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Roberto
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#16

Post by Roberto » 10 Apr 2002, 12:48

Sowjet wrote:
Dan wrote:Sense even my friend the esteemed Roberto gently remandered the silly dude with the red star on his head, what about "deracinate" as a translation of the German word?

Stop posting insults. You seem to have not understood the sense of this thread. It is for Holocaust documents not for silly discussions. So post some documents or hold your breath. BTW : i'am from germany...
Sowjet,

If you are German, you know that the accurate translation of the term "Ausrottung", when referring to a group of people, is “extermination”, physical annihilation of that group. This means that the translation you provided may very well be inaccurate and tendentious when it uses the word “uprooting” to translate “Ausrottung”. As I said, a transcription of the original German text would help us decide whether there is really anything wrong with the translation.

I consider your thread a good idea, but I think you should strive to, whenever possible, provide the original German wording of a given document and your own translation thereto, or a translation you have checked yourself and agree with. If you should not be comfortable enough with the English language to do such translations, feel free to send me a transcription of the document you would like to see translated in a private message.

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Hans Frank's words of 16 December 1941

#17

Post by michael mills » 11 Apr 2002, 03:50

GFM2000 posted an extract from an address by Hans Frank to his Cabinet (not a public speech), which the poster dated 16 November 1941, but which I think was actually 16 December.

It is not my purpose to address the translation from the original German, but rather the meaning of the extract. As I have said, a document by itself does not tell us much; it needs to be placed in context.

In particular, I wish to address the words: "But what should be done
with the Jews? Can you believe that they will be accommodated in settlements in the Ostland? In Berlin we were told: why are you making all this trouble? We don't want them either, not in Ostland nor in the Reichskommissariat; liquidate them yourselves! ". What exactly was Frank talking about here?

In order to answer that question, we need to look at Frank's exact words, and ask some questions about them.

First, Frank says "In Berlin we were told.....". The question we need to ask is, WHO told Frank something.

The clue is given in the following words "we don't want them either, not in Ostland or in the Reichskommissariat [Ukraine]". The question is, who is WE? Obviously, the "we" who is doing the talking, saying something to Frank in Berlin, is officials of the German administration in the Reichskommissariate Ostland and Ukraine, or perhaps officials of the reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, who oversaw the administration of the Reichskommissariate. These were precisely the people who did not want Polish Jews in Ostland or Ukraine since they already had enough of a Jewish problem there.

Now, why did the officials responsible for the German administration say these things to Frank? What was the context?

Obviously, Frank must have approached those officials with the suggestion that Polish Jews could be shipped into the Ostland and Ukraine. The words quoted by Frank show that the answer was a definite "no".

Such an approach by Frank would have been entirely in harmony with his earlier behaviour. In October 1941, he had asked Rosenberg, the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories for permission to start deporting Polish Jews into Ostland and Ukraine; at that time, Hitler had just given the order to commence deporting German Jews into those areas, and Frank hoped to ride on the coat-tails of that order. However, Rosenberg had told Frank that it was not possible to deport Polish Jews at that time, although it might become possible later. In early December, Frank had apparently renewed his request, and had been refused again.

Now, according to Frank, the people he was talking to in Berlin, who as I have shown must have been officials of the German administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories, said to him "Liquidate them yourselves". Why did they say that to Frank?

Obviously, Frank must have asked those officials to carry out the liquidation, and they had replied, no, YOU do it.

The context suggests that Frank asked the officials of the Ostministerium for permission to deport Polish Jews from HIS area of responsibility to THEIR area, and, knowing that they would be likely to resist, suggested that they could solve any problems of overcrowding arising from the influx of large numbers of Polish Jews by simply liquidating a part of them, probably the old and the sick, those unable to be used for labour.

Frank had a precedent for such a suggestion. On 25 and 29 November, 5000 German Jews who had previously arrived at Kaunas were slaughtered there by EK3 of Einsatzgruppe A. Knowledge of that massacre had become widespread, and Frank may have thought, if that could be done to German Jews, it could certainly be done to Polish Jews.

However, the evidence suggests that the two massacres at Kaunas were contrary to German Government policy. A few days later, Himmler sent a reprimand to Jeckeln, the Higher SS and Police Leader for Ostland and Russland-Nord, ordering him to act in accordance with the guidelines for the treatment of Jews deported into the Occupied Eastern Territories, and warning him that any actions on his own initiative contrary to orders ("Eigenmaechtigkeiten und Zuwiderhandlungen") would be punished.

That reprimand had been given a few days before Frank was in Berlin talking with the officials of the Ostministerium, and it is likely that the latter had heard about it. Therefore, they knew that no liquidations of Polish Jews deported into their territories would be allowed at that time, and they would be faced with all the problems of overcrowding. Accordingly they told Frank that any liquidation of the Polish Jews would have to be done by him, not by them.

So, on 16 December 1941, when Frank was addressing his Cabinet about the possibility of deporting the Polish Jews en masse to the East, he knew that that possibility did not exist at that time. As a result, he was "gingering up" his Cabinet to accept some other solution. However, his words indicate that as of that date, there was no mass extermination policy in existence, nor had any order for one been given. If there had been, Frank would not have been asking the officials of the Ostministerium to carry out a liquidation, and they would no have been countering with an imprecation to "do it yourself"; they would all have known that they could sit back and let their Jewish problems be solved for them by the Security Police.


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#18

Post by Roberto » 11 Apr 2002, 12:44

However, his words indicate that as of that date, there was no mass extermination policy in existence, nor had any order for one been given.
Hardly so. If you take a look at the context in which the quoted speech was made, if becomes clear that a lot had changed since October 1941 and the date on which Frank made this speech.

On 12 December 1941 – the day after the declaration of war on the USA - Hitler had communicated in a meeting with the Reichsleiter and Gauleiter of the NSDAP the general outlines of the policy to be henceforth adopted in regard to the Jews of Europe.

Goebbels' diary entry regading Hitler's statements on 12 December 1941 reads as follows:
Bezüglich der Judenfrage ist der Führer entschlossen, reinen Tisch zu machen. Er hat den Juden prophezeit, daß, wenn sie noch einmal einen Weltkrieg herbeiführen würden, sie dabei ihre Vernichtung erleben würden. Das ist keine Phrase gewesen. Der Weltkrieg ist da, die Vernichtung des Judentums muß die notwendige Folge sein.


Translation:
In respect of the Jewish Question, the Führer has decided to make a clean sweep. He prophesied to the Jews that if they again brought about a world war, they would experience their annihilation in it. That wasn't just a catch-word. The world war is here, and the annihilation of Jewry must be the necessary consequence.
Source:

http://www.holocaust-history.org/nazis-words/

Emphasis is mine.

What this "annihilation of Jewry" meant and how it was to be brought about is made clear by the recollections of Hitler's statements by another participant in the meeting, governor of Poland Hans Frank. In his speech to members of his staff on 16 December 1941, he stated the following:
As far as the Jews are concerned, I want to tell you quite frankly, that they must be done away with in one way or another. The Fuehrer said once: should united Jewry again succeed in provoking a world war, the blood of not only the nations which have been forced into the war by them, will be shed, but the Jew will have found his end in Europe * * *
"Gentlemen, I must ask you to rid yourselves of all feeling of pity. We must annihilate the Jews, wherever we find them and wherever it is possible, in order to maintain here the structure of the Reich as a whole. This will, naturally, be achieved by other methods than those pointed out by Bureau Chief Dr. Hummel. Nor can the judges of the Special Courts be made responsible for it, because of the limitations of the framework of the legal procedure. Such outdated views cannot be applied to such gigantic and unique events. We must find at any rate, a way which leads to the goal, and my thoughts are working in that direction.
"The Jews represent for us also extraordinarily malignant gluttons. We have now approximately 2,500,000 of them in the General Government, perhaps with the Jewish mixtures and everything that goes with it, 3,500,000 Jews. We cannot shoot or poison those 3,500,000 Jews, but we shall nevertheless be able to take measures, which will lead, somehow, to their annihilation, and this in connection with the gigantic measures to be determined in discussions from the Reich. The General Government must become free of Jews, the same as the Reich. Where and how this is to be achieved is a matter for the offices which we must appoint and create here. Their activities will be brought to your attention in due course.


Source:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Frank.htm

Emphases are mine. The first is to point out the similarity with Goebbels' diary entry, which suggests that Frank was referring to the same source as Goebbels - the Führer's utterances on 12 December 1941 in which he harked back to his "prophecy" made years before. The second is to point out a passage where it becomes very clear that "annihilation" was meant in a physical, homicidal sense and that it had been decided upon on an overall and not just regional level, hence Frank's reference to "gigantic measures to be determined in discussions from the Reich".

The "discussions from the Reich" that Frank referred to were the so-called Wannsee Conference that took place on 20 January 1942, in which Frank was represented by State Secretary Dr. Bühler and where the intended fate of European Jews was outlined as follows:
Under proper guidance, in the course of the final solution the Jews are to be allocated for appropriate labor in the East. Able-bodied Jews, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns to these areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, since it will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion, have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product of natural selection and would, if released, act as a the seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of history.)

In the course of the practical execution of the final solution, Europe will be combed through from west to east. Germany proper, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, will have to be handled first due to the housing problem and additional social and political necessities.
Source of quote:

http://library.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/wanneng.html

While these passages expressly address only the fate of the able-bodied Jews capable of working, the intended fate of non-Jews is implicit. If the working Jews were to be "eliminated by natural causes" (i.e. worked to death) and the survivors were eventually to be "treated accordingly" (i.e. killed), there can be no doubt that the non-working and therefore useless Jews were to be "treated accordingly" right away.

The original plan to "comb" Europe from west to east suffered an alteration pursuant to the request formulated by State Secretary Dr. Bühler:
State Secretary Dr. Bühler stated that the General Government would welcome it if the final solution of this problem could be begun in the General Government, since on the one hand transportation does not play such a large role here nor would problems of labor supply hamper this action. Jews must be removed from the territory of the General Government as quickly as possible, since it is especially here that the Jew as an epidemic carrier represents an extreme danger and on the other hand he is causing permanent chaos in the economic structure of the country through continued black market dealings. Moreover, of the approximately 2 1/2 million Jews concerned, the majority is unfit for work.
Source of quote:

http://library.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/wanneng.html

Contrary to the original intention, the "final solution of this problem" thus commenced in the General Government, as noted by Goebbels in his diary entry of 27 March 1942, ten days after the first deportations from Lublin to Belzec extermination camp. It is worth while to read the whole of Goebbels' diary entry of that day, for Goebbels' notes make clear that the "barbaric process" of deportation and liquidation of the Jews from the General Government was but the beginning of the execution of the "final solution of this problem" outlined at the Wannsee Conference. They also leave no room for doubt about the genocidal nature of this "final solution":
Beginning with Lublin, the Jews in the General Government are now being evacuated eastward. The procedure is a pretty barbaric one and not to be described here more definitely. Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole it can be said that about 60 per cent of them will have to be liquidated whereas only about 40 per cent can be used for forced labor.

The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is to carry this measure through, is doing it with considerable circumspection and according to a method that does not attract too much attention. A judgment is being visited upon the Jews that, while barbaric, is fully deserved by them. The prophesy which the Fuehrer made about them for having brought on a new world war is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner. One must not be sentimental in these matters. If we did not fight the Jews, they would destroy us. It's a life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus. No other government and no other regime would have the strength for such a global solution of this question. Here, too, the Fuehrer is the undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions and therefore inexorable. Fortunately a whole series of possibilities presents itself for us in wartime that would be denied us in peacetime. We shall have to profit by this.

The ghettoes that will be emptied in the cities of the General Government now will be refilled with Jews thrown out of the Reich. This process is to be repeated from time to time. There is nothing funny in it for the Jews, and the fact that Jewry's representatives in England and America are today organizing and sponsoring the war against Germany must be paid for dearly by its representatives in Europe - and that's only right.


