aware of this meeting?

Kershaw also talks about a meeting in November 1940 with Soviet and Germans. And that the Soviets were putting more pressure on the Germans for other areas.

I do not have the book in front of me but I will take a look at it when I get home.

Kershaw also stated that this was when Hitler gave the go ahead for the invasion of the USSR. I can not say much though because I most likely forgot parts of it.

As far as the USSR and US blackmailing into the war, well....

[Roberto]

Interesting discussion! I would like to run something by you to see what you think. Ernst Topitsch, in his "Stalins Krieg" (Stalins war), writes about a meeting between Hitler/Ribbentrop-Molotov on Nov. 12. 1940. He, Topitsch, claims that this meeting has been covered up by historians. In fact, he states, mention of it was disallowed in Nuremberg. As well, an order went out to the Soviet secret police to secure the minutes of this meeting as soon as the Red Army enters Berlin. At this meeting, just roughly, Molotov brought a list of demands from Stalin dealing with spheres of influence. If Topitsch is right and his sources are reliable, and why not, Hitler could never have accepted those demands. He had two options, accept and wait for further orders/demands, or war.

I have the following on the Hitler/Ribbentrop-Molotov meeting, what preceded it and what followed:

[...]The sudden expansion of Soviet territory westward, although conceded in principle in 1939, produced fresh anxieties in Berlin. The Soviet-Finnish war had left Germany in a difficult position, for her sympathies were with the Finns. After the end of the war German troops were stationed in Finland. The deliveries of machinery and weapons to the Soviet Union agreed upon in the pact were slow and irregular, in sharp contrast with the scrupulous provision by the Soviet side of materials and food. Despite constant Soviet complaints, the German suppliers dragged their heels whenever they could rather than allow the latest technology fall into Russian hands. From Hitler’s point of view the most unfortunate consequence of the pact was the rapid forward deployment of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. He was embroiled in a major war, which he had not wanted and which the pact had been supposed to avert. Now, instead of a powerful Germany dominating Eastern and Central Europe following Poland’s defeat, Germany was engaged in an unpredictable war against the British Empire, while the Soviet Union was free to extend its influence unchecked. The occupation of Bessarabia was a final blow. A few weeks later Goebbels wrote in his diary: ‘Perhaps we shall be forced to take steps against all this, despite everything, and drive this Asiatic spirit back out of Europe and into Asia, where it belongs.’
Hitler had anticipated him. On July 3 [1940],instructions were issued to the German armed forces, under the code name ‘Fritz’, to begin preliminary studies for an operation against the Soviet Union. At first the army believed that Hitler wanted to inflict only a local defeat on Soviet forces so as to push back the frontier between them and force Stalin to recognize ‘Germany’s dominant position in Europe’. The army told Hitler on July 21 that a limited campaign could be launched in four to six weeks. But Hitler’s ideas, which had at first been uncertain, hardened over the course of the month, as a stream of intelligence information came in showing how Soviet diplomats were now pushing into the Balkans in their efforts to spread Soviet influence. When Hitler’s Operations Chief, General Alfred Jodl, called together his senior colleagues on July 29, he had the most startling news. After making sure that every door and window in the conference room aboard a specially converted train was tightly sealed, he announced that Hitler had decided to rid the world ‘once and for all’ of the Soviet menace by a surprise attack scheduled for May 1941.
[….]
There can be no doubt that practical strategic issues did push Hitler towards the most radical of military solutions. But a great war in the East had always been part of his thinking. Here was the real stuff of Lebensraum – living space. Hitler’s plans assumed fantastic proportions. By August he had decided to seize the whole vast area stretching from Archangel to Astrakhan (the ‘A-A Line’) and to populate it with fortified garrison cities, keeping the population under the permanent control of the master race, while a rump Asian state beyond the Urals, the Slavlands, would accommodate the rest of the Soviet people. Planning moved forward on this basis. By the spring of 1941 comprehensive programmes for the racial, political and economic exploitation of the new empire had been drawn up. ‘Russia’, Hitler is reported as saying, ‘will be our India!’.
Every effort was made to keep the whole enterprise camouflaged. Hitler maintained relations with his Soviet ally, although they became acutely strained. On 27 September 1940 he signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, which divided the world into separate spheres of interest – ‘New Orders’ in the Mediterranean, eastern Asia and Europe. This realignment was read with unease in Moscow. The some month German troops appeared in Romania for the first time, and in Finland. Hungary and Romania joined the Tripartite Pact. In October Italy, which had joined the war on the German side in June, invaded Greece and opened up the prospect of fascist expansion into the Balkans. The on October 13 Stalin received a long, rambling letter from Ribbentrop which ended with a tantalizing invitation to join the Tripartite Pace and revise the world order together.
It is not entirely clear why Hitler authorized Ribbentrop to send the invitation. He may have hoped that the growing threat of the Soviet Union might be neutralized by agreement after all. He may have used it as an opportunity to find out just what Soviet ambitions were. But for Ribbentrop there was reason enough. He hoped that he could create a powerful bloc opposing the Anglo-Saxon powers and pull off another remarkable diplomatic coup. Stalin gave a cautious reply. It was arranged that Molotov go to Berlin in November. The object of the visit, according to General Alexander Vasilevsky, who accompanied him, was ‘to define Hitler’s intentions’ and to ‘hold off German aggression for as long as possible’. The evidence now suggests that Molotov was pursuing more than this, that Stalin wanted a second pact defining spheres of influence in Eastern Europe.
Molotov arrived by train on November 12. Two days of discussion followed which satisfied neither party. Molotov was so abrupt with Hitler that their meeting on the first afternoon became heated, and Hitler refused to attend the evening dinner to welcome the Soviet party. Hitler and Ribbentrop hinted that the Soviet Union should turn away from Europe towards British India. They talked in generalities, Molotov in details. His instructions were to discuss points that closely concerned Soviet security in Europe, but he found that the Germans were trying to get the Soviet Union embroiled in the war with Britain. There could be no agreement on this basis. In the middle of an embassy banquet on the 13th, Molotov found himself forced to take shelter from a British bombing raid. Taking advantage of the interruption, Ribbentrop presented Molotov with a draft treaty delimiting the Soviet ‘New Order’ ‘in the direction of the Indian Ocean’. With the noise of guns and bombs in the background, Molotov dismissed the suggestion and told Ribbentrop that what the Soviet Union really wanted was hard talking about Bulgaria, Turkey, Sweden, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece. The following day Molotov returned to Moscow. On November 25 he filed with the German ambassador a list of demands that represented the Soviet price for extending the alliance: German withdrawal from Finland, a free hand for the Soviet Union in Iran and the Persian Gulf and Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey. Hitler ordered Ribbentrop not to reply.
Agreement had always been unlikely, as both sides recognized. Goebbels watched Molotov and the Soviet delegation breakfasting with Hitler in the Chancellery. ‘Bolshevist subhumans’, he wrote in his diary, ‘not a single man of stature.’ On the very day of Molotov’s departure, Hitler ordered preparations ‘to settle accounts with Russia’. On December 15 he told his military staff that by the spring German ‘leadership, equipment and troops will visibly be at their zenith, the Russians at an unmistakable nadir’. On December 18 he signed War Directive Number 21 ordering the preparation for war on the Soviet Union, ‘Operation Barbarossa’. A date was set for the following May, ‘the first fine days’. On January 9, at his retreat in Berchtesgaden, he gave a speech on the future of Germany. ‘Russia must now be smashed,’ one witness recalled him saying. ‘The gigantic territory of Russia conceals immeasurable riches … Germany will have all means possible for waging war against continents … If this operation is carried through, Europe will hold its breath.’
The failure of Molotov’s visit did not diminish Stalin’s desire to avoid a direct military confrontation with Germany. The Soviet Union was not, as Hitler knew, ready for a major war, and would not be for at least a year. Stalin has often been pictured as a man blinded by appeasement, leading an unprepared country to the brink of ruin in 1941. It is certainly true that right up to the moment of German attack Stalin did not want war and hoped that it could be avoided by negotiation – a view not very different from Neville Chamberlain’s in 1939 – but the absence of preparation is a myth. The Soviet political and military leadership began to prepare the country from the autumn of 1940 for the possibility of a war with Germany. The problem was not the absence of preparation but the fundamental flaws in strategy and deployment that underpinned it.

