Unfortunately for our true believer, he cannot provide any evidence that Rauff’s captors just "let him walk away".
Neither can he provide any evidence to substantiate his conviction (or shall we say his Faith?) that "for example is an Allied forgery based on making minor alterations ... (blah, blah, blah)". His fellow true believer Ingrid Weckert has tried but failed miserably.
As to Smith’s "I would really like to cross-examine the guy" (the crap he always comes up with when he can offer no indications that the depositions of a certain witness, corroborated by other evidence, are inaccurate), I once took the trouble of translating the whole of Rauff’s deposition before the Germany in Santiago de Chile in 1972. Rauff made these statements at a time when he was safe from criminal prosecution, for there was no way the Chilean government would extradite him to face trial for his crimes in Germany. But perhaps Smith can nevertheless give us a plausible, evidence-backed explanation why he should have lied (as his "I would really like to cross-examine the guy" – baloney implies) when, e.g., he confirmed the existence of Becker’s letter that "Revisionist" true believers would so badly like to be an "Allied forgery".
[From: ZSL, II 415 AR-Z 1310/63-E32, Bl.534-549,
StA Hamburg Az. 147 Js 31/67.
Copy kindly made available by ZSL.
(Blackening due to data confidentiality reasons were rendered with XXXXXXXXX)]
[Reference 45 from:
Sonderdruck: M.Beer, _Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden_,
Miszelle, VfZ 37(3), pp.403-417 (1987)]
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Embassy
Of the
Federal Republic of Germany
Santiago Santiago, 28 June 1972
RK Sk 1600
Interrogation Protocol
------------------------
Present LR I Dr. XXXXXXXXX, authorized to carry out all consular
tasks, XXXXXXXXXX as protocol writer
in the preliminary judicial investigation against
Bruno Streckenbach
Suspect of murder (NSG)
There appeared
at the request of the Hamburg County Court, examining magistrate 4
- Az.: (54) 3/70 - of 1 March 1972
1.) County Court Counselor XXXXX, examining magistrate 4 at the
Hamburg County Court
2.) Public Prosecutor XXXXXXXXX, public prosecution at the Hamburg County Court
3.) Attorney at Law Dr. XXXXXXXXX, as defender of the suspect
4.) the witness Walter Rauff.
The witness was admonished to tell the truth, informed of the consequences of an untrue deposition and interrogated as follows:
1. Personal Data:
My name is Walther Rauff, 66 years old, living in
XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXXXX, widower, industrialist,
German national. No relative or in-law of the suspect.
Informed about his right to refuse a deposition according to paragraph 55 StPO [German law of criminal procedure],
he is willing to make a deposition.
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2. On the Subject Matter:
Between 1924 and the end of 1937 I was at the Reich Navy. I left the Navy at my own request and was discharged with all honors. “With all honors” means that I had the right to wear a uniform and was entitled to a pension.
I now searched for a new employment corresponding to my training. During my time at the Reich Navy, I had me SA-Obergruppenführer von Jagow, who had been a reserve officer with me. He called me one day and told me that he had talked about a job for me with Heydrich. I was to present myself at the office of the Geheime Staatspolizei to Dr. Best. At this presentation Dr. Best told me that I was supposed to begin my work at the SD main office on 7.1.1938. It was foreseen that during six months I should go through all departments of the security police, the SD and the crime police on an information basis. I began my rounds with Schellenberg at the SD main office. After a few weeks, however, the original plan was dropped. I was now put in charge of the personal and material mobilization preparations for the SD and the security police. This means that I was to check which members of the SD and the security police would in case of mobilization have to stay at their posts under all circumstances.
In this area I remained until the merger of SD and security police to constitute the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. As far as I remember, that must have occurred at about the time of the beginning of the war with Poland.
During the Polish campaign I was in Berlin. During the Norwegian campaign I was in Oslo to organize the news communications with Germany from there. Heydrich had told me that thereafter I could for some time go back to the navy. From the beginning of 1940 onward I thus was with the navy for at least a year, clearing mines in the Channel. In the first months of 1941 I was called back to Berlin. As they told me, Heydrich himself had requested me from Raeder.