Source:

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/g/goe ... 942-mar-27

Emphases are mine.

Hitler’s public statements at the same time were not as explicit, for obvious reasons. But Himmler’s statements before selected insider audiences at his speeches in Posen on 4 October and 6 October 1943, when the "final solution" had been largely put into effect, were even more explicit than Goebbels' diary entries. Transcriptions and translations of the passages of these speeches addressing the “Jewish question” can be found in my post of 11/22/01 11:55:17 am on the thread

Authenticity of Himmler's Posen Speech
http://pub3.ezboard.com/fskalmanforumfr ... D=87.topic

of the old forum and in my previous post on the present thread.

Only shortly before his death did Hitler refer to the genocide of the Jews with the openness that had characterized the utterances of his followers in their private diary entries and speeches before insider audiences. On page 3 of his political testament, he wrote the following:
Ich habe aber auch keinen Zweifel darüber gelassen, daß, wenn die Völker Europas wieder nur als Aktienpakete dieser internationalen Geld- und Finanzverschwörer angesehen werden, dann auch jenes Volk mit zur Verantwortung gezogen werden wird, das der eigentliche Schuldige an dieses mörderischen Ringen ist: Das Judentum! Ich habe weiter keinen darüber im Unklaren gelassen, daß dieses Mal nicht nur Millionen Kinder von Europäern der arischen Völker verhungern werden, nicht nur Millionen erwachsener Männer den Tod erleiden und nicht nur Hunderttausende an Frauen und Kindern in den Städten verbrannt und zu Tode bombardiert werden dürfen, ohne daß der eigentliche Schuldige, wenn auch durch humanere Mittel, seine Schuld zu büssen hat.


Translation:
I have also left no doubt that, if the nations of Europe are again to be regarded as mere shares to be bought and sold by those international money and finance conspirators, then that race, Jewry, which is the real guilty party in this murderous struggle, will be saddled with the responsibility. I also made it clear that this time, not only would millions of children of European Aryan races starve, not only would millions of grown men meet their death, and not only would millions of women and children be burned or bombed to death in the cities, but that the real culprit would atone for his guilt, even if by more humane means.


Source of quote:

http://www.holocaust-history.org/nazis-words/

Emphasis is mine.

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#19

Post by Snafu » 26 Apr 2002, 02:41

Regarding the "Testament of Adolf Hitler", referred to several times in this thread, David Irving has something to say about it and I think it's only fair that we let him be heard:

http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/docs/Testam ... enoud.html

As "Sowjet" quoted the January 30, 1942 Sportpalast speech about "annihilation" of the Jews, this is Hitler three days previously in the Wolfschanze, according to the notes of Heinrich Heim:

27/1/1942, evening:
"Der Jude muss aus Europa hinaus! Am besten sie gehen nach Russland. Ich habe kein Mitleid mit den Juden. Sie werden immer ein Element bleiben, das die Völker gegeneinander hetzt."
(Monologue im Führerhauptquartier, p.241 (Hamburg 1980); my emphasis)

Translation:
"The Jew must out of Europe! It's best they go to Russia. I have no compassion for the Jews. They will always remain an element that incites the peoples against each other."


Obviously, what the führer yelled out in front of the entire German people, he spoke about in discriminating terms to his inner circle?

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#20

Post by Roberto » 26 Apr 2002, 02:48

Snafu wrote:Regarding the "Testament of Adolf Hitler", referred to several times in this thread, David Irving has something to say about it and I think it's only fair that we let him be heard:

http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/docs/Testam ... enoud.html
Let me guess: Old Dave is yelling "forgery". Am I right?
As "Sowjet" quoted the January 30, 1942 Sportpalast speech about "annihilation" of the Jews, this is Hitler three days previously in the Wolfschanze, according to the notes of Heinrich Heim:

27/1/1942, evening:
"Der Jude muss aus Europa hinaus! Am besten sie gehen nach Russland. Ich habe kein Mitleid mit den Juden. Sie werden immer ein Element bleiben, das die Völker gegeneinander hetzt."
(Monologue im Führerhauptquartier, p.241 (Hamburg 1980); my emphasis)

Translation:
"The Jew must out of Europe! It's best they go to Russia. I have no compassion for the Jews. They will always remain an element that incites the peoples against each other."

Obviously, what the führer yelled out in front of the entire German people, he spoke about in discriminating terms to his inner circle?
What exactly did the Führer "yell out" on 30 January 1942?

And what "inner circle" was around him in the evening of 27.1.1942? Only Goebbels, Himmler, Frank and other insiders, or also guests not so familiar with what was to happen?

Besides, the wording of the protocol of the Wannsee Conference a week before suggests that, while extermination was a policy decided upon, it was not yet clear how exactly it was to be brought about. Transportation of European Jews - at least the able-bodied ones - to Russia, where the local Jews were being massacred since the beginning of the German attack in June 1941, and killing them there or working them to death or simply leaving them to die of starvation and exposure, still seems to have been an alternative under consideration in January 1942:
Under proper guidance, in the course of the final solution the Jews are to be allocated for appropriate labor in the East. Able-bodied Jews, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns to these areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, since it will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion, have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product of natural selection and would, if released, act as a the seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of history.)

In the course of the practical execution of the final solution, Europe will be combed through from west to east. Germany proper, including the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, will have to be handled first due to the housing problem and additional social and political necessities.
Source of quote:

http://library.byu.edu/~rdh/eurodocs/germ/wanneng.html

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#21

Post by michael mills » 27 Apr 2002, 14:35

Snafu wrote:
Regarding the "Testament of Adolf Hitler", referred to several times in this thread, David Irving has something to say about it and I think it's only fair that we let him be heard:

http://www.fpp.co.uk/Hitler/docs/Testam ... enoud.html


Let me guess: Old Dave is yelling "forgery". Am I right?
This has been dealt with before. Two things need to be distingusihed from each other. One is the book "The Political Testament of Adolf Hitler", published by Genoud, which purports to be a collection of statements made by Hitler in early 1945 and copied down by Bormann. Genoud claims to have found the copies made by Bormann, but there is a strong possibility that the material in the book was manufactured by Genoud himself.

The other thing is the testament dictated by Hitler in the bunker shortly before he committed suicide. One of his secretaries, I think Traudl Junge, testified that she had typed it.

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#22

Post by Snafu » 28 Apr 2002, 13:33

Medo: What exactly did the Führer "yell out" on 30 January 1942?
- "Annihilation" is not a difficult word to comprehend and as "denial" of the popular interpretation of "die Endlösung der Judenfrage" is forbidden, we may only conclude that Hitler was actually very frank to the German people and the world about the plans of a certain project, well known to us all.


Medo: "And what "inner circle" was around him in the evening of 27.1.1942? Only Goebbels, Himmler, Frank and other insiders, or also guests not so familiar with what was to happen?"
- We do not know that, but these distinguished guests, whose presence itself is nothing but pure speculation and to whom Hitler found it so necessary to cover up his intentions, evidently didn't even realize they never had to read between the lines at the führer's private dinner parties. To learn what the general public and every newsagency in the world was just about to be told, they could simply have turned on the radio.


Medo: Besides, the wording of the protocol of the Wannsee Conference a week before suggests that, while extermination was a policy decided upon, it was not yet clear how exactly it was to be brought about.
- Which only creates more problems for both sources as the Endlösung according to Höss and later Eichmann was instituted already the previous summer. Construction of the Belzec extermination center began in November 1941 (Hilberg, Destruction..., p.875f) and the death machinery in Auschwitz and Chelmno had been in operation since autumn and December 1941, respectively. The Auschwitz Museum on the subject:
http://www.auschwitz.org.pl/html/eng/hi ... _1_ok.html
Höss and Eichmann on the final solution, see for instance: Hilberg, p.881; The Eichmann Trial: District Court Sessions, Session 10, 19 Apr 1961: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 10-01.html


Medo: "Transportation of European Jews - at least the able-bodied ones - to Russia, where the local Jews were being massacred since the beginning of the German attack in June 1941, and killing them there or working them to death or simply leaving them to die of starvation and exposure, still seems to have been an alternative under consideration in January 1942"
- Indeed it may, or why not send the Jews to Africa even?

Adolf Hitler, 29/5 1942,
Berlin:
"All of Western Euorope must after a certain time therefore become entirely freed of Jews. This was necessary already because of the reason that there was always a certain percentage of fanatics among the Jews who again tried to put Jewry on its feet. Therefore it was neither recommendable to try getting rid of the Jews by sending them to Siberia, while because of their resistence to all climates, they would only become especially hardened there. It was much better - because the arabs did not want them in Palestine - to transport them to Africa, thereby exposing them to a climate which infuenced every human being with our resistence in a negative way, whereby it would become impossible for the Jews to make any trespass on the areas of interest of European people."
(Henry Picker, Hitlers bordsamtal i högkvarteret 1941-42 (Halmstad 1967), p.140; my translation)

Take note of the date! Seems the bewilderment at what really to do with the Jews was apparent not only in January 1942, but actually persisted for a while.
On the other hand, considering the on going realization of the extermination enterprise, one can only wonder at Hitler’s African ramblings in May/June 1942. Was the guy totally schizophrenic?

Initiation of mass gassing operation, extermination camps:

Auschwitz: Autumn, 1941
Chelmno: December, 1941
Belzec: March 17, 1942
Sobibor: April, 1942
Treblinka: July 23, 1942
Majdanek: September - October, 1942


P.S
Thanks to Mr Mills for pointing out the difference between "Hitler's Politicial Testament" and the "personal" one, which is something different alltogether. I ought to have done this myself.

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#23

Post by Gwynn Compton » 28 Apr 2002, 13:58

Indeed it may, or why not send the Jews to Africa even?
Probably because there wasn't so much "space" in the African theatre... and no doubt also that after the war it was no doubt intended to be the domain of Italy.

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#24

Post by Snafu » 28 Apr 2002, 16:26

Gwynn Compton: "Probably because there wasn't so much "space" in the African theatre... and no doubt also that after the war it was no doubt intended to be the domain of Italy."
Well, in May 1942 it would have been even more impossible to transport the Jews to Siberia, which kind of indicates that Adolf isn't speaking of any detailed concept or plan, easily accomplished in any kind of foreseeable future, but rather putting forward loose thoughts and ideas that supposedly adhere to a post war environment. (Provided of course the Jews haven't all been gassed by then.)
The domain of Italian interests in Africa is generally percieved as centered in the north around the Mediterranean and the north-east, in the "horn of Africa" area. The continent is huge and would from the perspective of Adolf Hitler, have no problems of swallowing a Jewish reservation or homeland.

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#25

Post by Roberto » 29 Apr 2002, 11:32

Quote:
Medo: What exactly did the Führer "yell out" on 30 January 1942?

