Generalplan Ost

[witness]

His constant demand for "proof" that there has, over the course of more than one thousand years, been constant and significant interbreeding between Slavic and Germanic peoples in Central Europe, particularly in the area of what are now Poland, Czechoslovakia and Austria, suggests that he is uncomfortable with the thought that such interbreeding took place on a large scale.

The contributor michael mills sticks to his delusion that I am "uncomfortable with the thought that such interbreeding took place on a large scale." Where did he get it from ?
Delusion can be considered as a rigid ,encapsulated thinking not succumbing to any rational reasoning.Which mills demonstrates so beautifully.
No I don't have any problems with interbreeding between nations despite
mills desperate attempts to attribute such problems to me.
The argument began with the accertion that Slavs can (and many do )
perceive this war as war against them as an ethnic entity,
The reason for this perception are . I repeat :
1. Nazi racial doctrine declaring Slavs '' subhumans '' who should get out of the lands which the Germans deemed suitable for expanding their "Lebensraum"
2. Tremendous casualties inflicted on the Slavic population of Poland and Soviet Union.
3.Brutal treatment and repressions of Slavs living under the Nazi occupation.

The arguments against such reasoning went as follows
- if there were people like Globochnik serving in the German army then this war didn't have any racial character with which I disagree because obviously exceptions only confirm rules. By the same token Kapos
( Jewish police men ) also could be brought up in support of an argument ( which many including michael mils also quite keen to to impose even if all the accumulated evidence shows the opposite ) that Nazis didn't have much problems with the Jews and only struggled with Bolshevism.Then it is claimed that on the territory of the former Austria-Hungary the widespread interbreeding between Slavic and German population was taking place and therefore Nazis could not possibly have any racial hostility towards Slavs ( and this is hinted that Hitler himself had some Czech anscestry (?) on the basis of the fact that his nick might (or might not ) have some Czech roots.)
Numerous statements of the Nazi leaders , as well as Hitler's numerous statements in his "Mein Kampf ", the facts of monstrous brutality towards Slavs
( brutality which Nazis never allowed themselves towards Western Europeans ) are conviently forgotten .
So one can ask -why michael mills contibutor is so frustrated with pointing out that this war did have clear racial character ?
Simple -because it does not fit with his Nazi apologetic stance. With his claims that all Nazi crimes against Slavs and Jews were not dictated by their racial bigotry ...No not at all - The Nazis were just pressed by the war circumstances .. In other words they just had some logistic problems.
Read Nazis were not such bad guys at all.
As a matter of fact they were good guys much much better then those
darn Slavic barbarians governed by the darn Zionist.
We all know this

[David Thompson]

Witness -- Please avoid the kind of insulting personal remarks that appeared in your earlier post on this thread.

[witness]

My fault David.
My only excuse is that such remarks were caused by this statemnt of mills

"Witness" still seems to have trouble accepting that his precious Slavic race has been corrupted through mixing with Germans.

I consider this as an insult which caused my, not very friendly remarks as well.
Regards

[David Thompson]

Witness -- When that happens, deny the offending statement and then take his argument by the throat. Do not descend into personal insults.

[michael mills]

"Witness" wrote:

The argument began with the accertion that Slavs can (and many do )
perceive this war as war against them as an ethnic entity,
The reason for this perception are . I repeat :
1. Nazi racial doctrine declaring Slavs '' subhumans '' who should get out of the lands which the Germans deemed suitable for expanding their "Lebensraum"
2. Tremendous casualties inflicted on the Slavic population of Poland and Soviet Union.
3.Brutal treatment and repressions of Slavs living under the Nazi occupation.

I am quite familiar with the interpretation of the German-Soviet War 1941-45 as a racial war between Germans and Slavs, being the climax of a German-Slav conflict that had been waged over several centuries.

That particular interpretation was propagated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by the Soviet Government, and also by the Communist satellite governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. I remember from my student days in the 1960s a publication called "The Slavic Encyclopedia" (or some similar title), produced in the early 60s or late 50s, which was dedicated to the idea that the whole history of Eastern Europe from earliest times was a struggle by peace-loving Slavs against aggressive German invaders, which was finally resolved by a Slavic victory in 1945.

My contention is that the above interpretation is a propagandist travesty, and is a distortion of the facts.

The most important fact that is distorted by the above (mis) interpretation of history is that the war in the East was not one of the German people against all Slavic peoples, but one of the German Government against certain Slavic states, ie Poland and the Soviet Union, and to a certain extent against the peoples of those states, in alliance with other Slavic states and peoples, ie Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria.

The false interpretation of history promoted by "Witness" ignores the fact that the essential thrust of the foreign policy of Germany under its National Socialist Government from 1933 onward, was to set up a system of alliances with all East European states, including the Slavic ones (Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia) aimed against the Soviet Union, which in National Socialist ideology was not so much a Slavic state as a structure composed of Slavic serfs ruled by a Jewish tyranny. There was nothing in German foreign policy that could remotely be conceived of as a war against Slavs per se.

The only non-Communist Slavic state that National Socialist Germany set out to destroy was Czechoslovakia. But that state was unviable from the outset, a mixture of peoples, including a substantial number of ethnic Germans, ruled over by a Czech minority. The German policy was to break the state up into its component parts, to give independence to Slovakia and Ruthenia, and to annex the Czech lands, Bohemia and Moravia, which had been a component part of the German state for a thousand years (until 1867). That policy may be called anti-Czech, but certainly not anti-Slav, since it favoured the Slovaks and the Ruthenians.

Nor was National Socialist Germany anti-Polish. In fact, Hitler reversed the anti-Polish policies of the Weimar Republic, and established good relations; his aim was to set up an alliance between Poland and Germany, aimed against the Soviet Union. Hitler was even prepared to support further Polish expansion to the East, allowing it to annex Ukraine, in return for Polish support for German annexation of the Baltic States.

The only claim Hitler made on Poland was for it to permit the reunification of Danzig with Germany, and the granting of an extra-territorial corridor linking Germany with East Prussia. The return of Danzig to Germany would not have prejudiced Poland's right to use that city as a free port for its overseas trade, as is shown by the example of Memel; when the latter city was transferred from Lithuania to Germany early in 1939, Germany granted Lithuania full access to the port.

The only reason why war broke out between Germany and Poland in 1939 is that the vain, corrupt, power-mad colonels ruling Poland wanted it. Once they had received the "blank cheque" from Britain at the end of March 1939, they took a hard line in refusing Germany's entirely reasonable requests for the return of Danzig, in the full knowledge that that would lead to war; the Polish colonels wanted war because they saw it as the opportunity to achieve their long-held chauvinist dream of seizing the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line (East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia).

Thus, the pompous Polish colonels knowingly provoked a war which they thought would be over in a week with the triumphant entry of the Polish army into Berlin. Instead, to their surprise, it led to the utter defeat of Poland, and almost to its complete destruction. Faced with Polish intransigence, Hitler reversed his attitude of friendship for Poland, and opted for a policy of complete ruthlessness in suppressing any resistance.

The ruthless treatment of Poland by National Socialist Germany cannot be explained by anything in Hitler's ideology. I would challenge "Witness" to find anything in "Mein Kampf" which expresses racial hostility toward Poles, or the concept of a war of conquest against Poland. In fact, there are very few references to Poles or Poland in the whole work.

It is true that since the beginning of the 19th century there had been ethnic conflict between Germans and Poles in the German eastern provinces, particularly in Posen Province. But that conflict had not been violent; it was Polish chauvinists who injected racial violence into the conflict in the immediate aftermath of the First World War, when they tried through terror to ethnically cleanse Posen, Silesia and West Prussia of their ethnic German populations. Between 1939 and 1944, the entire Polish population suffered the retribution for that violence unleashed in 1918 by the chauvinists from their own ranks.

The policy of National Socialist Germany toward Yugoslavia was initially not hostile. Hitler tried to draw it into an anti-Soviet alliance, and eventually achieved that aim in March 1941. However, friendly relations were broken by the Serb chauvinist anti-German, anti-Croat coup of 27 March (it needs to be remembered that that coup was not only aimed against Germany, but also against the autonomy that had been granted to Croatia in the Sporazum of August 1939). It was only after the Serb chauvinist coup that Hitler decided on war against Yugoslavia.

But that war was not aimed against all the Slavic peoples of Yugoslavia; it was aimed solely against the Serb chauvinists. The German invasion led to the freeing of the Croats and the Bosnian Muslims, and also of the Kosovar Albanians. German measures against the Serbs were tough, but only so as to suppress resistance; there was no German policy of destroying the Serbian people. Apart from the Jews, such genocide as occurred in Yugoslavia was the result of warfare between Slavs, not agaisnt them, ie of Croats and Bosnian Muslims against Serbs.

Referring back to Hitler's ideology as expressed in "Mein Kampf", there are certainly anti-Slav elements in so far as there are many expressions of hostility toward Czechs. That hostility needs to be seen in the context of the ethnic struggle between ethnic Germans and ethnic Czechs in Bohemia for predominance in that province, a struggle that almost split the Austrian Empire and left a deep impression on German Austrians such as Hitler. But it is noteworthy that Hitler's hostility toward Czechs did not lead to great brutality, let alone anything resembling genocide; apart from isolated repressive episodes such as the destruction of Lidice, the Czech people lived relatively quietly under German rule, and enjoyed a standard of living during the war that was the equal of, or even higher than, that permitted to the German people.

Thus, the difference in the German treatment of Poles and Czechs cannot be traced back to Hitler's ideology, since Hitler was hostile toward Czech s but not toward Poles. The much greater brutality toward Poles was a result, not of ideology, but of the war situation; the Poles resisted and caused germany a lot of trouble, whereas the Czechs did not resist.

It was the German-Soviet war that most resembled a German-Slav racial war. In that context, the idea of the Russian "Untermensch" was used by Germany as a propagandistic device, as in the the pamphlet "Der Untermensch" produced by Himmler's agencies.

However, such an anti-Slavic attitude was not uniform throughout the German Government. Rosenberg and his ministry in particular opposed it, and tried to promote a more nuanced policy, in which Great Russians were certainly discriminated against, but other Slavic peoples, in particular the Ukrainians, were favoured. There was constant conflict between Rosenberg and the more anti-Slavic extremists, eventually resolved in favour of Rosenberg's more moderate position.

When it comes to the huge casualties suffered by the Russian and other Slavic peoples during the Soviet-German war, it must be borne in mind that those casualties were not solely due to German policies, but also to the methods of waging war adopted by the Soviet Government, which amounted to using its own people as expendable cannon-fodder.

Finally, the negative image of the Russian people that was promoted by parts of the German Government, in particular by Himmler's agencies, was not one that was created by Germans or held by them alone. In fact, it is a fair bet that Poles have traditionally been far more hostile to the Russian people than Germans have ever been. Until the First World War, relations between Germany and Russia tended to be quite good, and there was never any underlying hostility between the two peoples, apart from a short period in the middle of the 18th century when Russia and Prussia were at war.

Thus, the historical relationships between Germans, Russians and Poles bear out my main point. Conflict between Germans and one or other of the Slavic peoples has been far less common than conflict among the Slavs themselves. When it comes to barbarities, one need think only of the mass slaughters inflicted in the warfare between Poles and Ukrainians in the 17th century, or the "Kolyivshchina" of the 18th, when Orthodox Ukrainian Cossacks massacred Ukrainian Catholics.

[Roberto]

Comments to Mills’ last post (Part 1)

"Witness" wrote:

The argument began with the accertion that Slavs can (and many do )
perceive this war as war against them as an ethnic entity,
The reason for this perception are . I repeat :
1. Nazi racial doctrine declaring Slavs '' subhumans '' who should get out of the lands which the Germans deemed suitable for expanding their "Lebensraum"
2. Tremendous casualties inflicted on the Slavic population of Poland and Soviet Union.
3.Brutal treatment and repressions of Slavs living under the Nazi occupation.

I am quite familiar with the interpretation of the German-Soviet War 1941-45 as a racial war between Germans and Slavs, being the climax of a German-Slav conflict that had been waged over several centuries.

That particular interpretation was propagated in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War by the Soviet Government, and also by the Communist satellite governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia. I remember from my student days in the 1960s a publication called "The Slavic Encyclopedia" (or some similar title), produced in the early 60s or late 50s, which was dedicated to the idea that the whole history of Eastern Europe from earliest times was a struggle by peace-loving Slavs against aggressive German invaders, which was finally resolved by a Slavic victory in 1945.