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I now became head of division II D at the RSHA. In this division all technical matters were regulated. The division II D (technology) consisted of 6 or 7 sections. I was head of division until several months after the death of Heydrich. Thereafter I was sent to an assignment in Africa with Rommel.
When Heydrich went to Prague as a Protector I accompanied him there to organize the local news network. During this time I often traveled between Berlin and Prague. When the attempt occurred I was in Berlin and about to leave for Rome. When Heydrich’s aides told me that his life was not in danger I traveled to Rome. As far as I remember I stayed at the RSHA another 3 – 4 months after Heydrich’s death. I think Kaltenbrunner had already been nominated Heydrich’s successor when I went to Africa. If I’m now being told that Kaltenbrunner took charge only at the beginning of 1943 and that Heydrich died on 4 June 1942, however, I would like to say that I had already gone to Africa at the time Kaltenbrunner took charge.
If I’m asked for the head of department II, I remember a small public servant whose name I don ‘t recall at the Moment. If the name Dr. Siegert is mentioned, I can only say that I was referring to him. The first dead of department II, however, was Dr. Best. At any rate I remember that Dr. Best had been head of department II since the constitution of the RSHA, although I can no longer say today when it was that he left the RSHA.
The head of department I (personnel) since the merger of security police and SD to the RSHA was Streckenbach, as far as I remember. If I am asked whether after the constitution of the RSHA the former department I was split into the new departments I and II, I have no memory of such a process.
If further confronted with the name Dr. Nockemann, I can say that he also was, as far as I remember, head of department II.
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About Dr. Nockemann I remember that he had a car accident at which his wife and his driver lost their lives. Dr.Nockemann then left the department II and was later killed in action in Russia. I cannot say, however, when the accident was and when he left the department II. I would now say that Dr. Siegert was Dr. Nockemann’s successor, but I cannot state this with certainty.
How long Streckenbach was head of department I, I don’t know either. I cannot even say if he ever left the RSHA. Neither can I say with certainty if he was still head of department when I left the RSHA and went to Africa. A successor of Streckenbach I do not know. Even if confronted with the names Schulz and Ehrlinger I cannot remember them as successors of Streckenbach, although I well know Ehrlinger as a person.
I would still like to clarify that I was with Rommel only for a short time and already returned to Berlin before the battle of El Alamein. My stay in Berlin, however, was also a short one and thereafter I went to Tunis with my people. Already since I first left for Africa I had no longer taken any care of procedures in Berlin, especially at the RSHA.
I know that the relationship between Best and Heydrich was a very tense one. I know that Best wanted to leave the RSHA because he didn’t get along with Heydrich.
If asked for the relationship between Heydrich and Streckenbach, I think that Streckenbach was very reserved towards Heydrich and by no means approved to all of Heydrich’s measures. As far as I can judge, however, the relation between Best and Heydrich was tenser than the one between Streckenbach and Heydrich. I would like to add, however, that I had much more to do with Best than with Streckenbach. In response to the corresponding question I would further like to stress that I got to know nothing from Heydrich about his relation to Best and Streckenbach.
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This because, although Heydrich had also been a member of the navy, I had no personal contact with him. My first personal encounter with occurred only after I had been at the SD main office for more than on year.
Gradually I became aware that there were many intrigues inside the RSHA. I don’t know what professions Streckenbach had had before, in my opinion he made his way straightly and correctly at the RSHA, which was bound to shock a man like Heydrich. As the main source of my experience in this respect I can name Dr. Plötz, who was a good friend of mine. I also learned something through Kluckhon. I cannot say to what areas the measures of Heydrich to which Streckenbach did not approve referred, but I can state with certainty that there were differences between him and Heydrich.
About the relationship between Streckenbach and Himmler I know nothing.
I don’t know if Streckenbach was in any way involved in the administration of department II, but I don’t think he was. As far as I can remember Dr. Siegert was full head of department and not just in charge of heading department II on behalf of someone else.