"Annihilation" is not a difficult word to comprehend and as "denial" of the popular interpretation of "die Endlösung der Judenfrage" is forbidden, we may only conclude that Hitler was actually very frank to the German people and the world about the plans of a certain project, well known to us all.
The exact German wording would be appreciated. One thing is the threatening rhetorical rambling of a demagogue, another is a
statement about measures already accomplished or in the process of being accomplished.
Quote:
Medo: "And what "inner circle" was around him in the evening of 27.1.1942? Only Goebbels, Himmler, Frank and other insiders, or also guests not so familiar with what was to happen?"
- We do not know that, but these distinguished guests, whose presence itself is nothing but pure speculation and to whom Hitler found it so necessary to cover up his intentions, evidently didn't even realize they never had to read between the lines at the führer's private dinner parties. To learn what the general public and every newsagency in the world was just about to be told, they could simply have turned on the radio.
Three days later, and there would still be a difference between what Hitler told the public and what he spoke in his inner circle. The former might be put away as the rhetoric of a rambling demagogue and be given as little attention as previous utterances – after all the SA had been singing
“Wenn erst das Judenblut vom Messer spritzt ...”
since 1933. A statement in Hitler’s inner circle, if falling on the wrong ears, might be used by his enemies as evidence that something big was up and that it emanated from the highest instance of command.
Quote:
Medo: Besides, the wording of the protocol of the Wannsee Conference a week before suggests that, while extermination was a policy decided upon, it was not yet clear how exactly it was to be brought about.
- Which only creates more problems for both sources as the Endlösung according to Höss and later Eichmann was instituted already the previous summer. Construction of the Belzec extermination center began in November 1941 (Hilberg, Destruction..., p.875f) and the death machinery in Auschwitz and Chelmno had been in operation since autumn and December 1941, respectively. The Auschwitz Museum on the subject:
http://www.auschwitz.org.pl/html/eng/hi ... _1_ok.html
Höss and Eichmann on the final solution, see for instance: Hilberg, p.881; The Eichmann Trial: District Court Sessions, Session 10, 19 Apr 1961: http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 10-01.html
The assumption seems to be that the erection of killing installations would necessarily have been related to an all-out massacre of the Jewish population in Europe. That this was not so in regard to either Chelmno or Belzec has been demonstrated i.a. by German historian Christian Gerlach in his book Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord. Chelmno was – at least at the beginning – meant for the liquidation of 100,000 Jews from the Warthegau regarding whom governor Arthur Greiser had obtained a special authorization from Himmler, without Hitler’s involvement.
Belzec was also a limited affair in the beginning, aimed at getting rid of the “useless eaters”, i.e. those unfit to work, among the Jews of the Lublin district. The gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau, on the other hand, were initially used to eliminate Soviet prisoners of war and non-Soviet camp inmates who had become sick or otherwise unfit to work. In other words, the killing installations were there before it was decided to use them on an exterminatory scale – and accordingly to expand them and complement them with additional ones.
Quote:
Medo: "Transportation of European Jews - at least the able-bodied ones - to Russia, where the local Jews were being massacred since the beginning of the German attack in June 1941, and killing them there or working them to death or simply leaving them to die of starvation and exposure, still seems to have been an alternative under consideration in January 1942"
- Indeed it may, or why not send the Jews to Africa even?
Because it was an impracticable solution – just as the initially intended deportation to the inhospitable regions of the “Russian East” eventually turned out to be.
Adolf Hitler, 29/5 1942,
Berlin:
"All of Western Euorope must after a certain time therefore become entirely freed of Jews. This was necessary already because of the reason that there was always a certain percentage of fanatics among the Jews who again tried to put Jewry on its feet. Therefore it was neither recommendable to try getting rid of the Jews by sending them to Siberia, while because of their resistence to all climates, they would only become especially hardened there. It was much better - because the arabs did not want them in Palestine - to transport them to Africa, thereby exposing them to a climate which infuenced every human being with our resistence in a negative way, whereby it would become impossible for the Jews to make any trespass on the areas of interest of European people."
(Henry Picker, Hitlers bordsamtal i högkvarteret 1941-42 (Halmstad 1967), p.140; my translation)

Take note of the date! Seems the bewilderment at what really to do with the Jews was apparent not only in January 1942, but actually persisted for a while.
It may actually have persisted even after the mass killing of Jews outside the Soviet Union had started. It was only on 19 July 1942 – shortly before the commencement of deportations to Treblinka extermination camp – that Himmler ordered the removal of the entire Jewish population, except for those in ghettoes and camps working for the war effort, from the General Government.
On the other hand, considering the on going realization of the extermination enterprise, one can only wonder at Hitler’s African ramblings in May/June 1942. Was the guy totally schizophrenic?
Much of his behavior suggests that he was not far away from that, as a matter of fact. Other factors may have been his unrealistic day-dreaming about alternatives to the mass killing that was already going on and/or discretion in the face of listeners that did not belong to the circle of the insiders charged with carrying out the “Final Solution”.
Initiation of mass gassing operation, extermination camps:

Auschwitz: Autumn, 1941
Chelmno: December, 1941
Belzec: March 17, 1942
Sobibor: April, 1942
Treblinka: July 23, 1942
Majdanek: September - October, 1942
Interesting data. The start of gassing operations at Majdanek in September-October 1942 explains why a part of the Jews of the General Government targeted by Aktion Reinhard(t) were dispatched at Majdanek rather than at Belzec or Sobibor after that time. It was obviously more practical to liquidate Jews from Lublin at “home” than to send them to the extermination camps that were further away.

The Höfle memo, intercepted and translated by the British decoding service at Bletchley Park, reads as follows:
13/15. OLQ de OMQ 1005 83 234 250

State Secret!

To the Senior Commander of the Security Police [and the Security Service], for the attention of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HEIM, CRACOW.

Subject: fortnightly report Einsatz REINHART.
Reference: radio telegram therefrom.


recorded arrivals until December 31, 42,

L [Lublin] 12,761,
B [Belzec] 0,
S [Sobibor] 515,
T [Treblinka] 10 335

together 23 611

sum total…[as per] December 31, 42,

L 24 733,
B 434 508,
S 101 370,
T 71 355, read: 713 555]

together 1 274 166

SS and Police Leader Lublin, HOFLE, Sturmbannfuhrer

========================


The mass killings at Belzec commenced ten days before Goebbels wrote the following in his diary:
Beginning with Lublin, the Jews in the General Government are now being evacuated eastward. The procedure is a pretty barbaric one and not to be described here more definitely. Not much will remain of the Jews. On the whole it can be said that about 60 per cent of them will have to be liquidated whereas only about 40 per cent can be used for forced labor.

The former Gauleiter of Vienna, who is to carry this measure through, is doing it with considerable circumspection and according to a method that does not attract too much attention. A judgment is being visited upon the Jews that, while barbaric, is fully deserved by them. The prophesy which the Fuehrer made about them for having brought on a new world war is beginning to come true in a most terrible manner. One must not be sentimental in these matters. If we did not fight the Jews, they would destroy us. It's a life-and-death struggle between the Aryan race and the Jewish bacillus. No other government and no other regime would have the strength for such a global solution of this question. Here, too, the Fuehrer is the undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions and therefore inexorable. Fortunately a whole series of possibilities presents itself for us in wartime that would be denied us in peacetime. We shall have to profit by this.

The ghettoes that will be emptied in the cities of the General Government now will be refilled with Jews thrown out of the Reich. This process is to be repeated from time to time. There is nothing funny in it for the Jews, and the fact that Jewry's representatives in England and America are today organizing and sponsoring the war against Germany must be paid for dearly by its representatives in Europe - and that's only right.


Source of quote:

http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/g/goe ... 942-mar-27

Gerlach’s recent research suggests that Goebbels may have been a little ahead of events in his assessment of the deportations to Belzec as the beginning of the execution of the “global solution”. Hitler’s quoted monologue on 29.05.1942, on the other hand, suggests that Hitler may still have been somewhat hesitant rather than the “undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions” as whom Goebbels saw him.

michael mills
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#26

Post by michael mills » 29 Apr 2002, 14:24

The assumption seems to be that the erection of killing installations would necessarily have been related to an all-out massacre of the Jewish population in Europe. That this was not so in regard to either Chelmno or Belzec has been demonstrated i.a. by German historian Christian Gerlach in his book Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord. Chelmno was – at least at the beginning – meant for the liquidation of 100,000 Jews from the Warthegau regarding whom governor Arthur Greiser had obtained a special authorization from Himmler, without Hitler’s involvement.
Belzec was also a limited affair in the beginning, aimed at getting rid of the “useless eaters”, i.e. those unfit to work, among the Jews of the Lublin district. The gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau, on the other hand, were initially used to eliminate Soviet prisoners of war and non-Soviet camp inmates who had become sick or otherwise unfit to work. In other words, the killing installations were there before it was decided to use them on an exterminatory scale – and accordingly to expand them and complement them with additional ones.
Gerlach’s recent research suggests that Goebbels may have been a little ahead of events in his assessment of the deportations to Belzec as the beginning of the execution of the “global solution”. Hitler’s quoted monologue on 29.05.1942, on the other hand, suggests that Hitler may still have been somewhat hesitant rather than the “undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions” as whom Goebbels saw him.
The above theories are those of Peter Longerich and Dieter Pohl, rather than of Gerlach, to whom Mr Muehlenkamp attributes them. Of course Gerlach may have since picked up Longerich's theories, but if so, he has abandoned the one claim for which he is best known, namely that Hitler ordered the Final Solution in early December 1941.

Longerich's theory is that all the early killings of Jews (Soviet Union, Chelmno, Belzec) were separate localised actions, authorised separately, and the result of specific conditions in particular localities. he believes that the local actions did not coalesce into an all-embracing genocide until May 1942.

Goebbels cannot have been ahead of himself on 27 march 1942 if Hitler had ordered the Final Solution in December 1941. Mr Muehlenkamp seems to have retreated somewhat from his earlier insistence on the December 1941 date (if so, he is to be commended for it).

By the way, the German word used by Goebbels that is translated as "global" is "generell". Goebbels was of course not imagining that every Jew in the world would be, or could be, hunted down.

It may well be that on 27 March 1942, Goebbels was exaggerating when he described Hitler as "the undismayed champion of a radical solution". It may well be that Goebbels was attributing to Hitler his own views, reading into Hitler's words wanted he wanted to hear.

That of course is precisely what Irving claimed in his Goebbels biography, where he stated that what Goebbels said in his diary about Hitler's eagerness for the implementation of the Final Solution cannot be taken at face value, that it is a matter of Goebbels attributing to Hitler his own radicalism.

It is good to see Mr Muehlenkamp endorsing some of the positions taken by Irving.

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Roberto
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#27

Post by Roberto » 29 Apr 2002, 19:51

medorjurgen wrote:
The assumption seems to be that the erection of killing installations would necessarily have been related to an all-out massacre of the Jewish population in Europe. That this was not so in regard to either Chelmno or Belzec has been demonstrated i.a. by German historian Christian Gerlach in his book Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord. Chelmno was – at least at the beginning – meant for the liquidation of 100,000 Jews from the Warthegau regarding whom governor Arthur Greiser had obtained a special authorization from Himmler, without Hitler’s involvement.
Belzec was also a limited affair in the beginning, aimed at getting rid of the “useless eaters”, i.e. those unfit to work, among the Jews of the Lublin district. The gas chambers of Auschwitz-Birkenau, on the other hand, were initially used to eliminate Soviet prisoners of war and non-Soviet camp inmates who had become sick or otherwise unfit to work. In other words, the killing installations were there before it was decided to use them on an exterminatory scale – and accordingly to expand them and complement them with additional ones.

Gerlach’s recent research suggests that Goebbels may have been a little ahead of events in his assessment of the deportations to Belzec as the beginning of the execution of the “global solution”. Hitler’s quoted monologue on 29.05.1942, on the other hand, suggests that Hitler may still have been somewhat hesitant rather than the “undismayed champion of a radical solution necessitated by conditions” as whom Goebbels saw him.
michael mills wrote:
The above theories are those of Peter Longerich and Dieter Pohl, rather than of Gerlach, to whom Mr Muehlenkamp attributes them. Of course Gerlach may have since picked up Longerich's theories, but if so, he has abandoned the one claim for which he is best known, namely that Hitler ordered the Final Solution in early December 1941.

Longerich's theory is that all the early killings of Jews (Soviet Union, Chelmno, Belzec) were separate localised actions, authorised separately, and the result of specific conditions in particular localities. he believes that the local actions did not coalesce into an all-embracing genocide until May 1942.

