Generalplan Ost

[viriato]

Roberto quoted:

Into the Russian cities we shall not go. They must die away completely.[my emphasis] We need to have no remorse in this respect […] we have no obligations whatsoever towards these people.

And yet the Generlaplan Ost presented by the "chicken's farm (witness words) iluminate" did plan the new roads to cross in the Russian cities, especially Moscow, they should not go. Just another inconsistency of the great plans of one of the most famous "developers" in the "Third Reich"...

[witness]

witness wrote:

Maybe those with some Slavic roots would be declared "less Aryans " among the perfect "Aryans ' and therefore not that precious ..

Maybe they would make any German with Slav roots second-class citizens. How many they were? A quarter, a third, half the total of Germans? Probably they wouldn't even have found one German without a Slav ascendency?

I have no clue and.. honestly I don't care. The whole Nazi doctrine doesn't make sense to me at all so why would I try to find some logic where there is none by definition ?
However the insect like gradation of people in this ''doctrine'' played quite a predominant role so if we know about the Nazis racial intentions now ( when they were just in the making ..) what would have happened had they won..?
Is not it logical to assume that the racial policies would progress even further ? And yes the racial gradation within the very German society
would have been quite probable.After all were not the Nazis pretty keen on
tracing Jewish ansectry in some of their leaders so that to avoid "contamination" ?

But then according to you Czechs seem not to be Slavs after all. And Bulgarians, Croats, Slovaks

I wonder -Are you familiar at all with the Nazi attitude to Slavs ?
So what ? Nazis didn't have plans to annihilate all Slavs per ser as Jews but rather to enslave portion of them (those who would not ''die out " or be deported )to make them their pudels . the fate of Czechs,Bulgarians .Croats, Slovaks were exactly this - being second class citezens of Europe serving the German interests.
However it would be even worse for the main body of Slavic people -Ukranians,Russians, Poles Belorussians (see above )

Not an oversimplication on your part of course

You are soo complicated I see..
But your very complicated mind seems not being able to process the obvious facts ..

We're speaking after all of a "great charachter". He would "develop" the conquered territories killing the maximum number of peolple and then dumping the rest on Siberia. How?

Again you are looking for logic where there is none.
Even to start the war with the USSR was not the most wise decision to begin with.
One can ask how can you fight the war on two fronts with the enemy grossly outnumbering and outproducinng you ? How can you conquer such vast territories while using the most ruthless methods of repression such as murdering civilians everywhere so that to inflame people's anger..To fight the war which was doomed to be lost..?
How can you make people greet you as liberators while declaring them "inferior "?
Any logic ?

[Roberto]

Roberto quoted:

Into the Russian cities we shall not go. They must die away completely.[my emphasis] We need to have no remorse in this respect […] we have no obligations whatsoever towards these people.

And yet the Generlaplan Ost presented by the "chicken's farm (witness words) iluminate" did plan the new roads to cross in the Russian cities, especially Moscow, they should not go. Just another inconsistency of the great plans of one of the most famous "developers" in the "Third Reich"...

[…]
The conquest of the Eastern territories was a gigantic colonial war, not a war to emancipate the peoples of Eurasia. Hitler saw the German future in the East in terms of colonial exploitation. A German governing class would rule the region, supported by a network of garrison cities – rather like the fortified towns of the Roman empire – around which would cluster settlements of German farmers and traders. Plans were drawn up for a web of high-speed motorways to link the regional centres with Berlin and a wide-gauge double-checked railway, around which would sweep the new imperial élite through land tilled by modern helots, millions of Slavs laboring for the master race. Any of the new colonial peoples surplus to the requirements of the empire were to be transported to Slavlands beyond the Urals or left to die.[…]

Modern highways serving the new masters while the slaves till the land or rot in their miserable cities - really an inconsistency?

It would be interesting to see the respective passages of the Generalplan Ost.

[michael mills]

Roberto wrote:

It would be interesting to see the respective passages of the Generalplan Ost.

The Generalplan-Ost has never been found. It is known only from Wetzel's detailed commentary on it, made in 1942.

[michael mills]

Roberto wrote:

Erhard Wetzel, the Race Referent (Rassereferent) for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete - RMO) between 1941 and 1944, was the author of a commentary on the Generalplan Ost, in which he spoke of the "resettlement" of 46-51 million eastern Europeans.

Roberto, have you actually read that commentary by Wetzel? Yes or no? Or are you just drawing on what someone else said about Wetzel's commentary.

I have actually read Wetzel's commentary. In it, he criticised the RSHA plan to transfer 35 million "ungermanisables" to Siberia over a period of 20 years. He found that the RSHA's calculations were faulty, since they had not taken population growth into account, and hence the number to be transferred would be much higher, between 46 and 51 million. He clearly thought that to be impracticable.

