A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

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Led125
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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#46

Post by Led125 » 26 Apr 2010, 00:06

Here is what Gerhard L. Weinberg says of Seraphim in his book The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Volume II: Starting World War II, 1937-1939 (University of Chicago Press, 1980) p.579 n.188:
G.D., D, 6* No 433; also TMWC, 37:546-56 The conference is discussed further in the text. On the document itself see Hildebrand, p.610, n.592; Henke, p.257, n.45.Like a number of other key documents that do not fit his ideological preconceptions, this one has been questioned by Hans-Guenther Seraphim; Like the others, this one can now be accepted as authentic.
Hildebrand is, going by his bibliography, either a reference to Deutsche Aussenpolitik or Vom Reich zum Weltreich by Klaus Hildebrand and Henke is a reference to England in Hitlers politischem Kalkuel by Josef Henke.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#47

Post by Led125 » 26 Apr 2010, 00:23

However, it could be something written down by Schmundt a long time after the conference, for example early in 1940, after the war with Poland had happened, and after Britain and France had declared war. In that case, Schmundt's recollection of what Hitler said on 23 May 1939 could well have been influenced by what had happened since, and that could account for the resemblance of what Hitler is presented as saying to the actual course of events in the months after the conference.

It may that what prompted Schmundt to write down his recollection of what Hitler said at the conference was the very fact that things had not turned out as Hitler had predicted ,ie the conflict had not been limited to Poland, Britain and France had declared war.
The thing is we don't know when Schmundt wrote his recollections, but someone close to these events, and writing after the fact with little at stake, did write that it was not likely that Schmundt wrote it months after. This makes it unlikely that Schmundt wrote after the declaration of war.
In any case, I think that Milch's recollection of Hitler's presentation on 23 May is likely to be correct, ie Hitler was outlining a hypothetical scenario where a conflict broke out because of continued Polish resistance to German demands over Danzig and the link to East Prussia, and adjuring his military leaders to prepare for it. In presenting that scenario, Hitler was trying to reassure the military leaders that he could use his political skills to ensure that, if a conflict did break out, Poland would be isolated.

Milch's interpretation is that Hitler was not revealing a firm decision for war, but rather outlining a worst case scenario, what would happen if German pressure failed to induce Poland to negotiate, and detailing the steps he proposed to undertake in such a case. If Milch was correct, then Hitler was probably still expecting that Poland would buckle and eventually agree to the German demands over Danzig and the link to East Prussia, and he did not consider an armed conflict inevitable, although it there was a risk of it.
Milch's interpretation of the meeting, seems not to be confirmed by the historical record, or Hitler's other statements, or indeed by an objective look at what Hitler did in 1939.

Not supporting your view that Hitler was reassuring the German military elite is the fact that they did not apear to say anything during the talk. As Milch said:

The gist of it was that Hitler declared he had decided to solve in one way or another the question of a corridor across the Corridor to East Prussia, and in connection with that he discussed the possibility of complications which, in consequence, might arise in the West. It was only a speech, not a discussion or a conversation
Milch's opinions that Hitler held out for negotiations is proven wrong by the fact that in April orders had been given out to avoid negotiations with the Poles.
Milch's interpretation of Hitler's purpose at the meeting on 23 May is also consistent with the assessment by Burckhardt that it was the Polish ultimatum to the Danzig Senate of 4 August which caused Hitler to make a firm decision for a first strike against Poland, ie that final decision was made just a few weeks before he gave the order to attack.
Burckhardt the Nazi sympathiser and the admirer of Hitler.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &start=540