Also after having been shown Heydrich’s letter of 20.6.1941 (sheet 6802) I can only say that I cannot remember ever having seen this letter. Even after having taken knowledge of the contents of this letter I cannot remember that Dr. Siegert should have headed department II only in someone else’s representation.
Of the Russian campaign I was informed officially only on the night before the commencement of this campaign. On that evening I learned from Heydrich at the RSHA or at some other place I don’t remember that the campaign against Russia was to begin the next morning. Up to this communication I had
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no concrete indications whatsoever that a campaign against Russia was imminent and when such a campaign would begin.
I can neither remember today that for this Russian campaign special detachments [Einsatzgruppen]and units should have been constituted in Pretzsch,Dübe and Bad Schmiedeberg. Only the place Bad Schmiedeberg is in some way in my memory today in connection with the formation of special detachments, because I was responsible for their equipment I would not have known, however, where the coming assignment would take place. In this context I would like to point out that the special detachments were not equipped with winter clothing as would have been necessary for an assignment in Russia.
For the provision of the motor vehicles of the security police my subordinate Pradel was responsible. Pradel, who had come from the order police, didn’t like me and was in a certain conflict with me. As to whether I had differences with him regarding the provision of motor vehicles for an upcoming assignment after my return from the navy, I consider that possible, but cannot remember it exactly. I can neither remember having had a meeting with Streckenbach in this respect.
I have been shown the respective statements of Pradel in his interrogation on 30.3 1971 (Sheet 6965 f, 6969). I can only say the following about this: The major Puschke that Pradel mentions is not known to me; I always dealt on a higher level, i.e. with General Fellgiebel in matters of communication material. In matters of motor vehicles I dealt at a similar level with the OKW, without however being still able to provide a name. It is not correct that, as Pradel states, I only returned to the department from the navy after the commencement of the Russian campaign. I neither remember to have spoken about the motor vehicles with Streckenbach. I cannot say whether in preparation of the coming assignment Streckenbach
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beyond mere matters of personnel, but I don’t think he was either. At any rate I don’t remember that he in any way became active on the area of the material equipment, for which the competence resided with department II. I can neither remember to have taken part in a meeting headed by Streckenbach in which issues of the coming assignment were discussed.
When asked how the representation of Heydrich was regulated, I remember that at the beginning Heydrich was represented by Dr. Best. I cannot say, however, if this regulation was kept until Dr. Best lets the RSHA. In this context I would like to point out that Heydrich was an extremely suspicious man who don’t liked it if another sat on his chair and ruled on his behalf.
How the issue of Heydrich’s representation was regulated when I returned to the RSHA at the beginning of 1941 I don’t know. I can only assume that someone represented him in his absence, without however being able to say who that could have been. Also for the time of his activity in Prague and for the time after his death I don’t know what the representation regulation was. I can only assume that during this time the heads of department were directly subordinated to Himmler. Furthermore a man like for instance Müller would never have subordinated himself to Strechenbach or another head of department at the same level.
As far as I know there very several candidates for the succession of Heydrich, but I am not able to give names in this respect. Whether Streckenbach was being considered as a successor I don’t know, but I consider it possible as he had a good name at the security police and the SD, this not for having played the wild man but for his being calm and objective. The fact of Kaltenbrunner having then become Heydrich’s successor surprised at least me.
I neither now anything about whether there was a regulation regarding the representation of one head of department by another. I would personally say that in case of impediment affecting one head of department the respective
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head of division became active under his own responsibility or turned directly to the head of the main office.
Of the measures against the Jews in Russia I knew right from the start. I never got to know officially, however, on what order the killing of the Jews was based. While I got to know after the war that there was a so called Führer order, the content of which was the liquidation of the Jews for racial reasons, I cannot remember that during the war it had ever been said that there was such an order. Of the existence of such an order I should have been informed for my activity in Tunis, because there were many Jews there who even worked for us voluntarily without anything happening to them.
Already during the Polish campaign I had heard of liquidation measures against the Jews, without being still able today to say whether I got to know that officially in the course of meetings or from any conversations.
