David Irving and the Klessheim Conference
-
- Forum Staff
- Posts: 23724
- Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
- Location: USA
-
- Member
- Posts: 9000
- Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 13:42
- Location: Sydney, Australia
David
Thanks for posting the text from Irving's "Hitler's War", and the excerpts from Horthy's memoirs and Ribbertrop's testimony at Nuremberg on the Klessheim meeting.
Do you know whether the 2001 edition of "Hitler's War", as posted by you, differs markedly from the original 1977 edition (I do not have either to hand)?
When Evans' critique is read against the 2001 version of Irving's portrayal of the meeting, then it appears to be baseless. The main thrust of that critique was that Irving had taken words from the meeting of 16 April and strung them together with elements from the meeting of the following day, thus distorting the latter. However, in the 2001 edition, the words recorded on the 16th and those on the 17th are clearly distinguished.
Has Irving revised his portrayal of the meeting, in order to take account of Evans' critique? If so, it means that the most recent edition is a better book than earlier editions, and can be read with greater confidence, despite what our friend Maple01 says.
Thanks for posting the text from Irving's "Hitler's War", and the excerpts from Horthy's memoirs and Ribbertrop's testimony at Nuremberg on the Klessheim meeting.
Do you know whether the 2001 edition of "Hitler's War", as posted by you, differs markedly from the original 1977 edition (I do not have either to hand)?
When Evans' critique is read against the 2001 version of Irving's portrayal of the meeting, then it appears to be baseless. The main thrust of that critique was that Irving had taken words from the meeting of 16 April and strung them together with elements from the meeting of the following day, thus distorting the latter. However, in the 2001 edition, the words recorded on the 16th and those on the 17th are clearly distinguished.
Has Irving revised his portrayal of the meeting, in order to take account of Evans' critique? If so, it means that the most recent edition is a better book than earlier editions, and can be read with greater confidence, despite what our friend Maple01 says.
-
- Forum Staff
- Posts: 23724
- Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
- Location: USA
Michael -- I don't know what difference (if any) there may be between the 1977 edition of "Hitler's War" and the 2001 edition. Since I didn't have a copy of either edition, I just went for the most easily accessible source of the book, which was on David Irving's website.
As to my posting the sources, you're welcome. This always seemed to me to be the best way to look at an historical disagreement.
As for the result of posting the sources, I agree with you. If the version of the Klessheim conference given in the 2001 edition of Hitler's War is the same as given in the 1977 version of the same work, Evan's criticism of Irving on that particular point seems picayune.
As I understand it, there are more substantial criticisms of Irving's works than his coverage of this episode. If it happens that Irving trimmed his sails between 1977 and 2001 on the subject, perhaps he realized that there was room for disagreement on the subject of the Klessheim conference.
As to my posting the sources, you're welcome. This always seemed to me to be the best way to look at an historical disagreement.
As for the result of posting the sources, I agree with you. If the version of the Klessheim conference given in the 2001 edition of Hitler's War is the same as given in the 1977 version of the same work, Evan's criticism of Irving on that particular point seems picayune.
As I understand it, there are more substantial criticisms of Irving's works than his coverage of this episode. If it happens that Irving trimmed his sails between 1977 and 2001 on the subject, perhaps he realized that there was room for disagreement on the subject of the Klessheim conference.
-
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1588
- Joined: 13 Mar 2002, 02:17
- Location: Houston, Texas
Profound thanks to Charles Bunch, David Thompson and Michael Mills for supplying various pieces to this puzzle which were otherwise not readily available to me. Here is an additional quote from Horthy's Memoirs, pps. 257-61:
"I could see little use in undertaking the journey to Klessheim but could not deny the cogency of the arguments in favour. The determining factor in my decision to see Hitler was the thought that in a personal interview I could press for the return of the Hungarian troops which were now stationed abroad. I set out for Klessheim, therefore, on March 17th, 1944, accompanied by Ghyczy, Csatay and Szombathelyi.