Goebbels cannot have been ahead of himself on 27 march 1942 if Hitler had ordered the Final Solution in December 1941. Mr Muehlenkamp seems to have retreated somewhat from his earlier insistence on the December 1941 date (if so, he is to be commended for it).
It seems that Michael Mills hasn’t read Gerlach's Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, namely the essay Die Bedeutung der deutschen Ernährungspolitik für die Beschleunigung der Mordes an den Juden 1942 (pages 167 to 257), from which I quote:
Bis zur Jahresmitte 1942 bestand das Ziel der deutschen Behörden im Generalgouvernement und weit darüber hinaus darin, die Juden durch Ermordung der nicht zur Arbeit benötigten, unnützen Menschen zu dezimieren, während die anderen noch längere Zeit für Zwecke der deutschen Kriegswirtschaft Zwangsarbeit leisten sollten. Hierauf gibt es zahlreiche Hinweise. Reichspropagandaminister Goebbels notierte über das Ausmaß der geplanten Vernichtung der Juden im Generalgouvernement, “daß 60 % davon liquidiert werden müssen, während nur noch 40 % in die Arbeit eingesetzt werden können”. Ebenso erklärte Staatssekretär Josef Bühler aus dem Generalgouvernement Anfang Mai 1942, die neuesten Pläne sähen – weiterhin – vor, “die arbeitsfähigen Juden” zu behalten und die “übrigen” zu ermorden. Auch Viktor Brack, für die “Euthanasie” zuständiger Abteilungsleiter in der Kanzlei des Führers, der Globocnik Personal für die Vernichtungslager zur Verfügung stellte, äußerte Ende Juni 1942, von zehn Millionen Juden in Europa sollten zwei bis drei Millionen nicht ermordet, sondern sterilisiert und als Zwangsarbeiter verwendet werden. Himmler soll bei seinem Besuch in Krakau Ende März 1942 mitgeteilt haben, bis zum Ende des Jahres sollte die Hälfte der Juden im Generalgouvernement vernichtet sein. Globocniks Koordinator bei der Vernichtungsaktion, Höfle, wollte sofort auch die ab März 1942 in den Distrikt Lublin deportierten deutschen Juden selektieren und die als arbeitsunfähig eingestuften ermorden. In anderen Gebieten, so im Warthegau und in Litauen, gingen die Behörden gleichfalls davon aus, es sollten vorläufig “nur” die “arbeitsunfähigen” Juden – die Mehrheit der jüdischen Bevölkerung – getötet werden. Im Wartheland hatte sich Reichsstatthalter Arthur Greiser eine Sondergenehmigung Himmlers und Heydrichs zum Mord an 100 000 Juden verschafft. Ende November 1941 prognostizierte man in Greisers Behörde dafür noch einen Zeitraum von vier Monaten bis Ende März 1942. Noch am 26. Juli 1942 plante Eichmann, die rumänischen Juden binnen kurzem in den Distrikt Lublin zu deportieren, wo “der arbeitsfähige Teil arbeitseinsatzmäßig angesetzt wird, der Rest der Sonderbehandlung unterzogen werden soll”.
Dem entsprachen auch Anweisungen, Juden zwischen 16 und 32 oder zwischen 16 und 38 Jahren von Vernichtungsaktionen auszunehmen. Sie kamen als Grundsatzbefehl von Himmler selbst sowie vom BdS Krakau, so zur Räumung des Warschauer Ghettos ab dem 22. Juli 1942. So deuteten auch viele Judenräte in den Ghettos “the extermination campaign more as an unwillingness to distribute food and other vital necessities to a population which the Germans considered to be inferior and inefficient" (Yisrael Gutman).
Heydrich hatte das Zwangsarbeitskonzept des RSHA auf der Wannsee-Konferenz vorgestellt. Es implizierte, daß am Anfang Selektionen der Menschen auf ihre Arbeitsfähigkeit hin stattfinden sollten. Jedoch was es ursprünglich Heydrichs Absicht, mit der Ermordung der Juden aus dem Reichsgebiet und Westeuropa zu beginnen. Staatssekretär Bühler forderte demgegenüber in Wannsee, mit der Vernichtungsaktion im Generalgouvernement anzufangen und sie dort “so schnell wie möglich” durchzuführen. Zur Begründung sagte Bühler, daß

“der Jude als Seuchenträger eine eminente Gefahr bedeutet und er zum anderen durch fortgesetzten Schleichhandel die wirtschaftliche Struktur des Landes dauernd in Unordnung bringt. Von den in Frage kommenden 2 ½ Millionen Juden sei überdies die Mehrzahl der Fälle arbeitsunfähig”

Überdies, so Bühler, gebe es nur geringe Transportschwierigkeiten. Damit erteilte Bühler faktisch Heydrichs in Wannsee noch aufrechterhaltenen Plänen für großangelegte Deportationen in die besetzten sowjetischen Gebiete (wo nun freilich beabsichtigt war, auch die überlebenden jüdischen Zwangsarbeiter schließlich zu töten) eine Absage. Schon Generalgouverneur Frank hatte bei seiner bereits erwähnten Rede am 16. Dezember erklärt, die Juden seien “außergewöhnlich schädliche Fresser”, und damit den wirtschaftlichen “Nutzen” ihrer Ermordung hervorgehoben.
Nach mehrmonatigen Vorbereitungen begann Mitte März 1942 die mörderische Dezimierung der Juden des Distrikts Lublin im Vernichtungslager Belzec. Die Selektion der jüdischen Arbeiter war in Lublin am 8. März abgeschlossen worden. Zwischen dem 17. März und dem 20. April wurden mindestens 30 000 Juden aus der Stadt Lublin in Belzec sowie bei Massenerschießungen getötet. Vom 6. Mai bis zum 10. Juni ermordeten SS und Polizei mindestens 57 500 Juden aus den Landdistrikten des Bezirks Lublin in Sobibór und Belzec. Hiernach wurde die Vernichtungsaktion im Distrikt Lublin zunächst gestoppt, obwohl dafür das Lager in Belzec zur Verfügung gestanden hätte. Im Distrikt Galizien fielen zwischen dem 15. März und etwa dem 9. April 1942 über 30 000 Juden den Morden durch Gas in Belzec und Massenerschießungen zum Opfer. Ziel dieser Aktionen war verschiedenen Quellen zufolge die Dezimierung der jüdischen Bevölkerung durch Morde an “Arbeitsunfahigen”. Danach begannen neue Deportationen in die Vernichtungslager im Distrikt Galizien am 27. Juli, im Distrikt Lublin am 19. August.
Die Morde im Distrikt Galizien trugen mehr den Charakter einer furchtbaren, langanhaltenden Dezimierung und ähnelten damit dem Ablauf in denjenigen besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten, die bis 1939 zu Polen gehört hatten. Bereits 1941 waren in Ostgalizien etwa 70 000 jüdische Menschen erschossen worden. Es liegen mehrere Indizien vor, daß ernährungs- und sozialpolitische Gründe mit dafür ausschlaggebend waren, daß ausgerechnet in dieser Region die ersten Massenmorde stattfanden. Sie wurden im Süden des Distrikts und in der Hauptstadt Lemberg durchgeführt. In den gleichen Gebieten herrschte zu dieser Zeit eine Hungernot, die die Zustände im übrigen Generalgouvernement und auch im sonstigen Distrikt Galizien weit übertraf. Dazu kam im Herbst 1941 eine Überschwemmungskatastrophe im Süden Galiziens. Außerdem stellen mehrere Quellen aus der Zivilverwaltung die Massaker als vorteilhafte Maßnahme für die Bekämpfung des als enorm beschriebenen Schleichhandels dar. Die Verhältnisse hatten sich auch zum Frühjahr 1942 nicht geändert, und die Morde im Frühjahr 1942 konzentrierten sich in Galizien – offenbar auf eine Entscheidung der Zivilverwaltung hin – wieder auf Lemberg und den Süden.
Dagegen wurde der Ghettoräumung in Lublin bis zum 20 April 1942 und den Tötungen durch Gas in Belzec eine Schlüsselfunktion für die “Endlösung” im ganzen Generalgouvernement zugemessen. Bereits einen Tag nach Beginn der Deportationen nach Belzec, am 18. März 1942, hatte Frank auf einer Sitzung der Distriktstandortführer und Amstwalter der NSDAP erklärt: “Ich weiß, welche Scherereien uns die Juden machen. Sie müssen weg, das ist klar.” An der Besprechung nahm auch Globocnik teil. Die Propagandaabteilung der Distriktverwaltung stellte schon am 28. März fest: “Die Judenaussiedlung hat bewiesen, daß die Aktion auch im großen Stil, also für das gesamte GG durchgeführt werden kann.” Ähnlich klang es in den Worten des Amtschefs des Distrikts Lublin, Engler, am 31. Mai an, nachdem Frank das neue Ghetto am Stadtrand besichtigt hatte, in dem nur noch 3 000 bis 4 000 Juden lebten. Ende April oder Anfang Mai reiste das von Christian Wirth befehligte Sonderkommando vollständig aus Belzec ab, nachdem es die fünfzig Männer des jüdischen Arbeitskommandos ermordet hatte; lediglich zwanzig ukrainische Hilfskräfte blieben im Lager zurück. Wirth fuhr davon, angeblich nach Berlin. Dieser merkwürdige Vorgang spricht ebenfalls dafür, daß vor einer Fortsetzung der Vernichtungsaktion die bisherigen Erfahrungen ausgewertet werden sollten.
Das Ergebnis war, daß die Mordmethode tauglich erschien und Vernichtungsaktionen dieser Art auf das ganze Generalgouvernement ausgedehnt werden sollten. Staatssekretär Bühler machte diese “neuen Nachrichten” den Hauptabteilungsleitern am 11. Mai offiziell bekannt. Anläßlich des Beginns der Ermordung der sogenannten arbeitsunfähigen Juden aus den Landkreisen des Distrikts Lublin ab dem 6. Mai in Sobibór – seit Mitte Mai auch wieder in Belzec – ordnete die Hauptabteilung Arbeit des Generalgouverneurs am 9. Mai an, alle jüdischen Facharbeiter zu registrieren. Diese diente allerdings nicht dazu, diejenigen festzustellen, die mit ihren Familiten noch von den Morden verschont werden sollten, sondern wurde mit einem Program zum Ausbau der jüdischen Zwangsarbeit verbunden. 100 000 Juden sollten zur Zwangsarbeit in der Rüstungswirtschaft beziehungsweise Zulieferbetrieben der Wehrmacht eingesetzt werden, um nichtjüdische Polen als Zwangsarbeiter ans Reich abgeben zu können. Die Weichenstellung hierfür fand am 8. Mai statt. Ähnlich war die Entwicklung auf der Ebene des Distrikts Galizien, wo der SSPF Katzmann am 20. Mai die Kreishauptleute um Meldung der Zahl der “nicht im Einsatz befindlichen Juden” befragte, um herauszufinden, wie viele sie abschieben wollten. Das Selektionsprinzip zwischen “Arbeitsfähigen” und “Arbeitsunfähigen” wurde also verschärft fortgeführt. In den folgenden Monate wurden verstärkt jüdische Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen in Rüstungsbetriebe und vor allem in den Dienst bei der Eisenbahn überführt, um nichtjüdische Polen zu ersetzen, sogar noch nach Beginn der totalen Judenvernichtung im August. Allerdings wandte sich Bühler gegen den Plan der SS und Polizei, die Rüstungsproduktion um große Konzentrationslager herum neu zu gruppieren, weil dies durch Zerstörung der wirtschaftlichen Verbindungen und Strukturen mehr Schaden als Nutzen bringe. Doch ohne Erfolg.
Ende Mai 1942 begannen auch Deportationen jüdischer Menschen aus dem Distrikt Krakau nach Belzec, die anscheinend bis zum 19. Juni dauerten. Dann setzte aus militärischen Gründen eine mehrwöchige Eisenbahntransportsperre ein. Bis Mitte Juli 1942 waren in Belzec und Sobibór etwa 160,000 polnische Juden ermordet worden. SS- und Polizeieinheiten hatten außerdem mehrere Zehntausende von ihnen erschossen. Rund 1,5 Millionen Juden waren im Generalgouvernement noch am Leben. In zwei Distrikten – Warschau und Radom – hatten noch keine großangelegten Vernichtungsaktionen begonnen. Um zu verstehen, was in den folgenden Monaten geschah, ist es aber nötig, zunächst auf die wirtschaftspolitische Entwicklung aus der Sicht der Regierung des Generalgouvernements einerseits und auf die Pläne der SS-Führung für die Judenvernichtung andererseits einzugehen.
My translation:
Until the middle of 1942 the goal of the German authorities in the General Government and far beyond consisted in decimating the Jews by murdering those not needed for work and therefor useless, whereas the others were still to carry out forced labor for the purposes of German war economy for a longer time. There are numerous indications to this. Reich Propaganda Minister Goebbels remarked about the extension of the planned annihilation of the Jews in the General Government, “that 60 % thereof will have to be liquidated, whereas only 40 % can be used for labor purposes”. In a similar vein, State Secretary Josef Bühler from the General Government declared at the beginning of May 1942 that the new plans – still – provided for keeping the “Jews fit to work” and murdering the “remainder”. Viktor Brack, the head of department in the Führer’s Chancellery responsible for the “Euthanasia”, who made available personnel to Globocnik for the extermination camps, stated at the end of June 1942 that of ten million Jews in Europe two to three million were not to be killed, but sterilized and used as forced laborers. Himmler is reported to have stated at a visit in Cracow at the end of March 1942 that until the end of the year half the Jews in the General Government would have to be liquidated. Globocnik’s coordinator for the extermination action, Höfle, wanted to immediately select also the German Jews deported to the Lublin district since March 1942 and to murder those considered unfit to work. In other areas, such as the Warthegau and Lithuania, the authorities also assumed that for the time being “only” the Jews “unfit to work” – the majority of the Jewish population – were to be killed. In the Wartheland Governor Arthur Greiser had obtained a special authorization from Himmler and Heydrich for the murder of 100 000 Jews. At the end of November 1941 Greiser’s office still prognosticated a period of four months until the end of March 1942 for this purpose. As late as 26 July 1942 Eichmann planned to shortly deport the Romanian Jews to the Lublin district, where “the part able to work is to be used for labor purposes, while the remainder is to be submitted to special treatment.”
In accordance with this there were instructions to exempt Jews between 16 and 32 years or between 16 and 38 years of age from extermination actions. These came as a basic directive from Himmler himself and from the Commander of Security Police and SD Cracow, such as the instructions for the clearing of the Warsaw ghetto since 22 July 1942. Thus many Jewish councils in the ghettoes interpreted “the extermination campaign more as an unwillingness to distribute food and other vital necessities to a population which the Germans considered to be inferior and inefficient" (Yisrael Gutman).
Heydrich had presented the RSHA’s forced labor concept at the Wannsee Conference. It implied that selections of people to determine their capacity for work were to be carried out at the start. However, it was originally Heydrich’s intention to commence with the murder of the Jews from the Reich territory and Western Europe. State Secretary Bühler, on the other hand, required at Wannsee that the extermination action commence in the General Government and be there carried out “as fast as possible”. Bühler justified his request by stating that