My contention is that the above interpretation is a propagandist travesty, and is a distortion of the facts.

Well, it’s not as if the statements of Hitler and other high-ranking Nazis, as well as their application in practice, had not provided ample food for this "propagandist travesty", is it?

Some examples:

1.

[…]As for the Poles and Ukrainians, Frank's attitude was clear. They were to be permitted to work for the German economy as long as the war emergency continued. Once the war was won, he told the District Standortfuehrung and Political Leaders at a conference at Cracow on 14 January '1944 :
"* * * then, for all I care, mincemeat [Hackfleisch] can be made of the Poles and the Ukrainians and all the others who run around here-it does not matter what happens." (2233-BB-PS)[…]

From the judgement of Hans Frank at the Nuremberg Trial.
Source of quote:
http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/Frank.htm

2.

"[…]
Two world-views fighting each other. Demolishing verdict about Bolshevism, which is equal to asocial criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for the future. We must depart from the standpoint of soldierly comradeship. The Communist is no comrade before and no comrade afterwards. This is a fight to annihilation. If we don’t see it as this, we will defeat the enemy, but in 30 years we will again be faced with the communist enemy. We don’t make war to conserve the enemy.
[…..]
Fight against Russia:
Annihilation of the Bolshevik commissars and the communist intelligence. The new states must be Socialist states, but without an intelligence of their own. It must be prevented that a new intelligence comes into being. A primitive Socialist intelligence is sufficient.
The fight must be conduced against the poison of disintegration. This is not a matter for military tribunals. The leader of the troops must know what this is about. The must lead in the fight. The troops must defend themselves with the means by which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU-people are criminals and must be treated as such.
For this the troops need not come out of the hands of their leaders. The leader must issue his directives in consonance with the feelings of the troops. [Marginal note by Halder: This fight is very much differentiated from the fight in the West. In the East harshness means mildness in the future.]
The leader must require themselves to do the sacrifice of overcoming their considerations.[...]"

From Hitler’s briefing of his generals on 30 May 1941, as taken down by Chief of the General Staff Halder. My translation from Christian Streit’s Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941-1945, emphases are mine.

3.

[…]1. For offenses committed by members of the Wehrmacht and its employees against enemy civilians, prosecution is not compulsory, not even if the offense is at the same time a military crime or violation.[…]

From the Führer Decree of 13 May 1941, on Regulation of Conduct of
Troops in District "Barbarossa" and Handling of Opposition.

Source of quote:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR5.htm

4.

[…]b. To nip the plots in the bud the most drastic means are to be employed immediately at the first provocation in order to make the authority of the occupation force prevail and to prevent further spreading. Attention should be paid to the fact that a human life in the countries concerned often means nothing and only by unusual severity can a deterrent effect be achieved. In these cases the life of one German soldier must be atoned for by the death sentence for 50 to 100 communists, as a rule. The manner of execution shall further increase the deterrent effect.[…]

From Keitel’s order of 16 September 1941

Source of quote:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR4.htm

5.

[…]Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war should be named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the Soviet Unions, while complaints about the treatment of other prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not become loud. It is obvious that nothing is so suitable for strengthening the power of resistance of the Red Army as the knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to be met. To be sure the Main Department for Politics has succeeded here by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material improvement of the fate of the prisoners of war. However this improvement is not to be ascribed to political acumen, but to the sudden realization that our labor market must be supplied with laborers at once. We now experienced the grotesque picture of having to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied Eastern territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like flies, in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. Now the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, "recruiting" methods were used which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was inaugurated. Without consideration of health or age the people were shipped to Germany, where it turned out immediately that far more than 100,000 had to be sent back because of serious illnesses and other incapabilities for work. This system in no way considered that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the power of resistance of the Red Army, since these methods were used only in the Soviet Union of course, and in no way remotely resembling this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway. Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to augment the hate for Germany and the National Socialist system. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in spite of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in order to break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously the Main Department for Politics has struggled unceasingly to place the methods of acquiring workers and their treatment within Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was thought in all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts at a minimum cost of the biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now 400,000 female household workers from the Ukraine are to come to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly that these people have no right to free time and may not visit theaters, movies, restaurants, etc. and may leave the house at the most three hours a week apart from exception concerning duty.
In addition there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the Reichs Commissariat itself. With a presumption unequalled we put aside all political knowledge and to the glad surprise of all the colored world treat the peoples of the occupied Eastern territories as whites of Class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe. Only the most limited education is suitable for them, no solicitude can be given them. Their sustenance interests us only insofar as they are still capable of labor, and in every respect they are given to understand that we regard them as of the most minute value.[…]

From the Memorandum by Bräutigam Concerning Conditions in Occupied Areas of the USSR, 25 October 1942

Source of quote:

http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/USSR1.htm

6.

Protocol of a meeting of the secretaries of state on 21.5.1941
Source: International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1948, Volume 31, page 84

[…]1.) Der Krieg ist nur weiterzuführen, wenn die gesamte Wehrmacht im 3. Kriegsjahr aus Rußland ernährt wird.
2.) Hierbei werden zweifellos zig Millionen Menschen verhungern, wenn von uns das für uns Notwendige aus dem Lande herausgeholt wird.
3.) Am wichtigsten ist die Bergung und Abtransport von Ölsaaten, Ölkuchen, dann erst Getreide. Das vorhandene Fett und Fleisch wird voraussichtlich die Truppe verbrauchen.[…]

My translation:

[…]1.) The war can only be continued if the whole Wehrmacht is fed out of Russia in the 3rd war year.
2.) Due to this umpteen million people will doubtlessly starve to death when we take what is necessary for us out of the land.
3.) Most important is the collection and shipment of oil seeds and oil cake, only thereafter of grain. The available fat and meat will presumably be consumed by the troops.[…]

Emphasis is mine.

7.

"Wirtschaftspolitische Richtlinien für die Wirtschaftsorganisation Ost vom 23.5.1941, erarbeitet von der Gruppe Landwirtschaft”
(“Guidelines of Economic Policy for the Economic Organization East, prepared by the Agriculture Group")
Source: Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, RW 31/144

[…]
Aus dieser Lage, die die Billigung der höchsten Stellen erfahren hat, […] ergeben sich folgende Konzequenzen:
I. für die Waldzone: […]
b) Ein deutsches Interesse an der Erhaltung der Erzeugungskraft dieser Gebiete ist, auch hinsichtlich der Versorgung der dort stehenden Truppen, nicht vorhanden. […] Die Bevölkerung dieser Gebiete, insbesondere die Bevölkerung der Städte, wird größter Hungersnot entgegensehen müssen. Es wird darauf ankommen, die Bevölkerung in die sibirischen Räume abzulenken. Da Eisenbahntransport nicht in Frage kommt, wird auch dieses Problem ein äußerst schwieriges sein. […]
Aus all dem folgt, daß die deutsche Verwaltung in diesem Gebiet wohl bestrebt sein kann, die Folgen der zweifellos eintretenden Hungersnot zu mildern und den Naturalisierungsprozeß zu beschleunigen. Man kann bestrebt sein, diese Gebiete intensiver zu bewirtschaften im Sinne einer Ausdehnung der Kartoffelanbaufläche und anderer für den Konsum wichtiger, hohe Erträge gebender Früchte. Die Hungersnot ist dadurch nicht zu bannen. Viele 10 Millionen Menschen werden in diesem Gebiet überflüssig und werden sterben oder nach Sibirien auswandern müssen. Versuche, die Bevölkerung dort vor dem Hungertode dadurch zu retten, daß man aus der Schwarzerdezone Überschüsse heranzieht, können nur auf Kosten der Versorgung Europas gehen. Sie unterbinden die Durchhaltefähigkeit Deutschlands im Kriege, sie unterbinden die Blockadefestigkeit Deutschlands und Europas. Darüber muß absolute Klarheit herrschen. […]
I. Armeeversorgung. Die Ernährungslage Deutschlands in dritten Kriegsjahr erfordert gebieterisch, daß die Wehrmacht in ihrer Gesamtverpflegung nicht aus dem großdeutschen Raum bzw. angegliederten oder befreundeten Gebieten, die diesen Raum durch Ausfuhren versorgen, lebt. Dieses Minimalziel, die Versorgung der Wehrmacht aus Feindesland im dritten und evtl. weiteren Kriegsjahren, muß unter allen Umständen erreicht werden.
II. Versorgung der deutschen Zivilbevölkerung
1) Erst nach der Abdeckung dieses Heeresbedarfs, der unter allen Umständen aus den Osträumen bereitgestellt werden muß, haben Lieferungen nach Deutschland zur Deckung des Zivilbedarfs einzusetzen. Hiebei ist jede Verzettelung auf Nebengebiete unter allen Umständen zu unterlassen. Im Vordergrund steht der Transport von Ölsaaten – insbesondere Sonnenblumenkerne, aber auch Leinsaat, Baumwollsaat, Sojabohnen – nach Deutschland, um die Fettbilanz zu verbessern. […]
2) Erst nach der Bewältigung des Transports der Ölsaaten kann eine Getreideausfuhr stattfinden, die selbstverständlich außerordentlich erwünscht ist, da ja Großdeutschland in steigendem Maße die besetzten Gebiete beliefern muß und auch selbst für die Zukunft seiner Reserven nach der schlechten Ernte 1940 und der bestenfalls zu erwartenden mittleren Ernte in diesem Jahr auffüllen muß. […]
3) […]
V. Diese Ausführungen zeigen, worauf es ankommt. Das Minimalziel muß sein, Deutschland im 3. Kriegsjahr völlig von der Versorgung der eigenen Wehrmacht zu befreien, um der deutschen Ernährungswirtschaft die Möglichkeit zu geben, einerseits die bisherigen Rationen beizubehalten, andererseits gewisse Reserven für die Zukunft anzulegen. Außerdem wird es notwendig sein, auf den drei entscheidenden Lebensmittelgebieten – Ölsaaten, Getreide und Fleisch – Zufuhren in einem größtmöglichen Umfang für Deutschland freizumachen, um die Ernährung nicht nur Deutschlands, sondern auch der besetzten Gebiete im Norden und Westen zu gewährleisten. […]
Abschließend sei nochmals auf das Grundsätzliche hingewiesen. Rußland hat sich unter dem bolschewistischen System aus reinen Machtgründen aus Europa zurückgezogen und so das europäische arbeitsteilige Gleichgewicht gestört. Unsere Aufgabe, Rußland wieder arbeitsteilig in Europa einzubeziehen, bedeutet zwangsläufig die Zerreißung des jetzigen wirtschaftlichen Gleichgewichts der UdSSR. Es kommt also unter keinen Umständen auf eine Erhaltung des Bisherigen an, sondern auf bewußte Abkehr vom Gewordenen und Einbeziehung der Ernährungswirtschaft Rußlands in den europäischen Rahmen. Daraus folgt zwangsläufig ein Absterben sowohl der Industrie wie eines großen Teils der Menschen in den bisherigen Zuschußgebieten.
Diese Alternative kann nicht hart und scharf genug herausgestellt werden.

