Well, the problem with that argument is that it's basically a lie.witness wrote:My understanding of strategic bombing is when the main objective are not civilians but the varios industries purveying to the armament and munitions productions not civilians. And as such strategic bombing can not be considered as crime even if it can inflict some civilian casualties.
In other words, if you read the newspapers of 1945, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima was only because it was a "military target." There were lots of military targets there. The civilians were just collateral-damage.
Now, let's take the German Navy's Zeppelin raids on London in 1915. They were nominally directed against British troop barracks. These were missed and civilians were killed, so from the German military's point-of-view the attacks were a complete failure, little more than harassment raids. From another point of view it led to mass-hysteria and left a deep impression in England.
Technically, both sides tried some strategic bombing in WWI using Gotha and Handley-Page bombers in 1917-18. The Gotha IV could carry a thousand ton bombload over a long range and the German Luftstreitkräfte amased over forty machines to attack London. The Germans hoped that this plus the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare would end the war. On June 13, 1917 a force of eighteen bombers killed 162 civilians and wounded 432. There was no effective air-defense and no machines were shot-down. Again, the military damage was not impressive to the Germans but there was massive psychological panic and it became a Cabinet-level crisis. The RAF was created in 1918 and German cities were attacked.
The German attacks ended in early 1918 as British defenses improved and the Gothas were forced to night attacks. By then the Germans had been using Riesen (Giant) four-engined bombers that could carry a one-ton bombload. The total British casualties from German attacks from May, 1917 to May, 1918 was 836 dead and 1,982 wounded, with a German loss of 62 bombers in 27 raids. Only 19 were lost from enemy aircraft and ground-fire, the rest from operational accidents.
When the German offensive on London was called off it was resumed on Paris on several occasions, but with no panic or drop in morale, unlike the previous London attacks. The Parisians lost 303 civilians killed and 539 wounded before the Germans called it off.
The Germans dropped strategic-bombing and used the big bombers for strategic-interdiction, attacks on enemy airfields, depots and rail-yards supporting the battlefield. There was heavy air-support for Ludendorff's Spring, 1918 offensives. The Germans used the world's first all-metal aircraft for close air-support, the Junkers J1, with a 150 pound bombload. The use of the Luftstreitkräfte in surprise attacks supporting ground-troops became part of German aerial doctrine as "deep artillery" to attack hardpoints and staging areas. The Luftstreitkräfte amassed 3,668 frontline aircraft, including 35 fighter squadrons, 22 ground-attack squadrons, and 49 observation detachments, supporting three ground-armies attacking the British front. The offensive initially gained air-superiority but then became a war-of-attrition that the Germans couldn't hope to win.
In the last months of the war the Germans were on the defensive and outnumbered two or three to one, which the Luftstreitkräfte met proportionately with kills to the same 3:1 ratio to the very end, and especially against inexperienced American units. Of the 3,600 aircraft available in March, by the end of the war the Germans still had 4,500 aircrew and 2,709 serviceable machines on the Western Front, against 7,200 Allied aircraft remaining despite heavy losses.
The British strategic bombing offensive under the command of Air Marshal Hugh "Boom" Trenchard consisted of several heavy bomber wings and targeted the German Ruhr cities. The Allies made 353 raids on Germany and dropped 7,717 bombs, killing 797 and wounding another 380. The total cost in damages was about 15.5 million RM (about $3.6 million). RAF losses cost were far more than German damage, about one aircrew for one or two civilians killed.
For the Germans the raids were seen as little more than a nuisance and could be substantially reduced simply by taking precautions like seeking shelter. The Luftstreitkräfte developed extension air-defense doctrines including searchlights and Flak. In 1918 the German Flak-forces totalled 2,558 cannon from 37mm to 105mm; it shot down of 132 Allied planes in September and 129 in October.
The Germans learned different lessons from the air-campaign and air-defense than their British counterparts. For the RAF, strategic-bombing was thought to be much more effective than going over-the-top in the trenches largely because Germany ultimately lost the war.
Hope that helps.
Source: James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1919-1940. Univ. Press of Kansas (1997); pp. 34-43. ISBN: 0700608362.
German 88mm Heavy Flak gun in 1918.