We also know that the Germans decided to use the Customs Crisis as a causus belli by increasing their demands and refusing to allow any attempt to avert the crisis. This pretty much torpedos Burckhardt's view.
Combining the recollection of Milch and other participants at the meeting of 23 May about what its purpose was with the criticism by Seraphim of the accuracy of the "Little Schmundt" memorandum leads to the conclusion that as of the end of May 1939 Hitler had not made a definite decision to attack Poland, and that his activity through the summer of that year, until the first week of August. was an exercise in psychological warfare aimed at inducing that country to agree to German demands rather than a preparation for armed conflict (although the planning of "Fall Weiss" continued as a contingency).
I've already mentioned what another leading historian makes of Seraphim. Others here have noted that his critique of the document doesn't seem to be very convincing, relying mainly on inferences.
In assessing Hitler's actual thinking as of 23 May, it is necessary to take into account the strategic situation that Hitler was facing, which was that Britain and France had set up Danzig as a casus belli for war with Germany. Just a few days before the meeting on 23 May, there had been a meeting in Paris at which the French Commander, General Gamelin, had promised the Polish Minister of war, General Tadeusz Kaprzycki, that France would take military action against Germany, beginning with immediate air operations, not only if Germany actually attacked Poland, but also if Poland took military action because it considered that its interests in Danzig were endangered.

Accordingly, if Hitler could pressure Poland into agreeing to German demands over Danzig, ie deter it from taking military action over Danzig, then Britain and France would be deprived of their casus belli, and Hitler would no longer need to fear the attack promised by Gamelin.

Andrzej Suchcitz, "Poland's Defence Preparations in 1939", in: "Poland between the Wars, 1918-1939", edited by Peter Stachura, page 112:
For interested readers here is a discussion on this a while back:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&t=162600

The Polish position on Danzig was identical to the Germa one: any moves by the opposing side would be seen as an act of war. In particular see the meeting on April 1st which set out what Poland's response to any hypothetical situation would be (and which Michael Mills continually ignores or pretends became irrelevant after other dates despite him not providing any documentary evidence to support this).


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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#48

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 02:01

Here is the testimony of another participant -- Field Marshal von Brauchitsch -- taken from IMT proceedings vol. 20, pp. 570-571:
DR. LATERNSER: The conference on 23 May 1939 is of particular importance. Did you, at that time, gain the impression that war had been decided upon?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No. There are quite a number of circumstances and facts which gave me the clear impression that there' was no intention of war. May I point out that since the autumn of 1938, negotiations with Poland had been in progress to clear up the pending questions. Hitler had spoken in the Reichstag about this problem. He had said that this was the only question which still required a solution. In previous speeches he had said that the rebuilding of the Wehrmacht was being carried out only to protect the homeland. At the end of December 1938, or during the first days of January 1939, the High Command of the Army received the following order from the High Command of the Wehrmacht. The Army will carry out the proposed and planned construction program by the year 1945. All preparations for any military action or any other operation were prohibited. At the meeting of 23 May 1939, Hitler said literally: "I should be an idiot if on

570

9 Aug. 46

account of Poland I were to drift into a war, like those incapable people of 1914." He ordered that rearmament should continue within the allotted time, that is, up to the years 1942 and 1943, and that order was directly connected with the one which I had received at the beginning of the year. Finally, he ordered that commissions were to be appointed to investigate all the other problems which had been touched upon. For me, all these facts were the clearest proof that in the case of Poland, too, it was merely a policy supported by military measures.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you raise objections of any kind during that conference on 23 May, of which you have just spoken?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: It was not a conference. It was an address of the Fuehrer to his subordinates. There was no discussion about it.

DR. LATERNSER: Field Marshal, I think you misunderstood me.

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No.

DR. LATERNSER: I was asking you whether during the conference of 23 May you voiced objections of any kind?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: Well, I gave my answer to that.

DR. LATERNSER: Was a plan of attack against Poland ever worked out before that time, before May 1939?

VON BRAUCHITSCH: No, never.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#49

Post by Led125 » 26 Apr 2010, 02:13

Brauchitsch testimony shows why Nuremberg testimony cannot be completely relied upon. He says that negotiations up till that point had been going smoothly; in fact in April Hitler forbade any negotiations with Poland.

I would be interested to know if any of the prosecutors contested the defence counsel's arguments about the Schmundt minutes.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#50

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 03:22

Led125 -- You wrote:
I would be interested to know if any of the prosecutors contested the defence counsel's arguments about the Schmundt minutes.
Here's what I found from the prosecution's closing arguments:

(1) IMT proceedings vol. 19, pp. 541-542:
MR. JUSTICE ROBERT H. JACKSON (Chief of Counsel for the United States): On the eve of the conflict Hitler reiterated his ideas:
"Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks on foreign property.