“the Jew as a carrier of diseases is an eminent danger and also keeps upsetting the economic structure of the country through continuous black market trading. Of the 2 ½ million Jews in question, furthermore, the majority are unfit to work”

Besides, according to Bühler, there were only slight transportation difficulties. Herewith Bühler in fact dismissed Heydrich’s plans, still upheld at Wannsee, for large-scale deportations to the occupied Soviet territories (where however it was intended to eventually kill also the surviving Jewish forced laborers). General Governor Frank had declared at his already mentioned speech on 16 December [1941] that the Jews were “extraordinarily harmful gluttons”, and thus pointed out the economic “benefit” of their being murdered.
After several months of preparation the murderous decimation of the Jews of the Lublin district at Belzec extermination camp began in mid-March of 1942. The selection of Jewish workers had been concluded in Lublin on 8 March. Between 17 March and 20 April at least 30 000 Jews from the city of Lublin were killed at Belzec and in mass shootings. From 6 May to 10 June SS and police murdered at least 57 500 Jews from the rural areas of the Lublin district at Sobibór and Belzec. Hereafter the extermination action in the Lublin district was stopped for the time being, although the camp at Belzec would have been available for it. In the district of Galicia more than 30 000 Jews fell victim to the murders by gas at Belzec and to mass shootings between 15 March and about 9. April 1942. The goal of these actions, according to various sources, was the decimation of the Jewish population by murdering those “unfit to work”. Thereafter new deportations to the extermination camps began in the district of Galicia on 27 July and in the Lublin district on 19 August.
The murders in the district of Galicia carried more the character of a terrible, long-term decimation and were thus similar to the development in those occupied Soviet territories which until 1939 had belonged to Poland. Already in 1941 about 70 000 Jewish people had been shot in Eastern Galicia. There are various indications that reasons of food supply and social politics contributed decisively to the fact that this of all regions was the one where the first mass murders took place. The killings were carried out in the southern part of the district and in the capital, Lemberg. In the same areas there was a famine at this time, which far exceeded the conditions in the rest of the General Government and also in the other parts of the Galicia district. There was also a flood disaster in Southern Galicia in the autumn of 1941. Several sources from the civilian administration furthermore describe the massacres as a beneficial measure for the fight against the black market trade, said to be of enormous proportions. The conditions had not changed by the spring of 1942, and the murders in the spring of 1942 in Galicia were concentrated – apparently due to a decision of the civilian administration – again in Lemberg and the South.
The ghetto clearing in Lublin until 20 April 1942 and the killings by gas in Belzec, on the other hand, were accorded a key function for the “Final Solution” in the whole General Government. Already one day after commencement of the deportations to Belzec, on 18 March 1942, Frank had declared at a meeting of the local district leaders and dignitaries of the NSDAP: “I know what problems the Jews cause us. They must be removed, that is clear.” The meeting was also attended by Globocnik. The propaganda section of the district administration remarked already on 28 March: “The evacuation of the Jews has proven that the action can also be carried out on a large scale, i.e. for the whole of the General Government.” Similarly sounded the words of the head of office of the Lublin district, Engler, after Frank had viewed the new ghetto at the edge of the city where only 3 000 to 4 000 Jews were still living. At the end of April or the beginning of May the Sonderkommando commanded by Christian Wirth wholly departed from Belzec after murdering the fifty men of the Jewish work detachment; only twenty Ukrainian auxiliaries remained at the camp. Wirth went away, allegedly to Berlin. This peculiar occurrence also speaks for the intention to analyze the experiences obtained until then before continuing the extermination action.
The result was that the murder method seemed adequate and extermination actions of this type were thus to be extended to the whole General Government. State Secretary Bühler officially communicated these “fresh news” to the heads of the main departments on 11 May. On occasion of the beginning of the murder of the so-called non-working Jews from the rural areas of the Lublin district since 6 May at Sobibor – since the middle of May also again at Belzec – the Main Department Labor of the General Governor ordered the registration of all Jewish skilled workers on 9 May. The purpose of this, however, was not to establish those who with their families were still to be spared from the killings, but was connected with a program for the intensification of Jewish forced labor. 100 000 Jews were to be used for forced labor in the armament industry or supplier industries of the Wehrmacht in order to allow for the delivery of non-Jewish Polish forced laborers to the Reich. The pre-conditions for this were set on 8 May. Similar was the development at the level of the Galicia district, where Head of SS and Police Katzmann had on 20 May required the area leaders to report the number of Jews “not currently assigned to work”, in order to find out how many they wanted to deport. The principle of selection between those “able to work” and those “unfit to work” was thus continued in a more stringent manner. In the following months Jewish male and female workers were in increasing numbers moved to the armament industry and mainly to the service of the railways to replace non-Jewish Poles, even after the commencement of the total extermination of the Jews in August. Bühler unsuccessfully turned against the plan of the SS and police to regroup the armament production around great concentration camps, alleging that due to the destruction of economic links this would bring more damage than benefit.
At the end of May 1942 there also began the deportations of Jewish people from the district of Cracow to Belzec, which apparently lasted until 19 June. Then there was a stop in railway transports for several weeks due to military reasons. Until the middle of July 1942 about 160 000 Polish Jews had been murdered at Belzec and Sobibór. SS and police units had furthermore shot several tens of thousands of them. Around 1.5 million Jews were still alive in the General Government. In two districts – Warsaw and Radom – no large scale extermination actions had yet begun. In order to understand what happened in the following months it is necessary, however, to have a look at the development of economic policies from the point of view of the General Government on the one hand and the plans of the SS leadership for the murder of the Jews on the other.
Emphases are mine.

There is no contradiction between the above description of the gradual development of the extermination actions – first restricted to one, then to two regions and carried out on a comparatively smaller scale at Belzec and Sobibór, then extended to the whole of the General Government after it had been verified that the Belzec method functioned – and the notion that Hitler gave his subordinates the basic “go ahead” in December 1941. As Gerlach points out in his essay on the significance of the Wannsee Conference in the above mentioned book, what the Führer communicated to his minions on 12 December 1941 was a Grundsatzentscheidung, an authorization to proceed as they saw fit in regard to the Jews. From that point in time on, what was already valid in the occupied territories of the Soviet Union became valid throughout the rest of Europe: The RSHA, the SS and the local administrators could be certain that the murderous measures they took against the Jews, regarding the organization and timing of which they were given a free hand, had the Führer’s backing and approval.
By the way, the German word used by Goebbels that is translated as "global" is "generell". Goebbels was of course not imagining that every Jew in the world would be, or could be, hunted down.
I wonder who other than Michael Mills understood the term “global” in a sense other than “general”, “overall” or “all-encompassing”, within the Nazis’ area of influence in Europe that Goebbels was obviously referring to.
It may well be that on 27 March 1942, Goebbels was exaggerating when he described Hitler as "the undismayed champion of a radical solution". It may well be that Goebbels was attributing to Hitler his own views, reading into Hitler's words wanted he wanted to hear.

That of course is precisely what Irving claimed in his Goebbels biography, where he stated that what Goebbels said in his diary about Hitler's eagerness for the implementation of the Final Solution cannot be taken at face value, that it is a matter of Goebbels attributing to Hitler his own radicalism.

It is good to see Mr Muehlenkamp endorsing some of the positions taken by Irving.
Irving may be not be altogether wrong in this respect. Ein blindes Huhn findet auch mal ein Korn. I haven’t read Irving’s Goebbels, but from what Mr. Mills tells us I conclude that Irving has departed from his original contention that Hitler didn’t even know about the whole thing until the end of 1943. Now he only seems to see him as less radical in his approach to the Jews than Goebbels, which is not altogether improbable, even though the difference, if there was any, seems to have reduced itself to Hitler still contemplating alternatives to the wholesale killing for which he had given authorization to proceed whereas such alternatives no longer crossed Goebbels’ mind – a hesitancy in pushing through decisions taken that seems to have been characteristic of the Führer, rather than any significant difference in approach.

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#28

Post by michael mills » 30 Apr 2002, 01:32

As Gerlach points out in his essay on the significance of the Wannsee Conference in the above mentioned book, what the Führer communicated to his minions on 12 December 1941 was a Grundsatzentscheidung, an authorization to proceed as they saw fit in regard to the Jews.
If that is what Hitler did in December 1941, then his "authorisation" did not have the significance that Gerlach and others following Gerlach, such as the folks at The Holocaust History Project, attribute to it.

Hitler had already in October 1939 given Himmler a general authorisation to take any measures he saw fit against population groups judged to be inimical to German interests. That was in the context of the appointment of Himmler to the post of Generalkommissar fuer die Festigung deutschen Volkstums. If Hitler actually did say something in December 1941, he was probably just reconfirming that authorisation, with special reference to Jews. Whatever he said then cannot be interpreted as the long-sought "order for the Final Solution", ie an order to kill every Jew in German hands without exception.

