A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

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Led125
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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#61

Post by Led125 » 26 Apr 2010, 10:52

Weinberg doesn't make an argument, no; but he does cite some other authorities concerning the document before he writes that Seraphim's critique cannot be trusted. I assume the other sources make an argument against it.

As for Burckhardt, it isn't an ad hominem remark.Herbert Levine's article ''The Mediator: Carl Burckhardt's Efforts to Avert a Second World War'' (The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Sep., 1973), pp. 439-455) says that German documents describe Burckhardt as an admirer of Hitler, Nazism and as an anti-Semite (the documents are PA/Pol. I: Voelkerbundbeziehungen, Deutschland-Polen/Danzig). Levine disagrees with the assessment, but it is telling.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#62

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 15:40

Additional findings of the IMT court, from IMT proceedings vol. 1, p. 188:
The Planning of Aggression

Evidence from captured documents has revealed that Hitler held four secret meetings to which the Tribunal proposes to make special reference because of the light they shed upon the question of the common plan and aggressive' war.'

These meetings took place on 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.

At these meetings important declarations were made by Hitler as to his purposes, which are quite unmistakable in their terms.

The documents which record what took place at these meetings have been subject to some criticism at the hands of defending Counsel.

Their essential authenticity is not denied, but it is said, for example, that they do not purpose to be verbatim transcripts of the speeches they record, that the document dealing with the meeting on 5 November 1937, was dated five days after the meeting had taken place, and that the two documents dealing with the meeting of 22 August 1939 differ from one another, and are unsigned.

Making the fullest allowance for criticism of this kind, the Tribunal is of opinion that the documents are documents of the highest value, and that their authenticity and substantial truth are established.

They are obviously careful records of the events they describe, and they have been preserved as such in the archives of the German Government, from whose custody they were captured. Such documents could never be dismissed as inventions, nor even as inaccurate or distorted; they plainly record events which actually took place.


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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#63

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 15:47

More from Gen. Halder. This testimony is from the "High Command Trial" in NMT proceedings vol. 10, pp. 716-717:
WITNESS HALDER

Q. Now, you attended the meeting with the Fuehrer on 23 May 1939, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember that the defendants Warlimont and Schniewind were there?

A. With reference to Warlimont, I cannot remember that he was present, but I do remember that Schniewind was there.

Q. And do you recall being told by Hitler in this meeting that Poland would be attacked at the first suitable opportunity?

A. Yes. That was said.

Q. And do you also recall being told that Danzig was not the subject of the dispute at all, but that it was a question of expanding Germany's living space?

A. That was also said.

Q. Now, was this information -- these intentions as expressed by the Fuehrer -- passed on to the leading field commanders, that is, the army group and army commanders who were to participate in the Polish campaign?

A. No, this was not passed on at the time. It was not passed on beyond the circle of those who attended the conference.

Q. Why not?

A. Because that was a long range political expose, the unreliability of which was known to everybody and could be felt by everybody who knew Hitler. A military command agency will only pass on information which is regarded by it as a certain basis.

Q. You mean only military information is passed on by the military headquarters? Was that your answer? It didn't come through clearly.

A. Yes.

Q. Well, but, Witness, the burden of most of your testimony has been that the leading generals were opposed to the Czech attack and to the Polish attack, and having had such a clear expression from the Fuehrer of his aggressive intentions at that meeting of 23 May 1939, I'm at a loss to understand why you didn't inform the leading military officials of what the Fuehrer had said, in an effort to increase this military resistance you have told us about. That seems to me to have been a very logical thing for you to have done.

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A. Conferences and discussions which were held by the Fuehrer were restricted to the circle in which he made his statements. In other cases, if that was not to be the case, he would order that information was to be passed on, which in this instance was not so.

Q. Well, in other words, you were bound by the Fuehrer order of secrecy?

A. Yes.

Q. But while you wouldn't disobey this. Fuehrer order of secrecy, you would engage in clandestine resistance activities against the head of the State. Is that what you want the Court to understand?

A. Yes. I don't quite understand the question.

Q. I say, while you would not disobey the Fuehrer's secrecy order you would, at the same time, engage in clandestine resistance -- military resistance -- against the head of the State. Is that what you want the Tribunal to understand?