Of course all of this is running countrary to the Zeitgeist. Germany and Japan, BAD, Italy bad at the beginning but became good later. England, USA and Russia GOOD, although Russia became bad later, but not really, just sort of, because there is still no interest in addressing the crimes of the Communists and anyone suggesting that they, the Russians, could also be blamed is a Nazi apologiser, as this thread shows.
Oh well
Wilf

Zeitgeist hin, Zeitgeist her, the problem is that there's plenty of evidence to Hitler's policies and aggressive intentions, whereas the evidence to similar intentions on the part of Stalin is rather thin.

So unless this situation changes, the pragmatic conclusion is that, although Stalin was no less a monster than Hitler and humanitarian considerations mattered as little to him as they did to his German counterpart, he wasn't the gambling warlord who would take the risk of an all-out attack on the most powerful military force of its time with the unprepared rabble of a Red Army he had on his hands.

[michael mills]

So, our esteemed colleague Roberto has posted an Amazon review of a book by David M. Glantz in support of positions taken by him.

Well, here is an Amazon review of Hoffmann's "Stalin's War of Extermination", which is after all the topic of this thread.

This important groundbreaking study, based on solid archival documentation, describes in detail the desperate attempt of the German Army to prevent Stalin's plan for a World Revolution by conquering Europe in a war of extermination. The author, Dr. Joachim Hoffmann, is clearly the most qualified specialist in Soviet military history in Germany. For over thirty years he has poured over Russian language documents about the Second World War. This book can be seen as the most important result of Dr. Hoffmann's long-lasting research. Because he followed certain official guidelines, the Freiburg Court Vice-President Johann Birk confirmed that this book does not violate any German law. This procedure was necessary in order to protect the author from criminal prosecution in Germany, where historians dissenting with official German myths are frequently subject to prosecution and sometimes even imprisonment. The dust cover of this book attempts to capture artistically what Dr. Hoffmann describes and substantiates in this book: Since the 1920s, Stalin planned to invade Western Europe in order to initiate the 'World Revolution.' The outbreak of the War between Germany and the Western Allies in 1939 gave Stalin the opportunity to prepre an attack against Europe which was unparalleled in history both in terms of Stalin's far-reaching goals as well as in terms of the amount of troops and armaments amassed at the Soviet border. Of course, Stalin's aggressive intentions did not escape Germany's notice who in turn planned a preventive strike against the Red Army. However, the Germans obviously underestimated both the strength of the Red Army and the determination of its leaders. What unfolded in June 1941 was undoubtedly the most cruel war in history. Dr. Hoffmann's book shows in detail how Stalin and his Bolshevik henchmen used unimaginable violence and atrocities to break any resistance in the Red Army and to force their unwilling soldiers to fight against the Germans who were anticipated as liberators from Stalinist oppression by most Russians. Stalin ordered not only to kill all German POWs, but also to kill Soviet soldiers who fell into German hands alive, because they failed to fight to their death. Dr. Hoffmann also explains how Soviet propagandists incited their soldiers to unbridled hatred against everything German, and he gives the reader a short but extremely unpleasant glimpse into what happened when these Soviet soldiers, dehumanized by Soviet propaganda and brutality, finally reached German soil in 1945: A gigantic wave of looting, arson, rape, torture and mass murder befell East Germany. After reading this book, the world should thank the German Army that they prevented Stalin from succeeding with his plans of World Revolution, despite all the wrongdoings the Germans committed themselves. Author Joachim Hoffmann, Dr. phil., born 1930 in Koenigsberg, East Prussia, studied modern history, Eastern European history and comparative ethnology at the University of Hamburg and Berlin's Free University. He received his PhD in history in 1959. Between 1960 and 1995, he was historian at the 'Militaergeschichtliche Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr' (Research Department for Military History of the German Army). His field of expertise was 'Armed Forces of the Soviet Union'; Dr. Hoffmann has authored numerous articles and books about political, diplomatic and military history of the 19th century and about the history of the German-Soviet war. In 1991, he was granted the 'Dr. Walter-Eckhardt' Award, and in 1992 the 'General Andrej Andrejewitsch Wlassow' Cultural Prize. Now retired, he lives near Freiburg, Germany.