It may be that such an all-encompassing order was never issued, and various German authorities proceeded as they saw fit under changing circumstances. That at least is what I believe. And such an interpretation comes close to Irving's 1977 contention that Hitler never issued a comprehensive and binding extermination order, simply giving ex post facto endorsement to what his subordinates had decided to do.

Certainly at Auschwitz, the principle of preserving Jews fit to work for labour while killing the unfit remained in place until the very end, and in fact in 1944 the pendulum swung in favour of the maximum utilisation of Jews for labour.

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#29

Post by Roberto » 30 Apr 2002, 18:39

In his essay Die Wannseekonferenz, das Schicksal der deutschen Juden und Hitlers politische Grundsatzentscheidung, alle Juden Europas zu ermorden, published in the book Krieg, Ernährung, Völkermord, Gerlach characterizes the decision communicated by Hitler on 12 December 1941 as follows:

Page 131:
[…]Die von Bräutigam weitergegebene Anordnung des Ministeriums bedeutete im übrigen nicht, daß alle Juden sofort getötet werden sollten; sie gab nur eine grundsätzliche Linie an. Das ist wichtig für das Verständnis der Initiative Hitlers im Dezember 1941 insgesamt: es ging hierbei nicht um eine konkrete Anweisung, sofort überall mit dem Mord an den Juden zu beginnen bzw. ihn zu Ende zu führen, sondern um eine Grundsatzentscheidung. Die praktische Durchführung, Organisation und das Tempo der Vernichtung blieben weitgehend den zuständigen Organen überlassen.[…]
Pages 160 and following:
[…]Die Grundsatzentscheidung vom Dezember 1941 ist ein zentrales fehlendes Glied im Entscheidungsprozeß für den Mord an den europäischen Juden. Sie stellte die Planungen für dieses Menschheitsverbrechen auf eine neue Grundlage. Sie enlastet jedoch niemanden; sie hatte nur zur Folge, daß die vielen schon bestehenden Ideen, Vorschläge und Initiativen für Vernichtungsaktionen auf regionaler Ebene gestützt, legitimiert, systematisiert wurden und einen neuen Antrieb bekamen.

Bezeichnenderweise hatte vier Tage vor der Führungsentscheidung und unabhängig von ihr das erste Vernichtungslager, Chelmno, seine Mordtätigkeit aufgenommen. Greiser hatte dafür buchstäblich eine Sondergenehmigung von Himmler und Heydrich zur Tötung von 100 000 Juden erwirkt. Daß Hitler eingeschaltet war, ist wenig wahrscheinlich, da sich Greiser, hätte er die Genehmigung von Hitler gehabt, sich dafür nicht hätte bei Himmler bedanken müssen. Dies tat er jedoch.

Um dies deutlich zu machen: meine Darstellung bedeutet nicht, daß ich die Ergebnisse der letzten mehr als zwanzig Jahre Grundlagenforschung insbesondere durch die sogenannte funktionalistische Schule verwerfen möchte. Die Judenvernichtung basierte keineswegs nur einfach auf dieser einen Entscheidung Hitlers oder insgesamt nur auf seinen Entscheidungen, Weisungen und Initiativen, sondern es geht hier um einen allerdings wichtigen Punkt innerhalb des Prozesses, der zur Ermordung der europäischen Juden führte. Die Analyse dieses Schubs kann dazu beitragen, auch die konkrete Rolle Hitlers genauer zu beleuchten. Es ist sicher schwer zu verstehen, daß Hitler eine Grundsatzentscheidung zur Ermordung aller Juden Europas fällte, nachdem dem Massenmord in einer Reihe von Ländern schon fast eine Million jüdischer Menschen zum Opfer gefallen waren. Es ist schwer zu begreifen, daß die Entscheidung nicht mit einem Mal fiel, sondern Schritt für Schritt, Gebiet für Gebiet, doch weist gerade der Fall Chelmno darauf hin, daß dies so war. Die herrschende Annahme, daß die grundsätzliche Entscheidung bereits zwischen Frühjahr und Herbst 1941 gefallen ist, basiert auf dem Glauben, daß vor der Überschreitung der Grenze zum Massenmord an den Juden etwas wie eine Ermächtigung der Staatsführung gestanden haben müsse. Doch für die Nationalsozialisten waren diese Vernichtungsentschlüsse politische, nicht moralische Entscheidungen. Deshalb konnten sie sich auf bestimmte Territorien oder gar Personengruppen (“Arbeitsunfähige”) beschränken.

Wie sind Inhalt und Folgen der Grundsatzentscheidung Hitlers zu bewerten? Bei seinen Äußerungen am 12. Dezember handelt es sich zunächst einmal nur um eine relativ kurze Passage innerhalb einer langen Rede, und es gab in dieser Zeit politische Fragen, die die deutsche Führung weitaus stärker in Anspruch nahmen und ihr dringender erschienen als die Verfolgung der Juden. Diese Redepassage war bereits eindeutig, für sich aber noch unkonkret. Den Inhalt von Hitlers getrennten Besprechungen mit Himmler, Bouhler, Frank, Rosenberg und anderen müssen wir uns als wesentlich konkreter vorstellen. Es geht bei den Vorgängen im Dezember 1941 nicht darum, ob die Akteure eine mehr oder weniger radikale Sprache benutzten (das taten sie zu anderer Zeit auch), sondern um die feststellbaren Ergebnisse. Zusammengenommen hatten die Rede am 12. Dezember und die weiteren Besprechungen drei wesentliche Folgen:

1.) neue, grundsätzliche Richtlinien zur Ermordung aller Juden durch die Regierung des Generalgouvernements und das Ostministerium – die Administrationen mit Gewalt über die meisten Juden im deutschen Machtbereich,
2.) die Intensivierung der Planung und Vorbereitungen zum Mord an Juden in verschiedenen Gebieten mit Giftgas,
3.) hatte Hitler, indem er die Ermordung aller europäischen Juden ankündigte, auch über das Schicksal der deutschen Juden entschieden.
Das zeigt etwa Hans Franks Äußerung in Krakau am 16. Dezember 1941, hinsichtlich der Ermordung der Juden werde im Generalgouvernement “das, was im Reich geschieht, bei uns zum mindesten auch zu geschehen haben”. Sie kontrastiert deutlich zu Himmlers Telegramm an Jeckeln fünfzehn Tage zuvor. Über die systematische Ermordung der Juden im Deutschen Reich konnte jedoch nur Hitler entscheiden, der gemäß Nürnberger Gesetzen allein das Recht hatte, Juden und sogenannte Mischlinge von den Restriktionen der Nürnberger Gesetze auszunehmen, und der 1941 vehement darauf verwiesen hatte, über eine etwaige Schlechterstellung der Mischlinge habe nur er zu entscheiden.

Hitlers Entscheidung war für die beteiligten Behörden notwendig mit Bezug auf den Mord an den deutschen Juden und um die Grundlage für eine zentrale Planung des Völkermords zu bekommen. Trotz aller Verwendung von Tarnsprache sind die Hinweise in Franks Rede am 16. Dezember in Krakau und in Heydrichs Ansprache nach der Niederschrift zur Wannsee-Konferenz in dieser Beziehung ernst zu nehmen; wir sehen dort sozusagen erste Entwürfe einer Gesamtplanung des Verbrechens. Eine solche Gesamtplanung zur kurzfristigen Ermordung hatte es zuvor offenbar nicht gegeben. Für das mörderische Vorgehen gegen die Juden in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten bedeutete die neue Richtlinie vom Dezember 1941 dagegen nur noch einen kleinen Schritt. Etwas größer war der Schritt im Generalgouvenement, wo der Druck aus Polizei und Teilen der Zivilverwaltung in Richtung auf eine großangelegte Vernichtung jedoch ohnehin schon so groß war, daß er früher oder später unweigerlich zu furchtbaren Konsequenzen geführt hätte.

Dies zeigt, daß Hitler bei seinem möglicherweise stärksten Eingreifen in den Vernichtungsprozeß keineswegs alles entschied und entscheiden mußte, und sein Eingreifen zwar deutliche, aber in gewissem Sinn auch begrenzte Folgen hatte. Die Erkenntnisse der Forschung über die schwerwiegende Verantwortlichkeit anderer Instanzen, und ganz besonders der Behörden direkt in den Besatzungsgebieten, werden dadurch bestätigt.

Für das Verständnis des Entscheidungsprozesses zum Mord an den Juden Europas scheint eine Annäherung über den Begriff des Utopischen nützlich. Selbstverständlich hat es Ideen zur Vernichtung der Juden und die Bereitschaft dazu in der NS-Bewegung vor 1941 schon viele Jahre gegeben, besonders bei Hitler. Doch gab es einen Unterschied zwischen Ideen, festen Absichten zum Völkermord und seiner Verwirklichung. Den ersten Plänen zu einer “Endlösung”, also den verschiedenen Vorstellungen von einer Zwangsumsiedlung, hafteten zwar von Anfang an stark destruktive Züge von langsamer Dezimierung durch schreckliche Lebensumstände und von verhinderter Fortpflanzung an, aber eben auch utopische Züge, denen innewohnte, daß diese ernsthaft verfolgten sogenannten Lösungen praktisch nicht zu verwirklichen waren. Das gilt für die Planungen von 1939/40 zur “Abschiebung” der Juden in den Distrikt Lublin ebenso wie nach Madagaskar. Die destruktiven Elemente verstärkten sich noch in dem Plan, die europäischen Juden nach einem militärischen Sieg über die Sowjetunion dorthin zu deportieren. Der Ablauf der Vernichtung wurde erst nach und nach vorstellbar – trotz der verbreiteten Bereitschaft dazu. Die Schritte von utopischen Umsiedlungs- und Vernichtungsplänen hin zu tatsächlich durchführbaren Mordprogrammen waren für die Durchführung des Massenmordes entscheidend. So erwies sich der Anfang 1941 gefaßte Plan, in der Sowjetunion etwa 30 Millionen Menschen zum Verhungern zu zwingen, um die Ernährung des deutsch beherrschten Europa zu garantieren, als undurchführbar. Daraufhin wurde er im Herbst 1941 ersetzt durch Programme zur Ermordung bestimmter Bevölkerungsgruppen, so von Millionen “arbeitsunfähigen” sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen. Für die gegen die Juden gerichteten Absichten stellten die Weichenstellungen im Dezember 1941 einen schwerwiegenden Schritt zur Verwirklichung, nämlich zur Konkretisierung der Pläne zum Völkermord dar.

Sowenig dieser ungeheuerliche Vorgang auch normale Politik war, sosehr Hitler ihn auch inszenierte – in dieser einen Hinsicht wurde über das Leben der europäischen Juden offenbar fast wie bei einem “normalen” politischen Entschluß entschieden: der “Führer” fällte die Entscheidung nicht einsam, sondern nach einer gewissen Zeit, in einer gewissen Situation und bei einem gewissen Anlaß stimmte er Initiativen aus dem Staats- und Parteiapparat zu. Viele drängten auf die Ermordung aller europäischen Juden hin, doch bevor sie damit systematisch beginnen konnten, bedurfte es im NS-System einer von Hitler gefällten Entscheidung.
My translation:

Page 131:
[…]The ministry’s directive passed on by Bräutigam did not, on the other hand, mean that all Jews were to be killed immediately; it only indicated a line of principle. This is important for the understanding of Hitler’s initiative in December 1941 as a whole, which was not a concrete instruction to begin with the murder of the Jews immediately and everywhere or to conclude it, but a decision of principle. The practical organization and the speed of extermination were to a great extent left to the competent bodies.[…]
Pages 160 and following:
[…]The principle decision of December 1941 is a central missing link in the decision process for the murder of the European Jews. It put the planning for this crime against humanity on a new basis. It does not relieve anybody, however, for it only had the consequence that the many already existing ideas, suggestions and initiatives for extermination actions on a regional level were supported, legitimized, systematized and got a new impulse.