It is also interesting that he thought there would be an increase in the native population in the 20-year period during which the resettlement was to take place. Clearly he did not think there would be a massive dying off due to starvation, which casts doubt on the reality of the alleged "Hunger Plan". Czeslaw Madajczyk, the editor of Wetzel's commentary, was also puzzled by the lack of reference to the putative "Hunger Plan", but he shrank from drawing the obvious conclusion, that there was no such plan.

[Roberto]

Roberto wrote:

Erhard Wetzel, the Race Referent (Rassereferent) for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete - RMO) between 1941 and 1944, was the author of a commentary on the Generalplan Ost, in which he spoke of the "resettlement" of 46-51 million eastern Europeans.

Roberto, have you actually read that commentary by Wetzel? Yes or no? Or are you just drawing on what someone else said about Wetzel's commentary.

"Someone else" being German historian Christian Gerlach, I suggest that Mills cut out the crap and, if he prides himself on having read Wetzel’s commentary, let our readers have a transcription/translation thereof so they can judge for themselves.

I have actually read Wetzel's commentary. In it, he criticised the RSHA plan to transfer 35 million "ungermanisables" to Siberia over a period of 20 years. He found that the RSHA's calculations were faulty, since they had not taken population growth into account, and hence the number to be transferred would be much higher, between 46 and 51 million. He clearly thought that to be impracticable.

OK, I’ll accept that when I have read it in a transcription of Wetzel’s commentary. For what I’ve seen of Mills suggests that he has a tendency for reading what he would like to believe into a given source, whether or not it is supported by the wording and context thereof.

It is also interesting that he thought there would be an increase in the native population in the 20-year period during which the resettlement was to take place. Clearly he did not think there would be a massive dying off due to starvation, which casts doubt on the reality of the alleged "Hunger Plan".

The

alleged "Hunger Plan"

is a well-documented reality, as Mills well knows. Whether and to what extent it was practicable considering the means that the occupiers had at their disposal is another question. Christian Gerlach, as Mills also knows very well, has demonstrated that and why it turned out to be practicable only to a limited extent.

[…]Beide Konzepte, der Hungerplan und die "Territoriallösung Sowjetunion", waren utopisch und praktisch nicht zu verwirklichen. Man konnte weder Millionen Menschen einfach zum Verhungern zwingen, Städte und ganze Gebiete absperren [footnote] zumal mit schwachen Sicherungstruppen, noch war die Durchführung einer Deportation so vieler Millionen jüdischer Menschen in dünnbesiedelte, weit entfernte und verkehrstechnisch schlecht erschlossene Gebiete angesichts der voraussehbaren Transportprobleme in der westlichen Sowjetunion technisch durchführbar. In jedem Fall waren beides Nachkriegspläne. Es waren gewissermaßen noch destruktive Visionen, die erst bei ihrem Scheitern zur Suche nach realisierbaren Vernichtungplänen führten.[…]

[Footnote: Gemeint ist hier der Normalfall im Besatzungsgebiet. Die Aushungerung von Leningrad 1941 bis 1943, der mindestens 600 000 Menschen zum Opfer fielen, was eine Ausnahme; die deutsche Belagerung band wesentliche Teile zweier deutscher Armeen]

My translation:

[…]Both concepts, the Hunger Plan and the "Territorial Solution Soviet Union" were utopian and could not be carried out in practice. It was not possible to simply force millions of people to starve to death, seal off cities and whole regions [footnote], especially with the weak security troops, nor was it technically possible to carry out the deportation of so many millions of Jewish people to the thinly populated, far away areas with few transportation facilities. Both were in any case plans for the postwar period.[my emphasis] They were in a certain sense mere destructive visions, which only after their failure led to the search for extermination plans that could be implemented.[…]

[Footnote: This refers to the normal case in the occupation area. The starvation of Leningrad, from 1941 to 1943, which claimed at least 600 000 victims, was an exception; the German siege tied down most of two German armies]