Here is the link to the above review:

http://s1.amazon.com/exec/varzea/ts/exc ... 51-1984903


There is in fact a link to the above review from the review of the Glantz book, showing that the boys at Amazon are not practising censorship.

Now, would our friend Roberto accept the above review at face value?

No?

Would he say that it is biassed in favour of Hoffmann?

Would he perhaps say that Amazon has simply taken the book at its own estimation, and quoted a summary by the publishers?

If so, he will I am sure forgive us if we take the Amazon review of the Glantz book with the same grain of salt as he no doubt will apply to the review of Hoffmann's work.

By the way, I note that one of the reviewers of the Glantz book, one Dr Robert A Forczyk, has the following to say:

Finally, the Red Army staff misjudged the German main effort - which they expected in the southwest along the Kiev axis - and thus further weakened the defenses of Leningrad and Moscow.

That bears out what I have written a number of times on this forum. The German breakthrough succeeded because it was concentrated in the north, whereas the Soviet Union had concentrated its forces in the south, to guard against an expected German thrust to seize Ukraine and the Caucasus, and also to be able to move into Romania and cut Germany off from its main source of oil. At first, the Germans did not advance in the south because the Soviet Union had superiority in that sector.

[michael mills]

Caldric wrote:

Kershaw also talks about a meeting in November 1940 with Soviet and Germans. And that the Soviets were putting more pressure on the Germans for other areas.

I do not have the book in front of me but I will take a look at it when I get home.

Kershaw also stated that this was when Hitler gave the go ahead for the invasion of the USSR. I can not say much though because I most likely forgot parts of it.

Here is an assessment of Molotov's visit to Berlin in "The Unholy Alliance", by Geoffrey Roberts, 1989, pp. 196-198.

Molotov arrived in Berlin on 12 November and the talks began. Ribbentrop outlined three German proposals: Russia to have a formal connection with the Axis by joining the Tripartite Pact; a secret spheres of influence agreement to be concluded between Italy, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union in which each would agree to direct their expansion southwards, in the case of Russia in the direction of the Indian Ocean; and the problem of Turkey and the Straits to be resolved in Russia's favour. What these proposals amounted to was a four-power pact aimed at the occupation of Britain's colonial empire - in Africa, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent and South-East Asia. Molotov replied that, while an exchange of views was useful, a definintion of long-range interests on such a broad scale would take time. More immediate problems in German-Soviet relations had to be cleared up first. Recent events had made earlier agreements redundant.
[Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy, series D, vol. 11, pp. 508-10 and 533-41. See also Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 255-8].

Similar exchanges took place between Molotov and Hitler. Hitler argued that 'the Soviet Union had to realize that in the framework of broader collaboration.....advantages of quite a different scope were to be reached'. But Molotov wanted to know what the German attitude toward a Russian guarantee to Bulgaria would be. And about German troops in Finland and Rumania. This provoked a heated discussion.
[Source: DGFP pp. 541-9].

According to the Soviet diplomat Valentin Berezhkov, after the first day Moscow sent a message with instructions for the rest of the negotiations:

'The Soviet Government categorically declined Hitler's attempt to involve us in discussions about the 'division of British property'. The instructions again stressed that we should press the German Government for explanations connected with matters of European security and questions which touched directly on the interests of the Soviet Union'.
[Source: V M Berezhkov, S Diplomaticheskoi Missiei v Berlin 1940-1941, Moscow 1966, p. 33].

In line with these instructions, the impasse of the early conversations remained unbroken through to the final meeting between Ribbentrop and Molotov on 14 November:

'The question which interested the Soviet Union in the Near East concerned not only Turkey, but Bulgaria.....the fate of Rumania was also of interst to the Soviet Union and could not be immaterial to her in any circumstances. It would further interest the Soviet Government to learn what the Axis contemplated with regard to Yugoslavia.....Greece....and Poland......(Molotov)

He could only repeat again and again that the decisive question was whether the Soviet Union was prepared and in a position to co-operate with us in the great liquidation of the British Empire. (Ribbentrop)'.
[Source: DGFP, series D, vol. 11, pp. 562-70].

Schulenburg was presented with a formal Soviet response to the German proposals in Moscow on 25 Novemebr. The Russians demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Finland; a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assitance treaty, with provision for Soviet military bases; recognition of the area south of Batum and Baku as the focal point of 'the aspirations of the Soviet Union'; and Japanese renunciation of their rights to coal and oil in North Sakhalin [Source: Nazi Soviet Relations, pp. 258-9]. As John Erickson has commented:

'Stalin's response........was in every sense a test of Hitler's intentions: the Soviet terms for joining a four power pact amounted to giving Hitler full freedom in the west only at the price of foreclosing his option to wage a successful war against the Soviet Union'.
[Source: 'Threat Identification and Strategic Appraisal by the Soviet Union, 1930-1941', in May, "Knowing One's Enemies", p. 414.]

No German reply to the Soviet terms was ever received. Hitler had already made up his mind to invade the USSR. On 18 December he signed the directive for Operation Barbarossa.
[Source: Documents on International Affairs (London: RIIA, 1954) pp. 68-72].

What the Soviet leadership concluded from the Berlin discussions has yet to be revealed. The only documental hint of their overall assessment is contained in a message to Maisky from Molotov on his return to Moscow:

'The discussions revealed that the Germans want to appropriate Turkey under the guise of guaranteeing her security in the manner of Rumania and cajole us with the promise of revising the Montreux Convention in our favour and the offer of helping us in this matter. We did not consent to this because we think that, firstly, Turkey must remain independent and, secondly, the Straits regime can be improved through negotiations with Turkey and not behind her back. The Germans and Japanese are apparently very keen to push us in the direction of the Persian Gulf and India. We refused to discuss this question because we consider this sort of advice from Germany out of place'.