My translation:

[…]
From this situation, which has been approved by the highest entities, […] there result the following consequences:
II. for the forest zone: […]
b) There is no German interest in maintaining the productive capacity of these regions, also in what concerns the supplies of the troops stationed there. […] The population of these regions, especially the population of the cities, will have to anticipate a famine of the greatest dimensions. The issue will be to redirect the population to the Siberian areas. As railway transportation is out of the question, this problem will also be an extremely difficult one. […]
From all this there follows that the German administration in these regions may well attempt to milder the consequences of the famine that will doubtlessly occur and accelerate the naturalization process. It can be attempted to cultivate there areas more extensively in the sense of an extension of the area for cultivating potatoes and other high yield fruits important for consume. This will not stop the famine, however. Many tens of millions of people will become superfluous in this area and will die or have to emigrate to Siberia. Attempts to save the population from starvation death by using excesses from the black earth zone can only be made at the expense of the supply of Europe. They hinder Germany’s capacity to hold out in the war, they hinder the blockade resistance of Germany and Europe. This must be absolutely clear.[…]
III. Army food supplies. The food situation of Germany in the third year of the war makes it mandatory that the Wehrmacht does not take its food supply out of the greater German area or the annexed or allied areas supplying this area through exports. This minimal goal, the supply of the Wehrmacht out of enemy territory in the third and eventually further years of the war, must be achieved under any circumstances.
IV. Food supplies for the German civilian population
1) Only after covering the army’s needs, which under any circumstance must occur out of the eastern areas, may there be shipments to Germany to cover civilian needs. Deviations to secondary areas are to be avoided under any circumstances. Priority is to be given to the shipment of oil seeds – especially sunflower seeds, but also linen seed, cotton seed and soy beans – to Germany in order to improve the fats balance. […]
2) Only after the transport of the oil seeds has been handled can there be shipments of grain, which of course are extremely desirable as Greater Germany must increasingly supply the occupied areas and also stock up its own reserves after the bad harvest of 1940 and the at best average harvest to be expected this year. […]
3) […]
V. These considerations show what the key issues are. The minimal goal must be to completely free Germany from the feeding of its own Wehrmacht in the 3rd year of the war in order to give German food economy the possibility of on the one hand keeping the rations so far issued and on the other to create certain reserves for the future. It will further be necessary to make available supplies for Germany to the greatest extent possible in the three key fields of nourishment – oil seeds, grain and meat – in order to guarantee the feeding not only of Germany, but also of the occupied areas in the north and west. […]
Finally the basics must be again pointed out. Russia under the Bolshevik system has withdrawn from Europe for pure reasons of power and thus disturbed the European work-sharing balance. Our task of reintegrating Russia into this balance necessarily implies tearing apart the present-day economic balance of the USSR. There is no question of maintaining what is there, but we are consciously moving away from it and integrating the food economy of Russia in the European area. This will necessarily lead both the industry and a great part of the people in the hitherto food importing areas to die off.
This alternative cannot be pointed out clearly and harshly enough.

Emphases are mine.

8.

File note on a meeting about economic policies and organization of the economy in the newly occupied territories with Hermann Göring on 8.11.1941
Source: Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv, WI ID/1222

[…] Hinsichtlich der Ernährung bemerkte er [Göring], daß die Truppe ihren Bedarf an Konserven wesentlich einschränken müsse. Der Wehrmacht machte er den Vorwurf, dass sich im Gebiet um Minsk in den Wäldern noch grosse Viehherden herumtreiben, die aber wegen der Partisanen nicht geborgen werden können. Einsatz von Truppen sei unbedingt notwendig.
Das Schicksal der Grosstädte insbesondere Leningrads sei ihm völlig schleierhaft. In diesem Kriege werde das grösste Sterben seit dem dreissigjährigen Krieg sein.
Wenn das Getreide nicht abbefördert werden kann, soll dieses zur Schweinezucht verwandt werden. Ab 1943 verlange er eine Höchstausnutzung der Ukraine. Die Versorgung ganz Europas müsse dann sichergestellt sein. […]

My translation:

[…] In regard to food matters he [Göring] remarked that the troops must significantly reduce their consume of conserves. To the Wehrmacht he addressed the reproach that in the area around Minsk there are still huge herds of cattle running around in the woods which cannot be collected due to the partisans. The deployment of troops was absolutely necessary.
The fate of the major cities, especially Leningrad, was completely indifferent to him. [Translator’s note: the German term “schleierhaft” literally means "veilful" and may also be translated as “unexplainable”. Translating the term as “indifferent” (in the sense of “I don’t know what will happen to them, and I couldn’t care less”) was considered to better fit the context, however.] This war would see the greatest dying since the Thirty Years War.
If the grain could not be shipped off it should be used for raising pigs. From 1943 onward he required a maximum exploitation of the Ukraine. The food supply for the whole of Europe must then be guaranteed. […]

Emphasis is mine.

9.

Whether nations live in prosperity
or starve to death
interests me only in so far as
we need them as slaves for our culture;
otherwise, it is of no interest to me.
Heinrich Himmler, 1943

Source: Heinrich Himmler, speech of October 4th, 1943.

Source of quote:

http://www.holocaust-history.org/quote.cgi?source18

10.

It is a question of existence,
thus it will be a racial struggle
of pitiless severity, in the course of which
20 to 30 million Slavs and Jews will perish
through military actions and crises of food supply.
Heinrich Himmler, June 1941

Source: Heinrich Himmler, as quoted by Christopher Browning,
in Nazi Policy, Jewish Workers, German Killers p. 23.
He comments in a footnote:
"The Wewelsburg meeting has now been dated to June 12-15, 1941,
according to Himmler's Terminkalendar found in the Moscow
Secret Archives (Osobyi 1372-5-23. The accession number fo
the copy in the US Holocaust Memorial Museum is: 1997.A.0328).

Source of quote:

http://www.holocaust-history.org/quote.cgi?source50

11.

[…] Hitler returned to the subject on the evening of 17 October, when Todt and Gauleiter Sauckel (who was responsible for conscripting foreign workers) provided and appreciative audience:

The Russian desert, we shall populate it … We’ll take away its character of an Asian steppe, we’ll Europeanise it. With this object we have undertaken the construction of road that will lead to the southernmost part of the Crimea and to the Caucasus. These road will be studded along their whole length with German towns and around these towns our colonists will settle.
As for the two or three million men whom we need to accomplish this task, we’ll find them quicker than we think. They’ll come from Germany, Scandinavia, the Western countries, and America. I shall no longer be here to see all that, but in twenty years, the Ukraine will already be a home for twenty million inhabitants, besides the natives …
We shan’t settle in the Russian towns, and we’ll let them go to pieces without intervening. And, above all, no remorse on this subject! We’re absolutely without obligations as far as these people are concerned.[my emphasis] To struggle against the hovels, chase away the fleas, provide German teachers, bring out newspapers – very little of that for us! We’ll confine ourselves, perhaps, to setting up a radio transmitter, under our control. For the rest, let them know just enough to understand our highway signs, so that they won’t get themselves run over by our vehicles.
For them the word ‘liberty’ means the right to wash on feast days … There’s only one duty: to Germanize this country by the immigration of Germans and to look upon the natives as Redskins … In this business I shall go straight ahead, cold-bloodedly.

Bullock’s translation of the highlighted passage is a rather benevolent one. Hitler’s words were actually the following:

In die russischen Städte gehen wir nicht hinein. Sie müssen vollständig ersterben. Wir brauchen uns da keine Gewissensbisse zu machen […] wir haben überhaupt keine Verpflichtungen den Leuten gegenüber.

Source of quote:

Christian Gerlach, Kalkulierte Morde, page 801

My translation:

Into the Russian cities we shall not go. They must die away completely.[my emphasis] We need to have no remorse in this respect […] we have no obligations whatsoever towards these people.

12.

Excerpt from Hitler’s Speech before the Wehrmacht’s Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, as quoted in Max Domarus, Hitler Reden 1932-1945, after IMT 789-PS

[…]Die Kämpfe sind anders geworden als vor 100 Jahren. Heute können wir von einem Rassenkampf sprechen. Heute kämpfen wir um Ölfelder, Gummi, Erdschätze usw.[…]

My translation:

[…]Fighting is different today from what it was 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a fight of races. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, raw materials etc.[…]

13.

[...]As part of wider efforts to destroy Polish culture, the Germans closed or destroyed universities, schools, museums, libraries, and scientific laboratories. They demolished hundreds of monuments to national heroes. To prevent the birth of a new generation of educated Poles, German officials decreed that Polish children's schooling end after a few years of elementary education. "The sole goal of this schooling is to teach them simple arithmetic, nothing above the number 500; writing one's name; and the doctrine that it is divine law to obey the Germans. . . . I do not think that reading is desirable," Himmler wrote in his May 1940 memorandum.[...]

Source of quote:

http://www.ushmm.com/education/resource/poles/poles.pdf
(page 10)

14.

File note by Martin Bormann about a conversation with Hitler

Geheim!

Berlin, den 2.10.1940
Bo-An.

Aktenvermerk
[…] Am 2.10.1940 entspann sich nach Tisch in der Wohnung des Führers eine Unterhaltung über den Charakter des Gouvernements, über die Behandlung der Polen […]
Der Führer betonte weiter, der Pole sei, im Gegensatz zum deutschen Arbeiter, geradezu zu niedriger Arbeit geboren; unserem deutschen Arbeiter müßten wir aber all Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten gewähren, für den Polen komme dies keinesfalls in Frage. Das Lebensniveau in Polen müsse sogar niedrig sein bzw. gehalten werden. Das Generalgouvernement solle nun keinesfalls ein abgeschlossenes und einheitliches Wirtschaftsgebiet werden, das seine notwendigen Industrieprodukte ganz oder zum Teil selbst erzeuge, sondern das Generalgouvernement sei unser Reservoir an Arbeitskräften für niedrige Arbeiten (Ziegeleien, Straßenbau usw. usw.). Man könnte, betonte der Führer, in den Slawen nichts anderes hineinlegen, als was er von Natur aus sei. Während unser deutscher Arbeiter von Natur aus im allgemeinen strebsam und fleißig sei, sei der Pole von Natur aus faul und müsse zur Arbeit angetrieben werden. Im übrigen fehlten die Voraussetzungen dafür, daß das Generalgouvernement ein eigenes Wirtschaftsgebiet werden könne, es fehlten die Bodenschätze, und selbst wenn diese vorhanden wären, seien die Polen zur Ausnützung dieser Bodenschätze unfähig.
[…]
Unbedingt zu beachten sei, daß es keine „polnischen Herren“ geben dürfe; wo polnische Herren vorhanden seien, sollten sie, so hart das klingen möge, umgebracht werden.
Blutlich dürften wir uns natürlich nicht mit den Polen vermischen; auch daher sei es richtig, wenn neben den polnischen Schnittern auch polnische Schnitterinnen ins Reich kämmen. Was diese Polen dann untereinander in ihren Lagern trieben, könne uns gänzlich gleichgültig sein, kein protestantischer Eiferer solle in diese Dinge seine Nase stecken.
Noch einmal müsse der Führer betonen, daß es für die Polen nur einen Herren geben dürfe und das sei der Deutsche; zwei Herren nebeneinander könne es nicht geben und dürfe es nicht geben, daher seien alle Vertreter der polnischen Intelligenz umzubringen. Dies klinge hart, aber es sei nun einmal das Lebensgesetz.[…]

Source of quote: Ernst Klee / Willi Dreßen, “Gott mit uns.“ Der deutsche Venichtungskrieg im Osten 1939-1945, Frankfurt 1989, pages 18/19.
Reference: Nuremberg Document 172-USSR, IMT, Volume XXXIX

My translation:

Secret!

Berlin, 2.10.1940
Bo-An.

File note
[…] On 2.10.1940 there was a conversation about the character of the General Government and the treatment of the Poles at the Führer’s place after the meal[…]
The Führer pointed out that, contrary to the German worker, the Pole is well-neigh born for low jobs; our German worker must be granted all possibilities of advancement, but for the Pole this is out of the question. The living standard in Poland must even be or be kept low. The General Government shall by no means become a closed and uniform economic region producing all or a part of its industrial products itself. The General Government is our reservoir of labor force for low jobs (brick factories, street building etc. etc.). One cannot, the Führer emphasized, put more into the Slav than what he is by nature. While our German worker is by nature generally ambitious and hard-working, the Pole is by nature lazy and must thus be propelled to work. Furthermore the conditions are lacking for the General Government to become an economic region of its own, because it has no mineral resources and even if such were available the Poles would not be able to exploit them.[…]
Under all circumstances it must be observed that there must be no "Polish masters"; where the are Polish masters, as harsh as this may sound, they must be bumped off.
Of course we must not mix our blood with that of the Poles, for which reason it is also right that beside the Polish male harvesters female harvesters come to the Reich. What these Poles then do among each other in their camps can be completely indifferent to us; no eager protestant should stick his nose into such things.
Again the Führer must point out that for the Poles there may be only one master, and that is the German; two master alongside each other there may not be and thus all representatives of the Polish intelligence are to be bumped off. This sounds harsh, but it is the law of life.[…]

While these documents don’t support the notion of a "war against Slavs per se" (assuming that this is indeed the thesis of witness; from what I know of Mills I wouldn’t be surprised if he had deliberately misrepresented his opponent’s statements, one of his favorite tricks), they do show that at least the Eastern Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians and Poles) were seen as inferior beings on whom the superior Germans were entitled to inflict whatever treatment corresponded to their interests, the "contamination" of the Slav inhabitants of the Soviet Union by "Jewish Bolshevism" making them even more worthless in the Nazis’ eyes and thus justifying their exploitation, displacement or decimation to whatever extent was deemed necessary in the service of German interests. In other words, the "superior" Germans were seen as entitled to take from the "inferior" Eastern Slavs whatever they wanted, and to do to them whatever they considered necessary. Hitler’s "New Order" in the East was to be something like ancient Sparta, with the Germans the Spartans and the Slavs the Helots.