"Living space, in proportion to the magnitude of the state, is the basis of all power. One may refuse for a time to face the problem, but finally it is solved one way or the other. The choice is between advancement or decline. In 15 or 20 years time we shall be compelled to find a solution. No German statesman can evade the question longer than that. We are at present in a state of patriotic fervor, which is shared by two other nations, Italy and Japan.

"The period which lies behind us has indeed been put to good use. All measures have been taken in the correct sequence and in harmony with our aims.

"After 6 years, the situation is today as follows:

"The national-political unity of the Germans has been achieved, apart from minor exceptions. Further successes cannot be attained without the shedding of blood.. ..

"Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies. ... The population of non-German areas will perform no military service, and will be available as a source of labor.
541

29 July 46
"The Polish problem is inseparable from the conflict with the West."
Extract from minutes of a conference held at the Reich Chancellery on 23 May 1939, in the presence of Hitler, Goring, Raeder, Keitel, and others (Document Number L-79, Exhibit USA-27).

And then came the war; and in a few months' time all Germany was led to believe that her strength was irresistible and that she was on the way to the conquest of the world. All that was implied by Hitler's cruel and monstrous words:
"As opposed to that we National Socialists must keep firmly to the aim of our foreign policy, namely, to secure for the German people the territory to which it is entitled in this world. And this act is the sole act which, before God and our German posterity, justifies bloodshed. ..."
All the cruel and monstrous implications of these words were elaborated here.


(2) IMT proceedings, vol. 22, p. 303:
MR. DODD: Did Hitler make any distinction between principle and practice, when, at the conference of 23 May 1939 held in the Chancellery and attended by the members of the High Command, he stated:
"The principle of avoiding the solution of problems by adaptation to circumstances must be banished. Rather must circumstances be adapted to necessities. . . . It is no longer a question of justice or injustice, but of the existence or non- existence of 80 million people."
In reality, under the Hitler regime no pre-established institutions, no legality, no limitation to arbitrariness, no excesses of power. were possible. There is no other principle than the "Fuhrerprinzip," no other legality than the good pleasure of the chief, whose orders must be executed without any possible dissension all the way down the scale.

The concept of a so-called institution which was supposed to have presided over the constitution of the collective organizations and given them a certain character, is merely an a posteriori construction originating in Defense Counsel's ingenuity.

The concrete activity of the collective organizations is the only thing which counts, and we have proved that it was criminal.
(3) IMT proceedings vol. 22, p. 352:
GENERAL RUDENKO: I do not plan, however, to delve deeply into the history of the Hitlerite State and its military machine to prove just when and how the subsequent criminal activity of the leading German military organs began. I want to mention only that evidence which refers to the beginning of the war.

Already on 23 May 1939, at a staff meeting held in the new Reich Chancellery, Hitler said to his chief military leaders:
"Danzig is not the crux of the matter. For us it is a question of the expansion of our 'Lebensraum' in the East. Thus the question of whether Poland is to be spared disappears and there remains only the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity."

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#51

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 03:31

Here are the findings of the IMT court, all from IMT proceedings vol. 22:

(1) pp. 441-442:
On 3 April 1939 a revised OKW directive was issued to the Armed Forces, which after referring to the question of Danzig made reference to Fall Weiss (the military code name for the German invasion of Poland) and stated:
"The Fuehrer has added the following directions to Fall Weiss:

(1) Preparations must be made in such a way that the operation can be carried out at any time from 1 September 1939 onwards.