"March 17th was a Friday, and it is an old superstition of the sea that one should never set out on a Friday. And, indeed, in my sea days, I had never done so. I had always waited until eight bells had heralded a new day. On March 17th, I was untrue to my old custom. I set out with an uneasy feeling that was soon to be justified. Details may have slipped my mind, but I still clearly remember twice putting my revolver in my pocket and twice taking it out again before leaving the train. I knew that I would not be searched as Hitler's Generals were; but justice was to be meted out to him by a higher tribunal. I left my revolver in my coach(2).
"For the time being, events followed the usual procedure. As my train drew in on Saturday morning, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Keitel and others were at the station. I had the impression that Hitler stooped more and looked much older than when I had last seen him. As we were driven to Schloss Klessheim, an estate belonging to Archduke Louis Victor, the brother of the late Emperor, I asked Hitler if he desired our Foreign Minister and the Generals to be present at our discussion. He replied that he did not.
"We went straight to his study, followed by Paul Schmidt(3), Hitler's interpreter. I had nothing against Herr Schmidt, whom I considered an intelligent and kindly man, and to whom we now owe the account of the exceedingly dramatic events of my stay at Klessheim which he has recorded in his book, (Paul Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923 - 1945.). However, as none of my people were present and as no interpreter was needed between myself and Hitler, I queried his presence, and he withdrew. Later I regretted this, for, had I not protested, there would have been a witness to our talk.
"Hitler was very ill at ease and seemed to find it difficult to begin. Instead of broaching the subject of the repatriation of our troops, he began with the Italian 'betrayal', which had put Germany in a difficult position. Since, according to his information, Hungary also was contemplating a change of sides, he felt he was obliged to take precautionary measures(4) in order to avoid being caught unawares a second time.
"Upon my dry request for 'proofs', he repeated his accusations against Premier Kállay and our Legations in neutral countries. I countered sharply with the reply that Magyars had never been traitors. "Without my consent, there can never be the change of sides that you have described," I declared. "Should events force my hand one day so that, to safeguard our very existence, I have to ask the enemy for an armistice, I assure you that I shall openly and honestly inform the German Government of such negotiations beforehand. We would, in any case, never be the first to take up arms against our German comrades."
"The conversation continued for some time and we both grew heated. "I do not know what you mean by 'taking precautionary measures'," I said to Hitler. "If by that phrase you mean military measures, or in other words the occupation of an independent and sovereign state which has made many sacrifices on Germany's behalf, that would be an unspeakable crime. I can only warn you against the execution of so injudicious a step, which would cause unparalleled hatred for your regime to flare up."
"From his excited answers, I realized that intelligent discussion was impossible. I interrupted him with the vehement words: "If everything has been decided upon already, there is no point in prolonging this discussion. I am leaving." Saying this, I walked quickly to the door with the intention of going to the rooms allocated to me on a higher floor. Hitler ran after me.
"I sent for my fellow countrymen and told them what had happened. We decided to leave Klessheim forthwith. I requested Baron Dörnberg, who was in charge of arrangements, to see to the immediate departure of our special train. Today I know what I did not know then: that Hitler's 'precautionary measures' had already been set on foot and that orders had been given, should I prove 'stubborn', for my arrest in Vienna on my way home.
"Hitler's immediate move, however, no doubt on the advice of his entourage, was an attempt to prevent our departure. To this end, an air alarm was sounded. The castle was put under a smoke screen and we were informed that bombs had severed the telephone communications. Together with that message, I received an invitation from Hitler to lunch and a request that we should continue our discussions in the afternoon. In the hope that he would have reconsidered his attitude, I agreed. The atmosphere during lunch could not be described as cordial. Hitler picked nervously at his vegetarian food. I felt little inclined to make conversation, nor apparently did the eight others assembled around the oval table in the handsome dining-hall.
"After the meal, several separate discussions sprang up. Hitler endeavoured to give Szombathelyi the impression that he regretted his project(5). That was probably all part of the game. He even went so far as to summon Field Marshal Keitel to ask him whether the occupation of Hungary could not be countermanded. Keitel replied that it could not as the troops were already on the march.
"Having heard this from Szombathelyi, I said to Hitler during our second interview, "Then I shall, of course, lay down my office." Hitler thereupon began to plead with me. He had, he declared, always loved Hungary. He would not dream of interfering with Hungary's sovereignty. We know now that it was not only to the Rumanians that he had often said the contrary. He knew that Hungary had always been a sovereign state, "unlike Bohemia," he added, "which used to belong to the Holy Roman Empire, that is to say, Germany." His military measures were intended only to safeguard Hungary. "I give you my word that the German troops shall be withdrawn as soon as a new Hungarian Government that has my confidence has been formed." I replied that I had to reserve judgment on that point, and withdrew once more to my own apartments.