[Roberto]

Comments to Mills’ last post (Part 2)

The only claim Hitler made on Poland was for it to permit the reunification of Danzig with Germany, and the granting of an extra-territorial corridor linking Germany with East Prussia. The return of Danzig to Germany would not have prejudiced Poland's right to use that city as a free port for its overseas trade, as is shown by the example of Memel; when the latter city was transferred from Lithuania to Germany early in 1939, Germany granted Lithuania full access to the port.

The only reason why war broke out between Germany and Poland in 1939 is that the vain, corrupt, power-mad colonels ruling Poland wanted it. Once they had received the "blank cheque" from Britain at the end of March 1939, they took a hard line in refusing Germany's entirely reasonable requests for the return of Danzig, in the full knowledge that that would lead to war; the Polish colonels wanted war because they saw it as the opportunity to achieve their long-held chauvinist dream of seizing the German territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line (East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia).

Thus, the pompous Polish colonels knowingly provoked a war which they thought would be over in a week with the triumphant entry of the Polish army into Berlin. Instead, to their surprise, it led to the utter defeat of Poland, and almost to its complete destruction. Faced with Polish intransigence, Hitler reversed his attitude of friendship for Poland, and opted for a policy of complete ruthlessness in suppressing any resistance.

Talk about distortions of history, Mills should know better than to write such rubbish.

First of all, it is rather questionable just how reasonable the German requests to Poland can be considered if we take into account that they came upon the heels of the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia and the conversion of Slovakia into an "independent" puppet state of Germany. Under these circumstances the Poles, who rejected Hitler’s demands before Britain gave them the supposed "blank cheque" that Nazi apologists like Mills make so much about, had every reason to assume that, just like in the case of Czechoslovakia, Hitler’s "reasonable" demands were just the beginning of a Nazi policy that would lead to the annexation of their whole country by Germany, if they gave in to it.

[…]Nicht nur England und Italien hatte Hitler durch die Vergewaltigung der Tschechoslowakei desavouiert und herausgefordert, sondern auch Polen.
[…]
Obwohl die Herstellung einer gemeinsamen polnisch-ungarischen Grenze einem polnischen Wunsch entsprach, so war die militärische Besetzung der Tschechei und vor allem der Slowakei durch deutsche Truppen eine Maßnahme, die offensichtlich gegen Polen gerichtet war. Denn sie konnte ja nichts anderes bezwecken, als den polnischen Staat nunmehr von drei Seiten, von Westen, Norden und Süden, unter militärischen Druck zu setzen.
Hitlers Forderungen nach Rückkehr des Freistaates Danzig in das Deutsche Reich und nach dem Bau einer exterritorialen Autobahn durch den Korridor enthüllten sich angesichts seines Vorgehens gegen Prag als das, was sie bei einer Akzeptierung sein würden: eine Vorstufe zur völligen Annexion Polens durch Deutschland! Denn die Abtretung der sudetendeutschen Gebiete und die Zugestehung einer exterritorialen Autobahn Breslau-Wien durch das Gebiet der Tschechoslowakei, ferner von 30 exterritorialen Durchgangsstraßen – all dies hatte ja die Tschechoslowakei nicht vor der völligen Annexion bewahrt. Polen würde also durch die Abtretung von Danzig und die Gestattung einer Autobahn durch den Korridor nicht dem gleichen Schicksal entgehen können.
Es zeugte von Hitlers Impertinenz, daß er – trotz der gerade vorgeführten Demonstration seiner wahren Ziele – glaubte, er könne auch jetzt noch und gerade jetzt seine Forderungen gegenüber Polen durchsetzen.
Am 21. März mußte Ribbentrop in seinem Auftrag dem polnischen Botschafter Lipski erneut die deutschen Forderungen in nachdrücklicher Weise darlegen. Der deutsche Außenminister entschuldigte sich zunächst, weil Polen über das deutsche Verhalten in der Tschechoslowakei nicht unterrichtet worden war, und umriß dann Hitlers Ansprüche auf Danzig und eine exterritoriale Auto-bzw. Eisenbahnstrecke durch den Korridor.
[…]
Hitler scheint tatsächlich geglaubt zu haben, angesichts der Vorfälle in der Tschechoslowakei würden die Polen nichts anderes tun, als schleunigst die deutschen Ansprüche auf Danzig und die exterritorialen Verkehrsverbindungen zu akzeptieren.[…]

Source of quote:

Max Domarus, Hitler Reden 1932-1945, Volume 3, pages 1106 and following.

My translation:

[…]Not only England and Italy Hitler had disavowed and challenged by his rape of Czechoslovakia, but also Poland.
[…]
While the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian border corresponded to a Polish wish, the military occupation of the Czech land and especially of Slovakia by German troops was a measure obviously directed against Poland. For it could have no other purpose then to now put the Polish state under military pressure from three sides, from the west, north and south.
In the face of his proceeding against Prague, Hitler’s demands for return of the free state of Danzig to the German Reich and the building of an ex-territorial highway through the corridor revealed themselves as what they would be in case of acceptance: a preliminary stage to the total annexation of Poland by Germany! For the cession of the Sudeten German area by Czechoslovakia, further of 30 ex-territorial roads of passage – all this had not kept Czechoslovakia from total annexation, after all. Poland would thus not escape the same fate by ceding Danzig and allowing a highway through the Corridor.[my emphasis]
It shows Hitler’s impertinence that he – despite the demonstration of his true goals he had just given – thought that he could even and of all times now impose his demands towards Poland.
On 21 March Ribbentrop on his behalf again had to present the German demands to the Polish ambassador Lipski in an emphatic manner. The German foreign minister first apologized for Poland not having been informed about the German proceeding in Czechoslovakia, and then outlined Hitler’s claims to Danzig and an ex-territorial highway and railway link through the Corridor.
[…]
Hitler seems to indeed have believed that, in the face of the events in Czechoslovakia, the Poles would do nothing other than hurriedly accept the German claims to Danzig and the ex-territorial traffic connections.[…]

Second, Hitler’s view of and intentions regarding Poland he clearly revealed to a restricted insider audience on 23 May 1939.

What follows is my translation of the transcription of the so-called Schmundt Notes featured under

http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/schm ... 1939.shtml

Long text, but everything other than boring!

The Schmundt Notes
Report on a Meeting on 23 May 1939

Command Issue
Only through officer
Place: the Führer’s office, New Reich Chancellery
Assistant on Duty: Lieutenant-Colonel of General Staff Schmundt

Participants: The Führer, Field Marshall Göring, Grand Admiral Raeder, Colonel General v. Brauchitsch, Colonel General Keitel, Colonel General Milch, General of Artillery Halder, General Bodenschatz, Commanding Admiral Schniewindt, Colonel at the General Staff Jeschonnek, Colonel of the General Staff
Warlimont, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Schmundt, Captain Engel,
Corvette Captain Albrecht, Captain v. Below.

Subject: Information about the Situation and Political Goals.

The Führer states the purpose of the meeting to be the following:

1.) Presentation of the situation.
2.) Setting of the tasks resulting from the situation for the Wehrmacht.
3.) Clarification of the consequences resulting from the tasks.
4.) Securing the secrecy of all decisions and works resulting from the result of the consequences.

Secrecy is a pre-condition of success.

In the following the contents of the Führer’s statements are rendered:

Our present situation is to be viewed under two aspects:

1.) Actual development from 1933 to 1939.
2.) The constantly equal situation in which Germany finds itself.

In the time from 1933-39 advances were made in all fields. Our military situation improved enormously. Our relationship with our environment has remained the same. Germany had left the circle of the power states. The balance of power was established without Germany’s participation.

Statement of Germany’s vital claims and re-entry into the circle of the power states disturbs this balance. All claims are taken to be an 'intrusion'.

The English fear an economic threat more than a common threat by power.

The mass of 80 millions has solved the ideological problem. The economic problems must also be solved. No German can avoid the creation of the economic pre-conditions for this. Solving the problems requires courage. There must be no avoiding the solution of the problems by adaptation. On the contrary, the circumstances must be matched to the demands. Without intrusion into foreign states or attacking foreign property this is not possible.

The living space, adequate to the greatness of the state, is the basis of all power.[my emphasis] For a time one may do without, but then the solution of the problems comes around one way or the other. There is the choice between rising or falling. In 15 or 20 years the solution will be compulsorily necessary for us. Longer than that no German statesman can go around the issue.

At the time we are in a state of national enthusiasm, in the same mood as two other states: Italy and Japan.

The time lying behind us has been well used. All steps were consequently directed towards the goal.

After six years the situation today is the following:

The national-political unification of the Germans has occurred, save for small exceptions. Further success cannot be obtained without bloodshed.

The drawing of the borders is of military importance
The Pole is not an additional enemy. Poland will always be on the side of our enemies. Despite the friendship treaty there has always been the intention in Poland to use any chance against us.

Danzig is not the object that is at issue. The issue for us is the extension of living space in the east and securing of food supplies as well as solving the Baltic problem.[my emphasis] Food supplies can only be obtained in areas sparsely populated. Beside the fertility the German thorough agriculture will immensely increase the surpluses.

In Europe there is no other possibility.

Colonies: Warning against giving away colonial possessions. That is no solution of the food problem. Blockade!

If fate forces us to a conflict with the West, it is good to have more land in the East.[my emphasis] In the war we can count even less on record harvests than in peacetime.

The population of non-German territories does not do military service and is thus available for work.[my emphasis]

The problem 'Poland' is not to be separated from the conflict with the west.

Poland’s inner steadfastness against Bolshevism is dubious. Thus Poland is also a dubious barrier against Russia.

A successful was in the west with a quick decision is questionable, as is the attitude of Poland.

Pressure from Russia the Polish regime will not withstand. Poland sees danger in Germany’s victory over the West and will try to take this victory away from us.

There can thus be no question of sparing Poland, and the decision that remains is to attack Poland at the first appropriate occasion.[my emphasis]

A repetition of the Czech case we cannot believe in. There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland. The success of isolation is decisive.

Thus the Führer must reserve for himself the final order to strike. There must be no simultaneous confrontation with the West (France and England).

If it is not certain that in the sequence of a German-Polish confrontation a war with the West is to be excluded, the fight must be mainly directed against England and France.

Principle: Confrontation with Poland – beginning with attack against Poland – will only have success if the West stays out.

If this is not possible it will be better to attack the West and to liquidate Poland[my emphasis] at the same time.

It is a matter of skillful politics to isolate Poland.[my emphasis]

A difficult question is that of Japan. While at the time they are for various reasons cool in what concerns going together with us, it is in Japan’s own interest to move against Russia in time.

With Russia economic relations are only possible when political relations have improved. In press statements a cautious attitude is becoming apparent. It is not to be excluded that Russia is disinterested in a shattering of Poland. If Russia keeps driving against us, the relationship with Japan may become closer.

An alliance of France, England and Russia against Germany-Italy-Japan would lead me to attack England and France with some devastating strikes.

The Führer doubts the possibility of a peaceful confrontation with England. It is necessary to be prepared for the confrontation. England sees in our development the foundation of a hegemony that would weaken England. England is thus our enemy, and the confrontation will be one of life and death.

What will this confrontation look like?

England cannot liquidate Germany with a few powerful strikes and force us into submission. For England it is decisive to carry the war as close as possible to the Ruhr area. French blood will not be spared. (West Wall!!) Possession of the Ruhr area is decisive for the duration of our resistance.

The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied militarily. Declarations of neutrality cannot be relied upon. If France and England want to bring about a confrontation during the war between Germany and Poland, they will support the Netherlands and Belgium in their neutrality and let them build fortifications to them force them to come along.

Belgium and the Netherlands will, though under protest, give in to the pressure. If England intervenes during our Polish war, we must thus make a lightning strike against the Netherlands. It is desirable to gain a new line of defense of Dutch territory up to lake Zuider. The war with England and France will be a war of life and death.

The idea that we may be able to buy ourselves out cheaply is dangerous: this possibility does not exist. The bridges must then be broken down, and the issue will no longer be right or wrong, but existence or non-existence of 80 million people.