(2) The High Command of the Armed Forces has been directed to draw up a precise timetable for Fall Weiss and to arrange by conferences the synchronized timings between the three branches of the Armed Forces."
On 11 April 1939, a further directive was signed by Hitler and issued to the Armed Forces, and in one of the annexes to that document the words occur:
"Quarrels" -- with Poland -- "should be avoided. Should Poland. . . however adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, 'a final settlement' will be necessary, notwithstanding the pact with Poland. The aim is then to destroy Polish military strength, and to create in the East a situation which satisfies the requirements of defense. The Free State of Danzig will be incorporated into Germany at the outbreak of the conflict at the latest. Policy aims . . . at limiting the war to Poland, and this is considered possible in view of the internal crisis in France, and British restraint as a result of this. . . ."
In spite of the contents of these two directives, Hitler made a speech in the Reichstag on 28 April 1939 in which, after describing the Polish Government's alleged rejection of an offer he had made with regard to Danzig and the Polish Corridor, he stated:
"I have regretted greatly this incomprehensible attitude of the Polish Government, but that alone is not the decisive fact; the worst is that now Poland, like Czechoslovakia a year ago, believes, under the pressure of a lying international campaign, that it must call up its troops, although Germany on her part has not called up a single man, and had not thought of proceeding in any way against Poland.. . . The intention to attack on the part of Germany which was merely invented by the international press. . . ."
It was 4 weeks after making this speech that Hitler, on 23 May 1939, held the important military conference to which reference has already been made. Among the persons present were the Defendants Goring, Raeder, and Keitel. 'The adjutant on duty that day was Lt. Col. Schmundt, and he made a record of what happened, certifying it with his signature as a correct record.

441

30 Sept. 46

The purpose of the meeting was to enable Hitler to inform the heads of the Armed Forces and their staffs of his views on the political situation and his future aims. After analyzing the political situation and reviewing the course of events since 1933, Hitler announced his decision to attack Poland. He admitted that the quarrel with Poland over Danzig was not the reason for this attack, but the necessity for Germany to enlarge her living space and secure her food supplies. He said:
"The solution of the problem demands courage. The principle by which one evades solving the problem by adapting oneself to circumstances is inadmissible. Circumstances must rather be adapted to aims. This is impossible without invasion of foreign states or attacks upon foreign property."
Later in his address he added:
"There is therefore no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland. The success of the isolation will be decisive. . . . The isolation of Poland is a matter of skillful politics."
Lt. Col. Schmundt's record of the meeting reveals that Hitler fully realized the possibility of Great Britain and France coming to Poland's assistance. If, therefore, the isolation of Poland could not be achieved, Hitler was of the opinion that Germany should attack Great Britain and France first, or at any rate should concentrate primarily on the war in the West, in order to defeat Great Britain and France quickly, or at least to destroy their effectiveness. Nevertheless, Hitler stressed that war with England and France would be a life-and-death struggle which might last a long time, and that preparations must be made accordingly.

During the weeks which followed this conference, other meetings were held and directives were issued in preparation for the war. The Defendant Ribbentrop was sent to Moscow to negotiate a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union.
(2) p. 525:
Goring attended the Reich Chancellery meeting of 23 May 1939, when Hitler told his military leaders "there is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland," and was present at the Obersalzberg briefing of 22 August 1939.
(3) p. 534:
Keitel was present on 23 May 1939 when Hitler announced his decision "to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity." Already he had signed the directive requiring the Wehrmacht to submit its "Fall Weiss" timetable to OKW by 1 May.
(4) p. 561:
Raeder received directives on "Fall Gruen" and the directives on "Fall Weiss" beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the Navy to support the Army by intervention from the sea. He was also one of the few chief leaders present at the meeting of 23 May 1939.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#52

Post by Led125 » 26 Apr 2010, 03:48

Thanks David.

Apparently the fact that there were contradictions led to a discussion between Raeder and Hitler to try and sort things out,this from Dr. Siemers's direct examination of Erich Schulte-Monting:
Q. How did you hear about the contents of the speech of 23rd May?

A. Raeder informed me fully, as a matter of principle, after every speech or conference, confidential or otherwise. Immediately after the speech, Raeder gave me his impressions; they are in conflict with these so-called minutes. Raeder did not have the - so to speak - exaggerated bellicose impression which appears in this document. But, on the other hand -

THE PRESIDENT: The witness must tell us what Raeder said to him. That is what I told you before. He may tell us what Raeder said to him.