[…]Dem Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung, unterstand das Kriegsgefangenenwesen im sogenannten OKH-Bereich, zu dem der militärisch verwaltete Teil Weißrußlands gehörte. Diese Stelle trug für das Massensterben der Kriegsgefangenen und ihre grausame Behandlung besondere Verantwortung (vgl. Kap. 8 ). Der Dienstsitz des Heerespolizeichefs im OKH befand sich zeitweise beim Generalquartiermeister, Abteilung Kriegsverwaltung. Die Geheime Feldpolizei ermordete allein in den besetzten sowjetischen Gebieten mehrere zehntausend Menschen, "Gegner” im weitesten Sinne. Auch die Feldgendarmerie dürfte dem GenQu unterstanden haben. Außer auf die Sicherungstruppen hatte er also auch Einfluß auf den Einsatz der Militärpolizeiorgane in den militärisch verwalteten Gebieten.
Besonders gravierend war die politische Initiative des Generalquartiermeisters bei der Hungerpolitik gegenüber der sowjetischen Bevölkerung. Ihr Zusammenhang mit der Versorgung des Heeres "aus dem Lande" wurde schon angesprochen. Die Abteilungen II und IVa/Heeresintendant des GenQu, Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Chefgruppe Landwirtschaft, sowie die entsprechenden regionalen und örtlichen Dienststellen setzten die Hungerrationen für die einheimische Zivilbevölkerung fest. Bei den Kriegsgefangenen hatte der GenQu hierauf noch größeren Einfluß. Wagner war auch an der Planung und Durchführung der frühzeitig entwickelten Hungerstrategie gegenüber der Bevölkerung Leningrads beteiligt. Die Hungerblockade forderte dort schließlich mindestens 600 000 Todesopfer. Da Leningrad aber den Kampf nicht aufgab und starke deutsche Truppen band, arbeitete ein Sachgebietsleiter in der Abteilung Heeresversorgung beim Generalquartiermeister wohl auf Wagners Befehl im November 1941 einen Vorschlag zur totalen Vernichtung aller Menschen in Leningrad mit Giftgasgeschossen aus. Diese seien "wirtschaftlicher im Erfolg (Weltkrieg)". Der Generalquartiermeister beteiligte sich auch an mörderischen Plänen gegen die Einwohner der Stadt Stalingrad und ihrer Durchführung. Er verschärfte dabei einen von Hitler gegebenen Befehl.[…]

My translation:

[…]The General Quarter Master was head of prisoner of war matters in the so-called Army High Command (OKH) area, to which the part of Belorussia under military administration belonged. This authority bore a special responsibility for the mass dying of the prisoners of war and their cruel treatment (see chapter 8 ). The office of the Army Police Chief at the OKH was temporarily located with the General Quarter Master, Department War Administration. The Secret Field Police murdered several tens of thousands of people in the occupied Soviet areas alone, "enemies" in the widest sense. Also the Field Gendarmerie is likely to have been subordinated to the General Quarter Master. Besides the security organs he thus also had an influence on the actions of the organs of military police in the areas under military administration.
The General Quarter Master’s political initiative was especially grievous regarding the hunger policy towards the Soviet population. The connection thereof to the army’s "living off the land" has already been addressed. The sections II and Iva/Army Director of the General Quarter Master, Economy Staff East, Chief Group Agriculture, as well as the corresponding regional and local authorities, established the hunger rations for the local civilian population. Regarding the prisoners of war the General Quarter Master had an even greater influence. Wagner was also involved in the planning and execution of the hunger strategy towards the population of Leningrad, developed at an early stage. The hunger blockade eventually claimed at least 600,000 dead there. As Leningrad didn’t give up the fight and tied down strong German troops, however, an area director in the Department Army Supplies at the General Quarter Master worked out, presumably at Wagner’s order, a suggestion for the total annihilation of all people in Leningrad with poison gas shells. These would lead to a "more economic success (see [First] World War)".[my emphasis] The General Quarter Master was also involved in murderous plans against the inhabitants of the city of Stalingrad and the execution thereof. In this respect he radicalized an order given by Hitler.[…]

Czeslaw Madajczyk, the editor of Wetzel's commentary, was also puzzled by the lack of reference to the putative "Hunger Plan", but he shrank from drawing the obvious conclusion, that there was no such plan.

Sure, it never existed. Except that there are those nasty documents suggesting otherwise, ain’t that so, Mills?

Protocol of a meeting of the secretaries of state on 2.5.1941
Source: International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1948, Volume 31, page 84

[…]1.) Der Krieg ist nur weiterzuführen, wenn die gesamte Wehrmacht im 3. Kriegsjahr aus Rußland ernährt wird.
2.) Hierbei werden zweifellos zig Millionen Menschen verhungern, wenn von uns das für uns Notwendige aus dem Lande herausgeholt wird.
3.) Am wichtigsten ist die Bergung und Abtransport von Ölsaaten, Ölkuchen, dann erst Getreide. Das vorhandene Fett und Fleisch wird voraussichtlich die Truppe verbrauchen.[…]

My translation:

[…]1.) The war can only be continued if the whole Wehrmacht is fed out of Russia in the 3rd war year.
2.) Due to this umpteen million people will doubtlessly starve to death when we take what is necessary for us out of the land.[my emphasis]
3.) Most important is the collection and shipment of oil seeds and oil cake, only thereafter of grain. The available fat and meat will presumably be consumed by the troops.[…]

"Wirtschaftspolitische Richtlinien für die Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost vom 23.5.1941, erarbeitet von der Gruppe Landwirtschaft"
(“Guidelines of Economic Policy for the Economic Organization East, prepared by the Agriculture Group”)
Source: Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RW 31/144