Characteristically the first extermination camp, Chelmno, had initiated its murder activity four days prior to the Führer’s decision and independently of it. Greiser had for this purpose literally obtained a special authorization from Himmler and Heydrich for the killing of 100 000 Jews. It does not seem very probable that Hitler was involved, given that Greiser, had be had the authorization of Hitler, would not have had to thank Himmler for it. This he did, however.

To make it clear: my exposition does not mean that I want to dismiss the results of the past more than twenty years of research on the bases, especially by the so-called Functionalist school. The extermination of the Jews was by no means based simply on this one decision of Hitler’s or only on his decisions, directives and initiatives as a whole, but we are talking about just one, though an important point within the scope of the process that led to the murder of the European Jews. The analysis of this impulse can contribute to also visualize more accurately the role of Hitler. It is surely difficult to understand that Hitler took a principle decision on the murder of all European Jews after the mass murder in a number of countries had already victimized almost a million Jewish people. It is difficult to comprehend that this decision was not taken all at once, but step by step, region by region. Yet especially the case of Chelmno indicates that this is how it was. The prevailing assumption that the basic decision already occurred between the spring and the autumn of 1941 is based on the belief that before crossing the border to mass murder of the Jews there need to have been something like an authorization by the state leadership. Yet for the National Socialists these extermination decisions were political, not moral decisions. They thus could be limited to certain territories or even groups of people (e.g. those “unfit to work”).

How are the contents and consequences of Hitler’s principle decision to be assessed? First of all, his utterances on 12. December were but a relatively short passage of a long speech, and at this time there were political questions that required the German leadership’s attention far more and seemed more urgent to it than the persecution of the Jews. This passage of the speech was already unequivocal, but by itself not yet concrete. The contents of Hitler’s separate meetings with Himmler, Bouhler, Frank, Rosenberg and others we must assume to have been much more concrete. The issue regarding the occurrences in December 1941 is not whether the actors used a more or less radical language (they also did that at other times), but the verifiable results. The three essential results of the speech on 12 December and the ensuing meetings can be summarized as follows:

1.) new principle guidelines for the murder of the Jews by the government of the General Government and the Eastern Ministry – the administrative entities with power of the greatest number of Jews within the German area of influence,
2.) the intensification of the planning and preparations for the murder of Jews in various areas by poison gas,
3.) by announcing the murder of all European Jews, Hitler had also decided on the fate of the German Jews. This is shown e.g. by Hans Frank’s utterance in Cracow on 16 December 1941 that in regard to the murder of the Jews in the General Government “what is happening in the Reich will at the very least have to happen here as well”. This decision contrasts clearly with Himmler’s telegram to Jeckeln fifteen days before. About the systematic murder of Jews in the German Reich only Hitler could decide, for it was he alone who according to the Nuremberg Laws had the right to exempt Jews and so-called half-breeds from the restrictions of these laws, and it was he who had in 1941 vehemently pointed out that he was the only one to decide on an eventual worsening of the situation of the half-breeds.

Hitler’s decision was necessary for the authorities involved both in regard to the murder of the German Jews an in order to obtain the basis for a central planning of the genocide. Despite all use of camouflage language the indications in Frank’s speech on 16 December in Cracow and in Heydrich’s address after the writing of the protocol of the Wannsee Conference must be taken seriously in this respect, for we can see in them the first drafts, so to say, of an overall planning of the crime. Such an overall planning for short-term murder had obviously not existed before. For the murderous proceeding against the Jews in the occupied Soviet territories the guideline of December 1941 represented only a small step further. The step was somewhat greater in the General Government, where the pressure by the police and parts of the civilian administration in the direction of a large-scale extermination was already so great, however, that it would have inevitably led to terrible consequences sooner or later.

This shows that with his possibly strongest intervention in the extermination process Hitler by no means decided or had to decide all, and that his intervention had clear-cut but in a certain sense limited consequences. The findings of research on the crucial responsibility of other instances, especially the authorities in the very areas of occupation, is hereby confirmed.

For the understanding of the decision process towards murder an approach via the term of the utopian seems useful. Of course ideas about the annihilation of the Jews and the respective preparedness had been there for many years prior to 1941, especially on the part of Hitler. Yet there was a difference between ideas, firm intentions to commit genocide and the implementation thereof. The first plans for a “final solution” contained strongly destructive aspects of slow decimation through horrible living conditions and impediment of reproduction, but also utopian aspects characterized by the impossibility of carrying out these seriously pursued solutions in practice. This applies to the plans of 1939/40 for the “pushing away” of the Jews to the Lublin district as well as to Madagascar. The destructive elements became stronger in the plan to deport Jews to the Soviet Union after a military victory over that country. The procedure of annihilation only became imaginable gradually – despite the widespread preparedness for it. The steps from utopian resettlement and extermination programs to actually executable murder programs were decisive for the execution of the mass murder. Thus the plan decided upon at the beginning of 1941 to force about 30 million people in the Soviet Union to starve to death in order to guarantee the feeding of German-dominated Europe turned out to be unfeasible. It was thereupon replaced in the autumn of 1941 by programs for the murder of certain segments of the population, such as millions of Soviet prisoners of war “unfit to work”. For the intentions directed against the Jews the point-settings in December 1941 constituted a crucial step towards the realization, i.e. the implementation of the plans for genocide.

As little as this monstrous process was normal politics, as much as Hitler produced it – in this respect the decision about the lives of the European Jews were taken almost as in a “normal” political deliberation: the “Führer” did not take the decision all alone, but after a given time, in a given situation and on a given occasion he approved the initiatives from the state and party apparatus. Many insisted on the murder of all European Jews, but before they could begin with it systematically, there was the need in the National Socialist system for a decision taken by Hitler.
How the above is supposed to vindicate Irving’s thesis that Hitler was not involved in the genocide of the Jews and in fact ignorant about it until some time in 1943 is beyond me, but perhaps Mr. Mills can illuminate us.

Recommended reading:

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Snafu
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#30

Post by Snafu » 21 May 2002, 14:56

Roberto: What exactly did the Führer "yell out" on 30 January 1942?

Me: "Annihilation" is not a difficult word to comprehend and as "denial" of the popular interpretation of "die Endlösung der Judenfrage" is forbidden, we may only conclude that Hitler was actually very frank to the German people and the world about the plans of a certain project, well known to us all.

Roberto: The exact German wording would be appreciated. One thing is the threatening rhetorical rambling of a demagogue, another is a
statement about measures already accomplished or in the process of being accomplished.
- I agree that the German text would be preferrable but why don’t you rather ask “Sowjet” about it? After all it was his post. As for the “rhetorical rambling of a demagogue”, we both seem to agree that such emotional outbursts don't necessarily explain very much.

Roberto: "And what "inner circle" was around him in the evening of 27.1.1942? Only Goebbels, Himmler, Frank and other insiders, or also guests not so familiar with what was to happen?"
- No reference is made to guests present in said tabletalk, but it's interesting that you happen to mention Hans Frank, governor of "Holocaustia" (that is Poland), as a given member of the entourage.
Frank at Nuremberg, according to Mark Weber:
Hans Frank, the wartime governor of German-ruled Poland, testified that during the war he had heard only rumors and foreign reports of mass killings of Jews. He asked other officials, including Hitler, about these stories and was repeatedly assured that they were false.

Frank's testimony is particularly noteworthy because if millions of Jews had actually been exterminated in Germanoccupied Poland, as alleged, hardly anyone would have been in a better position to know about it. During the course of the trial, Frank was overcome by a deep sense of Christian repentance. His psychological state was such that if he had known about an extermination program, he would have said so.
At one point during the proceedings, Frank was asked by his attorney, "Did you ever take part in any way in the annihilation of Jews?" His reply reflects his emotional state at the time:

“I say yes, and the reason why I say yes is because, under the impression of these five months of the proceedings, and especially under the impression of the testimony of the witness [former Auschwitz commandant] Höss, I cannot answer to my conscience to shift the responsibility for this solely on these low-level people. I never built a Jewish extermination camp or helped to bring one into existence. But if Adolf Hitler personally shifted this terrible responsibility onto his people, than it also applies to me. After all, we carried on this struggle against Jewry for years ... And therefore I have the duty to answer your question in this sense and in this context with yes. A thousand years will pass and this guilt of Germany will not be erased.”

http://vho.org/GB/Journals/JHR/12/2/Weber167-213.html
Looks like the holocaust was no less news to Frank (and others) at Nuremberg than it seems to have been to Hitler in May/June 1942. For references used by Weber, see link; quoted is the section “Extermination Denied”.


The real problem with the Gerlach thesis of a late order (December 1941), start and a somewhat ambigious "final solution" is of course that not only is it difficult to harmonize with several utterences of Adolf Hitler (although measures are thereby being made!), but to an even larger extent does it contradict the (under the pretext of being) unrelated witness statements of Rudolf Höss and Adolf Eichmann. Both who claimed to have been issued the führer order in the summer of 1941 and who stated that the "final solution" meant only one thing, the physical extermination of the Jewish people.
I’ll present excerpts from I.) “Autobiografische Aufzeichnungen” by Rudolf Höss; II.) Höss’s April 5th 1946 affidavit (Nuremberg document NO 3868-PS); and III.) District Court Sessions, Session 10, 19/4 1961 of the Eichmann trial.
Please let me apologize for the endless paste but context is important here and by the way, wasn’t the thread was meant for “holocaust documents” in the first place? :)



I.) Rudolf Höss, "Kommandant in Auschwitz, Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen":
1. Die "Endloesung der Judenfrage" im KL Auschwitz

Im Sommer 1941, den genauen Zeitpunkt vermag ich z. Zt. nicht
anzugeben, wurde ich ploetzlich zum Reichsfuehrer SS nach Berlin
befohlen, und zwar direkt durch seine Adjutantur. Entgegen seiner
sonstiger Gepflogenheit eroeffnete er mir, ohne Beisein eines
Adjutanten, dem Sinne nach folgendes: Der Fuehrer hat die Endloesung
der Judenfrage befohlen, wir - die SS - haben diesen Befehl
durchzufuehren. Die bestehenden Vernichtungsstellen im Osten sind
nicht in der Lage, die beabsichtigten grossen Aktionen durchzufuehren. Ich habe daherAuschwitz dafuer bestimm, einmal wegen der guenstigen
Verkehrstechnischen Lage und zweitens laesst sich das dafuer dort zu
bestimmende Gebiet leicht absperren und tarnen. Ich hatte erst einen
hoeheren SS-Fuehrer fuer diese Aufgabe ausgesucht; um aber
Kompetenzschwierigheiten von vornherein zu begegnen, unterbleibt das,
und Sie haben nun diese Aufgabe durchzufuehren. Es ist eine harte
und schwere Arbeit, die den Einsatz der ganzen Person erfordert,
ohne Ruecksicht auf etwa entstehende Schwierigkeiten. Naehere
Einzelheiten erfahren Sie durch Sturmbannfuehrer Eichmann vom
RSHA, der in naechster Zeit zu Ihnen kommt. Die beteiligten
Dienststellen werden von mir zu gegebener Zeit benachrichtigt. Sie
haben ueber diesen Befehl strengstes Stillschweigen, selbst Ihren
Vorgesetzten gegenueber, zu bewahren. Nach der Unterredung mit
Eichmann schicken Sie mir sofort die Plaene der beabsichtigten Anlage
zu. - Die Juden sind die ewige Feinde des deutschen Volkes und muessen
ausgerottet werden. Alle fuer uns erreichbaren Juden sind jetzt
waehrend des Krieges ohne Ausnahme zu vernichten. Gelingt es uns
jetzt nicht, die biologischen Grundlagen des Judentums zu zerstoeren,
so werden einst die Juden das deutsche Volk vernichten.