BY DR. SIEMERS:

Q. Admiral, I should like you to tell us just what Raeder told you.

A. Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech held out the prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those matters which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, that was his impression which he expressed to me at that time. He also told me that after the speech he had a conversation alone with Hitler during which he called his attention to the contradictions contained in the speech. At the same time he reminded Hitler of what he had told him previously: to settle the Polish case by all means in a peaceful way rather than resort to the warlike solution he was now considering possible. Hitler, he said, had reassured him, and had told him that politically he had things firmly in hand. At that time, when Raeder asked him, or rather called his attention to this contradiction, and asked him just what he really intended to do, Hitler had answered, as related to me by Raeder, the following:

"I, Hitler, have three ways of keeping matters secret. The first is for the two of us to discuss them together alone. The second is for me to keep them to myself. In the third case - the problems of the future - I think them over, but my thoughts are not translated into words."
Raeder called his attention to the impossibility of war.

To that, according to Raeder, Hitler replied: "Take an imaginary case, in which I had agreed to a settlement by the payment of one mark, and I have already paid 99 pfennig. Now, do you think that, because of this last pfennig, you would take me to court?"

And Raeder said "No." "You see," Hitler said to Raeder, "I obtained what I wanted by political actions, and I do not believe that because of this last political question - as we called it - the solution of the Polish Corridor - we will have to anticipate a war with England."

Q. And that was in a conversation between Hitler and Raeder after this speech had been made?
A. That took place after this speech.
http://ftp.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 6-04.shtml

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#53

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 04:48

On cross-examination (at IMT proceedings vol. 14, pp. 329-330) Adm. Schulte-Moenting described the internal contradictions in Hitler's address which left Grand Admiral Raeder confused and anxious:
MAJOR JONES: I want you to turn your mind for a moment, if you will, to Document L-79, which is in the British Document Book 10, Page 74. Those are the minutes of the Hitler conference on 23 May 1939 which you discussed in your evidence-in-chief this morning. I take it that you have read those minutes, Witness?

SCHULTE-MOENTING: May I look at them now? I have never seen these minutes before. If I were to be asked about them, I would first have to read them in toto.

MAJOR JONES: Well, you need not trouble to do that, Witness. You gave evidence this morning as to Raeder's discussion with you about this conference. Did Raeder tell you that Hitler had said on 23 May 1939, for instance:
"There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czechoslovakian affair. There will be war."
Then further, Page 76 of the report:
"The Fuehrer doubts the possibility of a peaceful settlement with England. We must prepare ourselves for the conflict. . . . England is therefore our enemy, and the conflict with England will be a life and death struggle."
And then the next paragraph but one:
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."

Now, I am suggesting to you that those statements of Hitler's represented Hitler's considered policy, and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action. Is that not so?

SCHULTE-MOENTING: First of all, I must correct a mistake. I thought that you had shown me a record on Russia and not the one on Poland. I saw it in different writing, and I thought it was another record. If it is the same record which I mentioned this morning, then I must state again that Raeder did not agree with the belligerent wording of these minutes as written down by Schmundt.

MAJOR JONES: Just one moment, Witness, if you please. I have read out certain extracts from that document, which I take it that you heard interpreted. Do you agree with me that those extracts represented Hitler's considered policy at the time and that that policy was in fact carried out in the field of action? If you keep your headphones on -- I know it is difficult. Just move them back if you wish to talk. Now, see if you can answer my question.

SCHULTE-MOENTING: I should like to remark in this connection that Hitler in his speeches pursued a certain purpose. In preparations

329

22 May 46

for war he saw a means of political pressure, and in the phrase "war of nerves" (which was not used in Germany only, but went everywhere through the ether far beyond Europe's boundaries) he tried to find a means of preventing war as well as a means of exerting pressure. This document itself contains contradictions which lead to the conclusion that he himself could not seriously have thought that a war would develop. I can prove this by saying, for example, that he states that the General Staff or the general staffs are not to concern themselves with this question; but toward the end he says that all the branches of the Wehrmacht must get together to study the problem. He says that a war with Poland must in no event result in war with England; politics must see to that. But in the next paragraph one reads: "But if a war actually does arise, I shall deal short sharp blows for a quick decision." In the next paragraph it says again, "But I need 10 to 15 years to prepare," and in the concluding paragraph it says: "The construction program of the Navy will in no wise be changed."