Damit ist das wesentlichste des Problems gekennzeichnet. Die Überschüsse Rußlands an Getreide werden entscheidend nicht durch die Höhe der Ernte, sondern durch die Höhe des Selbstverbrauchs bestimmt. Selbst eine geringe Herabsetzung um 30 kg je Kopf der Bevölkerung (220 kg statt 250 kg) und eine Herabsetzung der Pferderation um 25 % erzeugen einen Exportüberschuß, der fast an die Friedenshöhe heranreicht. […]
b) Da Deutschland bzw. Europa unter allen Umständen Überschüsse braucht, muß also der Konsum entsprechend herabgedrückt werden. Wie groß durch Drosselung des Verbrauchs die Überschussmengen werden können, zeigen die obigen Beispiele.
c) Dieses Herabdrücken des Konsums ist im Gegensatz zu den bisherigen besetzten Gebieten auch durchführbar deshalb, weil das Hauptüberschußgebiet räumlich scharf getrennt ist.
[…]Die Überschußgebiete liegen im Schwarzerdegebiet (also im Süden, Südosten) und im Kaukasus. Die Zuschußgebiete liegen im wesentlichen in der Waldzone des Nordens (Podsolböden). Daraus folgt: Eine Abriegelung der Schwarzerdegebiete muß unter allen Umständen mehr oder weniger hohe Überschüsse in diesen Gebieten für uns greifbar machen. Die Konzequenz ist die Nichtbelieferung der gesamten Waldzone einschließlich der Industriezentren und Petersburg. […]
1. Aufgabe der gesamten Industrie im Zuschußgebiet, im wesentlichen der Verarbeitungsindustrie im Moskauer und Petersburger Industriegebiet, desgleichen des Industriegebiets im Ural. Man kann wohl annehmen, daß diese Gebiete heute einen Zuschuß aus der Produktionszone von 5-10 Mill.t [Getreide] beziehen. […]
2. […]
3. Jede weitere Ausnahme zwecks Erhaltung dieses oder jenes Industriebezirks oder Industrieunternehmens in der Zuschußzone muß abgelehnt werden.
4. Erhalten werden kann die Industie nur, soweit sie im Überschußgebiet liegt. […]
Aus dieser Lage, die die Billigung der höchsten Stellen erfahren hat, […] ergeben sich folgende Konzequenzen:
I. für die Waldzone: […]
b) Ein deutsches Interesse an der Erhaltung der Erzeugungskraft dieser Gebiete ist, auch hinsichtlich der Versorgung der dort stehenden Truppen, nicht vorhanden. […] Die Bevölkerung dieser Gebiete, insbesondere die Bevölkerung der Städte, wird größter Hungersnot entgegensehen müssen. Es wird darauf ankommen, die Bevölkerung in die sibirischen Räume abzulenken. Da Eisenbahntransport nicht in Frage kommt, wird auch dieses Problem ein äußerst schwieriges sein. […]
Aus all dem folgt, daß die deutsche Verwaltung in diesem Gebiet wohl bestrebt sein kann, die Folgen der zweifellos eintretenden Hungersnot zu mildern und den Naturalisierungsprozeß zu beschleunigen. Man kann bestrebt sein, diese Gebiete intensiver zu bewirtschaften im Sinne einer Ausdehnung der Kartoffelanbaufläche und anderer für den Konsum wichtiger, hohe Erträge gebender Früchte. Die Hungersnot ist dadurch nicht zu bannen. Viele 10 Millionen Menschen werden in diesem Gebiet überflüssig und werden sterben oder nach Sibirien auswandern müssen. Versuche, die Bevölkerung dort vor dem Hungertode dadurch zu retten, daß man aus der Schwarzerdezone Überschüsse heranzieht, können nur auf Kosten der Versorgung Europas gehen. Sie unterbinden die Durchhaltefähigkeit Deutschlands im Kriege, sie unterbinden die Blockadefestigkeit Deutschlands und Europas. Darüber muß absolute Klarheit herrschen. […]
I. Armeeversorgung. Die Ernährungslage Deutschlands in dritten Kriegsjahr erfordert gebieterisch, daß die Wehrmacht in ihrer Gesamtverpflegung nicht aus dem großdeutschen Raum bzw. angegliederten oder befreundeten Gebieten, die diesen Raum durch Ausfuhren versorgen, lebt. Dieses Minimalziel, die Versorgung der Wehrmacht aus Feindesland im dritten und evtl. weiteren Kriegsjahren, muß unter allen Umständen erreicht werden.
II. Versorgung der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung
1) Erst nach der Abdeckung dieses Heeresbedarfs, der unter allen Umständen aus den Osträumen bereitgestellt werden muß, haben Lieferungen nach Deutschland zur Deckung des Zivilbedarfs einzusetzen. Hiebei ist jede Verzettelung auf Nebengebiete unter allen Umständen zu unterlassen. Im Vordergrund steht der Transport von Ölsaaten – insbesondere Sonnenblumenkerne, aber auch Leinsaat, Baumwollsaat, Sojabohnen – nach Deutschland, um die Fettbilanz zu verbessern. […]
2) Erst nach der Bewältigung des Transports der Ölsaaten kann eine Getreideausfuhr stattfinden, die selbstverständlich außerordentlich erwünscht ist, da ja Großdeutschland in steigendem Maße die besetzten Gebiete beliefern muß und auch selbst für die Zukunft seiner Reserven nach der schlechten Ernte 1940 und der bestenfalls zu erwartenden mittleren Ernte in diesem Jahr auffüllen muß. […]
3) […]
V. Diese Ausführungen zeigen, worauf es ankommt. Das Minimalziel muß sein, Deutschland im 3. Kriegsjahr völlig von der Versorgung der eigenen Wehrmacht zu befreien, um der deutschen Ernährungswirtschaft die Möglichkeit zu geben, einerseits die bisherigen Rationen beizubehalten, andererseits gewisse Reserven für die Zukunft anzulegen. Außerdem wird es notwendig sein, auf den drei entscheidenden Lebensmittelgebieten – Ölsaaten, Getreide und Fleisch – Zufuhren in einem größtmöglichen Umfang für Deutschland freizumachen, um die Ernährung nicht nur Deutschlands, sondern auch der besetzten Gebiete im Norden und Westen zu gewährleisten. […]
Abschließend sei nochmals auf das Grundsätzliche hingewiesen. Rußland hat sich unter dem bolschewistischen System aus reinen Machtgründen aus Europa zurückgezogen und so das europäische arbeitsteilige Gleichgewicht gestört. Unsere Aufgabe, Rußland wieder arbeitsteilig in Europa einzubeziehen, bedeutet zwangsläufig die Zerreißung des jetzigen wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts der UdSSR. Es kommt also unter keinen Umständen auf eine Erhaltung des Bisherigen an, sondern auf bewußte Abkehr vom Gewordenen und Einbeziehung der Ernährungswirtschaft Rußlands in den europäischen Rahmen. Daraus folgt zwangsläufig ein Absterben sowohl der Industrie wie eines großen Teils der Menschen in den bisherigen Zuschußgebieten.
Diese Alternative kann nicht hart und scharf genug herausgestellt werden.