"What was I to do? It was plain that my resignation would not prevent the military occupation, would indeed merely give Hitler and opportunity to introduce a hundred per cent Nazi Arrow-Cross regime. The precedent of the Italian debacle with its horrible attendant circumstances constituted a timely warning. So long as I continued head of the state, the Germans would have to show a certain circumspection. They would have to leave the Hungarian Army under my orders, and would therefore be unable to incorporate it into the German Army. While I was in charge, they could not attempt putting the Arrow-Cross Party into office to do their deadly work of murdering Hungarian patriots, of exterminating the 800,000 Hungarian Jews and the tens of thousands of refugees who had sought sanctuary in Hungary. It would have been easier for me to make the great gesture of abdication. I would have been spared many a denunciation. But to leave a sinking ship, especially one that needed her captain more than ever, was a step I could not bring myself to take. At the time it was more important to me that Hitler promised to withdraw his troops from Hungary as soon as a government acceptable to him had been appointed.
"One thing was clear to me: whatever 'proofs' Hitler may have had of our negotiations with the enemy, his treachery in overrunning our country after having lured me and my Ministers away from Budapest was so wicked that henceforward we should be entirely released from any obligations to Nazi Germany.
"The cup of Klessheim, however, had not yet been drained to the last dreg. As nothing more had been said about the time of departure of my train, I asked whether I was to consider myself a prisoner. Baron Dörnberg hastened to tell me that, the air alarm being over, my train would be ready to leave at eight o'clock that night. As I was preparing to go, the Foreign Minister of the Reich, Ribbentrop, came to read me the text of the communiqué covering my 'visit'. This document stated that the entry of German troops into Hungary was by 'mutual consent'. I protested angrily against this new lie. "You might as well have added," I fulminated, "that I begged Hitler to have Hungary occupied by Slovak and Rumanian troops, which was another of the threats he made." Ribbentrop wriggled desperately, putting forward the plea that in life minor untruths were often necessary. Phrased as it was, the communiqué made the occupation appear less hostile. I had been aware that this was the intention from the outset. I therefore insisted on the deletion of that particular lie. Ribbentrop at last agreed. But in the German press, the communiqué was published in its original form.
"At eight o'clock that night we left. On the platform at Klessheim I saw Hitler for the last time before he committed suicide in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, escaping by this act the justice of his earthly judges. A death which was announced to the world as death in action."
There seems to be some confusion as to dates. According to Irving and Evans, Horthy arrived and met with Hitler on March 16 and met again on the 17th. Horthy maintains he left Budapest on the 17th and arrived at Klessheim on the 18th. John Toland, "Adolph Hitler" Doubleday, 1976 (Vol II) at 887 says the meeting took place on the 17th (and cites Horthy's memoirs as his source!) but implies that there was only one meeting. Ian Kershaw, "Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis", W.W. Norton & Co. 2000, at 626-628, states that Horthy arrived on the morning of the 18th and left by train that evening, citing as his source both Paul Schmidt and a deposition or affidavit ("Aussage") of March 4, 1948 by Horthy concerning his meeting with Hitler in Klessheim (apparently introduced in evidence in the Eichman trial). Hmmmm! I need to ponder this and perhaps round up some other sources.
Regards and thanks again, Kaschner
"I could see little use in undertaking the journey to Klessheim but could not deny the cogency of the arguments in favour. The determining factor in my decision to see Hitler was the thought that in a personal interview I could press for the return of the Hungarian troops which were now stationed abroad. I set out for Klessheim, therefore, on March 17th, 1944, accompanied by Ghyczy, Csatay and Szombathelyi.
"March 17th was a Friday, and it is an old superstition of the sea that one should never set out on a Friday. And, indeed, in my sea days, I had never done so. I had always waited until eight bells had heralded a new day. On March 17th, I was untrue to my old custom. I set out with an uneasy feeling that was soon to be justified. Details may have slipped my mind, but I still clearly remember twice putting my revolver in my pocket and twice taking it out again before leaving the train. I knew that I would not be searched as Hitler's Generals were; but justice was to be meted out to him by a higher tribunal. I left my revolver in my coach(2).