Question: Short or long war?

All armed forces and state leaders have to strive for a short war. The state leadership must, however, prepare as well for a war lasting 10 to 15 years.

Throughout history people have ever believed in short wars. In 1914 they were still of the opinion that long wars could not be financed. Even today this view is still in many heads. Any state will, however, hold out as long as possible if there is not a decisive weakening right away (for instance Ruhr area). England has similar weaknesses.

England knows that an unfortunate outcome of the war will mean the end of its world power.

England is the motor that drives against Germany. It’s strength lies in the following:

1.) The Briton is proud, brave, tough, resistant and has an organizational talent. He knows how to take advantage of any new event. He has the adventure spirit and the courage of the Nordic Race. Quality sinks with broadening. The German average is better.

2.) It is a world power per see. Constantly increased by allies since 300 years ago. The power is to be seen not only as a real one but also as a psychological one encompassing the world. In addition there is the boundless wealth and the credit-worthiness related thereto.

3.) The geopolitical security and protection by strong sea power and a gallant air force.

England’s weakness:

If in the war we had had two more battleships and two more cruisers and begun the Skagerrak battle in the morning, the British fleet would have been beaten and England brought to its knees. It would have been the end of the World War. In the past it was not sufficient to beat the fleet, one also had to land to defeat England. England could feed itself. This is no longer possible today.

As soon as England is cut off from its supplies it is forced to capitulate. The supply of food and combustion material depends on protection by the fleet.

The attack of the air force against the English homeland does not force England to capitulate in one day. But if the fleet is destroyed, immediate capitulation is the consequence.

There is no doubt that a surprise attack can lead to a quick solution. It would be criminal, however, if the state leadership were to rely on surprise being achieved.

Experience tells us that surprise can be foiled by the following:

1.) Betrayal to persons outside the competent military circles;
2.) Ordinary coincidence leading the whole action to break down;
3.) Human failure;
4.) Weather conditions.

The date to strike must be established long in advance.
Beyond this one cannot, however, live in tension for long.
We must count on the weather conditions making a surprise intervention by the fleet and air force impossible.

This must be considered in the planning as a worst case. .

1.) It remains to be endeavored to deal the opponent a or the devastating blow at the very beginning. Right or wrong or agreements play no part in this.

This is only possible is one doesn’t ‘slip’ into a war with England due to Poland.

2.) Beside the surprise attack and the shattering of English possibilities on the continent, the long war is to be prepared.

The army has to take hold of the positions that are important for the fleet and the air force. If we succeed in occupying the Netherlands and Belgium and beating France, the basis for a successful war against England will have been created.

From western France the air force can take care of the narrower blockade of England, while the wider blockade is carried out by the fleet with the U-boats.

Consequences:

England cannot fight on the continent, the daily attacks by air force and navy cut apart all lifelines.

Time decides against England. Germany doesn’t bleed to death on land.

The necessity of this kind of warfare has been proven by the World War and the military confrontations since then.

From the World War the following compulsory conclusions for the waging of war must be drawn:

1.) Had the navy been stronger at the beginning of the war and the army turned on the Channel ports, the outcome of the war would have been another.

2.) A land cannot be brought to submission by the air force alone.
It is not possible to attack all objectives at the same time, and a few minutes in between bring the defense onto the stage.

3.) What is important is the reckless use of all means.

4.) Once the army in cooperation with the air force and navy taken the most important position, industrial production no longer flows into the Danaid barrel of army battles, but benefits the air force and the navy.

Thus the army must be in conditions to take these positions. The attack according to plan is to be prepared.

To study this is the most important task. The goal is always to bring England to its knees.

Every weapon has a decisive effect on the outcome of battle only as long as the enemy doesn’t possess it.

This applies to gas, U-boats and the air force. For the latter it applied as long as the English fleet had no defense, which in 1940 and 1941 will no longer be the case. Against Poland for instance the tank weapon will be effective, as the Polish army lacks the defense against it.

Where the effect can no longer be deemed decisive, its place is taken by surprise and genius of operation.

This is the program for attack.

The program obliges to the following

1.) Correct evaluation of the weapons and their effect:
for instance
a) Battleship or aircraft carrier, what is more dangerous in the individual case and on the whole. An aircraft carrier is better for protecting a convoy.
b) Is an air attack on a factory more important than one on a battleship? Where are the bottlenecks of factory production?

2.) Regarding the army’s quick preparedness. The neighboring states must be overrun from the barracks.

3.) Regarding the study of the opponent’s weak spots.
These studies must not be left to the general staff. Secrecy is then no longer guaranteed.
The Führer has thus decided to command a small study staff at the Wehrmacht High Command which contains representatives of the three Wehrmacht branches and will on a case by case basis take in the supreme commanders or heads of general staff. This staff must constantly inform the Führer and keep him updated.

The study staff takes care of the intellectual preparation of operations at the highest level and the technical and organizational preparations resulting therefrom. The purpose of certain instructions is nobody’s business outside the staff.

As much as the armament of our opponents may increase, they must at some time reach the end of their possibilities, and ours will be greater.

French recruit classes 120,000 men!

We will not be forced into a war, but there is no way for us around it.

Secrecy is the decisive pre-condition for success. Also towards Italy or Japan the goal must remain secret. For Italy there remains the breaking through the Maginot Line, which is to be studied. The Führer considers the breakthrough possible.

Putting together (bundling) the Wehrmacht branches for the study of the overall problem is important.

The purpose

1.) Study of the overall problem.
2.) " the procedure.
3.) " the required means.
4.) " the necessary training.

The staff must consist of men with much fantasy and best professional knowledge, as well as officers with a sober, skeptical mind.

Principle for the work:

1.) Nobody is to be involved who must not know.
2.) Nobody must learn more than he needs to know.
3.) When at the latest must the respective person know it? Nobody must know anything earlier than he needs to know it.

Upon question by Field Marshall Göring the Führer establishes that

a) the Wehrmacht branches determine what is to be built;
b) the ship building program is not to be changed;
c) the armament programs are to be targeted to 1943 or 44.

For the correctness of the rendering:
Schmundt, Lieutenant Colonel

Source:
Walther Hofer
Die Entfesselung des Zweiten Weltkrieges, pages 61 and following

It should become clear from the above that Hitler wanted to destroy the Polish state in order to a) keep it from eventually striking at him in the future, while he was at war with Britain and France and b) gain Polish territory as agricultural land, together with the manpower required to till it.

[Roberto]

Comments to Mills’ last post (Part 3)

The ruthless treatment of Poland by National Socialist Germany cannot be explained by anything in Hitler's ideology. I would challenge "Witness" to find anything in "Mein Kampf" which expresses racial hostility toward Poles, or the concept of a war of conquest against Poland. In fact, there are very few references to Poles or Poland in the whole work.

I don’t know if there’s anything in Mein Kampf, but ideology transpires in statements like those recorded by Bormann, see above quote. Poles are born cheap laborers who must be kept at that level to serve German needs, and any Polish leaders must be bumped off to make sure that those dumb and lazy unskilled workers obey only to German masters – if that’s not racist ideology, I don’t know what is.

Thus, the difference in the German treatment of Poles and Czechs cannot be traced back to Hitler's ideology, since Hitler was hostile toward Czech s but not toward Poles. The much greater brutality toward Poles was a result, not of ideology, but of the war situation; the Poles resisted and caused germany a lot of trouble, whereas the Czechs did not resist.

Looks like Mills is putting the cart before the oxen, for the "much greater brutality towards Poles" seems to have started before "the Poles resisted and caused germany a lot of trouble".

On page 3 of his book Forgotten Holocaust,

During the Wehrmacht's administration of Poland, which went on until October 25, 1939, the German armed forces joined the Schutzstaffel (SS) and police in what Polish historians have described as "a merciless and systematic campaign of biological destruction." During the period of military control in Poland, 531 towns and villages were burned; the provinces of Lodz and Warsaw suffered the heaviest losses. Various branches of the army and police carried out 714 executions, which took the lives of 16,376 people, most of whom were Polish Christians. The Wehrmacht committed approximately 60 percent of these crimes, with the police responsible for the remainder. An English woman was an eyewitness to the criminal activities of the Germans in Bydgoszcz at this time:

The first victims of the campaign were a number of Boy Scouts, from twelve to sixteen years of age, who were set up in the marketplace against a wall and shot. No reason was given. A devoted priest who rushed to administer the Last Sacrament was shot too. He received five wounds. A Pole said afterwards that the sight of those children lying dead was the most piteous of all the horrors he saw. That week the murders continued. Thirty-four of the leading tradespeople and merchants of the town were shot, and many other leading citizens. They square was surrounder by troops with machine guns.
Among the thirty-four was a man whom I knew was too ill to take any part in politics or public affairs. When the execution took place he was too weak to stand, and fell down; they beat him and dragged him again to his feet. Another of the first victims was a boy of seventeen, the only son of a well-known surgeon who had died a year before. The father had been greatly esteemed by all, and had treated the Poles and Germans with the same care and devotion. We never heard of what the poor lad was accused ...
These are only a few examples of the indiscriminate murders which took place. The shooting was still going on when I left the town. At the beginning it was done by the soldiers, afterwards the Gestapo and the SS took over, and exceeded the troops in their cruelty.[...]

It was the German-Soviet war that most resembled a German-Slav racial war. In that context, the idea of the Russian "Untermensch" was used by Germany as a propagandistic device, as in the the pamphlet "Der Untermensch" produced by Himmler's agencies.

However, such an anti-Slavic attitude was not uniform throughout the German Government. Rosenberg and his ministry in particular opposed it, and tried to promote a more nuanced policy, in which Great Russians were certainly discriminated against, but other Slavic peoples, in particular the Ukrainians, were favoured.

Ah, so the gentle Rosenberg wished to see the Great Russians treated like sub-humans. Interesting.

There was constant conflict between Rosenberg and the more anti-Slavic extremists, eventually resolved in favour of Rosenberg's more moderate position.

Was it, Mills? How so? For all I know, Soviet prisoners of war, regardless of whether they were Russians, Ukrainians or Belorussians, were treated like scum throughout the war. Deportation of forced laborers, especially from Ukraine, never ceased either, and neither did the killings sprees called "anti-partisan operations", directed against the peasants unfortunate enough to inhabit "bandit-infested" areas, especially in Belorussia.

When it comes to the huge casualties suffered by the Russian and other Slavic peoples during the Soviet-German war, it must be borne in mind that those casualties were not solely due to German policies, but also to the methods of waging war adopted by the Soviet Government, which amounted to using its own people as expendable cannon-fodder.

Which leads us to a "who was first, the egg or the hen?" – question: would the Soviets have been compelled to expend their people as cannon-fodder in order to save their state if it had not been for Hitler’s aggression?

Another question relates to the weight of Soviet manpower expenditure: just how many excess casualties were caused by the reckless Soviet way of making war, rather than by the magnitude and brutality of the fighting itself? The Germans and their allies had well over 4 million battlefield fatalities on the Eastern Front, and the wide initial gap in military prowess makes it seem probable that Soviet battle deaths would have been much higher than that even if the Red Army had used its manpower more sparingly.

Finally, the negative image of the Russian people that was promoted by parts of the German Government, in particular by Himmler's agencies, was not one that was created by Germans or held by them alone. In fact, it is a fair bet that Poles have traditionally been far more hostile to the Russian people than Germans have ever been.

If the statement refers to the time before the Third Reich, I agree. The views and policies promoted by the Nazi government created much enmity where such had hardly existed before.

[witness]

Thank you very much Roberto !
There is no need for my reply to mills after your posts.
I wish I was that efficient.

Today we can speak of a fight of races.(Hitler)

No matter how many arguments are brought up;how many immutable facts,how many quotations - the minds of the Nazi-apologists will remain the same -" the Nazis were the good guys ."
The good news is that for the majority of thinking people this kind of Nazi-apologetic blabbering is entirely absurd and simply ludicrous.
Best Regards.

[witness]

Roberto wrote :

While these documents don’t support the notion of a "war against Slavs per se" (assuming that this is indeed the thesis of witness; from what I know of Mills I wouldn’t be surprised if he had deliberately misrepresented his opponent’s statements, one of his favorite tricks

No this is not my thesis. My point of view is that many Slavs perceive this war as the war against the Slavic entity because of the above mentioned reasons.
I am very much aware that the reasons for this war were much more complex then that.This is mostly the question of subjective perception . I encountered different opinions on this subject :1 that this war was against Jews ( against their ''domination'' and "overrepresentation") 2. that this war was against
Anglo-Saxonian imperialism 3 .that this war was against Bolshevism.
But one can say that this was also the racial war against Slavs as well.