[neugierig]

Thank you all! So, the meeting took place. What went down? Who knows, different authors, different points of view. Topitsch writes about a Soviet demand which would have turned the Baltic See into a Russian interior lake. Maybe.
Roberto writes that there is plenty of evidence for Hitler's aggressive planning and hardly any for Soviet aggression. No, really??? :roll: The victor writes the history and it is a time honoured tradition to portray the defeated as scum. That's what I meant by Zeitgeist. The Red Army overran Germany, they had access to all the documents that were not destroyed, and perhaps using a bit of creative interpretation, made their point. Does anybody really think they would have left any incriminating material laying around?Following a brief period of openness, after the collapse of the Societ Union, I understand the Russian archives are closed again, or at least extremely hard to access. Further more, the defeat of the Hitlerite Hordes is still celebrated annually, it still binds the Russian people together. So, things aren't going to change anytime soon. I lived for almost ten years in the German Democratic Republic, after the war, were we were force fed all that crap about the peaceful and glorious Soviet Union.
Now to the other point Roberto is trying to make, about the rabble Soviet forces not being ready for war. If this was so, and unrealistic demands were made at this meeting by the Soviets, than maybe the German Leaders wanted to grasp the opportunity, knowing further demands would follow and that they than would have to deal with a much more powerful opponent. Perhaps... I've talked to a number of German veterans who fought in the east, all of them said that the Red Army was badly led and organized and only with shier numbers and the generous help of the US and Britain were they able to win the war. Since I wasn't there, I have to take their word for it.
Tomorrow, November 11., is Remembrance/Veterance day. It started out, here in Canada, with a moment of silence, was called Armistice day and has now, decades later graduated to a full fledged holiday. Don't get me wrong, I feel sorrow for every soldier that died in action, regardless of nationality, they were just pawns. But by rememberin/celebrating the defeat of the Germans/Japanese, and thats essentially what it is, the Feindbild (image of the enemy), is maintained. In my other post I mentioned the book "Day of Deceit". The author shows clearly that FDR & Co. were well aware of the Japanese plan to attack Pearl Harbour. This should unleash a storm of protest, because it proofs FDR sacrificed his soldiers so he could finally enter the war. Nothing. "We freed the world from the Nazis, fought the good fight, because they were about to attack America and conquer the world". (all 80 Million of them, counting woman and children)
Sounds familiar? The Communists told the Proletariat of the World to unite, under Russian auspices of course (Russin world domination)
Now Bush tells us, or is trying to since he is unable to string five words together, that we must make the world free for Democracy, under US auspices of course (US world domination) Have we learned anything? NO.
What fools us mortals be.
Wilf

[Roberto]

So, our esteemed colleague Roberto has posted an Amazon review of a book by David M. Glantz in support of positions taken by him.

Well, here is an Amazon review of Hoffmann's "Stalin's War of Extermination", which is after all the topic of this thread.

[...]

There is in fact a link to the above review from the review of the Glantz book, showing that the boys at Amazon are not practising censorship.

Now, would our friend Roberto accept the above review at face value?

No?

Would he say that it is biassed in favour of Hoffmann?

Would he perhaps say that Amazon has simply taken the book at its own estimation, and quoted a summary by the publishers?

If so, he will I am sure forgive us if we take the Amazon review of the Glantz book with the same grain of salt as he no doubt will apply to the review of Hoffmann's work.

In his pathetic eagerness to level accusations against me, Mills completely overlooked the context of my citation of the review of Glantz's book, which was meant to show Starinov that the same Glantz who Starinov cites in support of his contention that Soviet troops had shown their preparedness at Khalkin Gol obviously identified severe shortcomings hampering the Red Army's military performance in 1941:

However, according to Colonel David M. Glantz in his book "When Titans Clashed" (page 14)

Khalkin-Gol demonstrated the vialibilty of Soviet theory and force structure.

Which does not invalidate the existence of severe shortcomings in the Soviet armed forces, which the same author points out in Stumbling Colossus:

Germany's surprise attack on June 22, 1941, shocked a Soviet Union woefully unprepared to defend itself. The day before the attack, the Red Army still comprised the world's largest fighting force. But by the end of the year, four and a half million of its soldiers lay dead. This new study, based on formerly classified Soviet archival material and neglected German sources, reveals the truth behind this national catastrophe.
Drawing on evidence never before seen in the West, including combat records of early engagements, David Glantz claims that in 1941 the Red Army was poorly trained, inadequately equipped, ineptly organized, and consequently incapable of engaging in large-scale military campaigns--and both Hitler and Stalin knew it. He provides a complete and convincing study of why the Soviets almost lost the war that summer, dispelling many of the myths about the Red Army that have persisted since the war and soundly refuting Viktor Suvorov's controversial thesis that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike against Germany.

Stumbling Colossus describes the Red Army's command leadership, mobilization and war planning, intelligence activities, and active and reserve combat formations. It includes the first complete order of battle of Soviet forces on the eve of the German attack, documents the strength of Soviet armored forces during the war's initial period, and reproduces for the first time available texts of Soviet war plans. It also provides biographical sketches of Soviet officers and tells how Stalin's purges of the late 1930s left the Red Army leadership almost decimated.

At a time when the war in eastern Europe is being blamed on a fallen regime, Glantz's book sets the record straight on the Soviet Union's readiness, as well as its willingness, to fight. Boasting an extensive bibliography of Soviet and German sources, Stumbling Colossus is a convincing study that overshadows recent revisionist history and one that no student of World War II can ignore.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

From the Amazon review under

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/de ... ce&s=books

Whether Glantz really achieved in his book what the review says he achieved is another question, although it would not be surprising that he so did given Suvorov’s inability to put legs under his contentions.

Keep making a fool out of yourself, Mills. I’m enjoying every minute of it.

[Roberto]

Roberto writes that there is plenty of evidence for Hitler's aggressive planning and hardly any for Soviet aggression. No, really??? :roll: The victor writes the history and it is a time honoured tradition to portray the defeated as scum.

Does that affect the quality of the evidence to Hitler's aggressive plans?

Does it change the fact that, a decade after the opening of the former Soviet archives, the evidence to any plan of Stalin's to wage war of aggression is still scant, whereas the evidence that he harbored no such intention (for obvious practical rather than for moral reasons, of course) is plentiful?

That's what I meant by Zeitgeist. The Red Army overran Germany, they had access to all the documents that were not destroyed, and perhaps using a bit of creative interpretation, made their point. Does anybody really think they would have left any incriminating material laying around?

If they did not, tough luck for those who claim such evidence existed. They will have to keep trying to sell unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.