I have been shown the protocols of the meetings of the heads of department in the autumn of 1949. Although I am mentioned as a participant in most of these meetings and although the initial under the protocols is without doubt my own, I have no memory at this time of having taken part in these meetings. Herewith I by no means intend to question the accuracy of these protocols. If I think about this issue, I consider it possible that in my above mentioned capacity as mobilization organizer I took part in these meetings and, being the youngest of those present, was put in charge of writing the protocol.
Upon questions by the public prosecutor.
----------------------------------------
It was not part of my tasks as mobilization organizer to take care of the setting up of the special unit [Einsatzkommandos]. That was not even being discussed at the time.
The occupation of the CSR was a sort of acid test for my activity as mobilization organizer, because at that time it turned out that a part of the men who went on assignment should have remained behind. That’s why a new listing of those men who under any circumstances
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had to stay on their post was made.
Due to the experiences in the CSR the setting up of Einsatzgruppen was organized prior to the Polish campaign. I was involved in this in regard to the technical equipment of these detachments. The instructions for this I received on the one hand from Oberführer Albert, the head of department I of the SD main office, and from Dr. Best on the other.
Regarding the equipment of the Einsatzgruppen in the Russian campaign I must have received my instructions from the then in charge head of department, without being able to say if at the time it was Dr. Nockemann or Dr. Siegert. I thing that I returned from the navy in March or April of 1941. Whether the preparations for the Russian campaign in regard to the equipment of the Einsatzgruppen had already commenced at this time I don’t know.
I know nothing of an organization order for the Einsatzgruppen in the Russian campaign that was signed by all participants.
The fuel required by the Einsatzgruppen was provided by the Wehrmacht. That had been agreed upon at the highest level. The required ammunition was supplied directly to us by the Wehrmacht pursuant to negotiations with the Wehrmacht, and we then sent it to the Einsatzgruppen. There was thus no direct delivery of ammunition by the Wehrmacht to the Einsatzgruppen, as far as I know. The mentioned negotiations were even conducted by Heydrich himself whenever I was not getting any further. I personally can thus not imagine that Streckenbach should have told something about “Barbarossa” to a subordinate like Pradel for negotiations with the Wehrmacht. The required drivers were taken from the existing ranks of drivers or from slightly wounded who returned from the front and were still operational. I don’t know anything about the NSKK [Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrerkorps, National Socialist Truck Drivers’ Association] having been turned to. I consider it doubtful that Streckenbach should have told Pradel to get in touch with the NSKK in this respect.
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It may be that I talked with Streckenbach about personnel matters in regard to the Einsatzgruppen, but I have no concrete recollection of such a meeting. I actually know of no single positive case in which I went to Streckenbach in service matters. I last saw Streckenbach in 1960 or 1962 when I was in Germany. I was sitting in a café in Munich back then and casually saw Streckenbach passing by. We talked then, but not about common matters of service.
I cannot remember Streckenbach having been leader of an Einsatzgruppe during the Polish campaign and later head of the security police in Cracow.
Of the liquidation measures in Poland I must have got to know through meetings of the heads of department. A memory of my own in regard to these matters I no longer have today. I know that in one of these protocols liquidation measures towards the Polish intelligentsia were mentioned. Whether the liquidation of Jews was mentioned in other protocols I don’t know. I neither recall if at the lime there was a separation between a “short term goal” and a “final goal”. Whether I concluded from the meetings of the heads of department already at that time that the Jews were to be generally annihilated or whether that was even expressly mentioned at the meetings of the heads of department I no longer know. I would say, however, that such would have been recorded in the protocols if it had been expressly discussed.
If in the protocol about the meeting on 21.9. 1939 it is said that Jewry was to be concentrated in the cities in ghettoes to make possible a better control and their being pushed away at a later stage, I cannot say today what was meant by pushing away at that time (sheet 1713). As becomes apparent from the protocols of the heads of department there is no mention yet of a final solution therein, which means that I must revise my deposition insofar as I stated above that I knew of the general liquidations already in September 1939.