If, therefore, Hitler at that time had really been serious in his speech, that is, that an armed conflict with Poland would result shortly, then he would not have exclaimed first that we would have time until 1943 and, secondly, that there were to be no changes as far as the Navy was concerned. Rather he would have said to Raeder, privately at least: "In all haste prepare a strong U-boat program because I do not know what course events will take."

MAJOR JONES: But it is a fact that at about this time, the Fall Weiss operation was being prepared to the very last detail, was it not? That is the operation against Poland.

SCHULTE-MOENTING: The operation was prepared to such a stage that when it was canceled at the last minute we thought that we would not be able to reach our forces at sea by wireless. We considered this an extreme policy of exerting pressure in the form of a war of nerves. Since at the last minute everything was canceled we believed without doubt that it was only a means of pressure and not an entry into war. Not until we heard the cannons were we convinced that the war was no longer to be prevented. I personally believe. . .

MAJOR JONES: If you would shorten your answers as best you can, it would be very convenient.

I want to go from Poland to Norway. The first conference of the Defendant Raeder with regard to Norway took place on 10 October, you have told us. . . .
In other words, Schulte-Moenting is saying that the contradictions were in Hitler's original speech, and did not result from a version which was reconstructed months later. See also Grand Admiral Raeder's statement:
By contrasting these sentences, I wanted only to show how muddled the speech was.
and Schulte-Moenting's statement:
Raeder told me that Hitler in his speech held out the prospect of a future conflict with Poland, and that this was in contradiction to those matters which he had discussed with him alone. That the speech in itself was contradictory, that was his impression which he expressed to me at that time.
which is why Raeder wanted to talk privately with Hitler about what the Fuehrer meant in his 23 May 1939 speech. There would be no need for Raeder to want an immediate meeting if the contradictions were inserted in Jan 1940, eight months after the conference.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#54

Post by little grey rabbit » 26 Apr 2010, 06:42

David Thompson wrote:little grey rabbit -- You wrote:
In such a situation one can easily see how the fortuitous discovery of handwritten "secret" notes of meetings (buried in the ground in a secret trunk by a deceased member of the Wehrmacht resistance) that undermined the public record would be eagerly accepted by the prosecution.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6#p1458366

and
The question is not did he hold meetings, but is this document buried underground by a Wehrmacht plotter and rediscovered after his death is a genuine record or not.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1458638

What is the factual basis for your statements that (1) Gen. Schmundt was a member of the resistance -- "a Wehrmacht plotter"; and (2) that Schmundt's papers were buried in the ground in a secret trunk?
Both bad memory on my part, I recall reading trunk somewhere on the web, but I can't find it.
The Seraphim article makes clear he was killed by the bomb directed at Hitler which I had confused with being behind - very different.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#55

Post by little grey rabbit » 26 Apr 2010, 06:47

Burckhardt the Nazi sympathiser and the admirer of Hitler.
viewtopic.php?f=76&t=153975&start=540

We also know that the Germans decided to use the Customs Crisis as a causus belli by increasing their demands and refusing to allow any attempt to avert the crisis. This pretty much torpedos Burckhardt's view.
Given that Burckhardt was the first prominent leader (outside Jewish leaders) to confirm that the Germans had a policy of genocide against the Jews, in November 1942 - and his endorsement appears to have carried weight with the Allies (see They were expendable by Monty Penkower page 76) all I can say some Nazi sympathiser and admirer of Hitler!!!!

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#56

Post by little grey rabbit » 26 Apr 2010, 06:57

Someone has quoted from Halder's diary from August, so I am assuming there is nothing in his published diary to support this meeting or the extreme version that these notes document.

Personally, I think either these were notes taken during the meeting or they arent genuine. They are too incomplete (ie shorthand to keep up with speakers) and far to lengthy to be a normal record written down after the event. There would be more explanations and expansion in that case.

