Decision to kill Polish Jews: Mid-March 1942?

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michael mills
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#16

Post by michael mills » 31 Jul 2006, 14:28

Nick Terry is forgetting that the deportation plan briefly described in the Wannsee Protocol was never actually implemented, except for relatively small numbers of Jews sent to work on road-building projects in Ukraine and other places.

The historical events enumerated by Nick Terry, such as the killings at or near Maly Trostinets, or at the extermination centres in Distrikt Lublin, eventually at the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex represent a change of course, a move away from the plan for mass deportation into occupied Soviet territory towards one of killing Jews unfit for labour at points along the deportation routes.

As long ago as 1954, Reitlinger was able to see that what Heydrich revealed at the Wannsee Conference was actually the "last gasp" of what he calls the Russia Plan, before it was replaced by plans to send Jews to extermination centres closer to Central Europe.

My concern is to try to determine when the change away from a projected mass deportation of Western and Central European Jews to points of concentration in the occupied Soviet Union toward mass extermination occurred, and how and why it occurred.

I am exploring the possibility that the change did not occur as a result of a single decision at one point of time, but rather as the result of the addition of elements of extermination of particular groups of Jews to the deportation plan, in order to facilitate it by reducing the numbers to be deported.

The first such addition was the authorisation to kill about one third of the Jews of Reichsgau Wartheland, which was given as the result of an initiative by Reichsstatthalter Greiser. Presumably, the aim was to reduce the number of Jews held in the Lodz Ghetto (which was scheduled to be increased by Jews deported from Germany), until such time as the projected mass deportation to occupied Soviet territory could get underway after a victory in the East.

I am suggesting that the second such addition was the authorisation to liquidate the Jews of either Distrikt Lublin or the whole Generalgouvernement unusable for forced labour, some 60% of the total, and that it came sometime in March 1942, judging by the difference between Goebbels' diary entries of 7 and 27 of that month. By May of that year, an authorisation had been given to kill the unfit German Jews who had been deported to Lodz and Minsk.

Eventually, as the expected victory over the Soviet Union did not eventuate, the deportation plan was abandoned entirely (except for the groups of labourers who were actually sent to the DG 4 labour camps, or to Smolensk and a few other places), so that only extermination in specialised killing centres remained.

However, the deportation plan was still alive, at least in theory, when Goebbels made his diary entry on 27 March, since his wording implies that the 40% of Polish Jews adjudged fit for labour were also to be sent to the East, out of the Generalgouvernement. And at around that time Heydrich was still talking about sending European Jews to labour camps in the White Sea area, and others were talking about sending Jews tyo work on drainage projects in the Prypiat' Marshes; those were both elements of the deportation plan that had still not been definitively abandoned as of mid 1942, when the large-scale killing of Polish and German Jews unfit for labour was well underway.

Even after the deportation plan had been finally abandoned in the face of failure to gain victory over the Soviet Union, some anomalies still remained ,such as the survival of German Jews deported to Riga, or of Lithuanian Jews held in the Kaunas Ghetto.

As to the use of the term "entsprechend behandelt", I draw Nick Terry's attention to what I actually wrote, which was:
an expression that did not have any official definition, that could suggest active killing but did not necessarily do so
In the extract from an Einsatzgruppen Report quoted by Nick Terry, the expression "entsprechend behandelt" does indicate killing, and is a circumlocution similar to others such as "unschädlich gemacht". Those circumlocutions were not officially defined, unlike the word "Sonderbehandlung".

I further wrote that Heydrich probably was suggesting that, since the remaining core of Jewish deportees could not be released for fear of a Jewish rebirth, in his opinion they would have to be physically destroyed at some unspecified time in the future.

But the essential point is that there is no indication in the Wannsee Protocol that, despite Heydrich's suggestion about what would have to be done in the future, a definitive decision to kill the European Jews deported into occupied Soviet territory had been made at the time of the conference, an interpretation supported by the recent SD and Police memorandum summarised by Goebbels on 7 March, which gave him the impression that the deported Jews were to be concentrated in the East pending their transportation to a destination outside Europe after the war, which Goebbels speculates might be Madagascar.