A. It is the same situation which prevailed in the previous year, 1938. The experiences of 1938 had proved that a very clearly defined order which was available in writing, to the effect that it was Hitler's irrevocable wish and will to attack Czechoslovakia, had, in actual fact, not been carried out, but that instead the military preparations had represented a military means of pressure in order to support his political aims. We expected the same to be the case with respect to the preparations for the attack against Poland, which had been ordered by Hitler.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#64

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 15:55

Here is the testimony of Adm. Schniewind on Document L-79 in the "High Command trial", at NMT proceedings vol. 10, pp. 731-735:
DEFENDANT SCHNIEWIND:

Q. Thank you. During that time Hitler made his famous speech in the Reich Chancellery on 23 May 1939. How did it happen that you were present during that address?

A. I don't know the reason why. The Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief informed me that I was to accompany the Commander in Chief to attend a conference with Hitler.

Q. Concerning this conference, the witness General Halder, who also attended the conference, has already testified. The prosecution has submitted a memorandum of the Fuehrer's adjutant at the time, Lt. Col. Schmundt. This is Document L-79, Prosecution Exhibit 1083.* Are the contents of this memorandum consistent with your impression of the conference?

A. Most certainly not.

Q. The prosecution asserts, on the basis of this document, that Hitler had very clearly shown the developments. of his aggressive plans. Can you very briefly tell us about the contents and tendency of this address of Hitler's?
____________________
* Ibid.

731

A. This address of Hitler's was the first of this type which I attended. I went to this conference with comparatively great expectations, returned however, somewhat disappointed, and somewhat confused. An abundance of ideas was poured over us at the time, but any leading motive, any tendency for a decision, any decision was not expressed. In the course of the speech, which lasted at least two hours, Hitler first of all elaborated on inner political questions, successes which he had so far achieved; he stated that one had to be aware of the fact that a further prospering and strengthening of Germany might lead to difficulties. With this idea he turned to the foreign political sphere and gave a survey of the borders. His tendency was to speak about neighbors who were not always friendly disposed towards Germany. He mentioned Poland for instance, that most certainly was hostile to Germany; he stated that Russia's attitude was somewhat of an unknown quantity. He said that the Scandinavian countries wanted to guard their neutrality; England and France would regard a further strengthening of Germany with none too friendly eyes; Belgium and Holland would perhaps endeavor in the event of a conflict to remain neutral, to serve both sides if possible. However, these last mentioned countries would perhaps not be in a position to withstand pressure of the western countries. These, in outline, are the ideas which I gathered from Hitler's speech, and, the theme which became apparent. At the end of his statements was a warning that on the basis of the situation which existed at the moment, one had to be careful and guard one's self interests. All questions of a military-political nature had to be carefully examined. In order to do this, he intended to create a study staff which was to work under his personal supervision and leadership.

Q. After that speech did you gain the impression that a warlike conflict was intended or was imminent?

A. No. Neither the one nor the other. However, it is possible that I left that conference with a certain feeling of uncertainty.

Q. At any rate, it is your opinion that the so-called Schmundt minutes of the conferences do not relate the contents of the conference correctly?

A. Yes, that is my opinion.

Q. Now, I will have the so-called Schmundt minutes put to you. Document L-79, Prosecution Exhibit 1083; the following sentence is contained therein and I quote:

"Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all. It is a question of expanding our living space in the East and of securing our food supplies, of the settlement of

732

the Baltic problem". Doesn't that sentence tell us that Danzig was only a pretext?

A. If you read it out of the context as you did now, one might infer this after having witnessed the development of events, but I read the sentence before the one that you read. There it says: "Poland will always be on the side of our adversaries; in spite of treaties of friendship, Poland has always had the secret intention of exploiting every opportunity to do us harm," Such a sentence and such a meaning was quite within the scope of Hitler's statements; and if you go on to say now that that was Poland's attitude, namely, an adverse attitude, then if you continue this trend of ideas, you may arrive at the result that Danzig is not the final objective; that is, if conflicts arise, further developments will occur. This idea, by the way, is also expressed in the Fuehrer directive about Case White, where a similar deduction is made and from where you can clearly infer this trend of ideas.