Nach Erhalt dieses schwerwiegenden Befehles fuhr ich sofort nach
Auschwitz zurueck, ohne mich bei meiner vorgesetzten Dienststelle
in Oranienburg gemeldet zu haben. Kurze Zeit danach kam Eichmann
zu mir nach Auschwitz. Er weihte mich in die Plaene der Aktionen in
den einzelnen Laendern ein. Die Reihenfoge vermag ich nicht mehr
genau anzugeben.

Zuerst sollte fuer Auschwitz Ostoberschlesien und die daran
angrenzenden Teile des General-Gouvernements in Frage kommen.
Gleichzeitig, und dann je nach Lage fortgesetzt, die Juden aus
Deutschland und der Tschechoslowakei. Anschliessend der Westen:
Frankreich, Belgien, Holland. Er nannte mir auch ungefaehre Zahlen
der zu erwartenden Transporte, die ich aber nicht mehr nennen kann.
Wir besprachen weiter die Durchfuehrung der Vernichtung. Es kaeme
nur Gas in Frage, denn durch Erschiessen die zu erwartenden Massen
zu beseitigen, waere schlechterdings unmoeglich und auch eine zu
grosse Belastung fuer die SS-Maenner, die dies durchfuehren muessten
im Hinblick auf die Frauen und Kinder.


Rudolf Hoess: Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische
Aufzeichnungen. Eingeleitet und kommentiert von Martin Broszat.
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1958. Pp. 153-154.
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/h/ ... himmler.01
II. Rudolf Höss, NO 3868-PS (affidavit in English, April 5, 1946):
Mass executions by gassing commenced during the summer of 1941 and
continued until fall 1944. I personally supervised executions at Auschwitz
until the first of December 1943 and know by reason of my continued duties
...that these mass executions continued as stated above.

The "final solution" of the Jewish question meant the complete extermination
of all Jews in Europe. I was ordered to establish extermination facilities
at Auschwitz in June 1941. At that time, there were already in the general
government three other extermination camps; Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek.

...[W]hen I set up the extermination building at Auschwitz, I used Cyclon B,
which was a crystallized prussic acid [prussic acid is simply HCN, hydrogen
cyanide. -Ed R.] which we dropped into the death chamber from a small
opening. It took 3 to 15 minutes to kill the people in the death chamber....
We knew when the people were dead because their screaming stopped.

[More deleted for brevity]

"I understand English as it is written above. The above statements are
true; this declaration is made by me voluntarily and without compulsion;
after reading over the statements, I have signed and executed the same
at Nuremberg, Germany, on the fifth day of April 1946.

Rudolf Franz Ferdinand Hoess"

Taken as reproduced in Aspects of Western Civilization (sic), edited by
Perry M. Rogers, pp.385-387.
http://www.nizkor.org/ftp.cgi/people/h/ ... //hoess.03
(Note: There is a German version of the same text at Nizkor, translated by Harry Mazal, but the English version is actually the original. Turns out that Höss never wrote the affidavit himself, but merely signed it. Look at Höss’s affirmation above: “I understand English as written above…”!)


III.) Adolf Eichmann, Eichmann trial, Session 10, 19 April 1961:
Eichmann: May I now relate in short, Captain, what I know, from what I remember, of the things that happened since the beginning of the German-Russian War. In June, I think, the war began, June or July, let us say the beginning of the war was in July. And I suppose two months later, possibly it was three months, at any rate it was towards the end of summer... I shall tell you presently why I know this - that it was towards the end of summer - at the time when Heydrich ordered me to come to him, I presented myself and he said to me: "The Fuehrer..." for this was a matter of emigration etc. etc., accompanied by a short introductory speech..."the Fuerer has given orders for the physical destruction of the Jews."
He uttered this sentence to me and it was as if he wanted to test the effect of his words. In definite contradiction to his manner - he made a long pause. To this day I remember it. At first I did not grasp the trend of his thoughts. Seeing that he was so meticulous in his choice of words, I subsequently understood and I didn't say a word in reply, for I had nothing to add to this. For concerning these matters, such a brutal solution had never occurred to me. Here everything would be taken from me. All my work, all my efforts, all the interest that I had in the matter, it was as if the air had been taken out of me. And then he said to me: "Eichmann, go to Globocnik in Lublin." I knew he had been in Lublin before the Sudeten occupation.
Less: To whom?
Eichmann: Globocnik, I shall shortly come to more specific details, Captain, Sir. "Go to Globocnik, the Reichsfuehrer has already given appropriate instructions, and see how far he has progressed in his objective. He uses, so I believe, Russian tank trenches for the extermination of the Jews."

(---)

"Globocnik had a senior rank of SS-Gruppen...Brigade Fuehrer or Gruppenfuehrer. Then Globocnik called in a certain Sturmbannfuehrer Hoefle, obviously from his headquarters. I did not know this man, I had never seen this man Hoefle, and later on we travelled from Lublin. I no longer recall what was the name of that place. I am confusing this, for I am unable to say whether it was called Treblinka or otherwise. Truly I no longer have an idea where I was taken to then. This I don't know any more. But this could have been established, I imagine, since there are other testimonies on this subject, and through them it would certainly be possible to check this. For I am not the only person to know of these matters. I reached this place and there was something in the form of a forest.
L. Yes...
E. Things resembling a forest. A road passed through there, a Polish carriage road. Now I still remember, on the right of the road there was an ordinary house, a hostel in which men who were working there lived. A certain Captain of the Security Police, that is to say of the Order Police greeted us. There was also a number of workers there. The captain of the Order Police - this surprised me considerably - was without his uniform coat, and his sleeves were rolled up, and it seemed that he was somehow participating actively in the work. This I still remember. And they were erecting wooden huts, possibly two, perhaps three, this I no longer know exactly. The size - a sort of house with two or three rooms, I would say of that size , not large; and apparently - but I do not know this any more - Hoefle had given instructions to this Police Captain that he should explain this installation to me.
And then he began. He was a man with a voice, let us say ordinary, uncultured - perhaps he was accustomed to drinking, I do not know - with a gruff voice. He spoke the dialect of the south-western region of Germany, and he told me how he had made everything here hermetically sealed, that everything had been sealed, since an engine of a Russian submarine was going to operate here...
Presiding Judge: Please stop now. We shall have a two minutes' silence in memory of those who fell in our wars.
...and the gases of this engine were going to be directed inside and the Jews would be poisoned. This was terrible for me. I do not have such a steadfast nature for something of this kind...of this kind to pass over me without reaction.

(---)

L. So after this you had to [go to] Auschwitz?
E. I returned and received the orders. I was forced also to visit Auschwitz...because...not in order to see this there, first and foremost...but also on that, incidentally, he obliged me to report. I told him that I would see it because they were building extensions there - I did not know at all that there were other buildings - I had to report to him on this as well...yes, furthermore, I must also say this, Captain...these people, when you came to them, made a special amusement for themselves of the whole matter, to give a man who had come to them directly from an office desk the most horrifying description and to intimate the whole thing in as abrupt a fashion as possible and they rejoiced, obviously, from time to time, if here, from the point of view of his nerves...the person could not retain his composure as they were accustomed to call it, in the way they did, is that not so?
Hoess once said...I think that I was there three times, two or three times in Auschwitz. Three times, I was there once because of Storfer...he had said to me, Hoess said to me that Himmler was there and took everything in, he watched everything exactly and that even his knees shook, Hoess said to me.
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eic ... 10-02.html
(Note: During his interrogation Eichmann actually told about a visit to the extermination camp of Chelmno (Kulmhof) before retelling the trip to Minsk, but as he on this particular detail was uncertain whether it had taken place in 1941 or 1942 and the operation carried out was on Jews from the Lodz ghetto, mainly cleared between January and May 1942 according to the canonical holocaust, I have omitted this reference.)


Firstly, one has to acknowledge that the above testimony are independent, given by two individuals some fifteen years apart, or considering the alternative, that Eichmann would have drawn so heavily on Höss would only result in making his own testimony virtually worthless. Not that it would be a liable escape route for holocaust defenders/followers of Gerlach in the first place, because Eichmann tells mainly of self experienced events.

Secondly, both sources (Höss and Eichmann) put the change of policy in regard to the Jewish question (the “führer order”) within the same time span. Höss claims to have been called to Berlin and told by Himmler during the summer of 1941 and Eichmann says he was informed on the issue by Heydrich (head of the SD) two or three months after the invasion of the Soviet Union, i.e at the end of August or September 1941. About the significance of the "final solution" nobody was in doubt.
It could have been that either Eichmann or Höss was mistaken, for instance assigning events that took place in the summer of 1942 to 1941, but both should not have made the same mistake.

Thirdly, it is evident from both sources that the planning and actual carrying out of the "final solution" was closely linked in time and intention to the führer order itself – i.e Summer-Autumn 1941 and that contrary to Gerlach, any possible early instructions not only referred to mass shootings by Einstatzgruppen, but that mass gassings were used from the very start - “Es käme nur Gas in Frage”.
Höss claims that he was ordered to put up extermination facilities at Auschwitz already in June 1941 with inaugeration being made that same summer. A time at which there existed in addition “three other extermination camps: Belzek, Treblinka, and Wolzek”. The last part is bound to be a brow raiser, because no Operation Reinhard camps are normally considered to have been in operation until 1942. The important thing is not however, whether Höss got the years mixed up or not, but that he is again corroborated in this regard - in his ‘error’ so to speak - by Eichmann, who in response to his conference with Heydrich was immediately ordered to take a tour among some of the existing extermination sites. Even during his initial talk with Heydrich (Aug/Sep 1941), he is in fact told to go and see Globocnik “in Lublin”. He arrives in a wooded area where “huts” are in the process of being erected, no doubt to be used for gassing by carbon monoxide (hence the big submarine engine). His uncertainty recollecting whether the location actually corresponds to Treblinka is secondary, because he manages to meet both Globocnik, who of course is none other than Odilo Globocnik, SS-Polizei Führer in the Lublin District and Commander of Operation Reinhard, as well as Hans Höfle, Globocnik’s Chief of Operations, in charge of organization and manpower. That is, we are still in some sort of Operation Reinhard extermination site.

Fourthly, both sources corroborate each other in yet another regard, that is they tell of a meeting in Auschwitz between Eichmann and Höss in 1941. Höss state that Eichmann – the Reichsführer had already briefed him about his coming visit – came to visit him shortly after the gassings had went into operation (summer 1941). Eichmann however say that he was sent to Auschwitz by Müller (head of the Gestapo and Eichmann’s closest superior) only on his third inspection trip after he had been first been to Globocnik, then to Bialystok-Minsk-Lvov in order to report on the mass executions carried out there, implying that the visit to Auschwitz was probably made sometime in September - October 1941.
Albeit there may exist a small time discrepency in other words, I find it just big enough to lend it substantial credibility, as far as verbal recollection is concerned.
According to Höss, they discussed the pace of sending the Jews of several European countries, including France, Belgium and Holland to their deaths and regarding the murder weapon itself it was agreed upon that “nur Gas käme in Frage” (“only gas came into question”), the method being motivated by the ‘traditional’ holocaust argument of higher efficiency and lesser strain on the personell under authority. (Of course any gassing carried out in Auschwitz and elsewhere would have amounted to just the opposite – harder labour and greater psychological strain – as any brief investigation of the physical evidence reveals).

The context implies in other words a full blown program of destruction of the Jews of Europe already in early Autumn of 1941 at the latest, including deportation of Jews from the France and the Benelux as well as extermination camps already in operation.

Now, how does Christian Gerlach treat these sources (and others like it)? Has he assessed them at all, even read them?

Because if taken into account, I have great difficulties seeing the significance of Belzec being erected only for a localized killing operation in November and indeed why Gerlach thinks Hitler issued the order in December when both Eichmann and Höss testifies to this event having taken place the previous summer.
That is of course provided any value could be alloted to Höss and the Eichmann trial and Gerlach (or Roberto for that matter) doesn’t simply need the Gerlach thesis in order to blur out huge discrepancies in the holocaust timeline, related to the Wannsee Conference for instance as well statements made by Hitler well into 1942.

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