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#17

Post by nickterry » 31 Jul 2006, 15:28

Two words in response to all the above:

Mogilev.
Belzec.

8O


michael mills
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#18

Post by michael mills » 01 Aug 2006, 07:02

At what point was the decision made to turn the transit camp adjacent to the railway line at Belzec into a killing centre by hastily constructing a gas-chamber using the exhaust of an internal-combustion engine?

Obviously before 27 March 1942, when Goebbels referred to the beginning of the liquidation of Polish Jews unusable for forced labour which was being carried out by Globocnik.

But the SD and Police memorandum summarised by Goebbels on 7 March seemingly contained no reference to any such planned liquidation, only to the concentration of European Jews in the East, pending their exile to an extra-European destination after the war. That suggests that at the time of the drafting of the memorandum, which presumably was toward the end of February, no decision to kill some component of the Jews being deported to the East had yet been made.

That in turn suggests that in the latter months of 1941, the transit camp at Belzec, which had existed in December 1939, was in process of being recommissioned as a way-station for the mass deportation into occupied Soviet territory that was being planned at that time. At a certain point, probably in early to mid-March, it was abruptly converted into a killing centre, pursuant to a decision made at around that time.

The theory that a mass-extermination centre was being planned at Mogilev in late 1941 is just a theory, resting on very little hard evidence. It certainly appears that there were plans to build a large holding camp for deported European Jews at that location, which would be consistent with the large-scale deportation plan that was being developed at that time. As Goebbels wrote on 7 March 1942, the memorandum he had just read described a plan to concentrate European Jews in occupied Soviet territory, and Mogilev may well have been one of the localities at which that concentration was to occur. The proposed camp at Mogilev did not eventuate because the mass deportation into occupied Soviet territory did not take place.

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#19

Post by David Thompson » 01 Aug 2006, 07:14

Michael -- You asked:
At what point was the decision made to turn the transit camp adjacent to the railway line at Belzec into a killing centre by hastily constructing a gas-chamber using the exhaust of an internal-combustion engine?
Probably by late August 1941, when SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Christan Wirth was appointed supervising inspector of the camps at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka, in Nazi-occupied Poland. (Into That Darkness 54) Wirth had previously handled much of the killing for the Aktion T-4 Euthanasia program, for which Hitler rescinded his order on 24 August 1941. That operation was disbanded 28 August 1941, and Wirth took up his new assignment, supervising camps that used the same gassing method. (Fleming 23)

Large-scale construction at Belzec began 1 November 1941. (Holo Ency 1768)

According to Adolf Eichmann, a camp near Lublin had the first gas chambers ready by early Autumn of 1941, when he went on a tour to see Higher SS and Police Leader Odilo Globocnik's operations:
A German police captain there showed me how they had managed to build airtight chambers disguised as ordinary Polish farmers' huts, seal them hermetically, then inject the exhaust gas from a Russian U-boat motor. I remember it all very exactly because I never thought anything like that would be possible, technically speaking. (Holo Levin 291)
In interrogations after his capture in 1960, Eichmann described his inspection tour:
[SS-Brigadefuehrer Odilo] Globocnik, the former Gauleiter of Vienna [later promoted to SS-Gruppenfuehrer], was then head of the SS and the police in the Lublin district of the Government General. Anyway, Heydrich said: 'Go and see Globocnik, the Fuehrer has already given him instructions. Take a look and see how he's getting on with his program. I believe he's using Russian anti-tank trenches for exterminating the Jews.' As ordered, I went to Lublin, located the headquarters of SS and Police Commander Globocnik, and reported to the Gruppenfuehrer. I told him Heydrich had sent me, because the Fuehrer had ordered the physical extermination of the Jews.