"For the time being, events followed the usual procedure. As my train drew in on Saturday morning, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Keitel and others were at the station. I had the impression that Hitler stooped more and looked much older than when I had last seen him. As we were driven to Schloss Klessheim, an estate belonging to Archduke Louis Victor, the brother of the late Emperor, I asked Hitler if he desired our Foreign Minister and the Generals to be present at our discussion. He replied that he did not.
"We went straight to his study, followed by Paul Schmidt(3), Hitler's interpreter. I had nothing against Herr Schmidt, whom I considered an intelligent and kindly man, and to whom we now owe the account of the exceedingly dramatic events of my stay at Klessheim which he has recorded in his book, (Paul Schmidt: Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne 1923 - 1945.). However, as none of my people were present and as no interpreter was needed between myself and Hitler, I queried his presence, and he withdrew. Later I regretted this, for, had I not protested, there would have been a witness to our talk.
"Hitler was very ill at ease and seemed to find it difficult to begin. Instead of broaching the subject of the repatriation of our troops, he began with the Italian 'betrayal', which had put Germany in a difficult position. Since, according to his information, Hungary also was contemplating a change of sides, he felt he was obliged to take precautionary measures(4) in order to avoid being caught unawares a second time.
"Upon my dry request for 'proofs', he repeated his accusations against Premier Kállay and our Legations in neutral countries. I countered sharply with the reply that Magyars had never been traitors. "Without my consent, there can never be the change of sides that you have described," I declared. "Should events force my hand one day so that, to safeguard our very existence, I have to ask the enemy for an armistice, I assure you that I shall openly and honestly inform the German Government of such negotiations beforehand. We would, in any case, never be the first to take up arms against our German comrades."
"The conversation continued for some time and we both grew heated. "I do not know what you mean by 'taking precautionary measures'," I said to Hitler. "If by that phrase you mean military measures, or in other words the occupation of an independent and sovereign state which has made many sacrifices on Germany's behalf, that would be an unspeakable crime. I can only warn you against the execution of so injudicious a step, which would cause unparalleled hatred for your regime to flare up."
"From his excited answers, I realized that intelligent discussion was impossible. I interrupted him with the vehement words: "If everything has been decided upon already, there is no point in prolonging this discussion. I am leaving." Saying this, I walked quickly to the door with the intention of going to the rooms allocated to me on a higher floor. Hitler ran after me.
"I sent for my fellow countrymen and told them what had happened. We decided to leave Klessheim forthwith. I requested Baron Dörnberg, who was in charge of arrangements, to see to the immediate departure of our special train. Today I know what I did not know then: that Hitler's 'precautionary measures' had already been set on foot and that orders had been given, should I prove 'stubborn', for my arrest in Vienna on my way home.
"Hitler's immediate move, however, no doubt on the advice of his entourage, was an attempt to prevent our departure. To this end, an air alarm was sounded. The castle was put under a smoke screen and we were informed that bombs had severed the telephone communications. Together with that message, I received an invitation from Hitler to lunch and a request that we should continue our discussions in the afternoon. In the hope that he would have reconsidered his attitude, I agreed. The atmosphere during lunch could not be described as cordial. Hitler picked nervously at his vegetarian food. I felt little inclined to make conversation, nor apparently did the eight others assembled around the oval table in the handsome dining-hall.
"After the meal, several separate discussions sprang up. Hitler endeavoured to give Szombathelyi the impression that he regretted his project(5). That was probably all part of the game. He even went so far as to summon Field Marshal Keitel to ask him whether the occupation of Hungary could not be countermanded. Keitel replied that it could not as the troops were already on the march.