******

A. It says in the second paragraph, under the heading Case White, "Should Poland, however, change her policy toward Germany, based up to now on the same principles as our own, and adopt a threatening attitude towards Germany, a final settlement might become necessary, notwithstanding the pact in effect with Poland." It goes on, and I quote: "The aim then will be to destroy the Polish military strength and create a situation in the East which satisfies the requirements of national defense". Here then, you have the logical connection between the final conclusion and the premise made very clear.

Q. It has further been stated, also on the basis of the Schmundt minutes of the conference, and I quote: "There is, therefore, no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with the decision to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity." Was that sentence stated in this manner as far as you remember?

A. This idea as far as I remember was not expressed -- not even in substance, because otherwise I am quite sure that I would have left this conference not feeling uncertain, as I stated I did, but I would have left it with the opinion that a war would break out very soon. That, however, was not the case. Even Admiral Raeder did not hold this point of view.

Q. How do you know that?

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A. The next day or the day after, I saw Raeder because of this conference which had taken place at Hitler's in order to learn his impression of Hitler's address.

Q. What did Raeder tell you on that occasion?

A. He said that he was completely without fear or anxiety; he had personally talked to Hitler; this he had done particularly, in order to learn whether in view of the developments or in view of Hitler's judgment of the situation any measures on the part of the navy were to be prepared. Hitler calmed him down and said that he had complete control over the situation; any measures on the part of the navy with reference to the building up of the fleet were not to be taken. I have to add here that Raeder had asked him whether the construction of submarines, for instance, was to be referred to the background in order to build larger vessels. Hitler had clearly answered that question to the effect that the building up of the fleet was to proceed according to plan, which meant that vessels of all types, as had been provided originally in the plan, were to be built, and that no serious warlike conflicts were to be expected in the near future.

Q. Admiral, I believe we have to make a correction here. Will you repeat that, please? What was Hitler's suggestion? What type of vessels was to be preferred? You said that the building of submarines was to be referred to the background in order to build larger ships, is that right?

A. I am afraid I used the wrong term then. Raeder's inquiry of Hitler was whether by any chance the building of submarines, which could be constructed in a short time, was to be particularly sponsored and furthered at the expense of the building of surface fighting vessels.

Q. And to that question which Raeder put, Hitler answered to the effect that the original construction plan was to proceed?

A. Yes. That is right.

Q. From the remarks made by Admiral Raeder, could you clearly gather that he did not expect a warlike conflict to result from these tensions?

A. Yes, that was the impression under which I left Raeder. It had been the purpose of my personal discussions with Raeder to determine whether any steps were to be taken on the part of my office or of the Naval War Staff by virtue of Hitler's speech. Moreover, Admiral Raeder expressed his opinion repeatedly on later occasions that a peaceful development was to be expected. I remember, for instance, that in summer 1939, on the occasion of a submarine maneuver he told the leader of the submarines and the

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submarine officers once again that the maneuvers in the near future would proceed undisturbed and were to be continued according to schedule, because no frictions were expected. Similar remarks were made on other occasions.

Q. Can you tell us very briefly whether Poland's attitude towards Germany changed in any way in the subsequent period, that is, after May 1939?

A. According to what I recollect today about the developments of those days, it is my opinion that during the time from April 1939 onward the tensions increased constantly. At that time the reasons given for this (which were also expressed in the German press) were that the treaty of friendship which was under preparation -- a treaty of friendship between England and Poland might perhaps be the cause of the more tense situation between Germany and Poland. At any rate, the situation was, that during the months between May, July and August 1939, there was an abundance of news and information about excesses committed towards the German frontier population -- reports about dismissals of employees and workers. Germans streamed across the Polish frontier, and the serious aspect was that our representatives in Poland also reported that the circles hostile to Germany -- the circles that wanted to annex territories -- mainly represented by the military formations and Sokols, gained increasing influence on the foreign policy of Poland.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#65

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 17:07

Here's a quick reference to the participants and their accounts so far in this thread:

(1) Albrecht – unknown

(2) von Below – admitted being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1457709 (Memoirs)

(3) Bodenschatz – admitted being present; accounts at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1458445 (interrogation summary) and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1457737 (IMT)

(4) von Brauchitsch – admitted being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6#p1458916 (IMT)

(5) Engel – unknown

(6) Göring – admitted being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1457765 (IMT)