Globocnik sent for a certain Sturmbannfuehrer [Hans] Hoefle, who must have been a member of his staff. We went from Lublin to, I don't remember what the place was called, I get them mixed up, I couldn't say if it was Treblinka or some other place. There were patches of woods, sort of, and the road passed through--a Polish highway. On the right side of the road there was an ordinary house, that's where the men who worked there lived. A captain of the regular police [Ordnungspolizei] welcomed us. A few workmen were still there. The captain [probably SS-Haupsturmfuehrer Christian Wirth], which surprised me, had taken off his jacket and rolled up his sleeves, somehow he seemed to have joined in the work. They were building little wooden shacks, two, maybe three of them; they looked like two- or three-room cottages. Hoefle told the police captain to explain the installation to me. And then he started in. He had a, well, let's say, a vulgar, uncultivated voice. Maybe he drank. He spoke some dialect from the southwestern corner of Germany, and he told me how he had made everything airtight. It seems they were going to hook up a Russian submarine engine and pipe the exhaust into the houses and the Jews inside would be poisoned.

I was horrified. My nerves aren't strong enough . . . I can't listen to such; things . . . such things, without their affecting me. Even today, if I see someone with a deep cut, I have to look away. I could never have been a doctor. I still remember how I visualized the scene and began to tremble, as if I'd been through something, some terrible experience. The kind of thing that happens sometimes and afterwards you start to shake. Then I went to Berlin and reported to the head of the Security Police. (Eichmann Interr 74-76)

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#20

Post by Boby » 01 Aug 2006, 10:03

David
Probably by late August 1941...
Is 1942.

According to various sources, was on 1 August 1942 when Wirth was appointed by Globocnik "Inspekteur der SS-Sonderkommandos Aktion Reinhard(t)"

Regards

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#21

Post by nickterry » 01 Aug 2006, 10:46

Inspector post, yes, 1942, assignment to Lublin district, early autumn 1941.

One does not need to rely on Eichmann's testimony to show that work was underway at Belzec in the autumn of 1941.

Michael should be aware that there is in fact more evidence for the hypothesis of a planned death camp at Mogilev than there is for a planned largescale deportation of Polish Jews to the Eastern Territories at any time from October 1941 up to March 1942 or beyond.

He cannot explain away the explicit statements in the Diensttagebuch to the impossibility of deporting Polish Jews to the eastern territories which are made in October and December 1941.

Michael has also dodged Boby's earlier citation from the Wannsee Protocol:
State Secretary Dr. Buehler stated that the General Government would welcome it if the final solution of this problem could be begun in the General Government, since on the one hand transportation does not play such a large role here nor would problems of labor supply hamper this action. Jews must be removed from the territory of the General Government as quickly as possible, since it is especially here that the Jew as an epidemic carrier represents an extreme danger and on the other hand he is causing permanent chaos in the economic structure of the country through continued black market dealings. Moreover, of the approximately 2 1/2 million Jews concerned, the majority is unfit for work.
The one constant of German planning between October 1941 and March 1942 is that Polish Jews would largely be 'dealt with' on Polish soil. Everything else changed.

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#22

Post by Boby » 01 Aug 2006, 10:51

About the date when Belzec was converted into an extermination center, there is interesting info:

On 13-14 March, Himmler was in Krakau and Lublin.

On 14 March, he meet in Lublin with Globocnik, Krüger and other SS by 20:00 p.m

On 15 March he returned to Berlin.

Source: Dienstkalender Himmlers, pp. 378-380

16 March: The Clearing of the Lublin ghetto began. Höfle have a meeting with Richard Türk, who run the Subdepartment of Population Welfare in the Office of the Governeur Zörner. Türk reported one day after:

1) It would be expedient to divide the Jews in the transports coming into the district of Lublin already at the departure station into those capable and those not capable of work. If this separation is not possible at the departure station, one must then switch over to dividing the transport in Lublin according to the above-mentioned viewpoint.

2) Jews not capable of work must all go to Belzec, the furthest border station in Kreis Zamosc.

3) Hauptsturmführer Höfle intends to build a large camp, in which the Jews capable of work can by classified according to profession and requisitioned.

4) Piaski will be freed of Polish Jews and become the collection point for Jews coming from the Reich.