But the situation may not be so bad, given that it was not the habit of the Soviet government and its intelligence services to destroy any documentation, but rather to file it and keep it "for all times". As they had no reason to assume their regime would ever be defeated or otherwise come to an end (such an assumption would also have been contrary to Marxist-Leninist ideology), there was also no reason for them to destroy "incriminating material".

Following a brief period of openness, after the collapse of the Societ Union, I understand the Russian archives are closed again, or at least extremely hard to access.

Is that so? Where did you read that?

Further more, the defeat of the Hitlerite Hordes is still celebrated annually, it still binds the Russian people together.

I can see nothing wrong with that. But the glasnost period and the post-Soviet period also saw bitter recrimination of the faults and phobias of the Soviet regime in general and Stalin's rule in particular, including his conduct of the war. I remember having once read in a Newsweek article that one Soviet politician or historian considered the same to be bordering on "self-flagellation". Why did all this "self-flagellation" not produce any evidence about Soviet plans to attack Germany in 1941? Is anything known about late-night shredding sessions at the archives of the former Soviet Union before they were opened to the public?

So, things aren't going to change anytime soon. I lived for almost ten years in the German Democratic Republic, after the war, were we were force fed all that crap about the peaceful and glorious Soviet Union.

Who said Stalin was a peace-loving fellow?

The evidence suggests not that he was peaceful, but that he didn't consider his country to be in a condition to wage war and had no reason to think it was.

Now to the other point Roberto is trying to make, about the rabble Soviet forces not being ready for war. If this was so, and unrealistic demands were made at this meeting by the Soviets,

What "unrealistic demands"? German withdrawal from Finland, a free hand for the Soviet Union in Iran and the Persian Gulf and Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey ?

than maybe the German Leaders wanted to grasp the opportunity, knowing further demands would follow and that they than would have to deal with a much more powerful opponent.

Well, as Overy tells us in the passages I quoted, Hitler had made up his mind to get rid of the Soviet Union even before such "unrealistic demands" were made. Further evidence collected by Shirer corroborates this and suggests that one of his goals in attacking the Soviet Union was depriving Britain of its Festlandssegen:

From the captured Nazi documents and from the testimony of many leading German figures in the great drama that was being played over the vast expanse of Western Europe that year, it is plain that at the very moment of Stalin’s monumental complacency Hitler had in fact been mulling over in his mind the idea of turning on the Soviet Union and destroying her.

The basic idea went back much further, at least fifteen years - to Mein Kampf.

And so we National Socialists [Hitler wrote] take up where we broke off six hundred years ago. We stop the endless German movement toward the south and west of Europe and turn our gaze toward the lands of the East ... when we speak of new territory in Europe today we must think principally of Russia and her border vassal states. Destiny itself seems to wish to point our the way to us here ... This colossal empire in the East is ripe for dissolution, and the end of the Jewish domination in Russia will also be the end of Russia as a state.

This idea lay like bedrock in Hitler’s mind, and his pact with Stalin had not changed it at all, but merely postponed acting on it. And but briefly. In fact, less than two months after the deal was signed and had been utilized to destroy Poland, the Führer instructed the Army that the conquered Polish territory was to be regarded “as an assembly area for future German operations.” The date was October 18, 1939, and Halder recorded that day in his diary.
Five weeks later, on November 22, when he harangued his reluctant generals about attacking in the West, Russia was by no means out of his mind. “We can oppose Russia,” he declared, “only when we are free in the West.” At that time the two-front war, the nightmare of German generals for a century, was very much on Hitler’s mind, and he spoke of it at length on this occasion. He would not repeat the mistake of former German rulers; he could continue to see to it that the Army had one front at a time.
It was only natural, then, that with the fall of France, the chasing of the British Army across the Channel and the prospects of Britain’s imminent collapse, Hitler’s thoughts should turn once again to Russia. For he now supposed himself to be free in the West and thereby to have achieved the one condition he had laid down in order to be in a position to “oppose Russia.” the rapidity with which Stalin seized the Baltic States and the two Romanian provinces in June spurred Hitler to a decision.
The moment of its making can now be traced. Jodl says that the “fundamental decision” was taken “as far back as during the Western Campaign.” Colonel Walter Warlimont, Jodl’s deputy at OKW, remembered that on July 29 Jodl announced at a meeting of Operations Staff officers that “Hitler intended to attack the U.S.S.R. in the spring of 1941.” Sometime previous to this meeting, Jodl related, Hitler had told Keitel “that he intended to launch the attack against the U.S.S.R. during the fall of 1940.” But this was too much even for Keitel and he had argued Hitler out of it by contending that not only the bad weather in the autumn but the difficulties of transferring the bulk of the Army from the West to the East made it impossible. By the time of this conference on July 29, Warlimont relates, “the date for the intended attack [against Russia] had been moved back to the spring of 1941.”
Only a week before, we know from Halder’s diary, the Führer had still held to a possible campaign in Russia for the autumn if Britain were not invaded. At a military conference in Berlin on July 21 he told Brauchitsch to get busy on the preparations for it. That the Army Commander in Chief had already given the problem some thought - but not enough thought - is evident from his response to Hitler. Brauchitsch told the Leader that the campaign “would last four to six weeks” and that the aim would be “to defeat the Russian Army or at least to occupy enough Russian territory so that Soviet bombers could not reach Berlin or the Silesian industrial area while, on the other hand, the Luftwaffe bombers could reach all important objectives in the Soviet Union.” Brauchitsch thought that from eighty to a hundred German divisions could do the job; he assessed Russian strength at “fifty to seventy-five good divisions.” Halder’s notes on what Brauchitsch told him of the meeting show that Hitler had been stung by Stalin’s grabs in the East, that he thought the Soviet dictator was “coquetting with England” in order to encourage her to hold out, but that he had seen no signs that Russia was preparing to enter the war against Germany.
At a further conference at the Berghof on the last day of July 1940, the receding prospects of an invasion of Britain prompted Hitler to announce for the first time to his Army chiefs his decision on Russia. Halder was personally present this time and jotted down his shorthand notes of exactly what the warlord said. They reveal not only that Hitler had made a definite decision to attack Russia in the following spring but that he had already worked out in his mind the major strategic aims.

Britain’s hope [Hitler said] lies in Russia and America. If that hope in Russia is destroyed then it will be destroyed for America too because elimination of Russia will enormously increase Japan’s power in the Far East.