(7) Halder – admitted being present; accounts at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1458463 (interrogation summary) and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1459102 (NMT)

(8) Hitler – unavailable; suicide 30 Apr 1945

(9) Jeschonnek – unavailable; suicide 18 Aug 1943

(10) Keitel – admitted being present; accounts at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1458017 (interrogation summary) and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1457744 (IMT)

(11) Milch – admitted being present; accounts at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1#p1458461 (interrogation summary) and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1457742 (IMT); see also Milch Diary entry at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 3#p1458443

(12) Raeder – admitted being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1457747 (IMT); secondary versions of Raeder's reactions by Schulte-Moenting at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 8#p1458928 and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 4#p1458934 (IMT); and Schniewind at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1459105 (NMT)

(13) Schmundt – unavailable; died of wounds 1 Oct 1944

(14) Schniewind – admitted being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5#p1459105 (NMT)

(15) Warlimont – denied being present; account at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 2#p1458462 (interrogation summary)

Korvettenkapitaen Albrecht is probably identifiable with Alwin-Broder Albrecht (18.9.1903-1.5.1945), who was Hitler's personal naval adjutant until he became involved in a sex scandal and was dismissed from the Navy on 30 Jun 1939. He then became an NSKK-Oberfuehrer. According to David Irving, Albrecht was killed in the battle for Berlin in 1945 (Hitler's War, p. 180).

Hauptmann Engel is probably identifiable with the later Generalleutnant Gerhard Engel (13.4.1906-9.12.1976); adjutant of the Wehrmacht with the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor 27 Mar 1938-1 Feb 1944.

So, for a quick summary, of the 15 listed participants at this meeting, 11 survived the war. Of those, 9 (v. Below, Bodenschatz, v. Brauchitsch, Göring, Halder, Keitel, Milch, Raeder, and Schniewind) said they attended the conference, one (Warlimont) said he didn't attend the conference, and we don't yet know what Generalleutnant Engel had to say.

At this point I think it's fair to say that AJP Taylor's claim, quoted at http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1#p1457521:
Hitler gave no speech on 23 May and most of those alleged to have been prsent were not even in Berlin
is inaccurate.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#66

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 17:54

little grey rabbit -- You wrote:
Both bad memory on my part, I recall reading trunk somewhere on the web, but I can't find it.
You're probably thinking about references to other documents compiled by Gen. Schmundt, involving the German plan to invade Czechoslovakia, which "were captured by American troops in a cellar at Obersalzberg, Hitler's headquarters, near Berchtesgaden." (IMT proceedings vol. 1, p. 520; vol. 2, pp. 6-7; vol. 3, p. 42). Document L-79 may have been part of that cache, but we don't know for sure yet.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#67

Post by David Thompson » 26 Apr 2010, 21:46

Unless there's more discussion of AJP Taylor's overstatement, I propose to move on to the issue of "forgery." After that, I plan to move on to the various specific questions posed about Gen. Schmundt's notes. If the forgery issue is conceded to be non-existent, we can skip that step. little grey rabbit (and the late AJP Taylor) are the proponents in the "forgery" discussion, and since AJP is dead, I'll leave it up to little grey rabbit to decide whether we can pass on the "forgery" issue before moving on. If not, let's take it up and air it out.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#68

Post by michael mills » 27 Apr 2010, 04:14

I think there can be no doubt that there was a meeting on 23 May 1939, at which Hitler gave a long, rambling presentation to the assembled German military leaders, who later said they found it rather difficult to understand exactly what Hitler's thinking was.

The real question is not whether the "Little Schmundt" document is a forgery, ie something that was not produced by Schmundt but is falsely claimed to be so, but whether it is a reliable and accurate representation of the message that Hitler was trying to convey to his military leaders.

it is noteworthy that certain of the persons present at the meeting, eg Milch (representing Göring, who therefore could not have been present, despite his claims at the IMT, perhaps motivated by pride and a creluctance to admit that he had not been present at an important meeting) and Schniewind, disputed the accuracy of the Schmundt notes, and stated that Hitler had not announced a firm decision on his part to attack Poland, but rather had said that the development of the political situation might lead to a conflict with Poland, and perhaps also with Britain and France.