...In conclusion he declared, he could receive daily 4-5 transports of 1,000 at the end station of Belzec. These Jews would cross over the border and would never return again to the General Government
Source: Türk notes, 17 March 1942. YVA O-53/79/470-1

The same day, Höfle discussed the deportations from the Ghetto with Fritz Reuter, an employer of the Department of Richard Türk:
[I received a telegram from the government in Cracow, signed by Mr. [Friedrich] Siebert, the chief of the SS department, in which the concluding sentence reads as follows: I ask you to be helpful to the SS and Police Leader of Lublin in his actions.

On March 7 I received a telephone call from the government [in Cracow], from Major Regger, in which I was strictly requested, in connection with the resettlement of the Jews from Mielec to the Lublin district, to reach an agreement with the SS and Police Leader, and it stressed the highest importance of this agreement....
]

Source: http://www.mtsu.edu/~baustin/ghetto.html

I arranged for a talk with Hstuf. Höfle for Monday, the 16th of March 1942, namely at 17:30 hours. In the course of the discussion the following was explained by Hstuf. Höfle:

It would be expedient to divide the transports of Jews arriving in the Lublin district already at the station of departure into employable and unemployable Jews. If it is not possible to make this distinction at the station of departure, one must eventually pass on to separating the transport in Lublin according to the aspects mentioned above.
Unemployable Jews are all to come to Bezec [Bełżec], the outermost border station in the Zamosz district.

Hstuf. Höfle is thinking of building a large camp, in which the employable Jews can be registered in a file system according to their occupations and requested from there.
Piaski is being made Jew-free and will be the collection point for the Jews coming out of the Reich.

Trawnicki [Trawniki] for the present time is not occupied by Jews.

H. asks where on the Dęblin-Trawnicki route 60,000 Jews can be unloaded. Informed about the Jewish transports now running as far as we are concerned, H. explained that of the 500 Jews arriving in Susiec, those who were unemployable could be sorted out and sent to Bezec. According to a teletype of the government of March 4, 1942, a Jewish transport, whose destination was the Trawnicki station, is rolling out of the Protectorate. These Jews are not unloaded in Trawnicki, but have been brought to Izbiza. An inquiry of the Zamosz district, asking to be able to request 200 Jews from there for work, was answered in the affirmative by H.

In conclusion he stated that he could accept 4-5 transports daily, of 1,000 Jews with the destination station of Bezec. These Jews would go across the border and would never come back into the General Gouvernement
Source: Józef Kermisz, Dokumenty i Materiały do dziejów okupacji niemieckiej w Polsce, Tom II, "Akce" i "Wysiedlenia," Warsaw-Lodz-Krakow 1946, p. 32 [Quoted in the book by Mattogno and Graf: Belzec, p. 103]

On 20 March, Türk wrote a note about the meeting between Höfle and 2 Kreishauptmann
Kreishauptmann Weienmeyer has as yet been able to learn nothing about final outcome of the deportation; all that is known is the existence of a collection camp some distance from the Belzec train station on the district border, that is entirely closed off, and the arrival of a SS-commando of some 60 men.
Source: Türk notes, 20 March 1942. YVA O-53/79/476

Regards
Boby

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#23

Post by Boby » 01 Aug 2006, 18:18

About the memorandum (the Wannsee Protocol) received by Goebbels in March.

Possibly was an edited version?

Is strange that Goebbels only mention: Jews concentrated in the east, and especulated with his final resettlement place: Madagascar.

He not mention the plan mentioned by Heydrich at the conference: work on road construction.

Regards

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#24

Post by David Thompson » 01 Aug 2006, 18:25

For readers interested in following this discussion, see the text, discussion and links at:

Minutes of Wannsee Conference
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=2947

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#25

Post by nickterry » 01 Aug 2006, 19:19

[Quoted in the book by Mattogno and Graf: Belzec, p. 103]

Tsk, tsk, Boby, I do hope you washed your mouth out afterwards.