[Roberto]

Thank you very much Roberto !

You're welcome, Michael, and I'm glad you liked it.

Though with much work on my desk, I couldn’t resist commenting when I saw your namesake again dishing up some of his untenable apologetic contentions.

I didn’t follow the discussion from the beginning, but if the contentions Mills attributed to you really corresponded to what you meant to say, I would be very surprised indeed.

Best regards,
Roberto

[michael mills]

Roberto has subjected us all to another snow job, apparently in an attempt to support the proposition, introduced by "witness" who may or may not support it, that the 1939-45 war in East Europe was a racial war between Germans and Slavs.

I will comment on the more relevant points. But it needs to be borne in mind that the issue is not one of a war between Germany and Poland, or between Germany and the Soviet Union, but one of a general race war between germans and Slavs per se. I have already shown that the proposition put forward by "witness" is unlikely to be true, on the one hand because Germany was not at war with all Slavs but was allied with some, eg Slovaks, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Bulgarians, (and parts of some with which it was otherwise at war, eg Poles in Belorussia and Ukraine, Vlasov Russians, Cossacks etc) and on the other because a lot of the violence during the war was perpetrated by Slavs on other Slavs, eg Croats on Serbs, Ukrainians on Poles etc.

Thus it is likely that most of the material dumped on us by Roberto is not really relevant to the essential issue.

Now to comments on Roberto's material.

Part 1: This consists of 14 quotations, the majority of which are examples of a German Government policy of ruthless economic expoitation of occupied Poland and the occupied Soviet Union for the purpose of providing the material resources for Germany to prosecute the war in the face of the Allied Blockade. Thus they demonstrate the ruthlessness of the German Government in responding to the exigencies of wartime conditions, but hardly a policy of waging racial war against the Slavs.

Indeed, quotation 5 is a complaint from a senior official of the Ostministerium, Braeutigam, about the ruthlessness with which the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories were being treated, on the basis that such treatment would turn those people against Germany. If a racial war against Slavs were being waged, then the question of winning over the local people would not have arisen.

Quotation 1 is an example of tough talk by Hans Frank, reminiscent of similar tough talk by officials on both sides during the war, concerning what they would like to do to the enemy. United States officials were not too gentle in their attitutde toward the Japanese, for example.

Quotation 2 is a call to annihilate the Bolshevik intelligence and Commissars, not Slavs per se. No doubt many millions of Slavs welcomed the annihilation of the Bolshevik intelligence (which was largely Jewish anyway).

Quotation 3 permits violence against the civilian population under wartime conditions, to the extent that such violence will not be automatically prosecuted. However, prosecution is not entirely ruled out. The order is a recognition of the nature of the expected partisan warfare, in which guerillas would hide among the civilian population and could be easily distinguished from them. It is not an indication of racial war.

Quotation 4 is likewise a measure to suppress opposition, not a measure of racial war.

Quotation 5 has been dealt with. It shows that ruthless measures were being perpetrated in a situation of total war, but does not indicate that that war was a racial one.

Quotations 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the German policy of taking food supplies out of the Occupied Eastern to feed the German people and Army, with a ruthless disregard for the consequences for the native population, which would inevitably entail mass starvation. But that policy was driven by a need to feed Germany, not by a specifically anti-Slavic attitude, and the ruthless atttitude toward the population of the occupied territories arose not because they were Slavs, but because they were competitors for the food supplies that the Germans wanted.

Quotation 9 represents an extreme version of the ruthless policy of exploitation. It does not present starvation as the inevitable fate of the conquered nations; living in prosperity is equally possible, under the condition that that is compatible with the interests of the German people.

Quotation 10 does mention a "racial struggle", but I would like to know the reliability of the source. That is, do the words quoted come from an actual record of what Himmler said at the meeting (ie a transcription or tape-recording), or do they come from someone's post-war recollection, which might well be tainted.

I note that Browning's footnote refers only to confirmation of the date of the meeting, not to its content.

I recall from Gerlach's "Kalkulierte Morde" that the words attributed to Himmler derive from a post-war interrogation of Bach-Zelewski, a most unreliable source. As I recall, Gerlach says that Bach-Zelewski even got the date of the meeting wrong by a year or so.

Quotation 11 documents Hitler's ideas about German colonisation of the conquered Russian territory. The German colonists would constitute a ruling class, served by the native population. What is unsaid but implicit in Hitler's words is that the German colonists would replace the existing Bolshevik ruling class, whom Hilter believed to be largely Jewish. Thus the forseen establishment of a German ruling class would be the result of a war waged against the existing Jewish Bolshevik ruling class, rather than against the already subjugated Slavs.

Quotation 12 has Hitler talking about a "racial war". But against whom? Is Hitler talking about a "racial war" waged by Germany, or is he saying that all wars are now racial in nature? He also talks about waging war for economic resopurces, so it is unclear exactly what he means. Perhaps Roberto should give the full context of the speech from which he has excerpted this very small snippet.

Quotations 13 and 14 refer to measures to crush Polish resistance, which involved eliminating the anti-German elements in Polish culture and education.

Roberto finally wrote:

Hitler’s "New Order" in the East was to be something like ancient Sparta, with the Germans the Spartans and the Slavs the Helots.

In fact, Hitler's model for German rule over Russia was British rule over India. Although the British certainly had a racially-based attitude toward the Indians over whom they ruled, it cannot be said that they waged a racial war against the Indians, certainly not a war of extermination, even though there were occasions when many millions of Indians died of starvation.

[walterkaschner]

Coming so late to this thread I am hesitant to put in my 2 pfennig's worth, but , in one of my favorite quotes of May West "I only succumb to temptation when I find it irresistible."

Although I do not at all agree with Michael Mills' notions as to the underlying cause of the German invasion of Poland (and I think this ground has been thoroughly ploughed and harrowed previously on this Forum or on its predessesor, so I don't intend to go into it further here except to point to Roberto's above post quoting Schmundt's notes of the May 25, 1939 meeting between Hitler and his senior officers), I must agree with Mr. Mills' basic point, which as I understand it is that the principal motive of the German invasion of Poland and then the USSSR was NOT racist - at least in the sense of a general race war of the "German race" against the Slavic.

In my view, the invasion of Poland was clearly motivated by a desire to obtain "Lebensraum" and a springboard for a future invasion of Russia. I agree with Mr. Mills that Poland itself was not initially (at the time of the composition of "Mein Kampf") a principal target of Hitler's ambition, but I do believe that it ultimately became one when Hitler realized that Poland would never agree to become a vassal and join Germany in a war against the Soviet Union. But I do not believe that the invasion of Poland had an anti-Slav racial motivation; I believe that it was rather basically motivated by a stategic desire to eliminate the threat of a two-front war and a tactical desire to push the German frontier toward the Soviets substantially farther towards the East. Certainly the Germans attempt to eliminate the Polish intelligentsia ( mirrored by the Russians, but I think for somewhat different reasons ) can be construed as racist, but can equally be explained by the same reasons that motivated the Russians.


In support of his view( with which I with some reservation agree) that there was not a pure racist animus behind the Germans aggresion against the Slavs, Michael Mills wrote

The historical record indicates that pretty well all Austrians must have some Slavic ancestry.

While I don't know if I would go so far as to say that "pretty well all Austrians must have some Slavic ancestry", a cursory thumb through of the Vienna phone book will confirm that it contains many, many names of obvious Slavic origin. Wasn't it Metternich who said that the Balkans begin in Vienna's 5th ward?

Moreover, in Germany itself there is (and was) plenty of evidence of racial mixture between Germans and Slavs, particularly in the case of those Germans originating from the Eastern borders, such as East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. The parents of my dear late wife were both Silesian, and bore the high cheekbones and blue grey eyes (as she did) which were typical of Slavs from that area. But although her father bore a Slavic name, he was a professional Prussian, then German, army officer and as loyal to Germany (although toward the end not to the Nazi government) as anyone could be. I know this is anecdotal, but one only has to skim the annals of German history to recognize the admixture of Slavic names to the German in the Eastern Prussian border areas. Remember, for example, Clausewitz??? And why should that be surprising after all? At least not to Americans, where most of us have become a hopelessly mongrelized race - if "race" is even a valid concept.

On the other hand, it seems to me obvious that a large (probably preponderant) segment of the Germans at the time felt the Slavs to be a decidedly inferior race. As Roberto has shown, this notion pervades most of senior Nazi thinking, Rosenberg and a few others( who had by this time little or no influence) to the contrary, although I think on pragmatic, rather than philosophical grounds. I am not impressed by the fact that the Germans took Bulgarians, Romanians, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Latvians etc. as their allies or even into their own armed forces. Hitler was (except where the Jews were concerned) an opportunist and pragmatist and clearly believed that "the enemy of my enemy (ie, the Soviet Union) is my friend." Yet I sincerely doubt that, had the Soviet Union been defeated, Hitler's Slavic allies and hangers-on would have been treated as anything more than puppet states, with their indigenous Slavic population denigrated, as Roberto suggests, into "helot" status.

I agree with Mr. Mills that much of Hitler's and others ferocious attack on the Russians as"Untermenschen" was probably in great part designed to whip up enthusiasm for Barbarossa, yet it is obvious that it struck a highly sympathetic cord with many, if not most, of the Nazis as well as a significant segment of the Wehrmacht. Clearly, the conduct of the Germans vis-à-vis the Russians was far and away more brutal than in the West, and with a few (but notable) exceptions even the "Grey Army" was prepared to accept the proposition that notions of civilized warfare did not apply in the East.

So, for whatever little it may be worth, it seems to me that the evidence at hand shows:

1. That the primary motivation of the German invasions of Poland and Russia was NOT Racist in the sense ( like that of the intent toward the Jews) of a basic intent to wipe out "("ausrotten") the Slavic populace;

2. That the fact that there had been a significant intermixture of Slavs and Germans over the years tempered to some extent the Germans' attitude toward the Slavs, yet I suspect that the feeling was that the "German" blood had worked to dilute and enoble the "Slavic" blood;

3. That to at least some degree the German exhortations against the Russian "Untermenschen" were for motivational and propaganda purposes;

4. That nonetheless, at the end of the day, the Slavs (or at least the Poles and the Russians, and IMHO the others as well) were considered by the Germans to be so inferior racially as deserving of no greater status than that of helot, or at best puppet, to German masters, which was the intended outcome of the drive towards "Lebensraum"; and

5. That had the Germans prevailed, the Slavic population of the conquered territories would have, at very best, been effectively dominated by the local or imported Germans much as the population of the Baltic States had been dominated for centuries by the "Baltdeutsche Baronen."

Sorry that I have nothing additional in the way of source material to support my views, but it seems to me that there has been adequate material already supplied on this thread to make a judgement.

Regards to all, Kaschner

[witness]

As I mentioned before this war was not entirely racial
( was there such a pure racial war in history to begin with ? ) having a lot of different underlying contributing reasons and therefore being very complex.
But this was also a racial war against Slavs as well as against Jews
I don't see any reason why this distinction is made -that this was a racial war against Jews but not against Slavs.
Both people were declared subhumans by the Nazi theorists.
Jews were to be exterminated as opposite to Slavs maybe just because they are not that numerous. To exterminate all Slavs would be absolutely impossible and absurd task so perhaps just only out of this reason Slavs were given this role of Helots in the happy vision of the Nazi future.
Again I don't see any serious principal difference with regards to the racist theories Of Nazism against Slavs or Jews and Gypsies.

[Roberto]

Roberto has subjected us all to another snow job, apparently in an attempt to support the proposition, introduced by "witness" who may or may not support it, that the 1939-45 war in East Europe was a racial war between Germans and Slavs.

If Mills had read my post more thoroughly, he might have discovered a statement of mine that the evidence shown did not support the notion of a general racial war between Germans and Slavs, although it shows an attitude of racist contempt in regard to Poles and even more so the Slavic peoples of the Soviet Union.

But then, what would this matter to Mills, eager as usual to pin convenient labels on his opponents by misrepresenting their statements?