The more he thought of it the more convinced he was, Hitler said, that Britain’s stubborn determination to continue the war was due to its counting on the Soviet Union.

Something strange [he explained] has happened in Britain! The British were already completely down. Now they are back on their feet. Intercepted conversations. Russia unpleasantly disturbed by the swift development in Western Europe.
Russia needs only to hint to England that she does not wish to see Germany too strong and the English, like a drowning man, will regain hope that the situation in six to eight months will have completely changed.
But if Russia is smashed, Britain’s last hope will be shattered. Then Germany will be master of Europe and the Balkans.
Decision: In view of these considerations Russia must be liquidated. Spring, 1941.
The sooner Russia is smashed, the better.

The Nazi warlord then elaborated on his strategic plans which, it was obvious to the generals, had been ripening in his mind for some time despite all his preoccupations with the fighting in the West. The operation, he said, would be worth carrying out only if its aim was to shatter the Soviet nation in one great blow. Conquering a lot of Russian territory would not be enough. “Wiping out the very power to exist of Russia! That is the goal!” Hitler emphasized. There would be two initial drives: one in the south to Kiev and the Dnieper River, the second in the north up through the Baltic States and then toward Moscow. There the two armies would make a junction. After that a special operation, if necessary, to secure the Baku oil fields. The very thought of such new conquests excited Hitler; he already had in his mind what he would do with them. He would annex outright, he said, the Ukraine, White Russia and the Baltic States and extend Finland’s territory to the White Sea. For the whole operation he would allot 120 divisions, keeping sixty divisions for the defense of the West and Scandinavia. The attack, he laid it down, would begin in May 1941 and would take five months to carry through. It would be finished by winter. He would have preferred, he said, to do it this year but this had not proved possible.
The next day, August 1, Halder went to work on the plans with his General Staff. Though he would later claim to have opposed the whole idea of an attack on Russia as insane, his diary entry for this day discloses him full of enthusiasm as he applied himself to the challenging new task.
Planning now went ahead with typical German thoroughness on three levels: that of the Army General Staff, of Warlimont’s Operations Staff at OKW, of General Thomas’ Economic and Armaments Branch of OKW. Thomas was instructed on August 14 by Göring that Hitler desired deliveries of ordered goods to the Russians “only till spring of 1941.” In the meantime his office was to make a detailed survey of Soviet industry, transportation and oil centers both as a guide to targets and later on as an aid for administering Russia.
A few days before, on August 9, Warlimont had got out his first directive for preparing the deployment areas in the East for the jump-off against the Russians. On August 26, Hitler ordered ten infantry and two armored divisions to be sent from the West to Poland. The panzer units, he stipulated, were to be concentrated in southeastern Poland so that they could intervene to protect the Romanian oil fields. The transfer of large bodies of troops to the East could not be done without exciting Stalin’s easily aroused suspicions if he learned of it, and the Germans went to great lengths to see that he didn’t. Since some movements were bound to be detected, General Ernst Köstring, the German military attaché in Moscow, was instructed to inform the Soviet General Staff that it was merely a question of replacing older men, who were being released to industry, by younger men. On September 6, Jodl got out a directive outlining in considerable detail the means of camouflage and deception. “These regroupings,” he laid it down, “must not create the impression in Russia that we are preparing an offensive in the East.”
So that the armed services should not rest on their laurels after the great victories of the summer, Hitler issued on November 12, 1940, a comprehensive top-secret directive outlining military tasks all over Europe and beyond. We shall come back to some of them. What concerns us here is that portion dealing with the Soviet Union.

Political discussions have been initiated with the aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued. Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline of the Army’s operation plans have been submitted to, and approved by, me.

As a matter of fact, on that very day, November 12, Molotov arrived in Berlin to continue with Hitler himself those political discussions.

Emphases are mine.

[Roberto]

Perhaps... I've talked to a number of German veterans who fought in the east, all of them said that the Red Army was badly led and organized and only with shier numbers and the generous help of the US and Britain were they able to win the war.

As an aside, I also remember having spoken with two German veterans about the fighting on the Eastern front.

One was an anti-tank gunner who, from what I understood of his geographic indications, fought on the Volkhov front. He spoke about Soviet mastery at camouflage and the rifle marksmanship of their snipers that he and his buddies were scared shitless of.

The other had been a paratrooper who fought on Crete, later on the Eastern front and at the end of the war in Italy. I remember he unfavorably compared the fighting prowess of US soldiers to that of Soviet soldiers, whom he considered not so well equipped but much tougher fighters.

None of this, of course, invalidates the fact that many Soviet soldiers had never seen a bicycle until they came to Berlin, as I remember having read in several sources and even once heard in what I presume to have been a glasnost - era film of the late GDR. Maybe you can help me with the title of that film, which I don't remember.

[Starinov]

I re-read parts of Ivanov's memoirs and what the General said was altered by Suvorov. In the original, Ivanov said that the Germans were faster in bringing their troops to combat readiness by two weeks but there is no mention of an attack.

I apologize for using that source before....

[Roberto]

I re-read parts of Ivanov's memoirs and what the General said was altered by Suvorov. In the original, Ivanov said that the Germans were faster in bringing their troops to combat readiness by two weeks but there is no mention of an attack.

I apologize for using that source before....

No problem.

[neugierig]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

neugierig wrote:
Roberto writes that there is plenty of evidence for Hitler's aggressive planning and hardly any for Soviet aggression. No, really??? The victor writes the history and it is a time honoured tradition to portray the defeated as scum.


Does that affect the quality of the evidence to Hitler's aggressive plans?