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#26

Post by Boby » 01 Aug 2006, 20:22

Tsk, tsk, Boby, I do hope you washed your mouth out afterwards.
Is sad that good investigators as Mattogno and Graf (and others) are involved in Holocaust denial. They have acces to multiple sources: in russian, in polish, in german, in english, in italian, in spanish... Are better that many of the Holocaust Historians.

:cry:

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#27

Post by nickterry » 01 Aug 2006, 21:31

Boby wrote:
Tsk, tsk, Boby, I do hope you washed your mouth out afterwards.
Is sad that good investigators as Mattogno and Graf (and others) are involved in Holocaust denial. They have acces to multiple sources: in russian, in polish, in german, in english, in italian, in spanish... Are better that many of the Holocaust Historians.

:cry:
No, they're not. None of their books are any good as history or pieces of research. Half their 'original' points are plagiarised off other deniers. They seem to share braincells sometimes. Mattogno might be almost redeemable if he wasn't such a fascist asshole, the rest are dreck. Graf in particular is, well, this is a family forum so I won't go there.

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#28

Post by Boby » 01 Aug 2006, 21:46

Nick, please note that im referring to his archive and literature reasearch, no his political agenda.

How many western Historians knowledge Russian, Polish and German?

Why Mattogno have more archives of the Zentralbauleitung that any other Historian in the world?

This is the question. Okay, his books are a piece of nonsense (in general), but they research are very good.

Regards

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#29

Post by nickterry » 01 Aug 2006, 23:22

Boby wrote:Nick, please note that im referring to his archive and literature reasearch, no his political agenda.

How many western Historians knowledge Russian, Polish and German?

Why Mattogno have more archives of the Zentralbauleitung that any other Historian in the world?

This is the question. Okay, his books are a piece of nonsense (in general), but they research are very good.

Regards
Plenty of historians know Russian, German and Polish. Chrisoph Dieckmann also knows Lithuanian, Yiddish and Hebrew on top! By the way, my understanding is that Graf is the Russian-speaker of the duo.

Mattogno might have looked through the ZBL records but it is doubtful that he has been honest and forthcoming with everything that is in them. Fortunately, they are all microfilmed at the USHMM as well as now at APMO. Michael Thad Allen will be producing a book on Auschwitz within the next couple of years. It will also have the singular merit of being in one volume and actually telling a story, which Mattogno's books do not.

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#30

Post by michael mills » 02 Aug 2006, 02:25

Thanks, Boby, for details on events in March 1942.

I would now like to comment on your point about the meaning of Bühler's statement made at the Wannsee Conference, as recorded in the minutes.

Bühler was present at the conference representing Frank and the interests of the administration of the Generalgouvernement. Accordingly, the position he took needs to be understood in the context of Frank's repeated attempts to set in train the expulsion of the large number of Jews in the Generalgouvernement, a number that had been increased through the dumping of Jews pushed out of the Polish western provinces annexed by Germany.

On 5 October 1941, Frank had stated to his Cabinet that after the end of the war it would be better to expel the Polish Jews across the Urals than to transport them to Madagascar, which was what was intended for them in the RSHA plan circulated by Dannecker on 15 August 1940.

Frank had previously been told by Hitler personally on 8 July 1940 that the Jews would be sent to a colony after the war, with Madagascar the most likely candidate; that information had been enthuastically received by the German administration of the Generalgouvernement, which began planning for that eventuality, for example, the sociologist Fritz Arlt predicted that the transportation of the Jews out of the Generalgouvernement to an overseas destination would create 1.5 million new workplaces for Polish peasants.

The reason why Frank was now, in October 1941, focussing on expelling the Jews across the Urals rather than to Madagascar was probably the most recent developments in relation to German Jews.

On 3 September 1941, Rosenberg, recently appointed as Reich Minister for the Eastern Territories, had told members of his office that the Jewish Question would be solved through deportation after the war to a territory yet to be selected, and until the time of their expulsion the Jews were to be held in ghettos or employed in agriculture.

In mid-September, possibly as a reaction to news that the ethnic Germans of the Volga Republic had been deported to Siberia by the Soviet Government, Hitler ordered that the deportation of german Jews into conquered Soviet territory should begin immediately, and not wait until the conclusion of the war.