The discrepancy between what is stated in the "Little Schmundt" document and what people like Milch and Schniewind remembered Hitler as having said could well be due to Schmundt's having written the document some considerable time after 23 May 1939, perhaps even in early 1940, as was suggested by Seraphim, that is after the possibility of conflict with Poland and with Britain and France had been converted into a fact. In that case, Schmundt's memory of what Hitler said may have been affected by intervening events, to the extent that he misremembered Hitler's talking of the possibility of conflict as a revelation of a decision to make war.

One part of Schniewind's testimony is highly interesting. He stated this:
Q. Can you tell us very briefly whether Poland's attitude towards Germany changed in any way in the subsequent period, that is, after May 1939?

A. According to what I recollect today about the developments of those days, it is my opinion that during the time from April 1939 onward the tensions increased constantly. At that time the reasons given for this (which were also expressed in the German press) were that the treaty of friendship which was under preparation -- a treaty of friendship between England and Poland might perhaps be the cause of the more tense situation between Germany and Poland. At any rate, the situation was, that during the months between May, July and August 1939, there was an abundance of news and information about excesses committed towards the German frontier population -- reports about dismissals of employees and workers. Germans streamed across the Polish frontier, and the serious aspect was that our representatives in Poland also reported that the circles hostile to Germany -- the circles that wanted to annex territories -- mainly represented by the military formations and Sokols, gained increasing influence on the foreign policy of Poland.
That is a very accurate summary of tension between Germany and Poland over the six months leading up to the german invasion. Schniewind correctly identified the two elements that had induced the Polish Government to adopt an increasingly intransigent attitude toward the German proposals for a settlement of outstanding issues. These were:

1. The agreement between Poland and Britain to support each other in an armed conflict with Germany; and

2. The increasing influence on the German Government of anti-German political elements in Poland, in particular in the Polish armed forces and in the Sokol organisation (an extremely anti-German paramilitary group disguised as a sporting association, linked to Endecja). As Schniewind correctly stated, some of those political elements desired to annex German territory (eg East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia), and they saw a war against Germany, fought in coalition with Britian and France, as an opportunity to achieve that end.

As for the views of the respected British historian AJP Taylor, he was clearly incorrect when he expressed the view that Hitler had given no speech on 23 May 1939. However, there may well be some substance to his view that Hitler's intention in talking to his military leaders about the possiblity of conflict was to enlist them in the pressure that he wanted to bring to bear on Britain and France to induce them to stop supporting Poland and compel it to stop resisting German demands.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#69

Post by David Thompson » 27 Apr 2010, 05:00

Michael -- I agree with you that the 23 May 1939 meeting took place, and I also agree with you that the "little Schmundt" protocol is not a forgery. Let's hear from little grey rabbit, however, and see if these two issues require further discussion before moving on. There's plenty more to talk about in regard to this document, but let's get the main points of controversy resolved first. I don't want to short-change our readers who came here to learn more about the subject.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#70

Post by Led125 » 28 Apr 2010, 03:18

This is from the direct examination of Ernst von Weizsäcker (NMT ('Green Series'), vol. 12, p.1106) and might be of interest:
Q. Prosecution Exhibit 1431 contains the military operations. plan against Poland. This exhibit deals with a Hitler conference held at the end of May 1939 with the circle of his closest military collaborators. Were you familiar with these events?
A. No. They were not known to me, because such military directives, if possible at all, dealt with even more confidential matters than political directives. But even without having knowledge of these reports, I had a deep distrust of what Hitler was aiming at and what would come.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#71

Post by Led125 » 28 Apr 2010, 03:39

Von Ribbentrop's Cross examination is also quite interesting:


Q. Now, when did you learn that Hitler was determined to attack Poland?

A. That Hitler contemplated a military action against Poland, I learned, according to my recollection, for the first time during August 1939. That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance of any eventuality becomes clear from this order with respect to Danzig. But I definitely did not learn about this order and I do not recollect now in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it.

Q. Are you telling the Tribunal that you did not know in May that Hitler's real view was that Danzig was not the subject of the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East?

A. No, I did not know it in that sense. The Fuehrer talked sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he had the intention of attacking Poland.

Q. Well now, just look at Page 117 - or it may be 118 of your document - on Page 117 You will find the minutes of the conference on the 23rd May, 1939, at the new Reich Chancellery.