Hitler hated Communism and wanted to destroy it. That's not a secret. The topic is whether the innocent and peaceloving SU was totally unprepared for the "Feigen Überfall Hitlerdeutschlands" (cowardly suprise attack of the Nazis), or if Stalin knew war was inevitable and did his best to provoke Hitler so he could claim to be the victim. Topitsch refers to a speech Stalin gave in front of some graduates of a military academy, on May 5, 1941. Next day "Prawda", in a short article titled: "We have to be prepared for any eventuality" (my rough translation) mentions the speech and that Stalin told the graduates that: "....because of the necessities of modern warfare, the army has been modernized and equipped accordingly....." There are, according to Topitsch, different versions of this speech, but Stalin supposedly stated that war was inevitable, it would start no later than 1942, and that, if need be, the SU would have to take the initiative. How good are Topitsch's sources? I don't know but I think as good as the ones claiming Hitler's 'Alleinschuld'. Of course, it doesn't fit in with the Zeitgeist and every effort must be made to discredit them. I still go back to the afore mentioned meeting and the unreasonable demands that were made by the SU. Can I 'prove' them? I could quote some sources but I haven't read any of the books that are the source of those quotes, so...no, not at the moment. It just strikes me funny that Stalin seems to have used the same tactics as the US used to get Japan to attack, which is a fact. As far as documents go, I know we have lots and lots that prove Hitler's guilt and none, or hardly any to lessen same. Does this prove that he is guilty as charged? Not in my HO. Many documents are still locked up, we are being manipulated. For example, when the GDR gave up it's ghost, the Stasi documents were seized by US authorities and shipped to the USA. I can't remember how long the kept them, but they are now back in Germany, or so we are told. Why were they seized and have all of them been returned? Did anybody know for certain how many were shipped and how many returned? What did the Americans do with them? Look at the pictures? I think not. Anything incriminating was removed and destroyed. Did we hear the sound of shredders? No. Can I prove any of this? Of course not, but please give me your explanation. Because a lot of documents are still locked up and I'm sure some of them have been destroyed, it is impossible to state anything definitively, it would be like reading a book starting with page 27 and then writing a review, not knowing what the first 26 pages contained. Anybody saying he/she knows exactly what happened/is happening, I could give them a good deal on the Brooklyn Bridge. We need to think critically, like Scott Smith. Oh no, there goes my reputation.
Wilf
PS.: I don't know how to work this newfangled thing to show quotes in the proper place and order, can someone give me some pointers? Please.

[Roberto]

Roberto writes that there is plenty of evidence for Hitler's aggressive planning and hardly any for Soviet aggression. No, really??? The victor writes the history and it is a time honoured tradition to portray the defeated as scum.

Does that affect the quality of the evidence to Hitler's aggressive plans?

Hitler hated Communism and wanted to destroy it. That's not a secret. The topic is whether the innocent and peaceloving SU was totally unprepared for the "Feigen Überfall Hitlerdeutschlands" (cowardly suprise attack of the Nazis), or if Stalin knew war was inevitable and did his best to provoke Hitler so he could claim to be the victim.

Again, who said anything about an “innocent and peaceloving SU”?

Stalin was neither innocent nor peace-loving, he just knew that his country was not prepared for waging war against Germany.

As to what else Stalin knew and did, evidence suggests that he did what he could to avoid any provocation, as a matter of fact.

And as to the SU’s being unprepared,

[…]It is certainly true that right up to the moment of the German attack Stalin did not want war and hoped that it could be avoided by negotiation – a view not very different from Neville Chamberlain in 1939 – but the absence of preparation is a myth. The Soviet political and military leadership began to prepare the country from the autumn of 1940 for the possibility of a war with Germany. The problem was not the absence of preparation but the fundamental flaws in strategy and deployment that underpinned it.[…]

Emphases are mine.

Topitsch refers to a speech Stalin gave in front of some graduates of a military academy, on May 5, 1941. Next day "Prawda", in a short article titled: "We have to be prepared for any eventuality" (my rough translation) mentions the speech and that Stalin told the graduates that: "....because of the necessities of modern warfare, the army has been modernized and equipped accordingly....." There are, according to Topitsch, different versions of this speech, but Stalin supposedly stated that war was inevitable, it would start no later than 1942, and that, if need be, the SU would have to take the initiative.

I have the following on this famous speech:

It is also true that Stalin and other military leaders stressed that the Red Army was an offensive force. On May 5 Stalin spoke publicly about the Soviet military: ‘The Red Army is a modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army’. This, too, has been taken as evidence of malign intent. Yet it is entirely consistent with the Soviet view of fighting dating from the 1920s. Defense was regarded neither as an acceptable option for a revolutionary state, nor as militarily desirable. Stalin said nothing that had not been said a hundred times before.

How good are Topitsch's sources?

And how good is his rendering thereof?

I don't know but I think as good as the ones claiming Hitler's 'Alleinschuld'.

What exactly is 'Alleinschuld' supposed to mean?

Whatever Stalin's plans for the future were, there's no evidence that Hitler's attack, at the time it was staged, was anything other than unprovoked aggression.

Of course, it doesn't fit in with the Zeitgeist and every effort must be made to discredit them.

Again the "Zeitgeist", which is rather irrelevant as long as Suvorov, Topitsch et al are unable to provide any conclusive evidence in support of their contentions - and which, to the extent that it exists at all, will have to bend to their theories as soon as they have something substantial to show.

I still go back to the afore mentioned meeting and the unreasonable demands that were made by the SU.

Again, what "unreasonable demands"?

German withdrawal from Finland, a free hand for the Soviet Union in Iran and the Persian Gulf and Soviet bases in Bulgaria and Turkey?

It just strikes me funny that Stalin seems to have used the same tactics as the US used to get Japan to attack, which is a fact.

In your mind, perhaps, unless you can provide evidence in that direction.

As to Stalin, the available evidence to his behavior suggests that, rather than trying to get Germany to attack (something he didn't have to do for, as we have seen, Hitler had been preparing the attack already before the Molotov visit) he did what he could to appease Germany and to avoid any provocation, trying to delay as much as possible an attack that he knew his armed forces were not prepared for.