I will comment on the more relevant points. But it needs to be borne in mind that the issue is not one of a war between Germany and Poland, or between Germany and the Soviet Union, but one of a general race war between germans and Slavs per se. I have already shown that the proposition put forward by "witness" is unlikely to be true, on the one hand because Germany was not at war with all Slavs but was allied with some, eg Slovaks, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, Bulgarians, (and parts of some with which it was otherwise at war, eg Poles in Belorussia and Ukraine, Vlasov Russians, Cossacks etc) and on the other because a lot of the violence during the war was perpetrated by Slavs on other Slavs, eg Croats on Serbs, Ukrainians on Poles etc.

As Mills, in his usual rat-like manner, has also taken recourse to misrepresenting my statements, I would like him to produce exact quotes of the statements of witness from which he concluded that "general race war between germans and Slavs per se" was witness’ contention.

Shall we see the quotes, or shall we conclude that Mills was again displaying his well-known intellectual dishonesty?

Thus it is likely that most of the material dumped on us by Roberto is not really relevant to the essential issue.

Careful with such statements, Mills. Readers may consider the material I "dumped" quite interesting and see Mills in an accordingly unfavourable light.

Now to comments on Roberto's material.

Part 1: This consists of 14 quotations, the majority of which are examples of a German Government policy of ruthless economic expoitation of occupied Poland and the occupied Soviet Union for the purpose of providing the material resources for Germany to prosecute the war in the face of the Allied Blockade. Thus they demonstrate the ruthlessness of the German Government in responding to the exigencies of wartime conditions, but hardly a policy of waging racial war against the Slavs.

What they demonstrate, my dear Mills, is that the German Government adopted especially ruthless policies in regard to Poles and inhabitants of the Soviet Union, policies they would not have applied in regard to e.g. Western Europeans, and that they did this because they considered the Slav inhabitants of Poland and especially the Soviet Union lesser human beings.

Indeed, quotation 5 is a complaint from a senior official of the Ostministerium, Braeutigam, about the ruthlessness with which the peoples of the Occupied Eastern Territories were being treated, on the basis that such treatment would turn those people against Germany. If a racial war against Slavs were being waged, then the question of winning over the local people would not have arisen.

Nonsense. If war and occupation had not been not influenced by racist considerations, the subject matter of Bräutigam’s complaint, i.e. the brutal and contemptuous treatment of the occupied Slav populations as "whites of Class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe", would not have existed.

Quotation 1 is an example of tough talk by Hans Frank, reminiscent of similar tough talk by officials on both sides during the war, concerning what they would like to do to the enemy. United States officials were not too gentle in their attitutde toward the Japanese, for example.

More junk. Frank was not talking about military enemies, but about an occupied population for which he had the deepest hatred and contempt. His statement was that, while the labour force of these inferior beings was unfortunately needed during the war, they could be disposed of, as far as he was concerned, when they were no longer needed. One might see his statements as the Nazis’ utilitarian-racist approach to the occupied peoples of Poland and the Soviet Union in a nutshell.

Quotation 2 is a call to annihilate the Bolshevik intelligence and Commissars, not Slavs per se. No doubt many millions of Slavs welcomed the annihilation of the Bolshevik intelligence (which was largely Jewish anyway).

Looks like Mills expects the audience to rely on his distortions and not read the quote, which speaks not only about Commissars and Bolshevik intelligence but also about the treatment of Soviet prisoners of war as being beyond the "standpoint of soldierly comradeship", about the coming war being a "fight to annihilation" and about a general policy of "harshness", which can hardly be explained by the antagonism between Nazism and Bolshevism alone. What this quote shows, in connection with the others, is that the Nazis considered the Slav inhabitants of the Soviet Union particularly worthless because, apart from their perceived racial inferiority, they were also tainted by Bolshevism.

Quotation 3 permits violence against the civilian population under wartime conditions, to the extent that such violence will not be automatically prosecuted. However, prosecution is not entirely ruled out. The order is a recognition of the nature of the expected partisan warfare, in which guerillas would hide among the civilian population and could be easily distinguished from them. It is not an indication of racial war.

Yeah, sure. Assuming that Mills can show us in what Nazi campaign other than "Barbarossa" the civilian population was deprived of the protection of law and declared fair game, as it was under this directive.

Quotation 4 is likewise a measure to suppress opposition, not a measure of racial war.

Of course, if Mills can show us that similar ruthlessness was mandated and/or applied as standard procedure anywhere else than in the Soviet Union, Poland and Yugoslavia.

Quotation 5 has been dealt with. It shows that ruthless measures were being perpetrated in a situation of total war, but does not indicate that that war was a racial one.

Looks like Mills hasn’t read it, otherwise he might have stumbled upon passages like

[…]In the prevailing limitless abuse of the Slavic humanity, "recruiting" methods were used which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods of the slave trade.[…]

or

[…]This system in no way considered that these methods would of necessity have their effect on the power of resistance of the Red Army, since these methods were used only in the Soviet Union of course, and in no way remotely resembling this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway.[…]

or

[…]With a presumption unequalled we put aside all political knowledge and to the glad surprise of all the colored world treat the peoples of the occupied Eastern territories as whites of Class 2, who apparently have only the task of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe.[…]

Quotations 6, 7 and 8 illustrate the German policy of taking food supplies out of the Occupied Eastern to feed the German people and Army, with a ruthless disregard for the consequences for the native population, which would inevitably entail mass starvation. But that policy was driven by a need to feed Germany, not by a specifically anti-Slavic attitude, and the ruthless atttitude toward the population of the occupied territories arose not because they were Slavs, but because they were competitors for the food supplies that the Germans wanted.

Looks like for Mills the war would have been a racial war only if Slavs had been killed or left to starve just because they were Slavs.

I don’t remember having stated that this was so.

What I did state and what the quotes clearly show, however, is that the Germans held the Slav inhabitants of the Soviet Union in such a deep contempt that they considered to let "umpteen million" of them starve to death in carrying out their food supply policies, which to me is a racist policy in that it would not have been applied against peoples not deemed "subhuman", like the Slav inhabitants of the targeted "food importing areas" were.

Quotation 9 represents an extreme version of the ruthless policy of exploitation. It does not present starvation as the inevitable fate of the conquered nations; living in prosperity is equally possible, under the condition that that is compatible with the interests of the German people.

Mills conveniently ignores what kind of "prosperity" Himmler accorded to those "nations": the “prosperity” of a slave’s existence, at the very best. If the "nations" were not useful as "slaves for our culture", they could go to hell.

Quotation 10 does mention a "racial struggle", but I would like to know the reliability of the source.

That’s my Mills. When he stumbles upon evidence he can’t try to twist his way, he questions "the reliability of the source".

That is, do the words quoted come from an actual record of what Himmler said at the meeting (ie a transcription or tape-recording), or do they come from someone's post-war recollection, which might well be tainted.

"Might be" doesn’t mean "is", and the "is" must be demonstrated by who so alleges. A simple rule that "sceptics" like Mills often forget.

I note that Browning's footnote refers only to confirmation of the date of the meeting, not to its content.

I recall from Gerlach's "Kalkulierte Morde" that the words attributed to Himmler derive from a post-war interrogation of Bach-Zelewski, a most unreliable source. As I recall, Gerlach says that Bach-Zelewski even got the date of the meeting wrong by a year or so.

Mills is invited to explain why he considers Bach-Zelewski a "most unreliable source", and to transcribe the passage from Gerlach’s book where it is stated that the witness got the date wrong "by a year or so", whatever this is supposed to matter. The date of the meeting seems to be confirmed by Himmler’s Terminkalender, the spirit of the statement tallies with that of others made by Himmler himself and other Nazi bigwigs like Göring (as quoted by Count Ciano, presumably also a "most unreliable source" for Mills), and both Browning and Gerlach, two historians of note, seem to consider whatever records on the Wewelsburg speech they consulted reliable enough. So it looks like Mills will have to do better.

Quotation 11 documents Hitler's ideas about German colonisation of the conquered Russian territory. The German colonists would constitute a ruling class, served by the native population. What is unsaid but implicit in Hitler's words is that the German colonists would replace the existing Bolshevik ruling class, whom Hilter believed to be largely Jewish. Thus the forseen establishment of a German ruling class would be the result of a war waged against the existing Jewish Bolshevik ruling class, rather than against the already subjugated Slavs.

Mills seems to think that a war conducted for the purpose of turning a people deemed as racially inferior into helots, whose fate would be serving their German masters at best, is not a racial war. As I have said on occasion, the greatest weakness of creatures like Mills is their inability to stop being themselves.

Quotation 12 has Hitler talking about a "racial war". But against whom? Is Hitler talking about a "racial war" waged by Germany, or is he saying that all wars are now racial in nature? He also talks about waging war for economic resopurces, so it is unclear exactly what he means. Perhaps Roberto should give the full context of the speech from which he has excerpted this very small snippet.

Hitler doesn’t say against whom the "racial war" was to be directed, otherwise I would have quoted the respective passage. But I consider it worth noting that Hitler applied this term, "racial war", to a war he was principally waging for the purpose of increasing Germany’s "living space" and obtaining related resources at the expense of peoples deemed inferior. Who other than those inferior Eastern Slavs does Mills think the Führer expected to obtain "oilfields, rubber, raw materials etc." from?

Here's the context, as requested by Mills.

Excerpt from Hitler’s Speech before the Wehrmacht’s Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939, as quoted in Max Domarus, Hitler Reden 1932-1945, after IMT 789-PS