Some things the seem incongrous
"Ziel ist immer England auf die Knie zu zwingen"
As I understand Hitler's world view before the war and a long time into it was that Germany and England should coexist. With England orientated to its colonial empire and Germany on its european sphere.

The other thing that immediately strikes me as incongrous
"Kriegsschiff oder Flugzeugtraeger, wer ist gefaehrlicher im Einzelfall und imm ganzen gesehen. Der Flugzeuger ist der bessere Schutz eines Geleitzugs."

Frankly, the record doesnt show that Hitler rated aircraft carriers at all, certainly it had very low priority in the building program. It seems a question that seems based more on America's experience in the Pacific than what Hitler was thinking in 1939.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#57

Post by bf109 emil » 26 Apr 2010, 07:11

Michael you wrote and assumed ...
From a historiographical point of view, the "Little Schmundt" can at best be used as a later interpretation by Schmundt of what Hitler had meant with his address on 23 May 1939, but not as a reliable indication of Hitler's thinking and intentions on that date.
but according to Milch, this was indeed Hitlers reliable indication or thinking and intention on May 23 1939...

He identified the Document L-79 which was the notes of Schmundt made at the meeting with Hitler on 23 May 1939 and agreed that that represented an expression of Hitler's policy that he intended to obtain Poland by peaceful measures, if possible, but if they were unsuccessful, then by war.

source.Interrogation of üRHARD MILCH
By Major Monigan
Time 6 November 1945, AM and PM

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#58

Post by michael mills » 26 Apr 2010, 08:12

Emil,

Milch was at the meeting on 23 May 1939. Look at what he said was his impression of the message that Hitler was trying to convey in his address to the assembled military leaders.

Milch stated that he gained the impression that Hitler's aim was to obtain what he wanted from Poland by negotiation, but recognised the possibility that an armed conflcit might erupt if Poland did not give in to German demands.

In otehr words, Milch did not gain the impression that Hitler had definitely decided to attack Poland, which is the meaning that the Prosecution at the IMT gave to the "Little Schmundt" memorandum.

From Milch's testimony at the IMT on 8 March 1946:
DR. STAHMER: Was anything said of the possibility of an attack on Poland or, as I remember, was only the solution of this Corridor problem mentioned?

MILCH: Actually, I understood him to say that he would solve this problem in any case, so his first thought was probably of negotiations, but if these negotiations did not produce results, then a military solution would probably have to be considered.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#59

Post by bf109 emil » 26 Apr 2010, 08:19

In otehr words, Milch did not gain the impression that Hitler had definitely decided to attack Poland, which is the meaning that the Prosecution at the IMT gave to the "Little Schmundt" memorandum.
yes you are right, but likewise Milch did agree that although Hitler sought Poland, he was going to gain it regardless, either through diplomatically or militarily as spoken on May 23 1939 and addressed and confirmed by Milch as to Hitlers claim of L-79 as being "that represented an expression of Hitler's policy"

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#60

Post by michael mills » 26 Apr 2010, 08:25

Here is what Gerhard L. Weinberg says of Seraphim in his book The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany: Volume II: Starting World War II, 1937-1939 (University of Chicago Press, 1980) p.579 n.188:
G.D., D, 6* No 433; also TMWC, 37:546-56 The conference is discussed further in the text. On the document itself see Hildebrand, p.610, n.592; Henke, p.257, n.45.Like a number of other key documents that do not fit his ideological preconceptions, this one has been questioned by Hans-Guenther Seraphim; Like the others, this one can now be accepted as authentic.
So Weinberg does not produce any reasoned arguments as to why Seraphim's critique of the "Little Schmundt" should be rejected.

He merely implies that it should be rejected because of Seraphim's alleged ideological background.

One could with as much justification say that Weinberg accepts the "Little Schmundt" and rejects Seraphim's critique of it because of his own ideological background.

LED125 is using the same ad hominem argument as Weinberg when he writes:
Burckhardt the Nazi sympathiser and the admirer of Hitler.

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