My translation:

Thus the essence of the problem has been outlined. The grain excesses of Russia are primarily determined not by the quantities harvested but by the amounts they consume themselves. Even a small reduction of 30 kg per head of the population (220 kg instead of 250 kg) and a reduction of the horse ration by 25 % will create an export excess almost reaching peacetime levels. […]
b) As Germany and Europe need excesses under any circumstances, consume must be reduced accordingly. How large the excess amounts resulting from a restriction of consume may become is shown by the above examples.
c) Contrary to the situation in the hitherto occupied areas this reduction of consume is feasible also because there is a clear geographical separation of the main excess region.
[…]The excess regions are located in the black earth region (i.e. in the south and southeast) and in the Caucasus. The food importing regions are mainly located in the northern forest zone (podsol[?] soil). This means that sealing off the black earth regions must under any circumstances make more or less high excesses available to us in these areas. The consequence is the non-supply of the entire forest zone including the industrial centers and Petersburg.[my emphasis] […]
1. We will give up all industry in the food importing region, mainly the manufacturing industry in the Moscow and Petersburg industrial area and the Ural industrial region. It can be assumed that these regions are currently importing an excess from the production zone in the amount of 5-10 million tons of grain. […]
2. […]
3. Any further exception for maintaining this or that industrial district or enterprise in the importing area must be rejected.
4. Industry can be maintained only insofar as located in the excess region. […]
From this situation, which has been approved by the highest entities, […] there result the following consequences:
II. for the forest zone: […]
b) There is no German interest in maintaining the productive capacity of these regions, also in what concerns the supplies of the troops stationed there. […] The population of these regions, especially the population of the cities, will have to anticipate a famine of the greatest dimensions. The issue will be to redirect the population to the Siberian areas.[my emphasis] As railway transportation is out of the question, this problem will also be an extremely difficult one. […]
From all this there follows that the German administration in these regions may well attempt to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur and accelerate the naturalization process. It can be attempted to cultivate there areas more extensively in the sense of an extension of the area for cultivating potatoes and other high yield fruits important for consume. This will not stop the famine, however. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Attempts to save the population from starvation death by using excesses from the black earth zone can only be made at the expense of the supply of Europe. They hinder Germany’s capacity to hold out in the war, they hinder the blockade resistance of Germany and Europe. This must be absolutely clear.[my emphasis][…]
III. Army food supplies. The food situation of Germany in the third year of the war makes it mandatory that the Wehrmacht does not take its food supply out of the greater German area or the annexed or allied areas supplying this area through exports. This minimal goal, the supply of the Wehrmacht out of enemy territory in the third and eventually further years of the war, must be achieved under any circumstances.[my emphasis]
IV. Food supplies for the German civilian population
1) Only after covering the army’s needs, which under any circumstance must occur out of the eastern areas, may there be shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs. Deviations to secondary areas are to be avoided under any circumstances. Priority is to be given to the shipment of oil seeds – especially sunflower seeds, but also linen seed, cotton seed and soy beans – to Germany in order to improve the fats balance. […]
2) Only after the transport of the oil seeds has been handled can there be shipments of grain, which of course are extremely desirable as Greater Germany must increasingly supply the occupied areas and also stock up its own reserves after the bad harvest of 1940 and the at best average harvest to be expected this year. […]
3) […]
V. These considerations show what the key issues are. The minimal goal must be to completely free Germany from the feeding of its own Wehrmacht in the 3rd year of the war in order to give German food economy the possibility of on the one hand keeping the rations so far issued and on the other to create certain reserves for the future.[my emphasis] It will further be necessary to make available supplies for Germany to the greatest extent possible in the three key fields of nourishment – oil seeds, grain and meat – in order to guarantee the feeding not only of Germany, but also of the occupied areas in the north and west. […]
Finally the basics must be again pointed out. Russia under the Bolshevik system has withdrawn from Europe for pure reasons of power and thus disturbed the European work-sharing balance. Our task of reintegrating Russia into this balance necessarily implies tearing apart the present-day economic balance of the USSR. There is no question of maintaining what is there, but we are consciously moving away from it and integrating the food economy of Russia in the European area. This will necessarily lead both the industry and a great part of the people in the hitherto food importing areas to die off.
This alternative cannot be pointed out clearly and harshly enough.[my emphasis]