A. Did you say 117?

Q. 117. I want you to look at - it may be on Page 118, and it begins:

"Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all, it is a question of expanding our living space in the East, and of securing our food supplies, and of the settlement of the Baltic problem. Food supplies can only be expected from thinly populated areas over and above the natural fertility following German exploitation, which will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other possibility for Europe."
[Page 239]

Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to you?
A. It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say, first, that it looks as if I was not present during this conference. That was a military conference, and Hitler used to hold these military conferences quite separately from the political conferences. He did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum (living space), but I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time - that is in May 1939 - of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept apart deliberately as had been done in other cases, because he always wanted his diplomats to work wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution.

Q. You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that your story?

A. Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because -

Q. Well now, just look at the very short paragraph a little further on where he says: "There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no alternative but to attack her at the first suitable opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair. There will be war. Our task is to isolate Poland."

Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign Minister?

A. I did not quite understand that question.

Q. It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland; that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign policy?

A. No, he did not mention it at that time, but, according to my recollection, only much later - in the summer of 1939 to be exact. At that time he did say that he was resolved to solve the problem one way or another.

Q. And do you say that you did not know in May that Hitler wanted war?

A. Did he want what?

Q. You did not know in May that Hitler wanted war?

A. No, I was not convinced of that at all.
Q. It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, is it not?
A. This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he actually carried it out later is an entirely different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on the next day.
http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tg ... 6-08.shtml

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#72

Post by little grey rabbit » 28 Apr 2010, 04:55

The real question is not whether the "Little Schmundt" document is a forgery, ie something that was not produced by Schmundt but is falsely claimed to be so, but whether it is a reliable and accurate representation of the message that Hitler was trying to convey to his military leaders.
If it is not a reliable and accurate representation then it is likely a forgery.
1. Significant meetings would almost invariably have minutes taken and minutes taken while the meeting was in progress.

the idea that Schmundt months later would produce many pages of a bizarrely embellished account and present in such a way as to be an accurate record is hypothetically possible but tending towards the highly improbable.

Either these are notes of the meeting or the most probable alternative explanation is they are not genuine.

Much like the documents surrounding Elie Wiesel's identity - some people can never be convinced and while always trawl around finding the most inconsequential objections.

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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#73

Post by bf109 emil » 28 Apr 2010, 08:43

Either these are notes of the meeting or the most probable alternative explanation is they are not genuine.
http://library2.lawschool.cornell.edu/d ... _27_02.pdf

there are and was minutes of the meeting and presented as evidence in Nuremberg on page 2 and 9 which source the document, as opposed to the type written one posted earlier as being...minutes in handwriting and
signed by Schmundt
as part of the index used in Nuremberg of 9 pages to show...The Nazi Conspirators' war
of Aggression Against Poland

Much like the documents surrounding Elie Wiesel's identity - some people can never be convinced and while always trawl around finding the most inconsequential objections.
not even close to being similar or along the same topic as a document show to defendants at Nuremberg, these authenticating the meeting and documentation...but I agree as Taylors trawling to find inconsequential objections to the authenticity of L-79 as being similar to someone who would never be convinced.

michael mills
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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#74

Post by michael mills » 29 Apr 2010, 02:32

If it is not a reliable and accurate representation then it is likely a forgery.
Those are not the only alternatives.

It is fairly clear that the so-called "little Schmundt" document is not an official record of the meeting of 23 May 1939. If they had been, they would have been circulated at the time to the participants in the meeting, but it is clear that the first time the participants saw them was at the IMT.

Furthermore, it is known from the testimony of participants at Hitler's military conferences that it was forbidden to make a record of what was said during the conference itself. It is clear that participants sometimes made notes after such conferences based on their memory of what was said, and sometimes notes made by different participants varied markedly from each other.

One possibility is that Schmundt made some notes soon after the conference of 23 May 1939, and then some time later, possibly early in 1940, wrote them up in expanded form as the document now known as the "little Schmundt", but reflecting the situation as it was at that time, ie there was an actual state of war with France and Britain. According to the critique by Seraphim, early 1940 was the most likely time of the composition of the "Little Schmundt" since it refers to ideas that were circulating at that time, but not in May 1939.