"Having heard this from Szombathelyi, I said to Hitler during our second interview, "Then I shall, of course, lay down my office." Hitler thereupon began to plead with me. He had, he declared, always loved Hungary. He would not dream of interfering with Hungary's sovereignty. We know now that it was not only to the Rumanians that he had often said the contrary. He knew that Hungary had always been a sovereign state, "unlike Bohemia," he added, "which used to belong to the Holy Roman Empire, that is to say, Germany." His military measures were intended only to safeguard Hungary. "I give you my word that the German troops shall be withdrawn as soon as a new Hungarian Government that has my confidence has been formed." I replied that I had to reserve judgment on that point, and withdrew once more to my own apartments.
"What was I to do? It was plain that my resignation would not prevent the military occupation, would indeed merely give Hitler and opportunity to introduce a hundred per cent Nazi Arrow-Cross regime. The precedent of the Italian debacle with its horrible attendant circumstances constituted a timely warning. So long as I continued head of the state, the Germans would have to show a certain circumspection. They would have to leave the Hungarian Army under my orders, and would therefore be unable to incorporate it into the German Army. While I was in charge, they could not attempt putting the Arrow-Cross Party into office to do their deadly work of murdering Hungarian patriots, of exterminating the 800,000 Hungarian Jews and the tens of thousands of refugees who had sought sanctuary in Hungary. It would have been easier for me to make the great gesture of abdication. I would have been spared many a denunciation. But to leave a sinking ship, especially one that needed her captain more than ever, was a step I could not bring myself to take. At the time it was more important to me that Hitler promised to withdraw his troops from Hungary as soon as a government acceptable to him had been appointed.
"One thing was clear to me: whatever 'proofs' Hitler may have had of our negotiations with the enemy, his treachery in overrunning our country after having lured me and my Ministers away from Budapest was so wicked that henceforward we should be entirely released from any obligations to Nazi Germany.
"The cup of Klessheim, however, had not yet been drained to the last dreg. As nothing more had been said about the time of departure of my train, I asked whether I was to consider myself a prisoner. Baron Dörnberg hastened to tell me that, the air alarm being over, my train would be ready to leave at eight o'clock that night. As I was preparing to go, the Foreign Minister of the Reich, Ribbentrop, came to read me the text of the communiqué covering my 'visit'. This document stated that the entry of German troops into Hungary was by 'mutual consent'. I protested angrily against this new lie. "You might as well have added," I fulminated, "that I begged Hitler to have Hungary occupied by Slovak and Rumanian troops, which was another of the threats he made." Ribbentrop wriggled desperately, putting forward the plea that in life minor untruths were often necessary. Phrased as it was, the communiqué made the occupation appear less hostile. I had been aware that this was the intention from the outset. I therefore insisted on the deletion of that particular lie. Ribbentrop at last agreed. But in the German press, the communiqué was published in its original form.
"At eight o'clock that night we left. On the platform at Klessheim I saw Hitler for the last time before he committed suicide in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery, escaping by this act the justice of his earthly judges. A death which was announced to the world as death in action."
There seems to be some confusion as to dates. According to Irving and Evans, Horthy arrived and met with Hitler on March 16 and met again on the 17th. Horthy maintains he left Budapest on the 17th and arrived at Klessheim on the 18th. John Toland, "Adolph Hitler" Doubleday, 1976 (Vol II) at 887 says the meeting took place on the 17th (and cites Horthy's memoirs as his source!) but implies that there was only one meeting. Ian Kershaw, "Hitler: 1936-1945 Nemesis", W.W. Norton & Co. 2000, at 626-628, states that Horthy arrived on the morning of the 18th and left by train that evening, citing as his source both Paul Schmidt and a deposition or affidavit ("Aussage") of March 4, 1948 by Horthy concerning his meeting with Hitler in Klessheim (apparently introduced in evidence in the Eichman trial). Hmmmm! I need to ponder this and perhaps round up some other sources.
Regards and thanks again, Kaschner
-
- In memoriam
- Posts: 1588
- Joined: 13 Mar 2002, 02:17
- Location: Houston, Texas
Hello all! Well, it seems that I am the one confused. There were two meetings between Hitler and Horthy at Schloss Klessheim. One in April of 1943 and one in March of 1944. So please disregard my earlier post as I garb myself in sackcloth and heap enormous quantities of ashes upon my ancient head! More to come.