File note on a meeting about economic policies and organization of the economy in the newly occupied territories with Hermann Göring on 8.11.1941
Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, WI ID/1222

[…] Hinsichtlich der Ernährung bemerkte er [Göring], daß die Truppe ihren Bedarf an Konserven wesentlich einschränken müsse. Der Wehrmacht machte er den Vorwurf, dass sich im Gebiet um Minsk in den Wäldern noch grosse Viehherden herumtreiben, die aber wegen der Partisanen nicht geborgen werden können. Einsatz von Truppen sei unbedingt notwendig.
Das Schicksal der Grosstädte insbesondere Leningrads sei ihm völlig schleierhaft. In diesem Kriege werde das grösste Sterben seit dem dreissigjährigen Krieg sein.
Wenn das Getreide nicht abbefördert werden kann, soll dieses zur Schweinezucht verwandt werden. Ab 1943 verlange er eine Höchstausnutzung der Ukraine. Die Versorgung ganz Europas müsse dann sichergestellt sein. […]

My translation:

[…] In regard to food matters he [Göring] remarked that the troops must significantly reduce their consume of conserves. To the Wehrmacht he addressed the reproach that in the area around Minsk there are still huge herds of cattle running around in the woods which cannot be collected due to the partisans. The deployment of troops was absolutely necessary.
The fate of the major cities, especially Leningrad, was completely indifferent to him.[my emphasis] [Translator’s note: the German term "schleierhaft" literally means "veilful" and may also be translated as "unexplainable". Translating the term as "indifferent" (in the sense of "I don’t know what will happen to them, and I couldn’t care less") was considered to better fit the context, however] This war would see the greatest dying since the Thirty Years War.[my emphasis]
If the grain could not be shipped off it should be used for raising pigs.[my emphasis] From 1943 onward he required a maximum exploitation of the Ukraine. The food supply of the whole of Europe must then be guaranteed. […]

Top level meeting at Orsha on 13.11.1941
Source: State Archive Nuremberg, NOKW-1535

[…]Bemerkungen des Generalquartiermeisters [Wagner] nach dem Abendessen.

[…]Die Frage der Ernährung der Zivilbevölkerung ist katastrophal. Um überhaupt zu einem Ergebnis xu kommen, mußte man zu einer Klassifizierung schreiten. Es ist klar, daß innerhalb dieser Klassifizierung an oberster Stelle die Truppe und ihre Bedürfnisse stehen müssen. Der Bevölkerung kann nur ein Existenzminimum zugebilligt werden. Dabei wird das flache Land noch einigermaßen erträglich darstehen. Unlösbar dagegen ist die Frage der Ernährung der Großstädte. Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daß insbesondere Leningrad verhungern muß, denn es ist unmöglich, diese Stadt zu ernähren. Aufgabe der Führung kann es nur sein, die Truppe hiervon und von damit verbundenen Erscheinungen fern zu halten.[...]

My translation:

[…]Remarks of the General Quarter Master [Wagner] after dinner

[…]The issue of feeding the civilian population is catastrophic. In order to achieve a result at all there must be made a classification. It is clear that within this classification the troops and their needs occupy the uppermost rank. The population can only be granted an existence minimum. The situation in the countryside will still be fairly bearable. The feeding of the great cities can however not be solved. There can be no doubt that especially Leningrad must starve to death, because it is impossible to feed this city.[my emphasis] The task of the leadership can thus only be to keep the troops away from this and from the phenomena related hereto.[...]