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If in the protocol about the meeting of 27.9. 1939 it is further stated (sheet 1714) that shootings were now only to be carried out in case of self defense and escape attempt while all order procedures must be handed over to military tribunals to give them so much work that they could no longer cope with it, I cannot say with certainty what is behind that. I presume that at the time the Wehrmacht had complained about some shootings, because the Wehrmacht was the highest judge in the front line area and didn’t like anyone else to carry out shootings or other judicial measures in their area. If it is further stated in the mentioned protocol that of the political leadership only 3 % were still left (sheet 1713), I cannot say what happened to the remaining 97 %. Probably a great part of them fled to the East. At any rate I consider it impossible that the 97 % were shot beforehand, because for that there were to many partisans afterwards who were led by members of the intelligentsia.
If in the protocol of 16.10.1939 (sheet 1723) it is further stated that C addressed the liquidation of leading Poles and mentioned lists to be presented by the leaders of the Einsatzgruppen, I no longer have any memory thereof today.
The old problem of SD-police and Wehrmacht mentioned in the remark of 5.10. 1939 (sheet 1720 ) was the one that the Wehrmacht hat absolute priority in the front line area but the security police and SD carried out tasks that were up to the Wehrmacht to carry out but could not be carried out by it. Thus there were always quarrels. It may be, but it is not necessarily so, that such differences also related to shootings. How this problem came up again, however, after Heydrich had declared at the meeting of 19.9 1939 (sheet 1705) that his meeting with Colonel Wagner could be called a very favorable result in the co-operation with the Wehrmacht, I don’t know.
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Whether I asked to take part in the meetings of the heads of department I don’t know. It is possible that I should have done that in regard to the equipment problems.
The file notes were meant for our own files, not for Heydrich.
All these assessments of the protocols don’t bring me any memory of my own about the occurrences at the time, although I have thought about them several times after such a protocol was first sent to me.
Regarding the annihilation of Jews in Russia I know that gas vans were used for this purpose. I cannot say, however, from when on and to what extent this happened. I used to think that the thing with the gas vans started at the time when I was at the navy. Today I have doubts about this and consider it possible that this matter only got going after I had returned from the navy. At any rate I now that at some time after my return I saw two of these gas vans standing in the yard, which Pradel showed to me. Somehow I then also learned that the gas vans were used for the execution of sentences and for the killing of Jews.
I consider it impossible that Pradel should have carried out the development of the gas vans on his own initiative. He must have received an order for this either from me or from another superior standing above me.
Whether at that time I had doubts against the use of gas vans I cannot say. The main issue for me at the time was that the shootings were a considerable burden for the man who were in charge thereof and that this burden was taken off them through the use of the gas vans.
I don’t think that Dr. Siegert was involved in these matters at the time, although he probably knew about them.
It is correct that I received something from Becker about the used of gas vans. I myself had told Becker to send me a corresponding report.
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I cannot explain why in the letter from section II A 2 of 19.11.1942 (sheet 3698 and following) shown to me Dr. Siegert is mentioned as "head of department in representation" and why this letter is also signed by Streckenbach “in representation”.
I can remember no process from department II that I submitted to Streckenbach.
It is not correct that I belonged to the same training course as Heydrich at the navy. He had entered the navy in 1922, whereas I came in only in 1924. He was a radioman, I was a mine seeker, and he was on shore while I was on board. Due to all these reasons there was no personal contact between us during my time at the navy. For this reason I did not turn to Heydrich when I left the navy, my connection was the already mentioned von Jagow. Later however there were closer personal contacts at a familiar level, without that having had any consequences in terms of service let alone brought me advantages.
Heydrich was an insanely ambitious man, a fox who was extremely suspicious and tolerated no one next to let alone above him. He was also a person who could not lose. Not even in a game. Accordingly the relation between him and all other persons at a very high level, such as for example Streckenbach, was very difficult due to Heydrich’s personality. I can thus repeat my statement mentioned above that an honest and straight person like Streckenbach had a shocking effect on Heydrich.