Some of the participants at the meeting of 23 May who were confronted with the "Little Schmundt" for the first time at post-war trials stated that, according to their own memory, the document was partially accurate but not entirely so. In particular, they stated that Hitler had not proclaimed a definite decision to attack Poland, but rather had talked of the possibility of a conflict breaking out.

The most credible explanation of the "Little Schmundt" is that Schmundt wrote up his notes of the meeting of 23 May at a time when the war with Poland had already occurred, and the feared state of war with Britian and France had become a reality, such that he misremembered Hitler's tough talk about the possibility of war as an actual declaration of an intent to make war.

In that respect, Ribbentrop's explanation given at the IMT is instructive:
Q. You did not know in May that Hitler wanted war?

A. No, I was not convinced of that at all.
Q. It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, is it not?
A. This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he actually carried it out later is an entirely different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on the next day.
One problem we have is that not only do we not know when Schmundt produced this document, we also do not know why he produced it. It is clear that it was not an official record, otherwise it would have been circulated to the participants. In fact, it seems to have been kept hidden away. Presumably Shcmundt wrote up his recollection of the meeting for some private purpose of his own, which he never revealed to anyone else, so far as we know.

The bottom line is that the "Little Schmundt" cannot be accepted as proof positive that as of 23 May 1939 Hitler had made a definite decision to attack Poland, and had rejected all other possibilities for a resolution of the dispute between Germany and Poland. At most, he was warning of the strong possibility that the dispute would end in an armed conflict, due to the intransigent attitude of Poland in which it was being encouraged by Britain and France, and telling his military leaders to make preparations for such a conflict, so that they would be ready if it did come about. He was also trying to encourage his military leaders not to be afraid of such a conflict if it came, by boasting about the supposed superior strength of his own personality.

It is not at all strange that in May 1939 Hitler was warning his military leaders about the possibility of an armed conflict breaking out. In that same month, the military leaders of Poland and France were meeting to make plans for an armed conflict with Germany, which they explicitly saw as having two possible causes:

1. a first strike by German against Poland; and

2. a first strike by Poland against Danzig.

Given the fact that Poland and France were discussing the possibility of war with Germany, it is little wonder that Hitler should be warning his own military leaders about the same possibility, and about a potential need to pre-empt Polish military action over Danzig.

David Thompson
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Re: A forged Nuremburg Document of a Hitler conference

#75

Post by David Thompson » 29 Apr 2010, 02:47

Michael -- You wrote:
One problem we have is that not only do we not know when Schmundt produced this document, we also do not know why he produced it. It is clear that it was not an official record, otherwise it would have been circulated to the participants. In fact, it seems to have been kept hidden away. Presumably Shcmundt wrote up his recollection of the meeting for some private purpose of his own, which he never revealed to anyone else, so far as we know.
See v. Below's memoirs, as quoted by Led125. According to v. Below, Gen. Schmundt kept notes on this and other meetings, and turned them over to Gen. Scherff, of the German Army military studies and writing program (Beauftragten für Geschichtsschreibung). This archive was subsequently captured by US troops.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9#p1457709

Both men served as Hitler's adjutants for years -- v. Below for the Luftwaffe (1938-1945) and Schmundt for the Heer (1938-1944) -- so v. Below probably knew Schmundt fairly well. As you can see from the quote, v. Below summarily dismissed as "completely impossible" the idea that Gen. Schmundt subsequently concocted his notes on the 23 May 1939 conference:
Es ist völlig ausgeschlossen anzunehmen, dass Schmundt den Bericht erst sehr viel später, etwa 1940 oder 1941, abgefaßt hätte. Ich kannte Schmundts Gewohnheit, solche Aufzeichnungen so schnell wie möglich nach den jeweiligen Ereignissen anzufertigen. Schmundt war als Generalstabsoffizier gewissenhaft und verantwortungsbewußt genug, um die Bedeutung solcher Gesprächswiedergaben richtig zu erkennen. Im übrigen entsprach der Inhalt der Niederschrift Hitlers Gedanken aus jener Zeit, wie ich sie nicht nur aus der Besprechung vom 23. Mai her kannte, sondern auch aus einzelnen anderen Gesprächen Hitlers im Kreise der Militärs.

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