23 November 1939, 12 Uhr

Besprechung beim Führer, zu der alle Oberbefehlshaber befohlen sind.
Der Führer trägt folgendes vor: [...]
Die steigende Volkszahl erfordert größeren Lebensraum. Mein Ziel war, ein vernünftiges Verhältnis zwischen Volkszahl und Volksraum herbeizuführen. Hier muß der Kampf einsetzen. Um die Lösung dieser Aufgabe kommt kein Volk herum oder es muß verzichten und allmählich untergehen. Das lehrt die Geschichte. Zuerst Völkerwanderung nach Südosten, dann Anpassung der Volkszahl an den geringen Raum durch Auswanderung. In den letzten Jahren Anpassung der Volkszahl an den ungenügenden Raum durch Verminderung der Geburten. Dies würde zum Volkstod, zur Ausblutung führen. Geht ein Volk diesen Weg, so werden alle Schwächen mobilisiert. Man verzichtet auf Gewalt nach außen und wendet die Gewalt gegen sich selbst an durch Tötung des Kindes. Das bedeutet die größte Feigheit, Dezimierung der Zahl und Entwertung.
Ich habe mich zum anderen Weg entschlossen: Anpassung des Lebensraums an die Volkszahl. Wichtig ist eine Erkenntnis: der Staat hat nur dann einen Sinn, wenn er der Erhaltung seiner Volkssubstanz dient. Bei uns handelt es sich um 82 Millionen Menschen. Das bedeutet größte Verpflichtung. Der, der diese Verpflichtung nicht auf sich nimmt, ist nicht wert, dem Volkskörper anzugehören. Dies gab mir die Kraft zum Kampf. Es ist ein ewiges Problem, die Zahl der Deutschen in Verhältnis zu bringen zum Boden. Sicherung des notwendigen Raumes. Keine geklügelte Gescheitheit hilft hier, Lösung nur mit dem Schwert. Ein Volk das die Kraft nicht aufbringt zum Kampf, muß abtreten.
Die Kämpfe sind anders geworden als vor 100 Jahren. Heute können wir von einem Rassenkampf sprechen. Heute kämpfen wir um Ölfelder, Gummi, Erdschätze usw. Nach dem Westfälischen Frieden war Deutschland zerfallen. Zersplitterung, Ohnmacht des deutschen Reiches war vertraglich festgelegt. Diese deutsche Ohnmacht wurde durch die Reichsgründung wieder beseitigt, als Preußen sich auf seine Aufgabe besann. Dann begann der Gegensatz gegen Frankreich und England. Seit 1870 ist England gegen uns. Bismarck und Moltke waren sich klar, daß noch einmal angetreten werden müßte. Damals war die Gefahr des Zwei-Fronten-Krieges. Moltke war zeitweilig für den Präventivkrieg. Ausnutzung der langsameren Mobilmachung der Russen. Deutsche Wehrkraft war nicht voll ausgenutzt. Ungenügende Härte der führenden Persönlichkeiten. Der Grundgedanke der Moltkeschen Pläne war die Offensive. Er hat niemals an die Defensive gedacht.
Nach Moltkes Tod wurden zahlreiche Gelgenheiten verpaßt. Die Lösung war nur möglich durch Angriff gegen einen Staat bei günstigster Gelegenheit. Politische und militärische Leitung haben Schuld daran, daß die Gelegenheiten verpaßt wurden. Die militärische Leitung erklärte immer wieder, daß sie noch nicht fertig sei. 1914 kam der Mehr-Fronten-Krieg. Er brachte nicht die Lösung des Problems.
Heute wird der zweite Akt dieses Dramas geschrieben. Zum ersten Male seit 67 Jahren muß festgestellt werden, daß wir keinen Zwei-Fronten-Krieg zu führen haben. Es ist das eingetreten, was man sich seit 1870 gewünscht hat und tatsächlich für unmöglich hielt. Zum ersten Male in der Geschichte haben wir nur gegen eine Front zu kämpfen, die andere ist z.Zt. frei. Aber niemand kann wissen, wie lange es so bleibt.
Ich habe lange gezweifelt, ob ich erst im Osten und dann im Westen losschlagen sollte. Grundsätzlich habe ich die Wehrmacht nicht aufgestellt, um nicht zu schlagen. Der Entschluß zum Schlagen war immer in mir. Früher oder später wollte ich das Problem lösen. Zwangsläufig wurde entschieden, daß der Osten zunächst zum Ausfall gebracht wurde.
Wenn der Polenkrieg so schnell gelang, so lag es an der Überlegenheit unserer Wehrmacht. Ruhmvollste Erscheinung in unserer Geschichte. Unerwartet geringe Verluste an Menschen und Material. Jetzt wird die Ostfront mit wenigen Divisionen gehalten. Es ist eine Lage, wie wir sie früher als unerreichbar ansahen. Jetzt ist die Lage folgende: Der Gegner liegt im Westen hinter seinen Befestigungen. Es ist keine Möglichkeit, ihn anzugreifen. Entscheidend ist: wie lange können wir die Lage aushalten?
Rußland ist z.Zt. ungefährlich. Es ist heute geschwächt durch viele innere Vorgänge. Außerdem haben wir den Vertrag mit Rußland. Verträge werden aber nur so lange gehalten, wie sie zweckmäßig sind. Rußland wird sich nur so lange daran halten, als es Rußland selbst für sich für gut hält. Auch Bismarck hat so gedacht. Man denke an den Rückversicherungs-Vertrag. [Fußnote: Der Hinweis ist völlig deplaziert. Der Rückversicherungsvertrag (gegenseitiger Neutralitätsvertrag zwischen Deutschland und Rußland, 1887 von Bismarck geschlossen) wurde nicht von Rußland, sondern von Deutschland fallengelassen, und zwar nicht von Bismarck, sondern von dessen Nachfolger Caprivi.] Jetzt hat Rußland noch weitgehende Ziele, vor allen Dingen Stärkung seiner Position in der Ostsee.
Wir können Rußland nur entgegentreten, wenn wir im Westen frei sind. Ferner strebt Rußland Stärkung seines Einflusses auf dem Balkan an und strebt nach dem Persischen Golf. Das ist auch das Ziel unserer Außenpolitik. Rußland wird das tun, was es für sich für gut hält. Augenblicklich ist der Internationalismus zurückgetreten. Falls Rußland darauf verzichtet, wird es zum Panslawismus übergehen. Es ist schwer, in die Zukunft zu sehen.
Tatsache ist, daß zur Zeit russische Wehrmacht geringen Wert hat. Für die nächsten ein oder zwei Jahre wird der jetzige Zustand bestehen bleiben.
Viel hängt ab von Italien, vor allem von Mussolini, dessen Tod alles ändern kann. Italien hat große Ziele für Befestigung seines Imperiums. Träger dieser Idee sind ausschließlich der Faschismus und der Duce persönlich. Der Hof steht ablehnend dem gegenüber. Solange der Duce lebt, so lange kann damit gerechnet werden, daß Italien jede Möglichkeit wahrnehmen wird, seine imperialistischen Ziele zu erreichen. Es ist aber von Italien zu viel verlangt, wenn es eingreifen soll, bevor Deutschland die Offensive im Westen ergriffen hat; ebenso hat Rußland erst eingegriffen, als wir in Polen einmarschiert waren. Sonst denkt Italien, daß Frankreich sich nur mit Italien beschäftigt, da Deutschland hinter seinem Westwall sitzt. Italien wird erst eingreifen, wenn Deutschland selbst gegen Frankreich offensiv vorgegangen ist. Ebenso wie der Tod Stalins kann der Tod des Duce uns Gefahren bringen.[…]

My translation:

23 November 1939, 12 Uhr

Meeting with the Führer, which all supreme commanders are ordered to attend
The Führer refers the following: [...]
The growing number of people requires greater living space. My goal was to bring about a reasonable relation between the number of people and the space available to it. Here the fight must commence. No people can go around solving this task, lest it wants to do without and gradually vanish. This is what history teaches us. First the peoples’ migration to the Southeast, then the adaptation of the number of people to the scarce space through emigration. In the last years adaptation of the number of people to the insufficient space by reducing the number of births. This would lead to the death of the people, to its bleeding dry. If a people takes this way, it renounces violence towards the outside and applies it against itself by killing its infants. This means greatest cowardice, decimation and devaluation.
I decided to take the other way: Adapt the living space to the number of people. One realization is important: the state makes sense only if it serves to maintain the substance of the people. In our case it is 82 million people. This means greatest responsibility. He who doesn’t take this responsibility upon himself is not worth belonging to the body popular. This gave me the strength to fight. It is an eternal problem to bring the number of Germans in relation to the soil. To secure the necessary space. No windy smartness helps here, a solution is only possible by the sword. A people that doesn’t put together the strength to fight must leave the stage.
Fighting is different today from what it was 100 years ago. Today we can speak of a fight of races. Today we fight for oilfields, rubber, raw materials etc. After the Peace of Westphalia Germany had fallen apart. This German impotence was again removed by the foundation of the Reich, when Prussia took conscience of its task. Then the antagonism towards France and England began. England stands against us since 1870. Bismarck and Moltke saw clearly that there would be another round. At that time there was the danger of a two-front war. Moltke for some time favored a preventive war, taking advantage of the slower mobilization of the Russians. The German striking power was not fully taken advantage of. Insufficient toughness of the leading personalities. The basic thought of Moltke’s plans was offensive. He never thought of defensive.
After Moltke’s death numerous chances were missed. The solution was only possible by attacking a state at the most favorable opportunity. The political and military leadership were to blame for this chance having been missed. The military command was always declaring that it was not yet ready. In 1914 the war on several fronts broke out. It didn’t bring the solution of the problem.

Today the second act of this drama is being written. For the first time in 67 years it must be verified that we don’t need to wage a war on two fronts. We have the situation that was desired since 1870 and actually considered impossible. For the first time in history we have to fight only against one front, the other is currently free. But no one can no how long things will stay this way.
For a long time I was in doubt whether I should strike first in the East or in the West. As a matter of principle I didn’t create the Werhmacht in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Sooner or later I wanted to solve the problem. Necessarily it was decided to make our first move in the East.
If the Polish war succeeded so quickly, this was due to the superiority of our Wehrmacht. The most glorious achievement in our history. Unexpectedly low losses in men and material. Now the Eastern Front is held with few divisions. It is a situation such as we considered impossible to achieve in the past. Now the situation is the following: the enemy in the West lies behind his fortifications. It is not possible to attack him. What is decisive is: how long can we bear this situation ?
Russia is currently harmless. It is weakened these days by many internal occurrences. Besides, we have an agreement with Russia. Agreements, however, are held only as long as they are useful. Russia will stick to this agreement only as long as she considers it good for herself. Bismarck thought so as well. Remember the Reinsurance Agreement [Footnote: this remark is completely out of place. The Reinsurance Agreement (a mutual neutrality agreement between Germany and Russia, signed by Bismarck in 1887) was dropped not by Russia, but by Germany; this was done not by Bismarck, but by his successor Caprivi.] Now Russia still has far-reaching goals, principally reinforcing her position on the Baltic.
We can oppose Russia only when we are free in the West. Russia furthermore strives for strengthening her influence in the Balkans and for the Persian Gulf. This is also the goal of our foreign policy. Russia will do what she considers good for herself. At the moment Internationalism has stepped back. If Russia should renounce it, she will go over to Pan-Slavism. It is difficult to look into the future.
The fact is that the Russian armed forces are currently of little value. For the next one or two years the current situation will stay the same.
Much depends on Italy, especially on Mussolini, whose death can change everything. Italy has great goals for the consolidation of her empire. The bearers of this idea are Fascism and the Duce personally. The court is in a position of rejection. As long as the Duce lives, we can count on Italy taking advantage of every possibility to reach her imperialist goals. It is asking to much of Italy, however, to expect her to intervene before Germany has taken to the offensive in the West; Russia also intervened only after we had invaded Poland. Otherwise Italy will think that France is busy only with Italy because Germany is sitting behind its West Wall. Italy will only intervene after Germany herself has proceeded offensively against France. Just like the death of Stalin the Duce’s death can bring danger for us.[…]

Quotations 13 and 14 refer to measures to crush Polish resistance, which involved eliminating the anti-German elements in Polish culture and education.

Yeah, sure. Let’s repeat my translation of quote 14, containing the statement that Poles are inferior beings fit only for unskilled labour and must be made to obey their German masters only, so that our readers may wonder whether Mills has simply not read the quote or is an inveterate liar dumb enough to expect readers to blindly rely on his statements.

[…]Secret!

Berlin, 2.10.1940
Bo-An.

File note
[…] On 2.10.1940 there was a conversation about the character of the General Government and the treatment of the Poles at the Führer’s place after the meal[…]
The Führer pointed out that, contrary to the German worker, the Pole is well-neigh born for low jobs; our German worker must be granted all possibilities of advancement, but for the Pole this is out of the question. The living standard in Poland must even be or be kept low. The General Government shall by no means become a closed and uniform economic region producing all or a part of its industrial products itself. The General Government is our reservoir of labor force for low jobs (brick factories, street building etc. etc.). One cannot, the Führer emphasized, put more into the Slav than what he is by nature. While our German worker is by nature generally ambitious and hard-working, the Pole is by nature lazy and must thus be propelled to work. Furthermore the conditions are lacking for the General Government to become an economic region of its own, because it has no mineral resources and even if such were available the Poles would not be able to exploit them.[…]
Under all circumstances it must be observed that there must be no "Polish masters"; where the are Polish masters, as harsh as this may sound, they must be bumped off.
Of course we must not mix our blood with that of the Poles, for which reason it is also right that beside the Polish male harvesters female harvesters come to the Reich. What these Poles then do among each other in their camps can be completely indifferent to us; no eager protestant should stick his nose into such things.
Again the Führer must point out that for the Poles there may be only one master, and that is the German; two master alongside each other there may not be and thus all representatives of the Polish intelligence are to be bumped off. This sounds harsh, but it is the law of life.[…]

Roberto finally wrote:

Hitler’s "New Order" in the East was to be something like ancient Sparta, with the Germans the Spartans and the Slavs the Helots.

In fact, Hitler's model for German rule over Russia was British rule over India. Although the British certainly had a racially-based attitude toward the Indians over whom they ruled, it cannot be said that they waged a racial war against the Indians, certainly not a war of extermination, even though there were occasions when many millions of Indians died of starvation.

Cheerfully mixing apples with oranges, Mills conveniently ignores the fact that the Slav inhabitants of the Soviet Union were to be starved to death, displaced to inhospitable regions or, at best, turned into slaves for whom "the word ‘liberty’ means the right to wash on feast days" (see my quote no. 11).

Not that I have a soft spot for the Brits, but did they deliberately endeavour to exploit India in such a way as to bring about massive starvation, and was starvation in India related to such deliberate policies?

Did they pursue a policy of keeping the Indians dumb and docile, not according them any rights and not caring for their welfare, to the point of letting their cities "die away completely" without remorse, because they thought they had "no obligations whatsoever towards these people"?

Last but not least, did they wage a large-scale war of aggression and conquest against India for the purpose of bringing about a system under which the lot of Indians would have been what Hitler had in store for the Slavs, and did they do this also because they considered the Indians inferior being below the level of humanity?

Let’s see if our Nazi-apologist Mills can show us evidence to such parallels.