Regards, Kaschner
Regards, Kaschner
I have the 1977 edition.No dates or timings are referenced---Evans is right on this regard.Evans criticises Irving for treating the talks as a single conversation, obscuring the fact that they occurred over two days, and thus distorting the development of ideas to a certain extent. In my opinion, of all the examples found by Evans of alleged "sharp practice" by Irving, this was the worst, the one in which Irving's treatment of the subject most failed to meet proper historiographical standards.
-
- Forum Staff
- Posts: 23724
- Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
- Location: USA
From page 509,1977 Edition.
More to come,a lot to type.Hitler gave the Hungarian regent,Horthy,a far rougher ride a few days later when the admiral flatly denied that the Forschungsamt records could be true;he supported Prime Minister Kallay to the hilt and thrice denied that Hungary was in contact with the enemy.Hitler with good reason trusted neither Horthy nor Kallay."We are all in the same boat,"he said."If anybody goes overboard now,he drowns."
Nor was the language Hitler and Ribbentropp used to prod the Hungarian regent into taking a sterner line over his Jewish citizens very delicate.The Nazis found it intolerable that eight hundred thousand Jews should still be moving freely around a country in the heart of Europe--particularly just north of the sensitive Balkans.For many months Germany had applied pressure for the Hungarian Jews to be turned over to the appropriate German agencies for deportation to "reservations in the east."It was agreed that so long as they remained,they were potential rumormongers,purveyors of deafism,saboteurs,agents of the enemy secret service,and contact men for an "international Jewry' now embattled against Germany.
Continued:
One paragraph to follow.Events in Poland were pointed to as providing an ugly precedent;there were reports of Jews roaming the country,comitting acts of murder and sabotage.The eviction of the Jews ordered by Hitler had recently been intensified by Himmler's order that even those Jews left working for armaments concerns in the Generalgouvernement were to be housed collectively in camps and eventually to be rid of as well.In Warsaw,the fifty thousand Jews surviving in the ghetto were on the point of staging an armed uprising--with weapons and ammunition evidently sold to them by Hitler's fleeing allies as they passed westward through the city.Himmler ordered the ghetto destroyed and its ruins combed out for Jews."This is just the kind of incident that shows how dangerous these Jews are.'
-
- Member
- Posts: 9000
- Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 13:42
- Location: Sydney, Australia
Poland should have been an object lesson to Horthy,Hitler argued.He related how Jews who refused to work there were shot;those who could not work just wasted away.Jews must be treated like tuberculosis bacilli,he said,using his favorite analogy.Was that so cruel when one considered that even innocent creatures like hares and deer had to be put down to prevent their doing damage?Why preserve a bestial species whose ambition was to inflict bolshevism on us all?Horthy apologetically noted that he had done all he decently could against the Jews:"But they can hardly be murdered or otherwise eliminated,"he protested.Hitler reassured him:"There is no need for that."But just as in Slovakia,they ought to be isolated in remote camps where they could no longer infect the healthy body of the public;or they could be put to work in the mines,for example.He himself did not mind being temporarily excoriated for his Jewish poilicies,if they brought tranquility.Horthy left unconvinced.
-
- Forum Staff
- Posts: 23724
- Joined: 20 Jul 2002, 20:52
- Location: USA
-
- Member
- Posts: 9000
- Joined: 11 Mar 2002, 13:42
- Location: Sydney, Australia
Moulded,
Thanks for posting the text of this incident as it appeared in the 1977 edition of "Hitler's War".
It is apparent that Irving has considerably revised his account of the Klessheim meeting in his 2001 edition, taking account of the criticisms levelled by Evans. That is of course what a competent an honest historian should do when his original account has been shown to be in error.
It also demonstrates that statements to the effect that nothing that Irving wrote can be trusted, are extreme and false. An account that has been revised to remove demonstrated inaccuracies is surely as trustworthy as the average historical writing.
Thanks for posting the text of this incident as it appeared in the 1977 edition of "Hitler's War".
It is apparent that Irving has considerably revised his account of the Klessheim meeting in his 2001 edition, taking account of the criticisms levelled by Evans. That is of course what a competent an honest historian should do when his original account has been shown to be in error.
It also demonstrates that statements to the effect that nothing that Irving wrote can be trusted, are extreme and false. An account that has been revised to remove demonstrated inaccuracies is surely as trustworthy as the average historical writing.