This is how German military intelligence of the Wehrmachtsabteilung Fremde Heere Ost saw the situation, for instance:

Feindbeurteilung vom 20.5.1941:

"Die Rote Armee steht mit der Masse der Verbände des europäischen Teils der UdSSR, d.h. mit rund 130 Schützendivisionen - 21 Kavalleriedivisionen - 5 Panzerdivisionen - 36 mot.-mech. Panzerbrigaden entlang der Westgrenze von Czernowitz bis Murmansk...Die Tatsache, dass bisher weit günstigere Gelegenheiten eines Präventivkrieges (schwache Kräfte im Osten, Balkankrieg) von der UdSSR nicht ausgenutzt wurden, ferner das gerade in letzter Zeit fühlbare politische Entgegenkommen und festzustellende Bestreben der Vermeidung möglicher Reibungspunkte lassen eine Angriffsabsicht unwahrscheinlich erscheinen... Grenznahe, zähe Verteidigung, verbunden mit Teilangriffen zu Beginn des Krieges und während der Operationen als Gegenangriffe gegen den durchgebrochenen Feind...erscheint aufgrund der politischen Verhältnisse und des bisher erkennbaren Aufmarsches am wahrscheinlichsten."
(Quelle: BA-MA Freiburg, RH 2/1983)

Source of quote:

http://hometown.aol.com/wigbertbenz

My translation:

Assessment of the Enemy, 20.5.1941:

"The Red Army stands with the mass of its units in the European part of the USSR, i.e. with about 130 rifle divisions - 21 cavalry divisions - 5 tank divisions - 36 motorized – mechanized tank brigades, along the western border from Czernowitz to Murmansk. The fact that hitherto far more advantageous opportunities for a preventive war (weak forces in the East, war in the Balkans) have not been taken advantage of by the USSR, furthermore the political condescension that has made itself especially felt more recently and the apparent endeavor to avoid possible points of friction, let the possibility of an attack seem improbable... Tough defense near the border, combined with partial attacks at the beginning of the war and during the operations as counterattacks against the enemy who has broken through ... are what in the face of the political situation and the so far recognizable order of battle seems most probable."
(Source: BA-MA [Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv = Federal Archives-Military Archives of the FRG], Freiburg, RH 2/1983)

Emphasis is mine.

As far as documents go, I know we have lots and lots that prove Hitler's guilt and none, or hardly any to lessen same. Does this prove that he is guilty as charged? Not in my HO.

Why not?

The documents speak a rather clear language.

Many documents are still locked up, we are being manipulated.

Yawn.

Do we have here another conspiracy theorist living in a Wolkenkuckucksheim of hidden menaces ?

For example, when the GDR gave up it's ghost, the Stasi documents were seized by US authorities and shipped to the USA. I can't remember how long the kept them, but they are now back in Germany, or so we are told.

Who is telling "us" so? (= what source are your contentions based on?)

Why were they seized and have all of them been returned? Did anybody know for certain how many were shipped and how many returned? What did the Americans do with them? Look at the pictures? I think not. Anything incriminating was removed and destroyed. Did we hear the sound of shredders? No. Can I prove any of this? Of course not, but please give me your explanation.

Explanation for what?

If you believe that documents were destroyed or suppressed, the burden of proof is on you.

Because a lot of documents are still locked up and I'm sure some of them have been destroyed, it is impossible to state anything definitively, it would be like reading a book starting with page 27 and then writing a review, not knowing what the first 26 pages contained.

What you are sure of hardly matters.

What you can demonstrate is what counts.

If you can provide no evidence, then either those "manipulators" you believe in did a splendid job or there was no manipulation at all.

Either way, it's tough luck for those who like to fantasize that they are being "manipulated".

Anybody saying he/she knows exactly what happened/is happening, I could give them a good deal on the Brooklyn Bridge.

That's what I tell people hooked on conspiracy theories which are not only implausible (in that they would require the connivance of state authorities and historians worldwide, among other things) but for which they can also not offer a shred of evidence.

We need to think critically,

That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.

How about thinking critically about what these fellows produce?

There are reasons enough to be suspicious, some of which have been discussed on this thread.

like Scott Smith. Oh no, there goes my reputation.

Relax, for now I'll give you the benefit of doubt and assume that you're merely a trusting soul who hasn't been around this forum long enough - even though your "we need to ..." rhetoric carries a strong smell of herring.

[Scott Smith]

PS.: I don't know how to work this newfangled thing to show quotes in the proper place and order, can someone give me some pointers? Please.

It's not too difficult, but some of the long-term posters still don't get it.

This turns on the quote bubble:

Code: Select all

[quote]

This turns it off:

Code: Select all

[/quote]

If you want it to say whose quote it is use this:

Code: Select all

[quote="Scott"]

And then don't forget to turn the command back off:

Code: Select all

[/quote]

Example:

Code: Select all

[quote="Roberto"]Relax, for now I'll give you the benefit of doubt and assume that you're merely a trusting soul who hasn't been around this forum long enough - even though your "we need to ..." rhetoric carries a strong smell of herring.[/quote]

Will print like this:

Relax, for now I'll give you the benefit of doubt and assume that you're merely a trusting soul who hasn't been around this forum long enough - even though your "we need to ..." rhetoric carries a strong smell of herring.

Now, to get really tricky for quote-bubbles inside of quote-bubbles!

Code: Select all

[quote="Roberto"][quote="neugierig"]We need to think critically,[/quote]
That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.[/quote]

Will print like this:

We need to think critically,

That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.

Now, here's a hypothetical three-way:

Code: Select all

[quote="Scott"][quote="Roberto"][quote="neugierig"]We need to think critically,[/quote]
That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.[/quote]
Blah, Blah, Blah.  :mrgreen: [/quote]

Which will print like this:

We need to think critically,

That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.

Blah, Blah, Blah.

Just put the attribution quote-command for the older quotes to the right and the most recent ones to the left, and be sure to use the turn-off command at the end of each passage.

Hope this helps.
Scott

[Roberto]

We need to think critically,

That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.

Blah, Blah, Blah.

I can understand that Smith is pissed at me and eager to ingratiate himself to a new admirer, but can he show us what evidence, provided by the cited authors in support of their contentions, would make my above quoted assessment invalid?

[Scott Smith]

We need to think critically,

That's what historians do all the time, except apparently for those who, like Topitsch, Hoffmann and Suvorov, try to sell a story they would badly like to believe in, no matter how little they can offer in support thereof.

Blah, Blah, Blah.

I can understand that Smith is pissed at me and eager to ingratiate himself to a new admirer, but can he show us what evidence, provided by the cited authors in support of their contentions, would make my above quoted assessment invalid?

I didn't say it was invalid. It was just a hypothetical exchange. In fact, I agree with the next statement:

How about thinking critically about what these fellows produce?

Furthermore, if Roberto will remember, I don't support the Suvorov thesis, but I do think that the Soviet Union was building for operations in 1942 when the time was ripe.