Points to note from the top level meeting at Orsha on 13.11.1941, General Quarter Master Eduard Wagner
Source: State Archive Nuremberg, NOKW-1535

[…]Nichtarbeitende Kriegsgefangene in den Gefangenenlagern haben zu verhungern.
Arbeitende Kriegsgefangene können im Einzelfalle auch aus Heeresbeständen ernährt werden. Generell kann auch das angesichts der allgemeinen Erhährungslage leider nicht befohlen werden.
Die Lage im Verpflegungsnachschub bei der Heeresgruppe Mitte ist z. Zt. So, dass eine sofortige Hilfe nicht einsetzen kann […]

My translation:

[…]Non-working prisoners of war in the prisoner camps are to starve to death.[my emphasis]
Working prisoners of war can in individual cases also be fed out of army supplies. Given the general food situation this cannot be generally ordered, however.
The food supply situation at Army Group Center is currently such that immediate help cannot be provided.[…]

[witness]

witness:

Unfortunaly I have not the book of Fest right now. What I was trying to explain is that some ancestor of Hitler (Czech speaking) had a name similar to "Hitler" and "germanized" it after settling in the German linguistic region.

Fine.Just let me remind you that the argument was started because you disagreed with the proposition that this war can be seen by Slavic people as the war against Slavs.In other words you disagree that in the Nazis' eyes it was the racial war as well as the war against Bolshevism.
I think that corresponding quotations provided by Roberto prove quite the opposite.
To back up your position that it was not the war against Slavs at all you made this statement :

And what about Hitler himself? Not tainted by the "inferior" Czech blood?

So I assume that you have some info proving that Hitler had some
Czech (Slavic ) anscestry ? Because one thing is as you said "Czech speaking "and quite another is "tainted by the "inferior" Czech blood? " don't you think ?
For example there are plenty of Russian Germans who speak perfect Russian but nevetheless not "tainted " by the Russian blood .
Again I strongly doubt that there is a shred of evidence in favor of such a suggestion that Hitler had some Czech ancsestry.
I am ready to be dissuaded of my opinion if you provide some evidence .

[viriato]

Roberto wrote:

Modern highways serving the new masters while the slaves till the land or rot in their miserable cities - really an inconsistency?

Yes because your source spoke of the Germans not inhabitating the Russian cities and their being destroyed. However it is plain to see that any cross of roads or navigable waters will lead soon or later to the building of a settlement because of the economical incentives given by a point of transshipment and/or cross. More than this is that the map (and I'm using the one that appears in the "Penguin Atlas of the Third Reich" by Richard Overy) do put the cities, Kiev, Moscow etc. in the center of those communication webs. They were to be used as nodal points in the future.

[viriato]

witness

I'm not speaking of the war from either your "Slav" point of view (or the Jewish point of view, or the Gipsy one) or the national-socialist point of view. I'm speaking of the war as an international conflagration with certain causes and different consequences. And I claim that the war (the 1914/1945 conflict) was in the main a war between Germany on one side and the UK (and than the US) on the other side for the primacy of power in Europe. Whatever other countries we can found on the side of the UK/USA (or Germany) is of secondary importance to the war. But I am also aware that Hitler and many national-socialists never understood it. Like D. Quijote they turned their eyes against their modern day windmills - the Jews, the "Slavs" and so on.

[witness]

witness

I'm not speaking of the war from either your "Slav" point of view (or the Jewish point of view, or the Gipsy one) or the national-socialist point of view.

There is no some imaginary "objective "point of view.
Our points of view are always from some subjective perspective.In the given example we are speaking of the Slavic and Nazi perceptions of this war.

I'm speaking of the war as an international conflagration with certain causes and different consequences

Rather vague .. Again for Slavs the consequences were -the ruthless and total war against them.

And I claim that the war (the 1914/1945 conflict) was in the main a war between Germany on one side and the UK (and than the US) on the other side for the primacy of power in Europe.

Really ?
Do you by any chance know how many divisions were deployed by Germany on the Eastern and Western fronts respectively ?
Do you know by any chance whom Hitler saw as his main enemy ?
Do you know by any chance about the Hess flight to England ( notwithstanding that this flight was initiated by Hess himself -still there is evidence that Hitler wanted alliance with England so that to have free hands against what he perceived as his mortal enemy namely Bolshevic Russia )?
And do you really think that "primacy of power in Europe" had nothing to do with the USSR ?

But I am also aware that Hitler and many national-socialists never understood it.

So "Hitler and many National -Socialists" were "unaware''what they were fighting for ?
They didn't understand the reasons for the war they themselves initiated ?

[michael mills]

Witness wrote:

What evidence are there that Hitler had some Slavic blood in his veins ?
It would be interesting to read this quote

The historical record indicates that pretty well all Austrians must have some Slavic ancestry. The whole area of modern Austria was at one time inhabited by Slavic tribes, which were gradually germanised in the early Middle Ages and mixed with incoming German settlers.

Furthermore, throughout the Middle Ages and right up to modern times, Slavs of various types, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Croats, moved into Austria and mixed with the people there.