Frank no doubt calculated that if German Jews were about to be deported into Soviet territory, Polish Jews could likewise be deported, and he would at last be free of the burden posed by them (some 1.5 million, including the Jews of East Galicia which had been joined to the Generalgouvernement).

At some point after 5 October, Frank approached Rosenberg to gain his approval to begin deporting Jews from the Generalgouvernement into the Eastern Territories under the control of Rosenberg's ministry. However, on 13 October Rosenberg informed him that an immediate deportation was impossible, and he would have to wait until the conclusion of Operation Barbarossa.

At some time in early December 1941, Frank must have again approached Rosenberg, or perhaps the Reichkommissars Lohse and Koch, who may have been in Berlin at the time, and again received a refusal to permit the expulsion of Jews from the Generalgouvernement into the Reichskommissariats Ostland and Ukraine. On 16 December, Frank reported back to his Cabinet in Krakow, with his oft-quoted words: "We were told in Berlin, 'Why are you making such a fuss? We cannot use them in Ostland and the Reichskommissariat [Ukraine] either, liquidate them yourself' ".

The persons who said to Frank "We cannot use them in Ostland and the Reichskommissariat" were most probably Lohse and Koch, who had the greatest vested interest in opposing having masses of Jews dumped on them. Lohse in particular had a history of vehemently opposing any attempt to deport Western Jews into his bailiwick; for example, in October 1941, when he was suddenly informed by the Sipo chief in Latvia, Rudolf Lange, that 20,000 German Jews were about to be sent to Riga, he flew into a rage and flew off to Berlin on 25 October in order to protest, but to no avail. So it is no wonder that in December, Lohse and Koch would have reacted violently to any suggestion by Frank of dumping Polish Jews into their territories; it is no wonder that they responded in very violent terms, telling Frank that if he wanted to be rid of the Jews in his territory he would have to do it himself, even to the extent of liquidating them.

Nevertheless, on 16 December 1941, Frank was still hopeful. He had received an invitation to a conference on the Jewish Question, which became the famous Wannsee Conference, and hoped that it would signal the beginning of a mass deportation of Jews, including those from the Generalgouvernement.

Thus, when Bühler went to the Wannsee Conference as Frank's representative, it was no doubt with the mission of ensuring that any decision made would include the rapid commencement of the deportation of the mass of the Jews from the Generalgouvernement. Bühler's words as recorded in the minutes show that that is precisely what he did do; contrary to the provisions of the deportation plan outlined by Heydrich, which stated that the deportation would begin in the West, he requested that it begin with the Jews of the Generalgouvernement.

In support of his request, he advanced the argument that the distance to be covered in a deportation of Jews from the Generalgouvernement into the Occupied Eastern Territories was so much less than the distances involved in the deportation of Jews from Western Germany, and therefore transport would not pose a problem. It is noteworthy that no representative of the Reich Ministry of Transport had been invited to the Conference, so there was no transportation expert present to confirm whether Bühler's claims about the lack of transport problems was true or false.

Since the whole thrust of the plan revealed by Heydrich, to the extent that it is recorded in the conference minutes, was the progressive deportation of the Jews of Europe into occupied Soviet territory, the most reasonable interpretation of Bühler's recorded words about ease of transport is that he was referring to the transport of Jews out of the Generalgouvernement into the adjacent Occupied Eastern Territories, rather than to transport within the Generalgouvernement itself. From the point of view of Bühler, the deportation plan revealed by Heydrich must have represented a victory over the previous obstructionism of Rosenberg, Lohse and Koch.

It appears that subsequent to the conference, the RSHA circulated a memorandum summarising the deportation plan revealed by Heydrich at Wannsee. That memorandum must have gone to agencies, such as Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment, that had not been represented at the conference, for their information as to the most recent developments.

Obviously that memorandum cannot have included Heydrich's ominous suggestion about the need for future "appropriate treatment", which may indicate that as at the time of the memorandum, probably the end of February, that suggestion was not yet officially approved German Government policy.

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