I cannot positively remember having witnessed Streckenbach and Heydrich together, but it is probable that I did. At least I would heard one of them talk about the other and heard about their relation from Heydrich’s adjutants. From all this I can draw the conclusion that the relation among them was very reserved.
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A concrete example for differences between Heydrich and Streckenbach I cannot name.
Dr.Plötz got along well with everyone, including Streckenbach. Whether he was a friend of Streckenbach’s I don’t know. Dr. Plötz was everything other than a soldier, how he got his job as an adjutant I do not know. Like everyone else he Dr. Plötz was also to carry out an assignment with the fighting troops at Heydrich’s wish. It is correct, however, that Plötz got to the front only after Heydrich’s death. The front line assignment desired by Heydrich, at least for the leaders, was to take place at the Waffen SS or the Wehrmacht. I know nothing about Heydrich having opposed a transfer to there. He however reserved himself the right to decide himself on the time when that was to happen. Assignments with the security police in the occupied territories he did not consider as front line duty.
Upon questions by the defender
------------------------------
Do you assume that the contents of the meetings of heads of department and of Einsatzgruppen leaders and respective protocols, especially the protocol of 27.9. 1939 (sheet 1710 and following) was communicated to other persons than those mentioned in the file note?
I am of the opinion that the contents of the protocols were not even communicated to the persons listed at the beginning of the protocol, because these protocols carry no distribution plan. I think that these protocols were made mainly as memory helpers for myself.
When confronted with the statement in the protocol of 27.9.1939 that deportations of Jews into the foreign language Au and pushing them over the demarcation line had been authorized by the Führer, I say that this meant the pushing away of the Jews from the German territories as far as possible to the east. If in this context a killing of the Jews had also been mentioned, I would certainly have taken that into the protocol.
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If in this protocol it is further mentioned that shootings are from now on to be carried out in case of self-defense or escape attempts while all other procedures are to be handed over to military tribunals, this means that all previous shootings had bee based on procedures, i.e. judicial procedures or judicial verdicts, insofar as they were not related to cases of flight or self-defense.
If in this protocol it is further mentioned that of the political leadership in the occupied territories a maximum of 3 % were still lift, then this number was certainly mentioned at the time. I don’t consider it to be correct, however, and think that a much higher percentage was still left. I also consider the numbers mentioned by Becker in his report to have been highly exaggerated in order to make an impression.
When confronted with the following characterization of Heydrich: “Vindictive person, exceptionally fast on the uptake, always exactly informed. Arguing with him was useless – he stuck to decisions that were often against any reason – during such arguments he made tough and unjust statements to the point of being insulting, leaving no room for opposition”, I would as a complement to what I above said about Heydrich myself underwrite this statement word by word as being accurate.
Upon question by the public prosecutor:
I myself never tried to fight through an argument with Heydrich because that was useless. If not even a man like Dr. Best could measure up to him, how am I supposed to have done that. I never experienced a confrontation between Dr. Best and Heydrich myself, however, and I cannot give another concrete example either of Heydrich having been inaccessible to other points of view and having stuck to a position once taken even against better knowledge. I can only say on the basis of my personal contact with him that the stated characterization is accurate, and I can for example point out that in Prague during visits of the state president he declared that he would only approach him
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to a certain extent and stuck to this position even after a young man from the diplomatic service who was in charge of the protocol had told him that he should approach him further. In this context I would like to repeat that Heydrich could not bear to lose in a game and that therefore my comrades and I in Prague had agreed to let him win at “Doppelkopf” [a card game].
On the other hand it is certainly correct that Heydrich could be a very charming and attentive host.
Schellenberg was a man just as pathetically ambitious as Heydrich.
Approved after dictation and signed.
Walter Rauff [signature]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walter Rauff
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Dr. KXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Protocol writer Counsel 1st Class
[Seal: Embassy
of the Federal Republic
of Germany
Santiago]
The above translation, together with a link to the site featuring the original German text and some background information, can be found on the thread
of this forum. My translation of Dr. Becker's letter to Rauff of 16 May 1942 was also transcribed on this thread.