Likewise, practically all Czechs must have some German ancestry, given that German tribes lived in Bohemia before the influx of Slavic tribes (Bohemia = Boheim = The Home of the Boii, the original Celtic inhabitants), and that throughout the medieval period Germans settled there and mixed in.

Accordingly, it is next to impossible that Hitler could have avoided having some Slavic ancestry.

[michael mills]

Witness is getting a bit off the beam with his theory of a war between Germans and Slavs.

During the First World War, Poles generally tended to support the Germans who were fighting against their Slavic brothers the Russians, since their prime desire was to be free of Russian domination. And those Poles who did not particularly like the Prussian Germans nevertheless enthusiastically welcomed the Austrians.

In that same war, we find Bulgarians fighting together with Germany and Austria against the Serbs.

In the Second World War, Croats and Bulgarians fought on the side of Germany against Serbs. Slovaks also fought on the German side, against Poles and Russians. There were even Serbs who fought on the German side, some serving on the Russian Front.

Then there were the Polish partisans in Belorussia who made a tactical alliance with the German occupiers to fight against Communist partisans.

Then there were all the ethnic Polish farmers in Belorussia and Ukraine who were favoured by the German administration because they were "loyal" and delivered their food quotas.

Then there were the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Slavs, mainly Ukrainians but also ethnic Russians, who joined the German occupiers to fight against the Soviet system, which they regarded as the greater evil.

It is simplistic nonsense to call the 30-year war (1914-45) fought in Eastern Europe a battle between Germans and Slavs. Quite often the fighting was between Slavs, with Germany allied to one side or the other.

For example, during the Polish-Soviet war of 1920, the German Government provided tacit support to the Soviet side. And throughout the 1920s Germany and the Soviet Union were effectively allied against Poland.

[michael mills]

Witness,

Is your Slavic race-consciousness offended by the thought that Slavs and Germans have been interbreeding for centuries?

Does it bother you that peasant peoples change their ethnic identity very easily and very often, depending on the environment they find themselves in? Are you unsettled by the fact that a German-speaker might be almost entirely of Slavic origin (example: Odilo Globocnik, of Croat derivation), or that a Czech-speaker might be almost entirely of German origin?

I never realised that you find it so hard to accept the historical reality of racial mixing. I would never have guessed from the tenor of your many posts that racial purity was so important to you.

[witness]

During the First World War, Poles generally tended to support the Germans who were fighting against their Slavic brothers the Russians, since their prime desire was to be free of Russian domination. And those Poles who did not particularly like the Prussian Germans nevertheless enthusiastically welcomed the Austrians.

In that same war, we find Bulgarians fighting together with Germany and Austria against the Serbs.

Where did I mention the WW1 ?

In the Second World War, Croats and Bulgarians fought on the side of Germany against Serbs. Slovaks also fought on the German side, against Poles and Russians. There were even Serbs who fought on the German side, some serving on the Russian Front.

Then there were the Polish partisans in Belorussia who made a tactical alliance with the German occupiers to fight against Communist partisans.

Then there were all the ethnic Polish farmers in Belorussia and Ukraine who were favoured by the German administration because they were "loyal" and delivered their food quotas.

Then there were the hundreds of thousands of Soviet Slavs, mainly Ukrainians but also ethnic Russians, who joined the German occupiers to fight against the Soviet system, which they regarded as the greater evil.

Of course there have always been poodles and those having some grudge who were ready to joing the Devil himself to make the score even..No suprise at all. However to deny that the Nazis considered this war racial as well as anti-Bolshevic is unreasonable at the very least.

It is simplistic nonsense to call the 30-year war (1914-45) fought in Eastern Europe a battle between Germans and Slavs. Quite often the fighting was between Slavs, with Germany allied to one side or the other.

"Simplistic nonsense " is to deny that this war had some racial character IMO. The evidence to this is abundant .

As to the Hitler attitude to Slavs let me remind you his attitude to the idea of broadening the ROA participation in the German military operations..
And his attitude to General Vlasov.

[witness]

Witness,

Is your Slavic race-consciousness offended by the thought that Slavs and Germans have been interbreeding for centuries?

Does it bother you that peasant peoples change their ethnic identity very easily and very often, depending on the environment they find themselves in? Are you unsettled by the fact that a German-speaker might be almost entirely of Slavic origin (example: Odilo Globocnik, of Croat derivation), or that a Czech-speaker might be almost entirely of German origin?

I never realised that you find it so hard to accept the historical reality of racial mixing. I would never have guessed from the tenor of your many posts that racial purity was so important to you.

mills
I asked you to back up your assertion that there is a "historical record "
that "that pretty well all Austrians must have some Slavic ancestry. "
What is this raving all about ?
Where did you get this from that I am "offended by the thought that Slavs and Germans have been interbreeding for centuries"?
Are you loosing your nerve ?

I never realised that you find it so hard to accept the historical reality of racial mixing. I would never have guessed from the tenor of your many posts that racial purity was so important to you

For God's sake where did you get it from in my posts ?